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A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF THE LATE
AMERICAN WAR.

BY
A. ^{so}MAHAN.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY LETTER
BY
LIEUT.-GENERAL M. W. SMITH.

A. S. BARNES & CO.,
NEW YORK, CHICAGO, AND NEW ORLEANS.
1877.

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UNITED SERVICE CLUB, PALL MALL,

28th November, 1876.

MY DEAR SIRs,—

According to Dr. Mahan's wish I have read over the portion of the proofs of his work which you have furnished me with.

It seems to me that his book will prove both interesting and instructive to those who wish to trace out the causes which have led to the success or failure of campaigns, and how battles have been lost and won.

Although the Doctor is not a military man, he seems to have studied carefully the science of strategy as it has been developed at different periods, and applies his knowledge in indicating where established principles have been deviated from.

He compares, plainly and practically, what he conceives might have been done in accordance with such principles, with what was actually done ; the results in the latter case having now become matters of history.

The author appears to have been familiar with the ground and scenes he describes so graphically, and to have been also fully furnished with all details relating to the strength, positions, etc., of the forces engaged.

As to his comments upon and criticism of the conduct and capabilities of those who occupied prominent positions during the years of the last American War, I am not prepared to offer any opinion. Whether the readers of the present work agree with all the views of the author or not, its perusal may lead them to think out the matter for themselves, and to consider at least one phase of military combinations on a large scale; and in these critical and uncertain times this may prove a beneficial exercise of the intellect, with reference to both military men and civilians.

Yours faithfully,

M. W. SMITH.

LIEUT.-GENERAL.

PREFACE.

SCIENCE, like its divine Author, is "no respecter of persons." This is equally true of impartial criticism, and especially so when such criticism pertains to the deeds and character of men of world notoriety,—men who consent to assume the conduct of enterprises and interests upon the issues of which the destiny of nations depends. In assuming such responsibilities, such men invite, and even challenge, such criticism, and will receive it from every "wise and understanding people." In the preparation of the following work, it has been a fixed aim of the author, not only to furnish needful information to his countrymen, but to exemplify the ideal represented by the words *impartial historic criticism*. He lays no claim to infallibility in the statement of facts, or in his deductions from the same; and will gladly confess, and promptly correct, any errors of any kind into which partial or impartial criticism may prove him to have fallen. In his criticism of the deeds and character of our Generals, of their campaigns and the conduct of the war, he claims to have known no man as a member of this or that political party, but to have contemplated and presented all in common from one exclusive standpoint, the military. If any of my countrymen regard any military commander as faultless, or void of merit, because he belongs to this or that political party, this history was not written for them, but for American citizens—citizens who would know that they are Americans who have occupied high places of trust and power, and under whose conduct oceans of American blood and treasure have been poured out. Criticism, when honest especially, is an important discipline of thought. Historic criticism not only furnishes

the means of such discipline, but enables even those who may differ from an author in his statements and deductions better to understand the subject treated of than were otherwise possible. All my countrymen who would understand this war as really conducted, will, it is believed, read this treatise with interest and profit. Nor was the work prepared for Americans alone, but for all friends of truth, of every clime, into whose hands this treatise may fall—friends of truth who take an interest in what concerns this great nation, and who would understand events which have for all future time shaped its destiny. With these suggestions, the work before us is commended to the consideration of my countrymen especially.

THE AUTHOR.

Oct. 23rd, 1876.

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INTRODUCTION.

I PURPOSE, from a standpoint hitherto unattempted, to write out a History of the War of the Rebellion. In the multitudinous works now before the public, all that is needful has been said in regard to the *causes* which led to that memorable scene of "terror, tears, and blood," and to matters of detail in respect to our battles and campaigns, and to our unexampled national expenditure. My plan pertains, not at all to the *causes* and *details* of facts as they actually occurred, but to the *conduct* of this war. In this war the nation lost more than half a million of precious lives, accumulated upon its hands hardly less than a million of its maimed and pensioned soldiers, expended many billions of treasures, and has loaded itself down with a present debt of upwards of two thousand millions of dollars. What the nation needs to be informed about is, not how this war was, but how it should have been, conducted, and whether such an appalling expenditure of time, life, limb, and treasure was needed in bringing the conflict to a successful termination. One fact is undeniable, that another such war—a war as protracted and as wasteful of life and treasure—as this would ruin the nation. It is hardly to be expected that our national patriotism, or prudence, would endure such another draft upon time, blood, and treasure, and a doubling up of the debt under which we are now groaning. Yet, amid the possibilities of the future, it would imply infinite presumption to affirm, or calculate upon, the impossibility of another such a national catastrophe. If the war was wisely, and especially most wisely, conducted, the nation needs, as her guides in the future, to understand the facts and the reasons for the same. If, from its beginning to its close,

it was badly conducted, as badly especially as can be conceived, this fact also should be known, with a full disclosure of the reasons thereof—that, as a nation, we may become wise and prudent through the knowledge and appreciation of past errors.

We need, also, to understand clearly the conduct of this war, as the immutable condition of knowing and appreciating the character and merits of the men whom we have elected, or may elect, to rule over us, and the wisdom, or unwisdom, which has induced the nation to elect these men to the high places which they occupy.

• No free people can become “a wise and understanding people,” and as moral as they are wise, unless by their votes they shall fill our chairs of state and representative halls with statesmen,—statesmen “with Atlantean shoulders fit to bear the weight of mightiest monarchies,”—statesmen, too, whose integrity and trustworthiness are as visible as their greatness. None but diminutive bodies can revolve around a small central orb. As long as this nation shall fill our chairs of state with small specimens of human nature, minds characterised by ignorance of national affairs, by greediness for filthy lucre, and indifference to official corruption,—statesmen fit to sustain the weight of the mighty interests of this great Republic, statesmen whose integrity and trustworthiness shall be as manifest as their great talents and wisdom, will be invisible in our Cabinets and halls of legislation. Had I a voice which could command the attention of the nation, that voice should break “trumpet tongued” upon the ear of every individual who is under the weight of the responsibility of the elective franchise; charging him, as he regards the best interests of his country, if he would save our Government from misrule and corruption, and prevent general demoralization, to shake off, at once and for ever, the shackles of party, to step out from the circles of party rings, and enter into a solemn covenant with his conscience and his God never again to cast a vote for any man to fill any important office,—any man whose high talents, wisdom, integrity, and trustworthiness are not “known and read of all men.” When manifest wisdom and trustworthiness shall become the *sine quâ non* con-

ditions of commanding the votes of the people of this nation, then shall "wisdom and integrity be the stability of our times," and this great Confederacy shall be God's pillar of fire in the forefront of all nations. To do something to ensure this "consummation so devoutly to be wished" has been the prime motive which has induced the preparation of this history.

WHAT I PROPOSE TO RENDER DEMONSTRABLY EVIDENT IN
THESE FUTURE PAGES.

Having made the science of war a subject of careful study from my youth up, having critically read the history of the great campaigns of past ages, and done so for the specific purpose of a clear understanding and comprehension of the *principles* on which they were conducted, and the wisdom and unwisdom of successful and unsuccessful commanders; having most carefully studied the conduct of this war from its commencement to its close; having as carefully considered the relative strength and resources of the two parties in the conflict, and the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each for attack and defence; and having contrasted the duration of this war with others in which the cases were at all similar, —I have from the beginning maintained, and will now proceed to render undeniably evident to every candid reader of these pages, the following propositions: that this war ought not have been of a single year's continuance after our armies were organised; that it ought not to have cost this nation a hundred thousand lives, or a thousand millions of dollars; that within any eight months of the continuance of the war, after the middle of October 1861, any Commander-in-Chief of ordinary ability and well instructed in military science, would have brought that conflict to a final termination; that had General Grant been such a commander, he would have brought the conflict to a practical termination during the interval which occurred after he received his commission as Commander-in-Chief and the opening of his spring campaigns. I am well aware that these are bold and will be to many presumptuous propositions; I am equally well aware that in these

propositions I distinctly and correctly represent the deliberate judgment of the best thinkers in the country, thinkers civil and military, to whom my views have been presented, together with the united opinions of the best military authorities in Europe. The conduct and continuance of this war, and the oceans of blood and treasure poured out in carrying it through, have no parallel in the history of the world, and are matters of wonder and astonishment to Christendom. We shall have real ground for national self-respect, and shall command the highest respect of the civilised world, when, and only when, we shall evince our wisdom, our candour, and integrity by a revealed comprehension and appreciation of the real facts of the case. All I ask of my countrymen is a candid hearing of my facts and arguments. If, after such a hearing, my proofs shall not be found "perfect and entire, wanting nothing," I freely consent to suffer any amount of national reprobacy which my worst enemies can devise.

I would here remark that the main portions of the criticisms which will be found on these pages were, during the progress of the war, expressed verbally to my own pupils, and to leading minds around me; and in communications addressed to such individuals as Secretary Chase, and Messrs. Sumner, Chandler, etc., and members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. In a long communication addressed to Secretary Chase, near the close of the year 1862, after giving quite an extended criticism on the conduct of the war, I made the statement that "if our military authorities had made it their supreme object to devise and carry out the worst system presented in history, or known to the science of war, they could not, in my honest judgment, have succeeded better than they had done." In his reply, after commending my criticisms, and requesting me to continue the correspondence, saying that my "suggestions would be very instructive to him, and might be beneficial to the nation," the Secretary added:—"The opinion which you have expressed about the conduct of the war thus far is an exact expression of apprehensions which have frequently suggested themselves to my own mind." It was impossible for him to conceive, he added, "of a war conducted upon worse principles

than this had been." In a note received from Mr. Sumner about the same time, this paragraph is found:—"I have from the beginning been profoundly impressed with your views. An administration more quick and positive than ours would have adopted them early, and the war would have been ended long since." "I fully endorse all your views," said Senator Chandler, in a similar note, "and have done all I possibly could to induce the Administration to adopt them."

I would further state, in this connexion, that an epitome of all my criticisms on the conduct of the war up to January 1863 is contained in two long communications read to President Lincoln in the early part of that month, and read in the presence of Senators Wade and Wilson, and other leading members of Congress. The substance of these communications was at first verbally presented to the President, in the presence of Senators Wade and Wilson, and was then, at his special request, committed to writing. After the reading of the papers, it was unanimously agreed that they should be submitted to some military man especially qualified to judge of their character; and General McDowell, with unanimous approval, was selected. The papers, it should be borne in mind, contained a special criticism of the previous conduct of the war, and a detailed plan for the conduct of future campaigns. After a full hearing of the documents, and a careful discussion of their essential features, General McDowell certified in writing that "the plan presented was the best that he had heard suggested." "With this plan adopted," he remarked to me, "we can finish up the campaign here in Virginia during the present winter." In one of my calls upon Mr. Sumner, at his own rooms, I found there the celebrated historian, Bancroft. After our mutual introduction, Mr. Sumner remarked to his friend that he was in the presence of an "individual who had studied the science of war from his youth, and who had presented certain papers on the conduct of the present war which have made a profound impression on all to whom they have been read. These papers, also," Mr. Sumner added, "contain a detailed plan for the conduct of our future campaigns. As a historian can be relied on to

keep a secret, I suggest that Dr. M. present to you the plan referred to." When I had done so, Mr. Bancroft promptly replied in these words, "Adopt that plan, and I am ready to write out a history of this war. Such has been its conduct thus far, that I have felt I could not endure the pain of writing out its history." He then expressed an earnest desire that the papers designated should be given to the public.

After I left Washington, one of our senators went down to the army of the Potomac, and laid the plan under consideration before General Burnside and his corps commanders. Every one of these commanders earnestly advocated the adoption of the plan. General Burnside fully endorsed the wisdom of the measure, but remarked that he had a plan of his own which he desired to test, before adopting the new one. He tried his own, failed, was superseded, and then expressed to that senator his deep regret that he had not followed the advice of his Generals. In regard to the criticisms contained in those communications, no individual in Washington, then, nor has any individual to whom they have since been presented suggested a doubt of the strict correctness of those criticisms; while the best authorities, military and civil, all agree that had that plan been adopted the war would have been brought to a final close within the space of eight months from January 1st, 1863. What that plan was, and how and why its adoption was prevented after the accomplishment of the event was rendered apparently certain, will be disclosed hereafter. The above facts and statements will evince, I judge, that I have reasons for the assurance of which I am possessed of the correctness of my criticisms on the conduct of this war, and that the public have reasons equally valid for giving a candid hearing to my presentations.

FACTS OF A GENERAL NATURE WHICH CHARACTERISED THE CONDUCT OF THIS WAR.

As preparatory to a full appreciation of particular criticisms, I would direct very special attention to certain facts of a general nature, facts which characterised the

conduct of this war from its commencement to its close. A careful consideration of these facts will evince the strict correctness of my estimate of the matter, namely, that in badness of conduct this war has hardly a parallel in the history of the world. Consider, in the first place,—

A fundamental fact stated by President Lincoln.

In the papers read before President Lincoln, this statement was made, that we had had at least from six to eight hundred thousand men called into the field, and yet these immense forces had been so distributed over the whole country that our central armies were always too weak to do any effective service. When that sentence was read, the President interposed for a time, and made the following statements:—"I confess to you, gentlemen, that there has been connected with the conduct of this war one fact which I have never been able to comprehend. It is true that we have had all these vast forces in the field, and yet in no battle that has thus far been fought have there been 70,000 men engaged on our side. When I visited Antietam, after the battle there, I found between 92,000 and 93,000 effective men under the immediate command of General McClellan; yet, take all the forces that were under fire in that battle, and add to them all that had previously fought at South Mountain, and the aggregate does not amount to 70,000 men. So it has been from the commencement of the war to the present time. Such facts as these, gentlemen, I admit to be beyond my comprehension." "But one inference can be drawn from such facts," I replied. "Your Commanders-in-Chief, President Lincoln, evince a palpable ignorance of their business. The world knows of no parallel to the facts you have just stated." What was true of the conduct of this war from the beginning up to January 1863, characterised, as we shall see hereafter, its conduct to the end. With the amount of available forces under their command, our Commanders-in-Chief never ought to have lost an important battle, and never ought to have fought one without an amount of force which outnumbered the Confederate as three to two, or

two to one. In all the important battles actually fought, on the other hand, the forces were so evenly balanced as to render victory on either side a matter of doubt, and victory and defeat so bloody as to appall the nation and the world.

Relative strength of the hostile forces during this war.

In judging correctly of the wisdom, or unwisdom, of military commanders in conducting their campaigns, we need to take distinctly into account the character and number of the forces under their command, as compared with the character and amount of the armies under hostile commanders. During the progress of this war, Napoleon sent the Adjutant-General of France to this country to learn, and report on his return, the actual condition of the Union army. That General was required to doff entirely his uniform, and to appear wholly as a private gentleman, revealing to nobody in this country his official character. In this state it was wisely judged that he would be in the best circumstances possible to ascertain the facts as they really were. Having obtained the desired information, he made this report to the home Government, that "the Union army was the best constituted and worst commanded army in the world." In that report, he correctly expressed the known judgment of the military authorities of Europe. Of the correctness of that report, as far as the soldiery of both the Union and Confederate armies are concerned, there can be no doubt whatever. Braver, stronger, more self-sacrificing men, or men more capable of enduring the hardships of war, the world never saw. But what shall we think of the second item in that report? Was, or was not, ours the worst commanded army in the world? No other judgment seems admissible if we adjudicate the case in the light of the comparative amount of the forces which constituted the Union and Confederate armies. According to official records, more than 2,600,000 men entered the Union armies during the progress of this war. After the middle of October 1861 our forces were never less than 800,000 and often exceeded 1,000,000 men, upwards of the number last designated being mustered out of service at the close of the war. According to the most

reliable Confederate authorities, there never entered their armies much, if any, over 600,000 men, while their effective forces actually, at any one time, in the field never exceeded 200,000. I give the figures pertaining to the Confederate armies as furnished by General S. Cooper, ex-Adjutant-General of the Confederacy, and endorsed as correct by Dr. J. Jones, Secretary of the Historical Society. These statements are also confirmed by the testimony of the ex-Vice-President of the Confederacy, Alexander H. Stevens, who says :—"The Confederates, all told in like manner, could not have much, if any, exceeded 600,000." If we consider the fact that the number of the white population of the eleven States which first entered into the Rebellion was, according to the census, less than 6,000,000 or less than 3,000,000 of males, the strict verity of the above statements becomes self-evident. Out of such a population not more than 600,000 men capable of bearing arms could have been drawn. Nor could such a population as constituted these States, especially in their circumstances, have equipped and kept in the field an effective force of more than 200,000 men. It must also be borne in mind that it was only in the early part of the war that men or provisions of any account were furnished by Tennessee, or Arkansas, and none from Western Virginia. In less than two years after the commencement of the war, also, soldiers from the States west of the Mississippi refused utterly to cross that river. Hence all the forces opposed to us east of said river, and where all the real issues of the war were located, had to be drawn from seven States whose white male population was less than 2,500,000. Such are the real facts of the case. The actual forces of the Confederacy during this war cannot have been underestimated by Messrs. Cooper and Stevens. Undeniably, the Union armies outnumbered those of the Confederacy, in all cases, as two, commonly as three, and during the entire period in which General Grant was our Commander-in-Chief, as four to one; yet, in almost all important battles the forces engaged were nearly equal, the issues of quite as many battles and campaigns were against us as in our favour, quite half a million of lives were sacrificed, and oceans of treasure, and between four and five years of

time were expended, in subduing a rebellion where such overwhelming odds were on our side.

The relative position of the Confederate and Union States.

The validity of such a deduction becomes still more palpable when we consider the relative position of the Union and Confederate States, and consequently of the hostile forces of the same. Leaving Western Virginia, Tennessee, and Arkansas out of the account, the nine remaining Confederate States lay in a comparatively narrow strip, between the Potomac and Rio Grand, with the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico on the south, and the Union States on the north; the Gulf and the Ocean being wholly under our control. No country could have been more fully exposed to perfectly crushing blows, both on its water and land sides, than were these States during the progress of this war. On the water side, any amount of force could, at any time, have been conveyed to any point we chose, while the Union and Confederate armies always lay in the near vicinity of one another. Whenever any one of our central armies desired to find the enemy, it had to march but a very few miles to attain the object desired. No commanders of armies ever enjoyed such advantages as did ours to encircle, crush, and capture forces so far inferior to their own. At any period after the middle of October 1861, our Commander-in-Chief, leaving the army of the Potomac intact, and from the forces actually in the field could have collected an army of 80,000 or 100,000 men, have conveyed them by water to Hilton Head, from thence by an inland movement have captured Charlestown and Willmington, have crushed the rebellion in the Carolinas, and by moving up on General Lee's rear, and assaulting him, in combination with the army of the Potomac, have destroyed or captured the Confederate army in Virginia, and thus wiped out the rebellion in the States east of Savannah river. Or the same end could have been better accomplished by first moving the body referred to round by Fortress Monroe, landing them where, at the command of General Grant, General Butler landed 20,000 men,—that is, at Burmuda Hundred; and from thence seizing all General Lee's communications south of

James river. In that case, between this body of men and the Potomac army, the entire army of General Lee would have been crushed or captured in a very few weeks. A very few weeks more would then have sufficed, through a general combination of all our armies, to wipe out the entire rebellion in all the States west of the Mississippi, and to ensure its speedy collapse everywhere. No man with any acquaintance with military affairs, or of common information, will for a moment doubt the validity of these statements.

Important facts connected with the army of the Potomac.

During the entire progress of this war, the objects of central regard on the part of the Union and Confederate States were the army of the Potomac, under its successive commanders, on the one hand, and that of Virginia, under General Lee, on the other. The exclusive mission of the former army was to strike a deadly blow at the heart of the rebellion by the capture of Richmond, and the dispersion, the annihilation, or capture of the army of General Lee. All parties were well aware that the accomplishment of this one mission would necessarily involve the speedy death of the Confederacy. And what was this army of Virginia? In the character of its soldiery, and in its management upon the field, it has seldom, if ever, been surpassed. In numbers, however, it never reached 120,000, and generally fell quite below 100,000 men. When it encountered the army of the Potomac under General Grant, it never had more than 70,000 men in all, being outnumbered by the actual forces opposed to it on the field of conflict, as quite three to one. The single mission of General Lee, with the small band of brave men under his command, was to perpetuate and establish the Confederacy by defending the Confederate capital and the State of Virginia against the overwhelming masses of men as brave as his own, masses arrayed against him. If any one, after a careful comparison of the relative numbers of these two armies, and after considering the forces which our Commanders-in-Chief might, at any time, have concentrated and combined for the conquest of Virginia, will take a map and contemplate the field on which these two armies operated,

he will perceive at once that no army could have been more exposed to crushing blows from forces which were, or might have been, combined against it, than was that of General Lee, and that no city can be more easily approached by superior hostile forces for purposes of assault or siege than was Richmond during that entire war; facts, also, which will be rendered demonstrably evident in the future pages of this history. What was actually accomplished on this field by this Potomac army? In its various campaigns, despite all its efforts, and that from no fault of its brave soldiery, the soil of the Union States was three times invaded by the little army of Virginia; in a large majority of the great battles fought, victory perched upon its standards, more than 200,000 Union soldiers were slaughtered, and the grand army of the Potomac never approached within seeing distance of the city which it was its supreme mission to reach and capture—never got in sight of that city, I say, until it was abandoned by the Confederates, and taken possession of by a small band of coloured troops. We may search all history for a parallel to such facts, and search in vain.

Periods of active service in our campaigns during this war.

The latitude and climate of the Confederate States permitted and required active service on the part of our armies during the entire year. Such service was also required by the examples of the great military commanders of all Christendom. Suwarrow, for example, marched the Russian army over the Alps in midwinter. The campaigns of Eylau and Austerlitz were carried on, the one amid the deep snows and terrible frosts of a Poland, and the other amid those of a Bohemian winter. The campaign of the Allies in France, the campaign which resulted in the capture of Paris, and the banishment of Napoleon to Elba, was wholly a winter campaign, and that in one of the most marshy provinces in Europe. The Germans, in their late French campaigns, never suspended operations for a single day on account of snow or frost. This has been true in all ages in regard to great armies under great military commanders.

Our great armies, however, uniformly rested during

the winter months and in midwinter. After the first Bull Run campaign, "all was quiet on the Potomac," and everywhere else, until the next spring, when the Confederates retreated from Manassas, leaving behind them that fearful array of "Quaker guns" which during the prior fall and winter months had so fearfully frightened our "young Napoleon," the great Commander-in-Chief of all our armies. After the victory at Gettysburg, the capture of Vicksburg, and the lesser advantages gained at Lookout Mountains and Knoxville, our immense forces lay for ten months in a state of perfect idleness, either within, or directly upon, the borders of the Confederacy, and that in accordance with the decision of a Council of War, a council held by our Commander-in-Chief, with his leading generals. Such was the general character of the conduct of this war during its continuance. Here we have one of the main reasons why the war "dragged its slow length along" through so many years. If our spring or fall campaigns were successful, the practical suspension of hostilities during the summer and winter months enabled the Confederacy to repair all damages, and to adjust itself fully to the new state which affairs had assumed,—we losing more men, in the meantime, through disease resulting from idleness and dissipation, that would have been lost through active service. Had our Commanders-in-Chief followed the example of successful warfare in other nations, the Confederacy would have had "no rest day nor night," winter or summer, after the full opening of hostilities to their final close.

Our unimproved victories.

The real test of generalship is, not the mere gaining of victories, but a subsequent improvement of the advantages thereby secured. In the war under consideration, it seems to have been the deliberate plan of our Generals to give their opponents full opportunity, after a defeat, to repair their losses, and readjust their armies to the new exigencies which had arisen. At Antietam, for example, our commander claimed a great and signal victory on the part of the army under his command, while not two-thirds of his forces had taken any part at all in the battle,—the entire corps of General Porter, for example, not

having fired a gun. Yet, with 30,000 fresh troops, and 60,000 more who were as ready to renew the fight as they had been to commence it the day before, our commander stood still, and saw General Lee pass his defeated army, without loss, over the Potomac. When absolutely commanded by the supreme authority at Washington to pass his army over the river in pursuit of the retreating foe, our "young Napoleon" absolutely refused obedience, under the plea that his army was in want of 10,000 pairs of shoes, and thus lay still for upwards of forty days. After the great victory at Gettysburg, General Lee retreated in one direction and our army moved off in another. When excessive floods delayed the retreating army, on its arrival at the Potomac, until ours came up, the latter then stood still, and did nothing whatever, until General Lee had manufactured a bridge and passed his army safely over. A signal victory on the 4th July required that our army should rest until the opening of the ensuing spring campaign. Such was the uniform policy of our commanders during this war. After the fall of Vicksburg, I wrote a communication to the *New York Times*,—a communication not published, of course. In this paper I remarked that any one at all acquainted with military affairs and the state of our country would perceive at once that the advantages to be derived from the victory at Gettysburg and the opening of the Mississippi, depended wholly upon the use which should be promptly made of the army under General Grant. If that army should be at once combined with that of the Potomac or Tennessee for a finally decisive movement upon Generals Lee or Johnston, the war might be brought to a speedy termination. I would venture, however, to give a prediction in respect to what would be done—Nothing decisive will now be attempted until the opening of the spring campaign next year; unimportant advantages will be magnified into signal victories; while the Republican papers will continually flood the country with reports that "the Confederacy is on its last legs," and is about to suffer a final collapse. During this wide interval, the Confederacy will repair the damages it has received, reorganise its armies, perfect its defences.

and adjust itself to existing circumstances. In the spring, consequently, our campaigns will open as if no hostilities had before existed. These were the exact statements made in that communication; the reader will readily call to mind how absolutely those predictions accorded with the events which followed. When I came to comprehend the principles on which that war was conducted on our part, nothing almost gave me so much pain and apprehension as a signal victory gained by one of our armies in some particular locality,—a victory of an indecisive character in respect to main issues. The reason was that that victory would so completely satisfy our Commander-in-Chief, whoever he happened to be, that active operations would everywhere be suspended for some six or ten months. This, as we shall see hereafter, is no caricature of facts as they actually occurred throughout this war.

The time of the continuance of this war, as compared with others in other countries.

In the history of the world, when armies have encountered each other in the open field, as was true of our war, hostilities have been of short continuance. In what a limited period, for example, did England convey her armies half round the globe, and subdue the Sepoy rebellion among 150,000,000 of people in India; a rebellion in which the English forces had to encounter a soldiery which had been trained and armed by England herself. The campaign of Austerlitz, in which Napoleon marched his army across the entire empires of France and Germany, fought several battles, captured Vienna, struck off northwards into Bohemia, and in midwinter ended the war by the famous battle which gave name to the campaign under consideration, was begun and ended in the space of ninety days. In ninety days after Austria joined Russia and Prussia against Napoleon in Saxony, the campaign, which involved many and bloody battles, was finished by the victory of the Allies at Leipsic. The winter campaign of the Allies in France, the campaign which resulted in the capture of Paris and the banishment of Buonaparte to Elba, was but of ninety days' continuance. In ninety days after the Allies

declared war against Napoleon on his return from Elba, Wellington and Blucher, all being taken by surprise, collected their armies, moved them to Belgium, quartered them there for several weeks before Buonaparte opened the campaign, fought four world-renowned battles, marched their armies from their last bloody field to Paris, captured that city, and sent the Emperor of France a prisoner to England. Wellington was longer than this in finishing up his Peninsular campaigns, because France had possession of all the strongholds of Spain, and the armies opposed to him were generally twice or three times as numerous as his own. Yet, with all these odds against him, he never lost a battle; and in a wonderfully short time drove the central army of France over the Pyrenees, and with his own invaded the French territory. Let us now compare a case which occurred in still more modern times. On the 15th of July, 1870, France declared war against Prussia. On the 29th of January following, an armistice was signed at Versailles, among the terms of which was the surrender of all the fortifications about Paris, together with all the military forces in the city. On the first day of March in the same year, a treaty of peace was ratified by the National Assembly of France. By this treaty she ceded to Germany all Alsace and one-fifth of Lorraine, and agreed to pay to that Government \$1,000,000,000 on account of the expenses of the war. During this brief period, the German armies had captured upwards of 700,000 prisoners, France losing upwards of 250,000 men in battle and by disease, together with the leading fortified places of her empire, such as Paris, Sedan, Metz, and Strasburg. In short, in less than seven months the Germans collected their armies, moved them into France, crushed the military power of that great nation, consisting of 40,000,000 of people, captured and destroyed not less than 1,000,000 of its soldiery, took its capital and leading strongholds, and compelled it to pay the expenses of the war. It took our Commanders-in-Chief with effective forces far more numerous than those of Germany, between four and five years to prostrate the military power of less than 6,000,000 of people; a people who could never keep in the field an effective force of over 200,000 men, and whose territories

were incomparably more accessible to our land and sea forces than was France to the armies of Germany or of the Allies. Can any one, in view of the palpable facts before us, doubt that within any ninety days after the middle of October 1861, it was clearly within the power of any one of our successive Commanders-in-Chief, had he understood his business, to have made such combinations of the forces under his command as to have secured the capture and the surrender or destruction of the army of Virginia? "My life upon the issue," I often remarked to President Lincoln during the interviews referred to, "if Richmond shall not be in our hands, and the army of General Lee captured or utterly dispersed, within three months from the present time, provided you will order the combinations proposed to be made." In my opinions upon the subject, such men as General McDowell, the corps commanders of the army of the Potomac, and leading thinkers in Washington, perfectly agreed. The reason why our war was thus protracted beyond all recorded examples is obvious. The Germans, for example, wherever the armies of France were collected, made that spot their centre, and made all their movements with fixed reference to one end—the encircling and capturing those forces. When a victory was gained, the retreating foe was relentlessly pursued until all possible advantages were reaped from said victory. After hostilities were commenced, they were never intermitted on account of heat, rain, snow, or frost, until the end proposed was secured. In our war, on the other hand, the armies of the Confederacy were never made our centres of operation, and their capture, or utter dispersion, the object of our aims. We were perpetually employed in assaulting strongholds, always approaching them on their strongest sides, leaving their communications intact, in conquering and holding territory, opening and guarding water communications, and "plugging up the Southern ports,"—always resting after our victories until the Confederacy had full opportunity to repair their losses. In short, our war on our part very much resembled a conflict between athletes, in which each aims exclusively to hit the other on his extremities, and in which the brave combatants rest twenty-four hours between each round.

Without further preliminary statements we now advance to a direct consideration of the actual conduct of this war; simply indicating the opinion that few facts in history will surprise the nation and the world more than will a disclosure, now for the first time made, of the real causes which actually brought this war to its sudden, unexpected, and bloodless termination.

CHAPTER I.

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN.

CAPTURE OF FORT SUMTER.—RESULTS FOLLOWING.

ON Friday, April 12th, 1861, at twenty minutes past four in the morning, and by special command of the supreme authorities of the Confederacy, the bombardment of Fort Sumter, from the forts and batteries in and about Charleston Harbour, commenced. The fortress was at the time garrisoned by the brave Robert Anderson, with such stern patriots for under officers as Captain Doubleday, General A. Snyder, and seventy men as brave and patriotic as their commanders. At nine o'clock Sabbath morning, April 15th, the little band were taken from the fort by the United States steamer *Isabel*; one man having been killed, and three wounded, by a premature explosion after the bombardment had ceased. The eventful drama of Sumter was immediately followed, on the one side, by the addition of four States to the Confederacy, making in all eleven States which entered into the Rebellion; the transfer of the capital to Richmond; and a second levy upon the seceded States for troops, a levy which increased the army of the said States to an equality in numbers to those which were called into the field by the Federal authorities. On the occurrence of the same event, President Lincoln, on the other side, called upon the Union States for 75,000 volunteers for three months' service, and subsequently for the enlistment of an indefinite number of volunteers whose term of service was to extend during the war. As the result of these successive calls, the Union army amounted on the 4th July, 1861, as given in the report

of the Secretary of War to Congress met in special session, to 310,000 men. Deducting from these the three months' volunteers, whose time of service was about to expire, "there will," says the report referred to, "be still an available force of volunteers amounting to 180,000; which, added to the regular army, will constitute a total force of 230,000 officers and men." At the period of the Bull Run campaign, our army in the field consisted of an effective force of 310,000 men. Of these, as we shall also see, upwards of 150,000 were located in and about Washington, and within the State of Virginia, under the immediate command of General Scott, our Commander-in-Chief, and all fully available, and admirably located for an immediate and successful movement upon the Confederate army and capital. Having furnished all these vast forces for the specific purpose of putting down the Rebellion, the public sentiment of the Union States called for prompt and decisive action. It was, also, intuitively manifest to all, that if the Confederate army in the great State of Virginia was annihilated, and the Rebellion was here fully subdued, and the capital of the Confederacy was occupied by the Union armies, there would be a speedy collapse of the Rebellion everywhere. Hence the cry which from all parts of the Union States broke continuously upon the ears of our military authorities at Washington—"On to Richmond!" It was under the pressure of this united sentiment of the Union States that the Bull Run campaign occurred. Before proceeding to our criticisms of this campaign, it may be important to notice certain

Interesting and important events in Missouri.

Among the most interesting and important events of a military character which preceded the campaign under consideration were those which occurred in Missouri under the direction of the immortal Captain (afterwards General) Lyon, aided in all his measures by the most efficient services of Colonel F. P. Blair, who assumed command of the First Missouri Volunteer Regiment, April 25th. The manner in which, by order of the War Department at Washington, Captain Lyon and Captain Stokes on the night of April 25th removed about 30,000

stands of arms and other important war materials from the arsenal at St. Louis, first to Alton, and then to Springfield, Illinois, must command the admiration of all who read the account of these transactions. This event was, on the 10th May ensuing, followed by another of still greater importance, the capture of Camp Jackson by Captain Lyon at the head of 6,000 volunteers. This camp had been formed in the outskirts of St Louis, under the direction of the Adjutant-General of the State, and was occupied undeniably in the interests of the Confederacy by a full brigade of armed men. Finding themselves surrounded by a force which could not be resisted, the whole brigade surrendered. The following note from Victor's "History of the Rebellion" will fully evince the importance of this transaction :—

Among the articles enumerated as found in the camp were three 32-pounders, a large quantity of bombs and balls, several pieces of artillery in boxes, twelve hundred rifles of a late model, six brass field-pieces, six brass mortars (6-inch), one 10-inch iron mortar, three 6-inch iron cannon, several chests of muskets, five boxes of canister shot, ninety-six 10-inch, three hundred 6-inch shells, twenty-five kegs of powder, a large number of musket stocks and barrels, between twenty and thirty boxes, and a considerable quantity of camp tools. On the steamer *J. C. Swan*, seized, by order of Captain Lyon, for carrying contraband of war, was found the register, showing that most of these arms and equipments had come up the river from the Baton Rouge arsenal.

On May 31st, General Harney, who had, during a command of a few weeks, fully evinced his utter incapacity to meet the exigencies of the then existing crisis, was superseded, and General Lyon substituted in his place as Commandant of the Western Department. An interview was held between the latter and C. B. Jackson, Governor, and Ex-Governor Sterling Price, in St. Louis, Colonel Blair and Major Conant being present as advisers of General Lyon. The parties failing utterly to agree, the Confederate representatives retired, Governor Jackson immediately calling the people of Missouri to arms, to "Rise, and drive out ignominiously the invaders who had dared to desecrate the soil which their labours had made fruitful, and which is consecrated by their homes." The place of ren-

dezdvous of the Confederate volunteers was Booneville. No sooner was General Lyon in full command, than he was after Jackson and Price. Putting his little army on board steamers and transports, he sailed June 13th for Booneville, having on the day previous issued a most stirring proclamation to the people of Missouri. On the morning of the 15th he landed at Jefferson Cty, and installed Col. Boersistein as Military Governor. On the next day, reinforcements having arrived from St. Louis, he sailed for Booneville, and on the 17th defeated the Confederates there, and drove what remained of them undispersed towards the southern part of the State. Pressing forward, and acting in concert with Colonel Siegel, who moved out from Rolla, his forces, having performed most brilliant feats of arms, were concentrated, July 10th, at Springfield; while Jackson and Price fled from the State. The visible results of prompt and decisive action in putting down the Rebellion in Missouri, intensified the desire of the nation for the adoption of similar measures in Virginia. If a few thousand of hastily collected and imperfectly drilled troops could do such things in the former State, what ought not to be expected from 150,000 men, perfectly disciplined troops, in the latter? Hence the cry, "On to Richmond!" became too loud and strong to be altogether disregarded.

Events in the State of Virginia.—The invasion.

Before the movement which we are soon to consider, however, was attempted, several events of more or less importance had occurred in the State of Virginia and in connexion with the army of the Potomac. In the department at Washington, an early movement of no little importance was effected—the open invasion of "the sacred soil of Virginia." This occurred on the 23rd June. Over the Long Bridge at Washington, and over the Chain Bridge at Georgetown, 10,000 men were conducted, those over the former under General Mansfield, and those over the latter under General McDowell, and safely established on the soil referred to. In the meantime, Colonel Ellsworth, with his Fire Zouaves, being conveyed thither by steam, took possession of Alexandria. The assassination of the brave

Colonel at this place caused deep grief to the whole nation. All the above results were accomplished without loss on our part, Colonel Ellsworth excepted, while some 300 prisoners, mostly civilians, were captured in an attempt to escape on a railroad train.

In the department of General Butler an affair ill-conceived, and very badly executed, occurred at Big Bethel, an affair in which a body of our troops, consisting of several thousand men, commanded by General Pierce, was defeated, with the loss of about 100 on our side; one being killed and seven wounded on the part of the Confederates. A transaction of similar importance occurred in the department of General McDowell. We cite from Mr. Greeley's "History of the American Conflict":—

Late on Monday, June 17th, General Robert C. Schenck, under orders from General McDowell, left camp near Alexandria, with 700 of Colonel McCook's 1st Ohio, on a railroad train, and proceeded slowly up the track towards Leesburg, detaching and stationing two companies each at Fall's Church and at two road-crossings as he proceeded. He was nearing Vienna, thirteen miles from Alexandria, with the four remaining companies, numbering 275 men, utterly unsuspecting of danger, when, on emerging from a cut and turning a curve, eighty rods from the village, his train was raked by a masked battery of two guns, hastily planted by Colonel Gregg, who had been for two or three days scouting along our front, with about 800 rebels, mainly South Carolinians, and who, starting that morning from Dranesville, had been tearing up the track at Vienna, and had started to return to Dranesville, when they heard the whistle of General Schenck's locomotive. Several rounds of grape were fired point blank into the midst of the Ohio boys, who speedily sprang from the cars, and formed under the protection of a clump of trees on the side of the track. The engineer, who was backing the train, and, of course, in the rear of it, instantly detached his locomotive, and started at his best speed for Alexandria, leaving the cars to be burnt by the rebels, and the dead and wounded to be brought off in blankets by their surviving comrades. The rebels, deceived by the cool and undaunted bearing of our force, did not venture to advance, for fear of falling into a trap in their turn; so that our loss in men was but twenty, including one captain. The rebels, of course, lost none. Each party retreated immediately—the rebels to Fairfax Court House.

Events in Pennsylvania and Northern Virginia.

Events of still greater interest were transpiring in

Southern Pennsylvania and Northern Virginia, where General Robert Patterson held command. On the 7th June he advanced with quite 20,000 men from Chambersburg to Hagerstown, General Wallace on his right taking possession of Cumberland and Romney. On the occurrence of these events, General Joseph E. Johnston, in command of the Confederates, burned the bridge at Point of Rocks, destroyed the superb railway bridge over the Potomac, made destruction of the armoury and shops at the Ferry, and retreated from Harper's Ferry to Winchester. While General Patterson remained at Hagerstown, the Potomac, at his command, was crossed and recrossed at Williamsport by General Thomas; the Confederates, in the meantime, returning to the river, completing the work of destruction at Harper's Ferry, thoroughly dismantling the Chesapeake Canal and the several railroads in that region, and made a conscription of Union men as well as Confederates to fill their ranks. Finally, on the 2nd July, General Patterson recrossed the Potomac at Falling Waters, encountering a slight resistance from General Jackson. On the 7th orders were given, but not executed, for an advance on Winchester, whither General Johnston had again retreated. On the 15th, the energetic commander of the Union forces, now increased to upwards of 30,000 men, moved through Martinsburg to Bunker Hill, nine miles from Winchester, having received specific orders from General Scott to make "a forward movement as rapidly as possible." The part which this important army took in the movement upon Manassas will be presented hereafter.

Events in Western Virginia.

In Western Virginia, in the department of General McClellan, events of the very highest importance were transpiring just at this time. By plans most wisely devised, and vigorously executed, the entire Confederate forces in this department, those in Kanawha Valley excepted, were either dispersed, or captured. The Confederate camps most strongly fortified at Rich Mountain under Col. Pegram, and at Laurel Hill under General Garnett, were captured, with most of their artillery and camp equipage.

After lying in the woods for two days in a starving condition, Colonel Pegram, July 17th, with 600 men under his command, surrendered at discretion. At a final stand made by General Garnett in his retreat, he was himself killed, and his whole force dispersed and disorganized, a portion of them escaping to join General Jackson at Monterey. Of the result of these victories, General McClellan thus speaks in his despatch to Washington :—

General Garnett and his forces have been routed, and his baggage and one gun taken. His army are completely demoralized. General Garnett was killed while attempting to rally his forces at Carricksford, near St. George.

We have completely annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia.

Our loss is about thirteen killed, and not more than forty wounded ; while the enemy's loss is not far from two hundred killed ; and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount to at least one thousand. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns in all.

ADVANCE ON MANASSAS, OR THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN.

All these events occurred prior to the advance on Manassas, and present to our consideration an army little less than 35,000 men at perfect liberty to be employed in a grand advance upon the State and capital of Old Virginia. The advance that was made we are now fully prepared to consider. The events above detailed absolutely evince one essential fact—the perfect reliability of the soldiery of the entire forces under the direction of our Commander-in-Chief for any service which the interests of the nation might require. In Missouri, in the Peninsula, before Washington, in Northern and Western Virginia, our newly-disciplined troops evinced all the courage, steadiness, and energy of disciplined veterans. The promptitude with which those Ohio volunteers re-formed after their surprise at Vienna is an honour to the State and nation. In no instance was there a reverse on account of the bad quality of the men engaged. Let us now advance to a direct consideration of the Bull Run campaign ; our aim being, not merely to present what was, but what ought to

have been, done under the circumstances. As a means to this end, let us consider, in the first place,

THE COMPARATIVE AMOUNT AND RELATIONS OF THE UNION
AND CONFEDERATE FORCES AVAILABLE FOR OFFENCE AND
DEFENCE ON THE SACRED SOIL OF VIRGINIA.

The campaign under consideration was, professedly, but the opening scene of a great drama, the finale of which was to be the subversion of the Rebellion in Virginia, and the capture of its capital; and in it that of the Confederacy. The nation did not demand or expect a *battle*, but a *conquest*, which should be visibly decisive of the fate of the Confederacy. A view of the situation and comparative amount of the forces in the two armies immediately opposed to each other will enable us to form a correct judgment of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the demand and expectation under consideration. The amount of effective forces under the direct supervision and control of our Commander-in-Chief, and fully available for the contemplated movement, could not, as we have stated, have been less than 150,000 men. Those under General Butler amounted to 15,000 men, those under the immediate command of General McDowell to quite 75,000, and those under Generals Patterson and McClellan to upwards of 30,000 each.

According to the best Confederate authorities, the entire forces under the command of Generals Beauregard and Johnston amounted to less than 30,000 men. Mr. Stevens puts their united forces at 28,000; 20,000 under the former, and 8,000 under the latter. Johnston had under his command, for example, but nine regiments, with a few hundred cavalry under General (Stonewall) Jackson. No Confederate authority places the forces of General Beauregard above the sum designated. In all the rest of the State it is quite safe to affirm that there were not over 20,000 organised troops that could have been rendered available against the Union armies. Our armies, then, outnumbered those of the Confederacy as three to one. If we adopt the relations of two to one we shall be far within the circle of real facts; and this last estimate is all that is asked, as the basis of

our statements of what was undeniably practicable through a wise use of the forces under our Commander-in-Chief.

Nor can we conceive of armies in better relations for offensive operations than were ours at the time. Equally unfavourable was the condition of the Confederate armies for successful defence. The latter armies were within a semicircle of forces, divided into four parts; by each of which, General Butler's excepted, they were outnumbered, and which could have been concentrated upon them with perfectly annihilating force. Let any one take a map and mark the location of the Confederate forces at Manassas and Winchester, at Yorktown, Richmond, and other parts of Virginia. Then let him notice the location of the armies under General Butler at Fortress Monroe, under General McDowell at Arlington, under General Patterson at Bunker Hill, and General McClellan in Western Virginia; bearing in mind that all these forces were perfectly free for effective service. But one judgment can be passed in view of the facts before us, namely, that no armies could be in a worse condition for defence than were those of the Confederates, nor in a better condition for offensive operations with overwhelming masses than were these Union forces. Let us now consider

What might have been, and ought to have been, done under the circumstances.

Let us suppose that 20,000 men had been detached from General McDowell and sent round to General Butler, the forces of the latter being thereby increased to 35,000 men; that when all things were in readiness the army of General Butler was moved to Bermuda Hundred, as it was in the campaign under General Grant; that those under General McClellan were by rapid marches moved to Stanton; those under McDowell having moved out in front of Manassas; while Patterson had moved down the Shenandoah and occupied a central position between the right of McDowell and the left of McClellan. The result of such dispositions, as every one at all acquainted with military affairs, or possessed of common understanding, cannot but perceive, would have been such as the following:—Richmond, being then unfortified, would have been captured by

General Butler with little or no resistance; his presence in that vicinity would have prevented any reinforcements being sent to Generals Beauregard and Johnston; while his occupancy of all communications south of James river would have rendered the retreat of the Confederate forces into North Carolina impossible. On the other hand, the Confederate generals at Manassas, finding themselves encircled by forces more than three times as numerous as their own, and finding all hope of escape cut off, would have surrendered without a battle, or after too feeble a resistance to be called one. Thus the Rebellion would, in a few days, have been totally suppressed throughout the entire State of Virginia, and that with very little bloodshed on either side. These advantages being promptly followed up, the Carolinas, with all their seaports, would, in a few weeks more, have been in our hands, and the almost immediate collapse of the Confederacy everywhere else would have been fully assured. This we affirm, in the open presence of the nation and world, and that with no fear of intelligent contradiction, that had the army of 310,000 effective forces under the command of our Commander-in-Chief on the 4th July, 1861, been promptly and wisely employed, the duration of the Rebellion would but a little have exceeded the period assigned to it by Mr. Seward,—to wit, “ninety days.” We have suggested but one plan for the disposition and movement of our forces for the suppression of the Rebellion in Virginia. Other dispositions and movements equally felicitous will readily suggest themselves to every reflecting mind. Who can doubt that the civilians were right in calling for an onward movement, and a decisive one, under the circumstances then existing? Let us now consider

What was done at this eventful crisis.

The affair at Bull Run, as it actually occurred, can be told in few words. On the 16th July, General Irwin McDowell, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Scott, moved out from his cantonments south of the Potomac, and near Washington, and moved in the direction of Manassas. For the service assigned nearly 35,000 men were detailed. This column consisted of four divisions:

the first under General Tyler, the second under General Hunter, the third under General Heintzelman, the fourth under Colonel Miles,—the fifth, under General Runyon, being left in the works south of the Potomac. On the 18th a sharp conflict, mainly with artillery, occurred between our advanced forces under General Tyler and a body of Confederate forces under General Longstreet, at Blackburn's Ford on Bull Run; we losing eighty-three and the Confederates sixty-eight men. This reconnoissance in force revealed the fact that the Confederate army was in a position where they intended to give battle, a position along the wooded valley of Bull Run, about midway between Centerville and Manassas Junction. On Saturday, General McDowell had brought up his forces, and made all preparation for battle on the next day. In the meantime, General Johnston, to be followed by his army, had arrived at Manassas, and, being the senior officer, had assumed the command of the Confederate forces,—following out, in full, the plan previously arranged by General Beauregard. General McDowell had arranged to have the battle commence at six o'clock the next morning. It was two or three hours later than this, however, before the flanking divisions reached the position at which fighting in earnest was to commence. In the early part of the day, all things seemed propitious for a decisive victory of the Union forces, the Confederates being driven, by 3 p.m., at least one mile and a half. At this juncture, the battalions of General Johnston, under Colonels Elzey and Early, appeared upon the Union right, and outflanked the same. Several of our regiments first recoiled under the unexpected fire poured upon them, and then broke in confusion and fled from the field. The result was a general panic of the Union forces, and a confused retreat in the direction of Washington. The Confederates, with their fresh reinforcements, and a splendid cavalry of 1,500 men, pursued our forces but a short distance, having discovered our first division drawn up in good order on the slope west of Centerville, and calmly, if not eagerly, awaiting their advance. Another and very important reason for such a short pursuit was afterwards assigned by the Confederate commander,—to wit, that they did not desire

to reveal to the Union generals the small forces available for pursuit.

Immediate results of this battle.

The direct results of this tragico-comic affair was the loss, on the part of the Confederates, according to the report of General Beauregard, of 269 killed and 1,533 wounded, with two or three hundred prisoners taken in the early part of the battle, and sent on to Washington, not reported. After stating that 1,460 wounded and other prisoners had been sent to Richmond, the report adds:—"The ordnance and supplies captured include some twenty-eight field pieces of the best character of arms" (our reports make the number 17-22), "with over one hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun, thirty-seven caissons, six forges, four battery waggons, sixty-four artillery horses, completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 4,500 sets of accoutrements, over 500 muskets, some nine regimental and garrison flags, with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a large store of axes and intrenching tools, waggons, ambulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence."

General McDowell states our losses as 481 killed and 1,011 wounded, giving no account of how many wounded and others were captured from us by the enemy. The greatest loss of all was the prestige of an expected victory, to be followed by a triumphant advance upon Richmond.

The peculiar character of the battle accounted for.

All histories of this war agree in respect to the fact that this battle was "without form or order," and with no unity of action among the various divisions, as far as the Union forces were concerned. General McDowell himself, during the day, did not seem to know what the various portions of his army were doing, or to have any controlling influence in directing their movements. Each division, brigade, and even regiment seemed to act by and for itself, and not as a part of an unified whole. During the progress of the battle, on various parts of the field, single regiments would be sent out, and after firing a cer-

tain number of rounds, would be retired, and others sent forward to act in their places. Such want of system has been recorded as a fault of the General in command. On the other hand, during our visit to Washington in January 1863, we found this to be the general opinion of him on the part of those best qualified to judge, President Lincoln included—that we had no better read General in our army, no better judge of the character of a proposed campaign, and few, if any, better qualified to plan one, or to manage a corps anywhere. During the sickness of General McClellan, after he became Commander-in-Chief, and when the President was greatly perplexed as to what should be done in the pressing crisis, General McDowell, with General Franklin, was sent for, for special counsel and advice. What were the difficulties which encircled him, as commander of the Potomac army? We state them as we received them personally from General McDowell himself. When he took command of this army, he made immediate arrangements to manœuvre them, and train them to act as harmonious parts of a systematised whole. All such measures were absolutely prohibited by General Scott. In urging their importance, General McDowell was charged with desiring to make a show. Hence it was that the regiments which constituted his brigades, his brigades which constituted divisions, and the divisions which constituted his army, never had the least discipline in concerted action, the army being, in reality, constituted of independent parts, with a nominal commander, who could by no possibility command in any proper sense his own forces. The battle had to be fought by regiments at a time, these being the only compact and systematized bodies in the army. Nor was it possible for any General to have given real system to such a body of men on a battlefield, or to be really cognizant of what was going on during its continuance.

In addition to all this, General Scott absolutely refused to furnish General McDowell an adequate cavalry force, though there was an abundance of such troops in Washington. This part of the army was obstinately kept on the north side of the Potomac, the most of those who accompanied the advance on Manassas having been got

over by stealth. Hence it was that all reconnoissances had to be made by infantry, with no adequate amount of cavalry to improve an advantage or to cover a retreat. Such are the real facts of the case before us. Under command, General McDowell took command of this army. Under positive command, he fought an important battle for which he had been absolutely prohibited giving his army the preparation necessary to render success a probability; the cavalry necessary to render a campaign what it should be being also arbitrarily withheld from him.

THE PART WHICH GENERAL PATTERSON DID, OR RATHER
DID NOT, ACT IN THIS TRAGIC COMEDY.

In the campaign under consideration, Beauregard counted on the co-operation of Johnston, and McDowell on that of Patterson. How Johnston met the expectations reposed in him we have already seen. The reliance of McDowell, on the other hand, turned out to have been a "broken reed." General Patterson had received positive orders from General Scott to attack and beat Johnston if he (Patterson) was in sufficient force to do it, and if not, to so employ his army as to prevent his Confederate antagonist joining Beauregard. Deeming himself too weak for offensive operations, nothing remained for our commander, then at Bunker Hill, but to keep Johnston where he was, at Winchester. As a means to this end, General Sanford, on Patterson's left, had made all dispositions to occupy the only roads on which Johnston could move to Manassas, so as to be there in time to be of service to his colleague. Sanford's movement was to have been made at four o'clock in the morning. A little after twelve o'clock the same night he received a detailed order from Patterson, to move promptly, not in the direction intended, but at right angles to the same; to make all dispositions on the way, by which our whole army at Bunker Hill should move, not towards Winchester, but make a safe retreat to Charlestown, near Harper's Ferry. So indignant were the men at what they were compelled to do, that when Patterson appeared before them the next day he was received with a loud and universal groan.

The reason for this movement was that a rumour reached the ears of our veteran commander that he was to be attacked by Johnston reinforced by 20,000 men. Thus, while the Confederate General moved on to Manassas, the Union commander, terror-stricken by a rumour, fled precipitately to Charlestown, and from thence brought his disappointed and indignant forces in safety to Harper's Ferry, where he was superseded by General Banks. Thus ended this farcical campaign.

What should have been done in the circumstances.

This campaign smote the North with horror, electrified the Confederacy, and was a presage of the final results of the war in the judgment of Europe. But one thing was required of our supreme military authorities in the crisis—a prompt disposition of all the available Union forces in all parts of the country for a most decisive movement upon the Confederate armies in Virginia, and for the capture of the capital of the Confederacy itself. The action of the army of Manassas after its victory, their retirement especially before a single division in regular array at Centerville, clearly revealed the utter impotency of that army, if assailed by the united forces under the command of our military authorities. Had the three months' volunteers retired, sufficient forces remained to accomplish what the crisis demanded. Nor would these volunteers have retired, as they were to do, under the disgrace of ignominious defeat, had they been assured that by another month's service they could crown themselves and their country with deathless honour.

What was done under the circumstances.

Instead of this, "the great and exceedingly bitter cry" of our Commander-in-Chief everywhere broke upon the ear of the nation, that "the civilians had compelled him to fight a battle before he was prepared for it." As a consequence, popular clamour was turned away from its proper object, military imbecility, and vented itself upon the civilians. From that time onward, civilians were to have nothing to say about the conduct of the war. All was to be left to the uncriticised direction of the Generals,

whether they might chance to be wise commanders or fools. To this cry the press succumbed; and hence from this time onward the conduct of the war was without impartial criticism, even what the European military authorities thought of it not being permitted to meet the national eye. This was one of our national calamities during the progress of this war. None but partizan criticisms had place in the columns of the national press. In respect to the conduct of war, as well as other subjects, the unbiased judgment of the people is generally correct, and should have free and full expression through the press. Otherwise, stupidity is about as likely to lead armies as wisdom. The civilians being silenced, however, another and still worse result followed, namely, with few and slight exceptions, the total inactivity of our great armies from the end of July 1861 to the 1st March of the year following; when, with similar exceptions, the conduct of the war, as we shall see, was everywhere as bad as it could have been.

CHAPTER II.

ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN IN THE DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON.

THE campaign of Bull Run convinced the Administration of the utter incapacity of General Scott to act as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United States in the then existing crisis. Yet, in deference to his former services in the cause of his country, he was not formally superseded until the last of October of that year. In addition to the facts already stated, he was informed, by telegram from Patterson, of the latter's retreat to Charlestown. On the 20th, the day previous to the battle of Bull Run, he was informed, by another telegram from Patterson, that Johnston had actually retired from Winchester to reinforce Beauregard at Manassas. Yet no order was sent to recall McDowell from a battle in which defeat, under the circumstances, was almost certain.

General Scott was, *de facto*, superseded by the appointment of General George B. McClellan to the supreme command of the department of Washington, then created as preparatory to such appointment. At this time, he found under his immediate command in his department, aside from the depletion of the forces previously there, by desertion, defeat, and the mustering out of the three months' volunteers,—he found under his immediate command, we say, 50,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillery, with 32 field guns. This force was, leaving out of view the army he had left behind him in Western Virginia, that under General Banks in the Shenandoah valley, and under General Butler at Fortress Monroe, more than sufficient to defend the national capital

against any force which the Confederates could bring forward to capture the place. It was, indeed, as we shall see, more than twice as large as he proposed to leave for the protection and defence of the same place when he took the army of the Potomac down to the Peninsula. He was, however, left but a few weeks in this condition. On the 15th October he reported, as in and about Washington, at Baltimore, and on the Potomac, within the State of Maryland, an army of 152,051 men, 8,404 of these being absent. With such a force under his command, he repeatedly assured the nation, not that he intended to make any aggressive movements at all, but that he could hold the capital against any force which the Confederates could bring against him. The Confederate General, Johnston, in the meanwhile, was lying in a state of perfect and fearless security at Manassas, with a force under his command amounting to less than 50,000 men. It may be well, as preparatory to future references, to give here the number of the forces present for duty at Manassas and in Northern Virginia under the command of General Johnston. As officially reported to the War Department in Richmond, the number present October 31st, 1861, was 44,131; December 31st it was 62,112; February 28th, 1862, it was 44,617.

NATIONAL SENTIMENT IN REGARD TO GENERAL McCLELLAN
WHEN HE WAS APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

On the 1st November, 1861, General McClellan assumed the command of the armies of the United States. "General McClellan," as Mr. Swinton has well said, "brought to his high trust proofs of talent which, though not sufficient to show him a proper captain of a great army, were yet enough to inspire the best hopes of him. He had served with distinction in Mexico, had studied war in Europe, was in the flower of his youth, and, above all, had just finished a campaign that, by its success amidst elsewhere general failure, seemed to furnish at once the presage and prophecy of victory." Yet, as has been equally well said by Mr. Caville J. Victor, "A greater trust never was confided to a younger man; nor does history show a

greater trust reposed in one who had done comparatively so little to prove his fitness for the trust." One fact is undeniable, however, to wit, that no other young or old man was ever advanced to successive high commands with more universal approval of the press and people. All parties approved and applauded his appointment. Nobody enquired to what party he had belonged, or questioned the wisdom of the authorities which advanced him to his high office. In anticipation of what he was to do, he received the cognomen of our "Young Napoleon." For his prompt organization of the army of the Potomac he was justly applauded. His long inaction in all departments under his command was seconded and applauded under the assurance "that he had a plan the development of which would, with absolute certainty, astonish and electrify the nation, and ensure the sudden collapse of the Confederacy." His fickleness in changing his plans; the transfer of the main portion of his great army from the front of the Confederate army, which had retreated from Manassas, to the Peninsula; his stopping four weeks with 130,000 men in front of 10,000 at Yorktown, when any commander of common understanding would, as we shall see, by a flank movement, have captured the place in four days: all these by the Republican press were presented to the country as masterly acts of strategy. Even his disastrous retreat from Chickahominy to Harrison's Landing was represented by the same class of papers as a prudential change of base, from a bad to a good position. Never did the Republican papers cease at all to uphold and eulogize him until his utter want of real capacity as a General became too manifest to be denied, and too calamitous to the nation to be further apologised for or endured.

At a very early period of his command the author of this treatise lost all confidence in our "Young Napoleon." One of the first facts which induced this distrust was an extract from a criticism of his published after his return from Europe, a criticism on the Crimean campaign. The extract referred to went the round of the papers, and was presented as a proof to the nation that we had at the head of our armies a tactician of the very highest order. In the extract, a fundamental error is professedly disclosed

in the conduct of that campaign on the part of the Allies. They besieged Sebastopol but upon one side, and that on the side which left the Russians perfectly free to send into the city any munitions of war, reinforcements, and provisions they pleased. Instead of this, as our strategist contended, they should have opened the siege on the other side, cutting off all communications between the empire and city, and thus ensuring the early surrender of the place. Now the prominent characteristic of a great tactician is that, in the presence of great armies, he will readily detect the plans of their respective commanders, comprehend their excellences and defects, and suggest important improvements in said plans. The defect, as I at once saw, in this criticism, was a total misapprehension of the real plan of the Allies, representing its fundamental excellences as essential defects, and presenting in the place of the one that was adopted the very worst that could have been adopted. The real and specific plan of the Allies, and the very best that could have been adopted, was not to capture the city and fortress before them a day earlier than they did. They desired to leave all communications between the place besieged and the Empire which was to defend it, perfectly open. The military authorities which developed the plan of the campaign on the part of the Allies understood perfectly that in the harbour of Sebastopol was the fleet of Russia, the idol of its Emperor; that the city with its harbour was the eye of the Empire looking towards the south and east; and that if besieged in a certain manner, such was the character of Nicholas that he would exhaust the army and treasury of his Empire in its defence. In carrying on the war on this plan, the Allies could convey their armies, munitions, and provisions, by water and rail, directly to the places where they were needed, and that at the least expense possible; while Russia would be necessitated to march her armies, convey all her munitions, materials, and provisions, wholly by land, from the centre of that vast Empire, and over the worst roads in the world. The plan of the Allies, then, as avowed by the French Emperor, was, not to capture Sebastopol at all, but to besiege it in such a form as to exhaust the treasury and military resources of Russia in

its defence,—one of the wisest plans known in the history of war, as the results fully demonstrated. In that war Russia lost upwards of 600,000 men,—almost its entire regular army; while the loss of the Allies was but about 150,000. In this war, also, the treasury of the Empire became so exhausted that its credit was gone; while the expense of the Allies was so small as not to burden the nations which entered into the alliance. Russia, almost without an army or credit, was necessitated to sue for peace, and accept it on the terms which the Allies proposed. Had the plan proposed by our tactician been adopted, Sebastopol would indeed have been soon captured, and the Allies have been necessitated to prosecute the war at a great distance in the interior, where the power of Russia would have been far greater than theirs. Two fundamental defects, as a consequence, became manifest to my mind in the criticism under consideration—an utter failure to comprehend the plan which he criticised, and the presentation, as an essential improvement of that which could not have been improved, of the very worst that could have been devised. In view of such facts, I at once located our Commander-in-Chief among fourth-rate tacticians. If I should suggest my honest judgment of General McClellan and his successor General Halleck, as leaders of great armies, I should say that they never evinced any capacity in planning campaigns but to blunder, and that they never blundered upon a plan that ought to have been adopted. Whether this impression is or is not correct will be rendered fully manifest in the sequel.

FUNDAMENTAL DEFECTS IN GENERAL McCLELLAN, AS THE LEADER OF A GREAT ARMY.

It may help the reader to comprehend more perfectly than otherwise the facts to be hereafter presented, if we stop here and consider some of the essential defects of our Commander-in-Chief, as the leader of great armies. One of the most prominent peculiarities of a great commander is an ability to determine, from facts which he can gather, the amount of forces in the army opposed to him.

On such points such commanders seldom err. On a particular occasion, for example, Buonaparte saw a small body of men take a position in his front, and remarked to his staff that there was an army of 60,000 men advancing to that position. The facts turned out to be just as he stated. The manner in which that small body took position revealed to the discerning eye of the great Emperor the precise amount of the advancing army. Now one of the fixed peculiarities of General McClellan was an amazing overestimate of the number, discipline, and furnishment of the army opposed to him. In his official report, given March 8th, 1862, he puts the number of the Confederate forces at Manassas and in Northern Virginia at 115,500, when the entire number as revealed from official sources, as affirmed by all Confederate and by English officers visiting Confederate armies, and the avowed opinions of the best informed generals in our army,—that number was less than 50,000. When he arrived at the Chickahominy, he sent a message to the President saying that the army opposed to him was quite as numerous as his own, and would fight well. He always laboured under a similar delusion in regard to the discipline, equipment, and provisions of the hostile forces. As his fixed maxim was never to fight a battle without the consciousness of overwhelming odds on his side, and as in the presence of an enemy his imagination always presented the opposing force as greater and better disciplined and provided than his own, his great skill consisted in avoiding general and decisive engagements, and hence he never brought anything important to pass.

Another essential defect in our “Young Napoleon” is what may be called self-distrust—distrust of his own plans after they had been adopted and partially executed. We state this from a leading officer in the Potomac army, and one of the most ardent admirers of General McClellan. He would adopt a plan, said this officer, as, of all others conceivable, the very best, and with great energy would enter upon its prosecution. At length, as difficulties accumulated upon him, he would think of some other and now impracticable plan. In the light of the new suggestion the defects in the existing plan would become more and more

palpable to his mind, until the sentiment of distrust would become so overpowering that he would be utterly unable to arrange or order any decisive movement. Such was his mental state, when he saw the difficulties before and around him, when he had lain for a time with his army on the Chickahominy. He here saw how much better it would have been to have moved his great army at Washington, in front of the enemy on the Rappahannock, and with his right wing reinforced, flanking them by a movement down the valley of the Shenandoah. Hence, he remained in palsied inaction until his disastrous retreat to Harrison's Landing. No nation can be more unfortunate than one whose armies are under such leaders as this.

We mention but one other serious defect in General McClellan as the leader of a great army. We refer to his overestimate of the necessity of universal and absolute readiness and order, as the condition, *sine quâ non*, of moving a great army. This characteristic of our General was thus presented to us by a distinguished United States senator. The fixed rule in the army is that each wheel of each army-waggon shall have an extra linch pin. If General McClellan should learn on the eve of a great advance that a single wheel of a single waggon lacked the required pin, he would stop his whole army for ten days, if that were necessary, to have the deficiency supplied. Hence it was that he was never ready to make an important movement. He could not obey an absolute order from the Commander-in-Chief to move his army across the Potomac, because he had just discovered that out of upwards of 90,000, some 10,000 of his men were not adequately shod. Hence it is that but for the absolute command of the supreme authorities nobody can divine when our army would have been moved from before Washington. The above characteristics will throw light upon all our campaigns which were conducted under the lead of General McClellan. Before proceeding further in our criticisms of the administration of our youthful commander, we will now devote a short chapter to noticing some important events which were at this time transpiring in Missouri in the department of General Fremont.

CHAPTER III.

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT IN THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT.

ON the 10th July, as we have seen, General Lyon arrived at Springfield, and formed a junction there with the forces of Colonel Siegel, who had advanced from Rolla. Here we left this brave little army before whom Governor Jackson and General Price, with their forces, had fled from the State of Missouri. On the 9th of this month, General Fremont was appointed to the command of the Western District, which included Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and Kansas. Tarrying some time in the city of New York to obtain necessary arms, equipments, and munitions, he arrived at St. Louis on the 25th of the same month, and assumed the command of his department. As General Lyon was doing all that could be done, and that in the best manner, in and about Springfield, General Fremont did not interfere with the arrangements of his predecessor. In the meantime, the Confederates, largely reinforced, particularly in cavalry, re-entered and overran Southern Missouri, and confined General Lyon to Springfield, who was waiting for reinforcements. The general mustering out of the three months' men, however, prevented any being sent to his aid. Learning that the enemy was advancing upon him in two strong columns, one from Cassville on the south, and the other from Sarcassie on the west, he determined to advance upon the former and stronger body, and strike that before it had formed a junction with the latter. Leaving Springfield August 1st, with 5,500 foot, 400 horse, and 18 guns, he at Dug Springs met and defeated on the next morning a detach-

ment of the advancing force. General McCulloch, who commanded this force, now moved west, and formed a junction with the column which was moving up from Sarcassie, while General Lyon returned to Springfield. The Confederates now advanced with great caution, and on the 7th reached Wilson's Creek, ten miles south of Springfield. At this point, our brave General knowing well that the opposing force outnumbered his as more than two to one, determined to surprise the Confederates now under the command of General McCulloch, and this by a night attack. He accordingly on the 9th left Springfield with two columns; the main one commanded by himself, and the less, 1,200 strong, with 6 guns, by Colonel Siegel. At 4 a.m. August 10th, the battle commenced by a front attack on the enemy's front by Lyon's forces, while the rear of McCulloch's right was attacked by Siegel. Taken by surprise, the Confederates at first recoiled in disorder. Becoming at length aware of the smallness of the force assaulting them, they returned and fought with desperate courage. On the enemy's right, Siegel at first gained a great advantage, and with his guns made terrible havock among the men opposed to him. Being at length suddenly assailed by a large force which had been mistaken for Unionists, his column was thrown into remediless confusion, and fled in disorder, five of his guns being taken. The entire weight of the Confederate columns now fell upon the devoted band under General Lyon. By the terrible fire of this band the enemy was, time and again, driven in confusion from the field, and driven but to return with greater force and determination. In the last onset, our brave commander, the idol of his army, and one of the most worthy of our nation's perpetual remembrance, fell, but with his army in possession of the field.

Major Sturgis now led back the Union forces in good order to Springfield; from whence, under the conduct of Colonel Siegel, a safe retreat, with a baggage train five miles in length, was effected to Rolla, and the south of Missouri was again in the hands of the Confederates. In this battle, which was fought by General Lyon contrary to his own judgment, he being over-persuaded by General Sweeny and others, the Union loss, as officially reported,

was 223 killed, 721 wounded, and 108 missing. General McCulloch reported the entire loss on the other side as 265 killed and 800 wounded. The Unionists throughout the country lamented the death of General Lyon, as did the Confederates that of General Jackson, and for similar reasons. The former was, unquestionably, in all respects, one of the best Generals known in the Union army. His great merits are confessed even by the Confederates. "The death of General Lyon," says Pollard, in his "Southern History," "was a serious loss to the Federals in Missouri. He was an able and dangerous man—a man of the times, who appreciated the force of audacity and quick decision in a revolutionary war. To military education and talents he united a rare energy and promptitude. No doubts or scruples unsettled his mind." Mr. Pollard, we would add here, thus explains the reason why our army was totally unmolested in its retreat to Springfield and from thence with its long train to Rolla:—"Shortly after the battle, the Confederate army returned to the frontier of Arkansas, Generals McCulloch and Price having failed to agree on the plan of a campaign in Missouri."

EVENTS IN THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT, UNDER THE IMMEDIATE DIRECTION OF GENERAL FREMONT.

On the 25th July, as we have seen, four days after the disaster at Bull Run, General Fremont arrived in St. Louis, and assumed command in the Western Department. Nothing can exceed the confusion and peril which everywhere encircled him. On the South, Louisville, Cairo, Cape Girardeau, Ironton, and Springfield, were threatened by large Confederate forces; while Lieutenant-Governor Reynolds was operating in Northern Missouri with an army approaching 5,000 in number, and the spirit of St. Louis was decidedly insurrectionary. From every direction the loudest calls for help reached him. In addition to the advance of McCulloch and Price upon Springfield, and the occupancy of North Missouri as stated, 20,000 men under General Pillow, for example, were advancing on Cairo, and General Hardee with 5,000 troops, 2,000 being excellently mounted and equipped cavalry, was advancing

upon Ironton. At Louisville and other assailable points, the Union forces were being confronted by superior hostile armies. Another difficulty which he had to contend with was the fact that the largest portion of the troops, which in great numbers arrived in St. Louis, were unarmed, and no means existed to arm them until arms and accoutrements should arrive from the east; all exertions which any commander could employ being used to hasten this consummation.

Under the circumstances, the first thing to be done was to render the most vital points which were about to be assailed, secure. To this end our commander accordingly addressed himself. Having received a letter from General Lyon which convinced him that there were no pressing necessities at Springfield, and having reinforced Ironton, and Cape Girardeau, he, in five days after his arrival, collected 3,800 men, and transported them to Cairo; finding a force of only 1,200 men under General Prentiss at this place. The sudden appearance of this reinforcement induced General Pillow, who had landed at New Madrid, a few miles below the place, to make a hasty retreat. Thus this vital point was rendered permanently secure. On the 7th August he was back again at St. Louis, and took immediate measures, amid other pressing calls, to reinforce General Lyon; sending orders to Colonel Stevenson to march with his regiment from Booneville, and Colonel Montgomery to move with his from Kansas to Springfield. From St. Louis he could, at the time, send no reinforcements, because his recruits there were unarmed. Before any of the troops ordered for the relief of General Lyon, however, could reach him, the battle at Wilson's Creek had been fought, the brave General was dead, and his little army was in safe retreat to Rolla. To hold General Fremont responsible for the defeat of General Lyon's army at Wilson's Creek is to hold him responsible for an event which did not occur; for there was no defeat, but a real victory, of our army there,—a victory which left the little band master of the field, which occasioned a backward movement of the Confederates to the borders of Arkansas and a division of their forces there; the Texans and Arkansas troops under McCulloch

moving south, and the Missourians under Price moving east, while, what was really expected, a safe retreat for our forces was secured. Should it be said that the orders to Colonels Stevenson and Montgomery should have been issued before the voyage to Cairo was commenced, the answer is ready:—1. It might not have appeared safe, or even necessary, to have issued these orders at that time. 2. A sufficient reply is disclosed in the reason assigned by Wellington for his oversight in not reinforcing and furnishing needful ammunition to the little band at La Haye Sainte, namely, that under such circumstances it is impossible for any finite mind to think of everything. The only matter of wonder is that our commander, in the untried and perplexing circumstances which surrounded him, and in so few days, thought of and provided for so many things as he did, and did everything so perfectly. Such a rapid comprehension of the complicated situation of affairs, such quick and accurate discernment of the means requisite to the varied ends to be secured, such promptitude and decision in action, and such efficiency in accomplishing predetermined results, have few parallels in history.

Let us contemplate, for example, the startling facts which came before him on the 13th and 14th August. At one and the same time, on the day first designated, came the news of the battle and death of General Lyon at Wilson's Creek, of Colonel Mulligan's arrival with the Irish Chicago Brigade, 2,800 Union soldiers in all, at Lexington, of Price's advance to Warrenton with from 5,000 to 15,000 men, threatening Colonel Mulligan, with the fact that General J. C. Davis, commanding at Jefferson City, a district including Lexington, was carefully watching the movements of General Price, and in addition to all these, a most pressing demand from General Grant, commanding at Cairo, for reinforcements to render that point secure. On the next day came an absolute order from General Scott to "send 5000 well armed infantry to Washington without a moment's delay." At the same time there came from General Anderson, commanding in Kentucky, a most pressing call to send reinforcements to Louisville, which was seriously threatened by the Confederates. who were rapidly annexing that State.

Let us now stop for a moment and contemplate this requisition from Washington. It was well known to the military authorities there that all was in imminent peril in this Western Department, and that "all was quiet on the Potomac," that the withdrawal of 5,000 well armed infantry from the Western Department might be fatal to our interests there, while so small a force could do nothing really for our security in and about Washington. If 50,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillery, with thirty field guns, with the many thousands of men who had been hastened to the national capital during the twenty-four days since the disastrous affair at Bull Run, could not enable our "Young Napoleon" to hold Washington, of what avail could the mere addition of "5,000 well armed infantry" be to prevent the fall of that city? While it is safe to affirm that this cowardly order did not originate with General Scott, it is equally safe to affirm that it did originate in a mind of unparalleled stupidity, or in one inspired with a base desire to render unsuccessful the efforts of a dreaded rival to prevent one of the greatest of national calamities, the ruin of our interests in Kentucky and Missouri. The bad order, however, was promptly obeyed, 2,000 troops being dispatched from St. Louis, 2,000 from Kentucky, and 1,000 from other sources.

The measures which General Fremont did adopt under the circumstances now claim our attention. For the relief of Colonel Mulligan he at once dispatched two regiments to Jefferson City, with orders that two others should be sent from that place to Lexington. Orders were also sent to General Pope, in command of 5,000 men in North Missouri, to move his forces to the same point. Similar orders were sent to General Sturgis and others, to co-operate in the concentration of forces for the relief of Lexington. The forces ordered to the city were quite equal to those by which it was threatened. None of these reinforcements, however, arrived in time to save the beleaguered force, which, after one of the most wonderful defences known in history, did surrender August 20th. The censures heaped upon the General in command, on account of the fall and temporary occupation by the Confederates, clearly indicates a forgetfulness of the fact that

all great enterprises are attended with some disasters, that all that the best commanders can do is to order adequate forces for the defence of important points threatened by the enemy, that unlooked-for occurrences, as was true in this case, may prevent the success of the wisest dispositions, and that when commanders in the management of vast and most complicated interests can only be censured for small disasters, the like of which attend all vast enterprises, we have, in the censures themselves, the best possible vindication of the superior wisdom of the conduct of such commanders. In the light of these undeniable facts and principles, General Fremont is more than vindicated against the only charges really brought against his administration. To General Lyon he did, before leaving St. Louis for Cairo, order the only body of forces which were in a condition to be moved. As soon as he returned to St. Louis, his first care was to forward to Springfield all the reinforcements needed. Before any such forces could reach that point, however, the blow was struck. At the same time we may safely challenge the world to designate any specific forces which should have been ordered to Lexington, that were not ordered to move to that one point, or to show that such orders were not as promptly sent as possible.

The general measures which General Fremont now adopted for defensive and offensive operations claim our special attention. A part of those measures are thus stated by Mr. Greeley:—"News of General Lyon's repulse and death reached St. Louis on the 13th. General Fremont thereupon decided to fortify that city with all possible despatch, as a permanent and central base of operations, to fortify and garrison, likewise, Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla, and Jefferson City; using for this purpose hired labour as far as possible, so that his raw recruits, even though unarmed, might be drilled and fitted for service as rapidly as might be; when on the receipt of sufficient arms, he would take the field at the head of a numerous and effective army, and speedily regain all that should have been meanwhile lost." Another measure, not stated in the above extract, was to connect all the railroads entering the city of St. Louis, that there might be no hindrance in passing

troops, munitions, and provisions through it to any place where they might need to be conveyed. The most important of all his measures was the plan of having the Mississippi and all the rivers connected with it commanded by ironclads. At his suggestion this plan was adopted by the Government. From this one suggestion greater results followed than from any other made by any commander of any department during the war. It was under the protection and by the aid of these vessels that Forts Henry and Donelson were captured, that General Pope succeeded in the capture of Columbus and the Hundred Islands, that the Confederate fleet was destroyed at Memphis, and that city captured, and that General Grant succeeded at Vicksburg. But for the ironclads, our army at Shiloh would, no doubt, have been taken. These benefits the nation owes to the comprehensive foresight of General Fremont.

While every energy was being put forth to render perfect all defensive arrangements, equal diligence was observed in preparing an offensive force for a final destruction of the Rebellion in Missouri. To put all assailable points in a state of security, 11,000 men were stationed in Fort Holt and Paducah, Kentucky; to prevent any advance upon Cairo or St. Louis, 10,000 were stationed at Cairo, 4,700 at Rolla, and 3,000 at Ironton. For offence and defence he had 7,000 men at St. Louis, 9,600 at Jefferson City, 5,500 in North Missouri, and 2,200 under General Lane on the borders of Kansas; while his recruits which were daily arriving were being as rapidly disciplined as possible for active service. By almost superhuman efforts, he was, in the latter part of September, enabled to take the field with an organized army of some 40,000 troops. Late on September 22nd he received from General Pope a telegram announcing the fall of Lexington, and the surrender of Colonel Mulligan and his immortal brigade. On the 22nd he left St. Louis for Jefferson City, expecting that General Price would make a stand somewhere on Missouri river. In this he was disappointed, General Price making a backward movement towards the south-west part of the State, stopping some time at Neosha, where he found General McCulloch with some 5,000 Confederates

from Arkansas. On finding that General Fremont was on his track, our Confederate commander retreated still farther south to Pineville, the extreme south-west corner of the State. General Fremont having advanced from Jefferson City, some thirty miles, to Tipton, the terminus of the Pacific Railroad, spent some time there in putting his army in perfect order, as preparatory to a rapid pursuit of Price and Jackson. Here, on October 13th, he was visited by our most trustworthy and sagacious Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, in company with Adjutant-General Thomas and suite. It happened to rain just at this time. Our visitants from Washington of course saw everything in the very worst light possible, and carried back the report that all was managed badly in the Western Department, and that General Fremont would never be able to move his army over the roads which had, just before, been traversed by General Price and his army. What seemed to burden the mind of our immaculate Secretary most heavily was the *financial* condition of this department. He imagined that he discovered some want of integrity in one individual who had principal charge of the commissariat of the army. As evinced by the resolution passed by the House of Representatives in Washington, in regard to our Secretary on his retirement from his high office, he was as jealous of the integrity of all who had charge of army funds as Cæsar was of the reputation of his wife. Our Secretary had in his pocket, when with our army, an order from the President to supersede General Fremont, should this be deemed expedient. As the army was fast in the mud, however, Mr. Cameron thought it best to leave it there under an affirmed incompetent commander.

We must stop here for a moment, to notice a somewhat brilliant affair which had just occurred at Fredericktown, in the south-east part of Missouri; a portion of the State which had hitherto been under the almost exclusive control of the Confederates. At the place designated above, General Jeff. Thompson, with a large force, occupied a very strong position. Here he was assailed by superior forces, sent by General Grant under Colonel Plummer from

Cape Girardeau, and by Colonel Carlile with another force from Pilot Knob. After a fight of two hours, Thompson retreated, leaving sixty of his dead behind, among whom was Colonel Lowe, his second in command. Being hotly pursued for twenty miles, Thompson's band was wholly dispersed and broken up. Nothing now remained but for Fremont to disperse the force concentrated under Price at Pineville, and Missouri would be totally free from Confederate insurrectionists and invaders.

We will, also, in this connexion, consider the composition of the army which General Fremont had collected for the work before him. The army concentrated at Tipton, other bodies which were to co-operate in the great movement being in other localities, consisted of 30,000 men. Of these, 5,000 were cavalry, while the number of cannon was eighty-six, a large number of them being rifled. Among the cavalry was a squadron known as "Prairie Scouts," a body of selected men commanded by Major F. J. White, who after a forced march of sixty miles, had just, without loss, recaptured Lexington, taking there, as Mr. Greeley states, "sixty or seventy prisoners, considerable property, and releasing a number of Unionists captured with Mulligan, including two colonels." There was also another body of horse equally noticeable, the Fremont 'Body-Guard,' under the command of one of the most chivalrous heroes of the age, Major Zagonyi. The army was divided into five divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Hunter, Pope, Siegel, McKinstry, and Asboth. The model after which this army was organized was, in the proportions of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the most perfect then known in Europe; the proportion of cavalry being about the same, and that of artillery being greater, than those in Wellington's army at Waterloo, the proportion of the latter being more nearly conformed to that in the army of Napoleon on the same occasion. The army under Grouchy sent after the Prussians from Ligny consisted of 31,969 men, of whom 4,350 were cavalry, 2,919 artillery, with ninety-six guns. When General McClellan first took command in the department of Washington, he found there, as we have seen, 50,000 infantry,

1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillery, with thirty field-guns, this army having been organized under our then Commander-in-Chief. Among those high in command in this army were individuals like Asboth and Siegel, who were well acquainted with the provisioning and movements of such bodies.

If we should refer to the *morale* of the army, it is safe to affirm that no other ever went into the field with more assurance of hope, with more devotion to the sacred cause which they were to defend, with more determination and patience to do and to dare, or with more confidence in their commander, than was true of this army at Tipton. To these statements there was one exception, General Hunter, the second in command, who was certain to succeed General Fremont, if the latter should be superseded. "General Hunter," says General Thomas, in his report, "expressed to the Secretary of War his decided opinion that General Fremont was incompetent, and unfit for his extensive and important command." No man in a high position ever had immediately under him, and within one step of his place, a small and ignoble mind who did not regard his superior as utterly disqualified for his place, and himself most amply qualified to fill the high position. A large number of intelligent men in Missouri, the report states, gave a similar opinion. It is a singular fact that all the Confederate prisoners while General McClellan was at the head of our armies, unitedly testified that he, in the united judgment of the Confederacy, was the greatest general we had, and was more to be feared than almost all others.

Contrary to the prediction of Mr. Cameron and his associates, the army of General Fremont did move, and did advance—quite rapidly too. By the 1st November, four divisions of the army were in Springfield,—all but that of General Hunter; General Pope's division having marched seventy miles in two days. When on the way, one of the most chivalrous exploits known in the history of war was performed by the Prairie Scouts and Guardsmen, a force of 300 men under the command, at the time, of Major Zagonyi, Major White being detained by sickness. As this small force approached Springfield, they found well posted there

a body consisting of 1,200 foot and 400 horse, and an adequate supply of guns. By a sudden charge all this force was utterly routed and dispersed. All this was done with a loss of but eighty-four killed and wounded. Zagonyi, of course, evacuated the place. Major White, however, having been first captured and then escaped, taking the leader of the capturing force in turn, improvised a home guard of twenty-four men, and re-entered and took possession of the place. Stationing twenty-two of this force as pickets on the outskirts, and holding the rest in reserve, he received a flag of truce from the Confederate commander, asking leave to bury their dead. This request, he replied, must be referred to General Siegel, who was approaching the place. Leave having been obtained, the Confederates, under the eye of the brave Major and his guard, quietly buried their dead. The victory of Zagonyi has been censured as a deed of desperate daring. By not dissimilar acts, however, Murat laid the foundation for his fame. Such deeds, when of occasional occurrence, impart new power to a whole army. Such was the impression of this victory upon the army of General Fremont. Certain it is that no army was ever better prepared for a decisive battle than was his, when all his dispositions were perfected for a great movement upon the Confederate army, now concentrated in force at Wilson's Creek. Just at this time, however, November 2nd, a messenger of ill omen arrived in camp, bringing an order from General Scott removing General Fremont, and ordering him to turn over his command to General Hunter, and report himself by letter to Washington. As General Hunter had not come up, it was determined, in a council of war, to march the next morning, and fight the battle contemplated. In the evening, however, General Hunter did arrive, assumed command, and ordered, not a battle, but a retreat with all possible haste, to the nearest railroads that could be reached by different divisions of the army. The excuse for this order was that it accorded with instructions received from Washington.

Now commenced a scene which gives us a palpable illustration of the extreme shortness of the step from the sublime to the ridiculous—the spectacle of one of the

bravest and best ordered armies in the world, an army of about 40,000 men, running for dear life from 20,000 badly furnished and dispirited foes. General Price, by his scouts, soon became aware of the dastardly retreat of our army, and commanded a hot pursuit, captured not a few prisoners, and not a small amount of baggage, until our retreating general halted his breathless troops at the places designated, surrendering all South-western Missouri to the Confederates.

This retreat, we believe, has but one parallel in history. We refer to the famous retreat of Admiral Field-Marshal Tschichagoff down the Beresina. When the French army in its retreat from Moscow reached this river, a Russian army under the Marshal named lay in their front, on the opposite side of the river, rendering a passage over and a farther retreat of the enemy strictly impossible, as Buonaparte afterwards affirmed. "Not a man of us," he said, "could have escaped had the Russian army remained where it was." As soon as the French army came in sight, however, Tschichagoff ordered a hasty retreat to another passage twenty miles below, and permitted the French to pass on just where and as they desired. So when our army was within striking distance of the enemy it had been so earnestly seeking, and was in the very act of inflicting upon him a crushing blow, which would have permanently delivered Missouri from the Confederates, our new commander beat a sudden retreat, and fled, terror-stricken,—fled before an enemy whose forces were hardly half as numerous or half as well provided as his own. Buonaparte would never pronounce the name of the Russian commander, always calling him "that ass of an Admiral."

No excuse or apology can be offered for the conduct of General Hunter in two particulars—assuming command when he did, and making any order from Washington, or any other consideration, a reason for not fighting a battle before his retreat, in the crisis then existing. There is not a law of our country, nor an usage known to war, which required him not to permit his predecessor to continue in command until after a battle then immediately pending, and determined on by the unanimous decision of a council of war, had been fought. On the other hand, all the

known usages of war prohibited his immediate assumption of command under the then existing circumstances. The same remarks apply to any orders which General Hunter may have received from Washington. Discretion in regard to the time when command shall be assumed, and a retreat ordered, is always expected in such cases. During the battle of Austerlitz, for example, Marshal Sault received a positive order from his Emperor to charge instantly upon the enemy's line. The Marshal, who was then carefully observing certain movements of the Austrians in his front, paid no seeming regard to the order. The same order was sent a second time, and a second time was disregarded. A third time the same order was sent, and that in the most absolute form. "Tell the Emperor," was the reply, "that I will obey his order, but not now." When the right moment arrived, the movement was made, and with such results that the Emperor, when he came up, thus addressed the Marshal, who had thus three times disobeyed an absolute order: "Marshal Sault, you are the greatest tactician of modern times." Admiral Nelson gained the victory at Copenhagen by continuing the battle after having received from his superior in command an absolute order to retreat; and received for his disobedience the approval of his Government and country. In regard to orders received from authorities which cannot be cognizant of what is rendered necessary by immediate exigencies, discretion is demanded by the higher laws of nature and nations, and by the known usages of war is demanded in regard to the time when and the manner in which orders shall be obeyed. In some circumstances, as in the case of Nelson, this higher law demands actual disobedience. Had General Hunter, before assuming command, permitted that battle to have been fought as arranged, his name would have gone down to posterity "as ointment poured forth." For having presumptuously assumed command, and ordered that retreat, his name, if it descends to posterity at all, must go down side by side with that of Admiral Field-Marshal Tschichagoff.

The motive which dictated the order from Washington suspending General Fremont and ordering that retreat, becomes perfectly palpable when contemplated in the

light of these palpable facts. On the 13th September, when General Fremont received the absolute order to "send 5,000 well armed infantry to Washington without a moment's delay," it was well known at the national capital that all was in the greatest peril in the Western Department, and that the greatest difficulty then was the want of arms to supply the recruits. "Reliable information," General Fremont telegraphed to Washington, "from the vicinity of Price's column shows his present force to be 11,000 at Warrensburg, and 4,000 at Georgetown, with pickets extending toward Syracuse. Green is making for Booneville, with a probable force of 3,000. Withdrawal of force from this part of Missouri risks the State; from Paducah, loses Western Kentucky." In the face of these appalling facts, "the 5,000 well armed infantry" were remorselessly forced from this department. When this was done, "all was quiet on the Potomac," with no more peril of an attack from the enemy than there was of "the falling of the sky;" while reinforcements were so rapidly coming in that, one month later, General McClellan reported 152,051 men under his command. On the 15th August, according to official reports, there had entered the Union army, our regular force included, an aggregate of 499,250 men. Deducting from these the three months recruits, an aggregate is left of about 420,000 men; and this number was vastly increased by September 13th, when the order under consideration was issued. Outside of the Department of Washington there were more than 100,000 unemployed troops nearer that city than was the eastern boundary of the Western Department. Why were all these passed by, and the requisition made from the only spot where real danger was known to exist?

We must also bear in mind here that when Mr. Cameron and his *portégé* General Thomas found General Fremont, as they thought, stuck fast in the mud, with the impossibility of extricating himself, he was left in command; "a bad name" being given him at Washington. As soon as our veteran commander had extricated himself, however, and was known to be about to precipitate his army with crushing force upon Price and McCulloch, and thus permanently free Missouri from the Confederates,

an order was hastened on suspending General Fremont, putting Hunter in his place, and ordering instant retreat. In the light of all these facts, we may safely challenge the world to assign any other motive or cause for those under consideration but a deliberate choice that the nation should endure eternal disgrace, and the people of the Western Department should suffer untold evils, rather than that a victory and conquest should occur,—a victory and conquest which should crown with immortal honour General Fremont.

The evils which immediately resulted from this disgraceful retreat from Springfield are thus truly depicted by Mr. Victor :—" That last retreat from Springfield let loose all the wild elements of disorder, rapine, and murder. The longsuffering Unionists of the south-western section offered up their homes, many of them their lives, as a sacrifice to a cause which could return them only suffering for devotion."

Had General Fremont been continued in command, and had he been supported as he might have been, the following results of national importance would unquestionably have occurred. In the first place, the world-wide dishonour which our nation was enduring from the disaster at Bull Run would have been more than wiped out by an annihilating victory over Price and McCulloch, and the immediate wiping out of the rebellion in two States, Missouri and Arkansas. Our army under Fremont undeniably outnumbered that under the hostile commanders, and the former was far better appointed and equipped, and was in far higher spirits, than the latter. How, we ask, could those raw troops from Missouri and Arkansas have withstood for an hour the fire of those eighty-six field guns, and all this followed up by crushing masses of infantry and cavalry? As was truly said by Major Dorsheimer, then in our army, " a victory such as the country has long desired and sorely needs—a decisive, complete, and overwhelming victory—was as certain as it is possible for the skill and valour of man to make certain any future event." Such a victory, also, with the advantages of pursuit which General Fremont possessed, would undeniably have been followed by the utter dispersion or capture of those Confederate

forces. This would have resulted in the immediate suppression of the Rebellion, not only in Missouri, but Arkansas, and the turning of the enemy's positions on the Mississippi.

Other events of still greater importance would have followed in other departments of General Fremont's command. An army at least 100,000 strong would have been precipitated upon the 40,000 Confederate forces occupying Central Kentucky, on a line extending from the eastern to the western borders of the State. These forces would, of course, have been driven at once out of this State, and beyond the southern borders of Tennessee. By the opening of the spring campaign, with the Rebellion effectively suppressed in the States of Missouri, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and with our ironclads in readiness, an army under the protection of the ironclad fleet would have passed down the Mississippi, captured New Orleans, and thus cut asunder the Confederacy, rendering its speedy collapse a matter of certainty. Such was the actual plan of the great commander of this department. Our military authorities at Washington, however, could not at that time endure the spectacle—(we record it with shame, but as a demand of integrity)—the spectacle of a great and energetic commander in any department, that commander being General John C. Fremont. Subsequent events fully vindicated the wisdom of Fremont's order pertaining to slaveholders, and the great mistake of our venerated President in reversing that order. The act of our President was, in effect, a proclamation to all the people in the border slave States, that Unionists should risk everything by devotion to, and Rebels nothing by their treason against, their country. It became, consequently, a common maxim in those States that Unionists were the only real sufferers from the war.

CHAPTER IV.

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

WE are now prepared to contemplate the military status of the nation under the administration of General McClellan, first as commander in the department of Washington, and practically of all our armies, and then as our actual Commander-in-Chief. Immediately after the disaster of Bull Run, as we have seen, he was called to the supreme command in the department designated, and Nov. 1st he, as announced by himself, "assumed command of the armies of the United States." Immediately after his appointment to the supreme command, General Henry W. Halleck was appointed Commander of the Western Department, and assumed command there November 12th. On the 15th of the same month, General Don Carlos Buell arrived at Louisville, and assumed command in Kentucky. These two generals were appointed in accordance with the express wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, and had fully developed with him, before leaving Washington for their respective spheres of action, a plan for the future conduct of the war. All these facts were announced to the country through the press at the time.

RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE FORCES AT THIS TIME.

To appreciate the conduct of the war under these generals, upon whom all issues, then pending, depended, we need, first of all, to attain to a clear understanding of the then existing relative positions of the Union and Confederate armies which were confronting each other at the time.

In the department of Washington, the Confederates

held possession of the entire territory of the present State of Virginia, the small portion of "the sacred soil" occupied by our forces immediately south of Washington excepted. At the same time their batteries on the Lower Potomac so commanded that river as to utterly cut off all communication between the national capital and the Chesapeake Bay and the ocean, by means of this most essential channel of communication. All our armies in this department lay immediately south of Washington, and north and east of the Potomac, we having abandoned to the Confederates all the places occupied by our previous advances, such as Centerville, Fairfax Court House, Winchester, Bunker Hill, Charlestown, Harper's Ferry, etc.

At this time, the Confederates had advanced into Kentucky, and on a line of some two to three hundred miles in extent, occupied the entire central and southern portions of the State, their line from the eastern border at Pointville, Johnson County, through Bowling Green, Donelson on the Cumberland river, and Henry on the Tennessee, these lying in the north of Tennessee, and Columbus on the Mississippi, in Kentucky. At Louisville, and opposed to the main Confederate force of Bowling Green, lay our main forces in this State, under the immediate command of General Buell. Strong forces in entrenched camps were also located at such important points as Cairo in Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. In all the places above designated, the Confederates were very strongly fortified, particularly at Bowling Green, Forts Donelson and Henry, and at Columbus. By occupying the three places last named, they fully commanded the navigation of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi rivers.

In Missouri, on his arrival there, General Halleck found the Union forces safely entrenched, as General Fremont had directed, at Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla, St. Louis, Jefferson City, and other localities, with the 40,000 men who, under the veteran Hunter, had fled from Springfield. This army General Halleck found "all snug" at the various railroad points to which they were directed to flee. From the beginning he had forces fully armed

and equipped, and ready for the field; forces perfectly adequate to all the necessities of the Union cause in that State. General Price, on the other hand, with a force which had fled precipitately before General Fremont when only 30,000 strong, occupied Springfield as his centre, and from thence had absolute control in the central and south-eastern portions of the State.

A careful survey of the field before us will absolutely evince that no armies ever were, or could be, in worse circumstances for offensive or defensive operations than were the Confederates, or in more propitious relations for both kind of operations than were the Unionists, at the period under consideration. In Virginia, for example, the Confederate forces lay in scattered fragments over that great State—fragments at totally unsupporting distances from each other. What, for example, could the forces at Yorktown, Norfolk, Petersburg, and Richmond do for the relief of the army at Manassas and Northern Virginia, provided the latter were suddenly assaulted? How easy it was, by an advance in force by Dranesville, to divide hopelessly the forces at Manassas from those at Leesburg, Winchester, and Harper's Ferry, and cut up all these forces in detail. From Fortress Monroe, from Western Virginia, on the Upper Potomac, and, above all, from Arlington, the Confederate forces were directly under our strokes, and helpless there.

No general could ask to have an enemy in a condition more exposed to have his line cut asunder, to be cut to pieces, routed, and destroyed piecemeal, than were the Confederate forces as seen from the central position of General Buell at Louisville; forces distributed on a line some 300 miles in extent, and consequently strong nowhere, easily flanked everywhere, and perfectly helpless where their line was at any material point cut asunder, or where any of their central positions were flanked, and assaulted with superior forces. At the same time, no general could have an army in a position from whence he could more readily concentrate his forces upon any point he should select than had General Buell at this period. The circumstances of the case render all these statements undeniably evident.

In the State of Missouri, General Halleck, as previous and subsequent facts absolutely evince, had but to advance the forces under his immediate command to Springfield in order to clear that State utterly of Confederate forces, and to free the Union inhabitants in it from all the intolerable sufferings to which they were subject in consequence of their fidelity to their country.

COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF THE FORCES CONFRONTING
EACH OTHER IN THESE DEPARTMENTS.

It may help us to understand still more perfectly the conduct of this war while General McClellan held supreme command, if we should now take into distinct consideration the comparative number of the hostile forces then confronting each other in these departments. As we have seen, according to the official report of the Secretary of War, December 1st, 1861, the Union army then amounted to 660,971 men. Of these immense forces, nearly, or quite, 200,000 were under the immediate command of General McClellan. On September 15th, as officially reported, there were in this department, not including those in Fortress Monroe, 180,000; on the 1st December, 198,213; January 1st, 1862, there were 219,767; and February 1st, 222,196. Directly in front of these forces, at Manassas and other parts of Northern Virginia, the Confederate forces were less than 50,000 strong. In all Virginia, their forces at this time were, undeniably, but a little if any more than 100,000 in number. In the department of Kentucky, General Buell commanded, soon after he entered his department, nearly 100,000 men, his force in January amounting to quite 114,000; to wit, 102 regiments of infantry, ten of cavalry, and sixteen batteries of artillery. In front of these forces, General Sidney E. Johnston, who commanded all the Confederate forces in Tennessee and Kentucky, never had in his command, at the various points on his line of about 300 miles in extent, a larger force than his namesake then commanded at Manassas and Northern Virginia, a force varying from 40,000 to 60,000 men, and never exceeding the latter number. So all Confederate authorities and all known

facts fully evince. At all times, General Buell's command outnumbered that of his opponent as three to two, and uniformly as two to one; while the forces of the former were always more centrally located and more readily concentrated than those of the latter.

Of the comparative number of the hostile forces in Missouri, little need be added to what has already been said in former connexions. While General Halleck had in Missouri, when he entered the State, a movable column of about 40,000 men,—a body which could, in any two weeks, have been increased to 60,000 or 80,000, if that number were needed,—General Price, as none will deny, never had under his command over 30,000 or 35,000 men. Such are the real facts in regard to the relative amount of the forces under the Union, on the one hand, and the Confederate commanders on the other.

ESTIMATES OF THE UNION COMMANDERS OF THE NUMBER OF THE HOSTILE FORCES TO BE ENCOUNTERED.

One of the most striking peculiarities of our generals in command in the departments under consideration is their fabulous over-estimates of the number of forces in the ranks of their opponents. General McClellan, during the fall of 1861, estimated the forces at Manassas and in Northern Virginia at 150,000. Just before the opening of the spring campaign, in an official report he estimated their number, as we have seen, at 115,500. General Wadsworth, then in command in Washington, and other generals whose positions gave them opportunities to gain accurate information,—these commanders, by enquiries from prisoners, deserters, fugitives, and others, determined the number and names of the regiments in the Confederate army before them, and gave what turned out to be a true estimate of the number of said forces. Annoyed by such revelations, General McClellan at length prohibited all such enquiries, and arbitrarily adhered to his own opinions. General Sherman, who commanded in Kentucky prior to Buell, wrote on to Washington that 200,000 men were required to drive back the invaders in his front. General Buell was ever oppressed with the

belief that the forces confronting him were too strong to be attacked. General Halleck was so appalled by his estimate of the vastness of Price's armies that he dared not move out of any of his entrenchments, and touch his opponent, anywhere. As soon as General McClellan approached the Chickahominy, he telegraphed to the President that the forces of the enemy were as large as his own, and would fight well. Such were the facts in all these departments.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE, AND OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DONE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

The question may now arise as to what might have been done, and ought to have been done, with the 660,000 men constituting the Union army at the time we are considering. Take one supposition, namely, 240,000 are assigned to the department under the immediate direction of General McClellan, 120,000 are placed under General Buell, and 80,000 under General Halleck, 200,000 being reserved for any exigencies required. Of the forces under General McClellan, 60,000 are placed under General Banks near Harper's Ferry, and 60,000 more under General Wool at Fortress Monroe, all the forces in Western Virginia being concentrated and held in readiness to move at a moment's warning. When all was in readiness here, General Banks would cross over by Harper's Ferry and other convenient places, and move down the Shenandoah valley, and thus flank the Confederates at Manassas and in Northern Virginia; the forces in Western Virginia being, in the meantime, commanded to move down to Staunton, and reinforce General Banks when he might arrive in that vicinity. While General Banks should make this movement, General McClellan should have moved out with more than 100,000 men in front of the central Confederate force under General Johnston at Centerville and Manassas; while General Wool, landing 60,000 men at Bermuda Hundred, should seize all the Confederate communications south of James river, and capture, if deemed expedient, Richmond itself. All the Confederate forces, being thus encircled by forces greater than their own, would inevitably, by a con-

centric and simultaneous movement of the Union armies, have been crushed and captured. No military man, or civilian of ordinary understanding, will doubt the practicability of such an arrangement and movement of our forces, or of the certainty that thereby the Confederate army in Virginia would have been annihilated and Richmond captured before the close of 1861.

In the Western Department, General Buell, of course, should not have moved until after the ironclad fleet was in readiness. General Halleck, however, should have promptly moved his heavy columns upon Price, and driving him headlong out of Missouri, and freeing that State from all invaders, should have passed down through Arkansas to the Mississippi, thus flanking all the Confederate positions on the river above, and necessitating the evacuation of such places. As soon as the fleet was in readiness, the identical move of Commodore Foote and General Grant upon Forts Henry and Donelson should have been made. These places having been captured, Grant and Foote, the former reinforced, should have passed up the Cumberland, and stopped, not, as they did under command and protest, at Clarksville, but should have pushed forward to Nashville, and captured that city,—an event, as afterwards appeared, perfectly practicable. Having accomplished this object, General Grant should have moved north, and confronted General Johnston in his retreat from Bowling Green, with General Buell in hot pursuit. But one destiny could have awaited this Confederate army under such circumstances,—its utter capture or dispersion. The way would now have been prepared for a movement of our fleet and a large army down the Mississippi, New Orleans being its last stopping place. While this should have been going on, all available forces east and west should have been precipitated upon the Carolinas and the Confederate States east of the Mississippi. By such dispositions and movements of our great armies, who can doubt that there would have been a total collapse of the Rebellion by the 4th July, 1862? The plan which we have sketched for the Western Department is, as we have intimated, and as will appear hereafter, identical with that formally developed by General Fremont for the conduct of the campaign in this department. Plans like

that above indicated would very readily have suggested themselves to any commander at all familiar with the great campaigns of ancient and modern times; and during this war, as all whom I corresponded with by letter or verbally upon the subject are aware, it was a matter of the deepest grief to my mind that for the want of a proper plan for the conduct of the war, a million of lives were being sacrificed when not a hundred thousand should have been, and thousands of millions of treasure were being expended when but a corresponding number of hundreds of millions should have been.

WHAT WAS DONE IN THESE DEPARTMENTS.

The mighty armies of which we have been speaking were raised and trained for a specific purpose—the putting down of a rebellion, and the doing of this with a promptitude and energy which would be an honour to the nation, and a lesson, never to be forgotten, for all who might be disposed to repeat such outrages in future. While the nation furnished these leaders such immense forces, Providence, up to January 1862, favoured them with the best conceivable weather for the movement of armies. General McClellan promised the President, on assuming his command, that “the war should be short, sharp, and decisive.” In the presence of a body of soldiers, the President and Secretary of War standing by, he said, “Soldiers, we have had our last retreat. We have seen our last defeat.” The same sentiment was intimated in his General Order on assuming command of the armies of the United States. These pledges were spread out most approvingly by the press before the nation, and “assurance of hope” gladdened the people. Their expectations were heightened by the announcement that Generals Halleck and Buell were the men whom our young chief had selected, on account of the accordance of their views and purposes with his. What qualities did these men reveal during the following months? The power of pre-eminent and unexampled immobility. “Their strength was to stand still,”—and here they evinced a power seemingly omnipotent. Day after day, national expectation was outraged by the

dull announcement, "All is quiet on the Potomac." All, too, was equally quiet under Buell and Halleck. Not an inch of the "sacred soil" was arrested from the Confederates by the immense forces under the immediate command of our "Young Napoleon;" nor was there a single movement made which looked in that direction. Not a single battery held by hostile forces on the Lower Potomac was silenced, though all those batteries lay in the immediate presence of our immense fleets and armies, the fleet asking but 4,000 troops to insure the free navigation of the river. Forty thousand Confederates, distributed over a line of about 300 miles in extent, held undisturbed possession of Central and Southern Kentucky, and that in the presence of more than 100,000 centralized forces under General Buell. Less than 30,000 men, under General Price, held quiet possession of more than one-third of the State of Missouri, and that in the presence of an immense army under General Halleck. Nor were there the remotest indications that this stolid immobility would ever have been disturbed, in any decisive manner, had not an absolute order from the President compelled our armies to move by the 22nd February, 1862. Our Commander-in-Chief and his two conferrees have, in one fundamental respect, the high merit of perfect originality in the science of war, namely, the origination of the doctrine that the true method to "conquer a peace," or subdue a rebellion, and this in a "quick, short, and decisive" manner, and with no backward movement or loss of a battle, is to raise, organise, and discipline immense and overwhelming armies, and then to keep "all quiet on the Potomac" and everywhere else, and permit the enemy to do everywhere just as he pleases. It was during these months of stupid inaction that the Adjutant-General of France visited this country, and, after a careful scrutiny of the status of our armies, made to his Government at home the report given in the Introduction. It is only within the circle of our own national history that events at all parallel to those under consideration can be found.

EVENTS WHICH DID TRANSPIRE IN THESE DEPARTMENTS
DURING THIS PERIOD OF INACTIVITY.

Little events become objects of national interest when the public mind is in a state of wakeful expectancy in respect to important occurrences. Three events, at the time we are considering, did occur in the department of Washington, events which have place in history. One is the unfortunate affair at Ball's Bluff, on the Virginia side of the Potomac; an affair in which, on October 21st, we lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, upwards of 1,000 men,—the lamented Colonel Baker, Senator from Oregon, being among the killed. A careful reader of all the facts of the case will find himself utterly at a loss to determine upon whom to lay the main responsibility. An order from General McClellan to General Stone, in command of our forces in Maryland, opposite Leesburg, informed the latter that General McCall was at Dranesville, and desired General Stone to "keep a good look-out on Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them (the enemy) away." The order is concluded with this suggestion, "Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them." Under this suggestion, General Stone ordered Colonel Devens to cross over "opposite Harrison's Island," and make the demonstration suggested. This order contained every caution which prudence could demand in the making reconnoissances, and this with a positive command to "return to his present position, unless he shall see one on the Virginia side, near the river, which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced, and one which can be successfully held against largely superior forces. In such case, he will hold on and report." Thinking that he had found such a position, he did report, and was reinforced by Colonel Baker with a California regiment. In their final position, they were attacked by overwhelming odds, and slaughtered, as stated. If any one can discover real blame anywhere here, they can find what the writer cannot. Such disasters are common in war under the most prudent commanders. One fact connected with this unhappy affair involves somebody in infinite criminality. As the affair was re-

garded, the entire facts not being known, as a disgrace to our armies, twenty-four hours after the event General McClellan telegraphed to the President from General Stone's head-quarters, that he had investigated, and "General Stone is without blame." As much discussion arose in Congress on the subject, and charges of wrong thrown at one and another individual, on the 8th February, by order of General McClellan, General Stone was arrested, and confined, in Forts Lafayette and Hamilton, until the 16th August, when he was released by an order from the War Department. On returning to Washington, search was made in vain in the War and Adjutant-General's Departments for any order for the arrest of General Stone, or any record of his arrest. General Halleck, the Commander-in-Chief, knew nothing of the matter. As the affair now stands, General McClellan appears before this nation as having arbitrarily, on his exclusive responsibility, arrested and held in durance vile a worthy General whom the man who made the arrest and caused the imprisonment had declared to be innocent.

On the 20th December a party of about 4,000 men, on a foraging expedition in the direction of Dranesville, and under command of General Ord, were attacked by General Stuart with a brigade about 2,500 strong. The Confederates were defeated, with the loss, on their part, as they stated, of 230 men; we losing nine killed and sixty wounded. The bravery evinced by our troops in this battle, and the chagrin occasioned by the Ball's Bluff affair, together with a desire to finish up the war and return home, excited throughout the Union army an almost irrepressible demand to be led against the enemy. Finding this feeling too strong to remain unheeded, our commander did put his great army in array, and marched out into the open country in front of the enemy's fortifications, thus challenging them to come out and fight him. As they remained quiet in their stronghold, our grand army marched back again, and "all was quiet on the Potomac."

While the expedition under General Burnside was being fitted out, our Commander-in-Chief was requested to en-

ploy the fleet, and a military force only 4,000 strong, to open the Potomac by destroying the Confederate batteries, to which I have referred. The force required was positively promised, and then withheld under the plea that they could not be landed on the Virginia shore at the place required. On the admiral in command of the fleet affirming that he would be responsible for the landing of the men, provided they were furnished him, another absolute pledge was given that the required force of 4,000 men should be furnished at a specific time. Again the promised force was withheld, under the plea that the measure would bring on a general battle. Just as if a general battle in front of Washington could be occasioned by the destruction of a few batteries on the Lower Potomac. Just as if, also, our Commander-in-Chief, with his great army, was not in Washington for the specific purpose of ending the war by fighting a great battle. The commander of our fleet now requested the privilege of going to sea, and not suffering the mortification and disgrace of remaining idle where he was. Thus during that autumn and winter the Potomac remained closed, and our immense army, and all the population of Washington, were held in dependence for all provisions and supplies upon a single railroad.

Events most humiliating to our country now remain to be told. The Confederates, representing themselves as 200,000 strong, boldly pushed their lines forward, and occupied Centerville, Fairfax Court House, and finally Munson's Hill, an elevation which overlooks the city. In these localities, particularly at the place last named, the nation was informed that there were present at least 100,000 men, that their fortifications, which were mounted with the heaviest ordnance, were of the most formidable character. After long delays and painful hesitations, however, our Commander-in-Chief did resolve to "take up his legs," and move upon the enemy at Munson's Hill. On the night, however, of darkness and terror, tears and blood, when the formidable movement was to have been made, the enemy was informed of the fact by signals from the city, and beat a mocking retreat. When our forces took possession of the place, what did they find

there? A low line of breastworks, with no ditch or anything else to protect them; works mounted with terrific engines of war, namely, one immense gun constructed out of a large stove pipe, and large logs of wood painted black, and so shaped as to appear to be huge cannon. So when the Confederates retreated from their advanced positions at Centerville, their fortifications were found to have been of a similar character, and to have been mounted with a terrific line of huge quaker-guns. General McClellan did not discover in all these revelations how illusive were his ideas of the numbers of the forces before him; nor did his mind seem at all to appreciate the humiliation and chagrin which the nation suffered from such facts. Our "Young Napoleon" turned out to be, not, what the nation supposed, "a mighty man, a man of renown," but, like Seraiah of old, "a quiet prince," whose stagnant imperturbability nothing, not even the spectacle of national dishonour, moved.

In the same state of stagnant immobility did the immense forces put under Generals Halleck and Buell remain. If the Confederates had planned our campaigns throughout, our 660,000 brave men, who were praying to be led against their foes, and thus enjoy an early return to the bosoms of their families, could not have been held in a state of more perfect inactivity than they were, an inactivity which we have never been able to explain but upon one hypothesis—an immutable determination, on the part of the three commanders under consideration, not to end the war by the collision of armies.

While these events were transpiring, public attention was being turned from what was not being done at the points where the only real issues of the war lay, to an unimportant expedition which was being fitted out under General Burnside for some southern locality. On the 11th and 12th January, this expedition sailed, an expedition consisting of thirty-one steam gunboats, carrying ninety-four guns and some 11,500 men. The results of this expedition, ably conducted as it was, were the capture of Roanoke Island, of Newbern, on the Neuse river, and other places in that part of North Carolina. In a short time, however, the little army was dispersed among so many places deemed necessary to be held, as to be utterly powerless

for aggressive movements in the interior. So matters remained, with the necessity of continuous reinforcements at each point, until the close of the war. This expedition, however, is instructive in many points of view. Some of them we will now refer to.

This expedition, like the many others which were projected during this war, had no bearing upon any issue on which the finale of the conflict depended. Instead of accomplishing any important purposes for the Union cause, they all in common acted as terrible irritants upon the surface of the Rebellion, increasing the intensity and endurance of its spirit, and multiplying the forces of the Confederacy.

The results of this expedition, we remark in the next place, fully explain a mystery which hangs over this war—the fact that we had such immense forces in the field, and yet that our central armies were always too weak to settle the issues pending upon their movements. As General Burnside, for example, entered North Carolina, and captured Roanoke Island, Newbern, Beaufort, and Fort Macon, their permanent occupancy became, it was thought, a necessity. Hence, in a short time, his army was broken up into small bodies located at unsupporting distances from one another, and the central force was rendered by continuous depletion too weak for aggressive action. So it was with our armies advanced into the Confederate States. The permanent occupancy of each place taken was thought a necessity. Hence it was that in a short time after the war commenced, our weakness for offensive movements was in exact proportion to the amount of territory we had conquered. At the time we visited Washington, in January 1863, for example, we had, according to the official report of the Secretary of War, upwards of 800,000 men, “well armed and equipped,” in the field. Yet, when it was required, in order to accomplish a movement which, as all admitted, would finish up the campaign in Virginia that winter,—when it was required, for such a movement, that some 60,000 men should be drawn from all this immense force and concentrated at Fortress Monroe, our Secretary of War, Commander-in-Chief, and even the President, were at an utter loss to

know where such a force could be found. The reason was the vast amount of conquered territory occupied by our forces located everywhere at unsupporting distances from one another. Wise commanders never thus disperse their armies. When hostile armies are in the field, places are never occupied but exclusively for strategic purposes. Such commanders act with exclusive reference to one fixed purpose—the destruction of the opposing army. This end being accomplished, places are easily taken possession of. Such, however, is not the form of wisdom which dwelt with our commanders. We told President Lincoln, at the time referred to, that it would require 2,000,000 men to subdue the Rebellion on the principles on which the war had, up to that time, been conducted, whereas 500,000 properly employed were all that were needed, — a statement fully verified by subsequent events.

In judging of this North Carolina expedition as a military measure, two additional considerations should be taken into account—the number of men at the time in the Confederate armies in Virginia and the Carolinas, according to the estimate of our Commander-in-Chief, and the use which might have been made of the forces under General Burnside. The Confederate army in front of Washington, and in North-eastern Virginia, amounted at that time, according to the avowed estimate of General McClellan, to about 150,000 men; the position at Manassas being then connected with North Carolina by ample railroad communications. If so many men were confronting Washington, what vast numbers of additional forces must there have been in all the rest of Virginia and the Carolinas. With such an estimate of the Confederate forces available for offence and defence, what infinite folly and presumption are implied in sending off 11,500 men to capture and occupy such places as Roanoke Island, Newbern, Beaufort, Washington, and Fort Macon. The fact that so small a force was permitted to capture and hold undisturbed possession of so many places in such an important part of so great a State, would have convinced any commander of ordinary capacities that he had fundamentally erred in the estimate referred to. The veil,

however, before the face of our commander remained as before.

Before General Burnside sailed south, we wrote on to Washington proposing that the first use made of his armament should be the following—that as soon as the fleet and army were ready he should be reinforced by all the forces at Fortress Monroe that could possibly be spared; that he should then sail, not south, but up the Potomac, and disembark his land forces at a point near Hoes' Ferry; that while the land forces should flank the batteries, to which we have before referred, on the land, the fleet should do the same on the river, side; that these batteries being captured, General Burnside should push on and capture Fredericksburg, that he should then march west, and when, at a point designated, he should be joined by a force of at least 60,000 men sent secretly down from Washington, should move on and capture the Confederate communications between Manassas and Richmond; and that, while this was being done, General McClellan should move his whole remaining army to the front of the Confederate position at Manassas, making this movement in such a manner as to separate the enemy's forces there from those in the northern part of the State. Who can doubt that if these measures had been adopted the annihilation of the Confederate army under consideration, and with that the overthrow of the Rebellion in Virginia and the Carolinas, would have been a question of but a few weeks' time? We are well assured that this plan was promptly laid before the military authorities at Washington. Our Commander-in-Chief, however, was of too quiet a spirit to entertain any question of such a character.

To represent still further the state of things in our army at Washington, we would here refer to a plan of operations submitted to General McClellan during this waiting period by General McDowell. In the communication which we read before President Lincoln and others in January 1863, we remarked that at any time during the fall or winter of 1861 an army of 80,000 men might have been secretly moved down to the vicinity of Aquia village, and from thence, by a march of some fourteen

or fifteen miles, to Bealton, where they would seize and hold all the Confederate communications south of Manassas. While this was being done, General McClellan might have moved out, with the remainder of his army, into the front of the place designated, and thus have placed the Confederate army there between two resistless masses, between which it would have been inevitably crushed, or have surrendered without a battle. When we read this statement to General McDowell, he remarked, "This is very singular," and then took from his desk and read a document containing the identical plan above indicated, specifying the same precise number of men to be sent down, and the same places to which they should be sent, with the identical front movement specified. This plan was laid before General McClellan, when the condition of the Potomac army was well nigh intolerable, the previous rains having rendered the narrow lanes between the lines of huts and tents occupied by the soldiery almost impassable. The plan, if adopted, would have brought the army out upon dry land, where their condition would have been infinitely improved, and all military movements unimpeded. Our Commander-in-Chief, however, seemed to have had an infinite tenacity for mud, and never seemed more quiet than when his army was too deeply mired to be moved at all, or was lying still amid the marshes of the Chickahominy, and dying piecemeal from drinking swamp water.

CHAPTER V.

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

THE longest period has its termination. So it was with the listless quietude of our armies. A general order issued by the President January 27th, 1862, absolutely required "that the 22nd day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces." The particular day was specified because it was the birthday of the father of our country,—a very inadequate reason, surely, for a determination of the time for the movement of great armies. On the 31st of the same month the President issued another order absolutely requiring a movement of the army of the Potomac upon the Confederate forces at Manassas prior to "the 22nd day of February next." These orders disturbed the stolid immobility of our Commander-in-Chief. A movement in some direction must be made, and "that right early." But whither, and in what form, shall the movement be made, were questions about which the sagacious mind of General McClellan seemed to have come to no positive decision. Up to a short time previous he had avowed an intention to let his first blow fall upon the Confederates at Manassas. But when the period for action drew near, another plan suggested itself—a surprise of the enemy, by moving his great army, by water, around to Urbana on the Rappahannock, or to Fortress Monroe, and from thence move upon Richmond before the enemy at Manassas could know what was being done. The chief matter of surprise in such a case is that the suggestion that such an army could be moved by such means, and the enemy not know it, did not convince the President and his

advisers of the utter incompetency of the General in command to plan a campaign or move an army anywhere. The idea of the new movement, however, took full possession of the mind of its originator, and in a council of war with his twelve division commanders he gained a vote of eight in its favour; one given conditionally and four against it,—Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Barnard voting in the negative, and General Keyes conditionally in its favour. The great impediment now arose—to gain the assent of the President and his immediate advisers to such an obviously ill-advised measure, a measure to which their repugnance was well nigh irresistible. That repugnance, however, was at length overcome, the President and Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, consenting on the express conditions—that the navigation of the Potomac should be previously opened; that a sufficient force should be left behind to render the city of Washington perfectly secure against effective attacks from the enemy; and that the contemplated movement should “begin as early as the 18th March instant.” This permission, dated March 8th, was accompanied with an absolute order “that the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy’s batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.” This order was accompanied by another of the same date, requiring that the army of the Potomac, now consisting, according to official report, of 222,196 men, be divided into five army corps, to be commanded by Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, and Banks; and that this order should be executed with such promptness as not to “delay the commencement of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the army of the Potomac.”

While these matters were going on, the army and the authorities and people at Washington were startled with rumours that the enemy had wholly withdrawn their forces from Manassas and Northern Virginia. Careful reconnoissance soon verified these rumours, and our grand army moved out and took possession of the formidable places in their front; thereby gaining important experience, as our commander stated, in the business of breaking up camps

and making marches. After reposing for four days amidst "the Quaker guns" by which this great General had been previously overawed, that grand army marched back again to their former cantonments.

While our army lay at Manassas, we wrote on to a member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War the following plan for the coming campaign—that General Banks should move his corps rapidly down the Shenandoah valley; that when he had arrived opposite our grand army he should be reinforced by another corps of sufficient numbers to render his force from 60,000 to 80,000 strong; that while the grand army should move directly upon the army in their front, the right wing of our central force being kept in constant communication with that under General Banks, the latter force should, by forced marches, move down the valley, capture Staunton, and then seize the Richmond and Tennessee railroad. This being done, all our forces, flanking the enemy on both wings, should press his forces into Richmond, when their capture would be only a question of time. In the same communication we stated definitely that no important movement should be made up the Peninsula from Fortress Monroe. To do this, we remarked, was to make a movement of greater peril than any other, and one also which, if effective, would merely drive the Confederate armies off into the country and render their capture more difficult than now. When we made this suggestion, we had never heard even a rumour that any fundamental movement in that direction had been thought of. At that time, also, we were ignorant, though we had often inquired upon the subject, that Bermuda Hundred was left unfortified by the Confederates. As soon as we learned this, we ever after contended that all movements upon Richmond should be made by a central army moving down as above indicated; while another army, 60,000 or 80,000 strong, should be landed at the point designated, and, by a movement westward from thence, should seize all the Confederate communications south of James river. Every reflecting mind will perceive at once, however, that had the plan which we suggested and stated above been adopted, and executed with vigour, the whole Confederate army in Virginia would have been at our

mercy in four weeks' time. Our great army, upwards of 200,000 strong, would have been kept together; all its movements and actions would have been unified and centralized for the one great issue before it; and success would have been as certain as anything future, and dependent upon human agency, can be. When we learned that the plan of transporting our central army down to that Lower Peninsula had been adopted, we wrote on to Washington that no parallel could be found for such a measure in the history of all past ages, and that I was quite sure that the future of the world would furnish no event at all like it.

FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIONS TO THIS MEASURE.

We are now fully prepared to consider the character of the measure under consideration; a measure which, as all now admit, the question "Who is to blame for the results?" aside, did, in fact, issue most calamitously to the nation. While we may safely challenge the world to offer a single valid consideration in favour of the movement, multitudinous objections of the most obvious and weighty character lie against it. One of its main merits, as presented by its author, was, that it would be a surprise to the Confederate commanders. In one respect it was a surprise to them, and to all the world, viz., that so crazy a plan could ever have dawned in the brain of any rational man. In the respect intended, the folly of our commander's calculations becomes manifest in the fact that three days after President Lincoln assented to the movement, the whole programme was discussed in the *Richmond Enquirer*. Let us now look directly at the fundamental objections which lie against this movement. We give these objections almost in the words in which they are found in the paper which we read before President Lincoln and others in January 1863.

1. While time was then most precious, and while, by the movement we have indicated, our army could have been brought in decisive collision with the enemy in less than two weeks, nearly one month passed before the army, transported to Fortress Monroe, was able to begin a movement towards Richmond. In the absence of considerations

of the most weighty character—and none such existed—such delay is inexcusable.

2. By this measure, the grand army of the Potomac, one of the grandest that ever existed, was, instead of being unified and centralised in the relations of its parts, wholly broken up, and its independent fragments located at unsupported distances from each other, and this on a line of nearly 300 miles in extent. When the movement by the Lower Peninsula was determined on, General McClellan, we must bear in mind, was relieved from his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief, and assigned to one exclusive command, the forces sent with him to Fortress Monroe; his authority not even extending to General Wool, who commanded at this fortress. Let us, for a moment, consider this new status of this grand army. At Fortress Monroe we have one independent command under General Wool; in the Peninsula, a second under General McClellan; south of Washington, under General McDowell, a third; in the Shenandoah valley, a fourth under General Banks; in Western Virginia, a fifth under General Fremont; and at Washington, a sixth under General Wadsworth. Let any one take a map and look over the situation here presented, and compare it with the status of this grand army before this senseless dispersion occurred, and he will perceive at once that no army can be conceived to be in a better condition for offensive action than ours was before this dispersion occurred, or in a worse condition for offence or defence than was ours after it was thus broken into fragments. Only two of these bodies, those at Fortress Monroe and Washington, were safe for a moment from a concentrated assault from all the united armies of the Confederacy, armies located anywhere in Virginia and the Carolinas; while the body assaulted could not be aided at all by any other portion of the grand army. Any one can perceive, also, the absolute impossibility of unity of action in the parts of an army thus broken up, and thus distributed,—action for offensive or defensive operations. For this unparalleled dispersion of this army, General McClellan is to be held exclusively responsible, the arrangement being reluctantly assented to by the President and his advisers, and protested against, in the council of war

above referred to, by all the corps commanders present, General Keyes excepted, and he assenting only provisionally.

3. By this measure nearly one half of our grand army was detached for mere defensive, while the whole burden of offensive operations was thrown upon the other half, the forces under the immediate command of General McClellan. The detached forces under Generals McDowell, Banks, Fremont, and Wadsworth, amounting in all to nearly 100,000 men, were avowedly detained for one exclusive purpose, the defence of Washington and Western Virginia. The only portion that could act offensively was the single body about 130,000 strong, the body that was with General McClellan in the Peninsula. In the state in which that army was, "before the captivity" to the Peninsula, all its parts could, as we have seen, have been employed for one united service—offensive operations; the army, in all its movements, being always between the enemy and the national capital. When Buonaparte left Paris to meet the Allies who had invaded France, he left behind him, in the city, but 2,000 soldiers. Had our army, as a unity, moved upon the enemy, a larger number would not have been required to tarry behind at Washington. The Peninsula movement required that nearly 100,000 be left behind to protect the national capital. Such was the strategic wisdom of our "Young Napoleon," deliberately choosing to meet his foes with one half of the force at his command.

4. This movement, we remark, in the next place, permitted the Confederate generals to concentrate at will all their forces upon McClellan, or to detach, at any time, one or more of their army corps, and precipitate such bodies upon the unsupported forces under McDowell, Banks, or Fremont. If we had submitted to a council of Confederate generals the plan of dispersing and locating the broken fragments of our grand army so as to render the state of affairs the best possible for them, and the worst possible for us, the said council could not have devised a plan better adapted to those ends, than was that developed by General McClellan. Such was the actual division and location of the fragments of our army, that had the Confederate generals been able to have concentrated in Virginia a force of 125,000 men, the army of

McClellan would undeniably have been utterly routed, with the most of it captured; and this to have been followed by the dispersion of the army corps under McDowell and Banks, and the national capital in their hands, in less than two months' time. Their first measure would have been, probably, to have drawn McClellan into a position where his defeat and rout would have been certain—a measure perfectly practicable. Then they would have precipitated crushing masses, first upon Banks or McDowell, and then upon the other, and finally moved upon Washington. Or they might have sent 55,000 men to hold our army in the Peninsula in check, and with the remaining 70,000 have crushed Banks and McDowell, then have captured Washington, and, lastly, have disposed of McClellan. Nothing but the weakness of the Confederacy prevented the results under consideration, in one or the other of the forms indicated.

5. General McClellan was permitted to carry out the plan which he had developed, on the express condition that he should leave behind him a sufficient force to render Washington perfectly secure against any attack from the Confederates. Two most essential facts should be taken into the account here, in forming our estimate of his character as a general, and also of the plan of operations under consideration. We refer to his estimate of the amount of the Confederate forces immediately opposed to him on the one hand, and to the forces which he purposed to have left for the defence of Washington on the other. According to his own official statement, made a short time before he left for the Peninsula, March 8th, the Confederate army near and north of Manassas was 115,000 strong. According to another estimate made by himself, the Confederates had, under General Magruder at Yorktown, from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and 20,000 more under General Huger at Norfolk. If we place the remaining forces in Virginia and the Carolinas, forces available for the defence of "the sacred soil," at 30,000 (and General McClellan's estimate would have been larger than this), there stood opposed to our grand army a force not less than 180,000 strong. Such was the estimate of General McClellan of the amount of the Confederate forces

opposed to him, when he devised and executed his world-famed Peninsula campaign. Under such circumstances, no prudent general in command of a force no greater comparatively than that commanded by General McClellan at the time, would have divided his army at all; much less would he have separated that army into fragments located at unsupporting distances from each other, every one of which being less than the force which might, at any moment, be concentrated upon it. The best that can be said of the plan under consideration is, that a worse one is inconceivable, and that this wears but one aspect—a deliberate purpose to put that grand army into the hands of its enemies. No plan conceivable can be more absolutely adapted to that end than the one under consideration.

But what was his plan for the protection of Washington against that army of 115,000 men, which, as he reported, lay within a few miles of that city? He purposed to take to the Peninsula four entire corps of the Potomac army, leaving for the protection of the national capital the corps of General Banks, and 20,000 of the most poorly furnished and least trained troops in that army, under General Wadsworth. General McClellan affirms that he left for the end under consideration, including 35,467 men under Banks, in the valley of the Shenandoah, 67,428 men, with eighty-five pieces of field artillery. Yet, he left in front of these, according to his own estimate, a hostile force 115,000 strong; and that with the separate forces under Banks and Wadsworth at such distances from each other that they could have been separately assaulted and crushed by overwhelming forces. Judged by his own estimates, General McClellan can, by no possibility, be defended against the charge of the most senseless and absurd blundering known in war, or of a deliberate intent to put the national capital into the hands of the Confederates. Such an uncovering to overwhelming odds, of such a post as Washington, has no parallel in history.

But the forces which he intended to have left for the protection of Washington did not, by any means, amount to the number above stated, but to less than 55,000 men.

Granting to General Banks all that he is affirmed to have had, but 19,022 men were, according to the official report of General Wadsworth, present with him, and fit for duty. Nearly all of these were new and imperfectly disciplined, while three of the regiments in this small force were under orders from General McClellan to join divisions on their way to the Peninsula, and 4,000 more of these troops were ordered to Manassas to relieve General Sumner, so that he could embark to Yorktown. Judged by his own estimate of facts around him, and by other facts of the most palpable character, and on the hypothesis that it was the deliberate purpose of the commander of the army of the Potomac to put Washington into the hands of the Confederate generals, is it possible to conceive of a plan better adapted to that end than the one our General did adopt? We choose to impute to him ineffable stupidity rather than deliberate treason,—the only alternative which the case presents.

6. The circumstances in which this movement was planned and executed demand special attention in this connexion. At that very time it was a matter of painful doubt with the nation which should command James river and the Chesapeake, the *Merrimac* or the *Monitor*. The former had just, in a crippled condition, been towed up to Norfolk for repairs, and was expected out, in a few days, for a second round with its puny rival. With our army in the Peninsula, with all the Confederate forces concentrated in front, and the *Merrimac* in command of the river and bay designated, the capture of McClellan and his army could have been only a question of time. What must we think of a General who needlessly puts a great army in such circumstances of peril as these?

7. The next consideration which requires attention relatively to the plan of this campaign, pertains to the route selected for a movement upon Richmond. This route, as any one will perceive who will consult the maps and acquaint himself with the facts of the case, is the most difficult and perilous that could have been selected. First of all, a wide marsh extending quite across the Peninsula east of Yorktown had to be crossed, a marsh which could be readily defended against immense odds. Farther up,

there were narrows which were necessary to be passed, and which were of the most defensible character. Next, the dull stream of the Chickahominy presented still another formidable obstacle. Then the whole march of the army was through the most sickly region known in the United States, a region in which the army would be necessitated, by drinking swamp water, to become very generally affected with the most wasting disease. By this route, also, our army, if so happy as to reach its doubtful destination, would find itself before Richmond, on the side where, of all others, it was most defensible and most strongly fortified.

8. It was the only possible direction in which, we remark again, the city could possibly have been approached and all its important communications be left untouched. To besiege a place effectively, the end being its capture, it must be so approached that the besiegers shall hold all the essential communications of the place, and thus ensure its capture by starvation, if by nothing else. In the case before us, the place to be besieged was to be approached on the only side which would leave open every one of its important communications. The possibility of capturing the place under such circumstances was a matter of extreme doubt; while its capture, should the siege be a success, would be as utterly barren of decisive results as was that of Philadelphia by Lord Howe. The best that can be said of this route is that it was the very worst that could, by any possibility, have been selected.

9. This plan, we remark finally, was based throughout upon a totally false idea of the only true and proper mission for which the army of the Potomac was created, and put under the command of General McClellan. The mission of armies is, not to capture cities or fortresses, but to put down the military power by which such places are defended. Suppose that all the important cities and fortresses of the Confederacy had fallen into our hands, the armies of the Confederacy being, at the same time, intact in the field, and animated with the hope of success. We should have been in the worst condition conceivable, as far as final results were concerned. The armies of France in Spain, for example, always outnumbered those of Welling-

ton as three to one. Yet in all collisions in the field he was invariably successful. The reason is obvious. The great armies of France were distributed all over the Peninsula, and occupying their important cities and fortresses, thus rendering it impossible for them to keep large forces in the field,—the exact cause of our weakness during the war we are now considering. What was the exclusive idea which determined, in the mind of General McClellan, this Peninsula campaign? The delusive and fatal idea that the great mission of the army which he commanded was to get to Richmond, and besiege and capture that. On the other hand, the exclusive mission of that army was to annihilate the Confederate forces in Virginia, and thus insure the fall of Richmond, and with it the collapse of the Confederacy itself. Had his mind been possessed of the true idea of the exclusive mission of his great army, the conception of this Peninsula route to Richmond would never have approached his thoughts. The main reason assigned by General McClellan for the adoption of this idea was that the new route was the shortest and most practicable route to Richmond,—clearly evincing the fact that he was under the control of a totally false and vicious idea in regard to the mission of the army which he commanded. The most fundamental defects of the plan under consideration are twofold—that it had its exclusive origin in a totally false and vicious idea of the mission of this grand army, and that the army route selected to realize this vicious idea was the worst that, by any possibility, could have been selected.

THE MANNER IN WHICH GENERAL McCLELLAN EXECUTED,
OR RATHER FAILED TO EXECUTE, HIS PLAN.

We shall best understand, not only the character of this campaign, but the conduct of the war in general, by an immediate consideration of the manner in which this Peninsula campaign was executed, or rather finally collapsed by that disgraceful retreat to Harrison's Landing.

Relative amount of forces opposed to each other in this campaign.

In regard to the amount of forces furnished for the campaign—a most material fact to be considered—we need but to refer to the official statements of the General in command. His official report April 30th, 1862, when he was before Yorktown, gives the aggregate of his forces as 130,878, of which 112,392 were present and fit for duty. This, we suppose, does not include Franklin's division of 12,448 men, which was in the meantime sent to him. He thus had, on the arrival of this division, an effective force upwards of 124,000 strong, with a co-operative force 10,000 strong, under General Wool. When our army was lying on the Chickahominy a reinforcement 10,000 strong was at one time added to it, under General McCall. On the 20th June his returns to the Adjutant-General's office gave the total strength of his army as consisting of 156,838 men. Of these 115,102 were present for duty, 12,225 being reported as absent on special duty, sick, or under arrest, and 29,511 as absent on leave. If we put his losses prior to this date, losses in battle and by sickness, at 10,000 (a very small estimate), then it is safe to affirm that General McClellan took with him, and subsequently received from Washington, for his Peninsula campaign upwards of 165,000 men. If we add to these the co-operative force ever available for any important exigency, of 10,000 under General Wool, we put down the army furnished him at 175,000 men. Some very high authorities place the army actually furnished him, General Wool's division not reckoned, at 180,000 men. No authority places the number below the estimate which we have given. According to the highest Confederate authorities, authorities sustained by the most palpable facts, this immense army was never confronted by a force 100,000 strong.

Difficulties which presented themselves on the arrival of our army at Fortress Monroe.

On the 2nd April our commander arrived at Fortress Monroe, finding there his advanced force, consisting of some 58,000 men in all. All things on his arrival were

found to be mixed up and confused. The means of transportation, so desirable when a surprise is calculated upon, were found to be insufficient; information with respect to the force and position of the enemy was "vague and untrustworthy," and the maps which he ordered to be in readiness were imperfect, and in essential respects erroneous. All such facts, given in detail in our General's report, reveal most clearly that this route for an advance upon Richmond was selected on the basis, not of accurate information previously obtained, but upon a blind guess that the unknown would present less difficulties and greater advantages than the known. To these natural difficulties, however, a far greater one was superadded, that which lay in the constitution of our General's mind, the sentiment of fear and apprehension, which gave to the forces confronting him an overwhelming magnitude. While before Washington he feared to advance "with 20,000 men, against an enemy who confronted him with 10,000." Here, in the Peninsula, he feared to advance with 56,000 men against an enemy who confronted him with but 11,000. When outnumbering his antagonist as more than ten to one, he dared not turn the enemy's position by a flank movement, which could have been easily done in three days; he dared not attempt so hazardous an experiment, lest he should suffer another Ball's Bluff disaster.

The advance and the check of the grand army.

On the morning of April 3rd the grand army moved out in two columns: one on the old Yorktown road, and led by the divisions of Generals Porter and Hamilton of the Third Corps, and Sedgwick's division of the Second Corps, all under the command of General Heintzelman; and the other column, led by General Keyes, and consisting of the divisions of Generals Couch and W. F. Smith, on the Warwick road. A slow and continuous march of two days brought both these columns to a sudden standstill before the formidable fortifications which the indefatigable Confederate commander, General Magruder, had erected across these roads, the one on Warwick river, and the other in front and around Yorktown. After a careful survey of the situation, our commander gravely concluded

that a line of fortification thirteen miles in extent could nowhere be forcibly broken through, or safely flanked, and that, consequently, the enemy must be driven from his position by counter fortifications. This was mainly attempted at the point where the opposite fortifications were most formidable, in front of Yorktown. A full month was spent in erecting batteries and getting the ordnance in place, when the enemy, having gained all the time desired to get everything in order in and about Richmond, retired, and left our grand army and great commander "alone in their glory." It should be borne in mind here, that while upwards of 112,000 men lay thus idle, and held at bay, in the presence of 11,000 enemies, Franklin's division, upwards of 12,000 strong, lay in transports near the mouth of York river, and might have been landed on the north shore of that river, and by a flank movement have rendered the position at Yorktown untenable. Nothing can be more humiliating to any nation than was such a check of such an army before such a line of fortifications, and these defended by such a contemptible force. Yet, in these circumstances, as in all others, the same apparition haunted the mind of our "Young Napoleon" of overwhelming forces in his front, and we hear also the same "great and exceeding bitter cry" for reinforcements. In his communications to the President he affirmed, while lying with upwards of 100,000 men around him, and not one-tenth as many in his front, that he would probably have the whole Confederate army on his hands, "probably not less than 100,000 men, and possibly more." To quell this crying, Franklin's division was detached from McDowell, and sent down to the Peninsula. This, however, was not enough. Soon after, as we shall see, the apparition of opposing forces swelled to 200,000, and would unquestionably have swelled to 300,000 had his own army been under 250,000 strong.

The effect of this month's delay amid those deadly marshes was as great a loss of life to our army as would have been occasioned by an important battle, and upon its *morale* as bad as a defeat. Rev. J. J. Marks, D.D., in his account of this campaign, says, "In a short time the sick in our hospitals were numbered by thousands, and many

died so suddenly that the disease had all the aspect of a plague." General J. G. Barnard, General McClellan's Engineer-in-Chief, in his report, says, "We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army; and toil and hardships, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired their *morale*. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy, we have tasted to our heart's content." In the judgment of our general, however, the matter at Yorktown was a great triumph to our arms, a triumph so great that he suggested to the President the idea that the regiments constituting the army of the Potomac should be permitted to have inscribed upon their banners the word YORKTOWN.

The advance from Yorktown.

As soon as it was known that Yorktown had been evacuated, a vigorous pursuit was ordered, a pursuit headed by General Stoneman, with four regiments, a squadron of cavalry, and four batteries of horse artillery. This advance was followed by the divisions of Hooker and Kearny on the Yorktown, and by those of Casey, Couch, and W. F. Smith, on Winn's Mill road. In front of Williamsburg, the advance was checked by the Confederate forces occupying Fort Magruder, which was located at the junction of all the roads leading farther up the Peninsula. The fortifications here presented were quite formidable, and every preparation had been made for a strong resistance, this being done by cutting down the forests on the right and left, and by filling the open ground in front with rifle pits. Had General McClellan been with the advance we should probably have had another delay here, such as we had before Yorktown. As it was, the next morning after the pursuit was commenced found the advanced division under the dauntless Hooker in the immediate presence of the enemy. Knowing that there were at least 30,000 of our troops in supporting distance from him, not over two miles away, and that the main army was just in their rear, Hooker opened the battle at 7.30 a.m., and, strange to relate, had to sustain the fight single handed until 4.30 p.m. At this time General Kearny arrived with his division, pushed to the front, and allowed

Hooker to act as a reserve. Before night set in, the several advanced divisions had gained such advantages as to render the place untenable. In this battle we lost 456 killed, 1,400 wounded, and 372 missing,—2,228 in all; 1,575 of these being from the single division of Hooker. Towards evening General McClellan arrived at the front, and at 10 p.m. sent to Washington the following lugubrious dispatch:—"After arranging for a movement up York river, I was urgently sent for here. I find Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, *probably greater a good deal than my own*, and very strongly entrenched. Hancock has taken two redoubts, and repulsed Early's brigade by a real charge with the bayonet, taking one colonel and 150 prisoners, killing at least two colonels and as many lieutenant-colonels, and many privates. His conduct was brilliant in the extreme. I do not know our exact loss, but fear Hooker has lost considerably on our left. I learn from prisoners that they intend to dispute every step to Richmond. I shall run the risk of at least holding them in check here, while I assume the original plan. My entire force is, undoubtedly, considerably inferior to that of the Rebels, who will fight well; but I will do all I can with the force at my disposal."

While our commander was writing such Jeremiads, "the Rebels" whom he hoped to "hold in check here" were leaving with such precipitation that they left all their badly wounded as prisoners of war. On awaking the next morning, and learning the real facts, he announced a complete victory, with "some 300 uninjured prisoners, and more than a thousand wounded in our hands."

The distribution of our army on the Chickahominy.

With no incidents worthy of special regard in a history like the present, our entire army, on the 22nd May, found itself quietly located on the Chickahominy; Norfolk in the meantime having been abandoned by the Confederates, and taken possession of by our forces under General Wool. We now have a special opportunity to judge of the real generalship of General McClellan. For the first time since he assumed the command of a great army we find him in circumstances in which a decisive

collision was certain to occur between his and the concentrated forces of the Confederates, and in which he was expected to assume the offensive. One of the special peculiarities of a great commander will be found in a wise disposition and arrangement of his forces for offensive and defensive operations. No opportunity will be allowed for a surprise, and no one part of the army will be left in a readily assailable position out of the reach of a ready and adequate support from the rest of the army. It is a well-known principle in the science of war that when a river separates the parts of an army from one another, that said stream should be covered with such a number of bridges that the army can be moved back and forth over the stream as readily as if it were not there. For a General to place his army on the two sides of a stream, when and where these conditions of support do not exist, is to leave the parts exposed to attack at the mercy of the enemy. In all the respects indicated, and they are all fundamental, the arrangement of our army in the position under consideration was in utter violation of the known principles of the science of war. This line, extending from Mechanicsville down the Chickahominy, and across the river to Fair Oaks, was at least twenty-five miles in extent. This is a capital error in war, the error which occasioned the defeat of Archduke Charles at Wagram, an error which creates a liability to have the line broken in the centre, and the sundered parts destroyed in detail, or to have the whole line rolled up by overwhelming assaults upon either wing. But the most fundamental error of General McClellan's line remains to be designated. As soon as his line was established on the Chickahominy, and a single bridge on his extreme left was erected, two entire corps, Keyes's first, and then Heintzelman's, were passed over and established on the south side of that stream. The two divisions of Keyes were advanced, far beyond any immediate support, to within about six miles of Richmond; Casey's division being stationed at Fair Oaks on the York River Railroad, and Couch's at Seven Pines, about one mile to the south-east on the Williamsburg road. At some three to four miles east of Keyes lay the corps of Heintzelman; Kearny's division on the railroad back of

Savage's Station, and Hooker on the Williamsburg road. The nearest support to these troops, the only body from which help in any important exigency could be received, was the Central Corps under General Sumner, a corps which lay some six miles off, on the north side of the Chickahominy. At Richmond lay the centralised Confederate army, more than 150,000 strong according to the avowed estimate of General McClellan, its real number not being then over 50,000.

The following facts will enable the reader to form a distinct apprehension of the state or distribution of our army at this time. The Chickahominy is a sluggish stream, nowhere fordable except at very low water. It runs through a swampy, miry bottom from one half a mile to a mile wide, the bottom being bordered by low and irregular bluffs. This stream, at a distance of from ten to fifteen miles north of Richmond, runs in a direction a little south of east, and enters the James river some twenty to thirty miles distant from the location of our army, which was distributed north of Richmond. Our army, of course, found all the bridges over the stream broken down. As soon as a single bridge on our left was completed, the two corps named were passed over and located as stated, that of Keyes about midway between the crossing and Richmond, and that of Heintzelman some three or four miles nearer the bridge; the two corps being out of supporting distance from each other, and their nearest support being, as stated, some six miles distant on the opposite side of the stream. The formation of our army corresponded to two sides of a triangle: the apex being at the bridge designated; the northern side consisting of the centre and right wing, extending some ten to fifteen miles in a north-western direction to Mechanicsville, a place located some five or six miles north of this stream; while the other side terminated, as stated, at Fair Oaks,—the full extent of our line being upwards of twenty-five miles. There was no bridge at all, be it remembered, between the separated parts of our army; the only bridges over the stream being the one at the apex referred to and the railroad bridge, which was near this. Can we conceive of a worse distribution of forces than we have in this case?

Had it been the deliberate purpose of our General—no such motive being attributed to him—to ensure the capture of the two corps located south of that stream, that of General Keyes especially, it is impossible to conceive of dispositions better adapted to that end than were those actually made.

Battle of Fair Oaks.

General Johnston, who commanded at Richmond at this time, was too wise a commander not to discern the opportunity thus put into his hands, and made instant arrangements to avail himself of it. Before General Keyes had time to fortify his position, the main body of the Confederate forces were in motion. According to the original arrangements, the battle was to have been commenced early in the morning, May 31st. The excessive rains of the previous afternoon and night, however, rendered it impossible for the attack to be made before 1 p.m. At this time, Casey's division being suddenly and unexpectedly assailed by overwhelming forces, in front and on both wings, was, after a most heroic and obstinate resistance, thrown into confusion, and in utter rout driven back upon General Couch's division at Seven Pines. This body, after a similar resistance, was hurled back in a similar state, while the whole corps rushed, a mingled mass, the Confederates in hot pursuit, in the direction of that of General Heintzelman.

As soon as the roar of the guns at Fair Oaks was heard, General Sumner, who was constructing two bridges over the Chickahominy, one having been carried away by the floods, made every possible effort to cross his corps over the remaining one. This bridge was in such an imperfect state that only infantry, a few in a line, and a few field guns, could be got over. At about 6.30 p.m., just as the Confederates were interposing between Keyes and Heintzelman, for the purpose of first capturing the former and then destroying the latter, Sumner, with Sedgwick's division of his corps, came upon the field and filled the gap which the Confederates were about to occupy. By this interposition, the battle was protracted until darkness terminated the conflict.

In the morning, after two or three hours' indecisive fighting, the Confederates retired unpursued from the field, and after stopping for the rest of the day to gather up the spoils on the grounds which had been occupied by the corps of General Keyes, leisurely returned to Richmond.

In this battle, General McClellan admits a loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, of 5,739 men; the Confederates admitting a loss of upwards of 4,000. The rain and flood, which necessarily delayed the advance of the Confederates from Richmond, prevented the destruction of the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman,—that of the former without a question. In his despatches, General McClellan, as if to divert attention from his own errors, charged that "Casey's division gave way unaccountably, and discredibly." That division did not give way until more than one-third of its number lay dead or wounded upon the bloody field; Keyes's corps losing 4,000 out of 12,000 men. In this battle General Johnston was severely wounded, and General Lee succeeded him as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Confederacy. Soon after this, the bridges being completed, our whole army was established on the south side of the Chickahominy; the corps of General Porter and the division of General McCall located at Mechanicsville, excepted.

What should have been done when General McClellan lay before Yorktown, or when he arrived upon the Chickahominy.

Success in war depends fundamentally upon what is denominated *economy of forces*. A great commander so plans his campaigns that every form of force under his control is made available and efficient for the grand result at which he aims. All small bodies are brought into requisition, and so located as to render efficient help. Wellington, for example, so disposed of the parts of his army at Waterloo, that cowards who could not be made to stand a direct fire or charge at all, performed a part of service as important as that rendered by veterans. Let us apply this principle to the case under consideration. When General McClellan lay at Yorktown, he asked for the addition to his army of General Franklin's division; making that army upwards of 130,000 strong. Suppose

that Franklin had been retained where he was, and that the contingent asked for had been made up from the commands of Burnside and Wool,—a measure perfectly practicable. With this force, General McClellan moves up and establishes himself on the Chickahominy. While this was being done, all the forces under Generals McDowell, Banks, Fremont, and Franklin (General Wadsworth and his forces being left in the garrisons at Washington), are combined into a second army for a co-operative movement upon the army of General Lee, and Richmond. All these combined would constitute an army at least 90,000 strong, and these could have been readily increased to 100,000 by forces brought in from other departments. This army should have moved upon the Confederates from the west and north-west of Richmond; while McClellan, passing his over the Chickahominy, should have moved direct upon the city, keeping his right wing in communication with the left of the co-operative forces. Here we should have had a real economy of all the forces available for this Virginia campaign; and who can doubt the practicability of such a disposition of our armies, or the certainty of their speedy success? As it was, nearly 100,000 men were held in stupid idleness, and more than 175,000, after being wasted with disease, were driven in disgrace from the Chickahominy down upon James river. To us, it has ever been a matter of unutterable wonder that such obvious combinations of the national forces as that above indicated did not occur to our Generals in command, and that when the necessity of just such combinations was continuously and importunately urged, and backed up by the highest influence, upon our military authorities in Washington, the importance of said combinations could not be appreciated. Our leading commanders and military authorities manifested infinite skill in one direction only—the art of scattering and wasting, instead of economising, the forces intrusted to their direction.

Events which preceded the retreat to Harrison's Landing.

We have already stated the facts pertaining to the separation of the portion of the Potomac army which did not follow McClellan to the Peninsula,—a separation and

distribution which left the disunited parts exposed to be slaughtered in detail, as the enemy might choose. No sooner was McClellan established in the Peninsula than General Johnston concentrated the main portion of his army at Richmond, leaving Jackson to guard against any advances from Western Virginia and down the Shenandoah valley. As soon as General Banks, in his advance down the valley referred to, had left one of the divisions of his corps under General Shields in front of Winchester, and taken the other to Manassas to relieve the corps of General Sumner, that it might go with General McClellan, General Jackson precipitated the force under his command upon the division under General Shields. In a battle fought March 23rd, the former was signally defeated, by the superior generalship of the latter, and compelled to retire precipitately back to his former position. Becoming apprehensive of a combination between the forces of Fremont and Banks for a flank movement such as we have indicated should have been made, Jackson determined to anticipate the event by a sudden advance, first against Fremont, and then against Banks. Having been largely reinforced, he left General Ewell to hold General Banks in check, and moved, May 7th, with the rest of his command, *via* Staunton, up into the mountain region. General Milroy, whose force was nearest the advance of the invaders, retreated to McDowell, and there awaited reinforcements. At about 8 or 9 a.m., May 13th, a friend of ours, Dr. Dorsey, a surgeon in our army, from whom we received the following account, had, with several associates, ascended to the roof of the house where they were stopping, and were surveying the scene around them. They had been there but a few moments when Dr. Dorsey called the attention of his associates to certain dark lines which had become visible, and which were circling the elevations but a few miles distant. General Milroy was instantly sent for, who pronounced the moving forces before them to be the advance of General Jackson's army. At 10 o'clock the same morning, General Schenck arrived with several thousand reinforcements, having marched his brigade from Franklin, thirty-four miles distant, in twenty-three hours. Being the senior officer, General

Schenck assumed command. At a council of war, which was immediately called, it was deemed unsafe to attempt a retreat before evening. Learning that the enemy were planting a battery on the mountain, from whence our whole encampment would be commanded, General Milroy proposed that they should be assaulted on the high plateau where they were encamped. On being asked whether he would lead the assault, the veteran Milroy replied that "that was just what he wanted to do." Four regiments, one from Virginia, and three from Ohio, were accordingly detached for the perilous service. The assault of this body was, to the Confederates, a perfect surprise in the day time. Before they were fully aware of the advance, the bold Milroy with his dauntless regiments was in close range. For one hour and a half a most destructive fire was poured into the ranks of the enemy, when Milroy retired in good order, bringing with him our entire killed and wounded. Our loss was 256, of whom 145 were slightly wounded. Jackson reported a loss on his part of 71 killed, among whom were three colonels and two majors, and 390 wounded, among whom was General Edward Johnston. In the evening our forces were quietly withdrawn in the direction of Franklin; while, early the next day, the main force of Jackson, a show of pursuit having been made by a small body, was found some fourteen miles away on their return to Staunton. It is said that this surprise by Milroy was a source of deeper chagrin to Jackson than any event of his military life. He was the hero of surprises, and hence his bitter chagrin at being so signally surprised himself.

On his return to the Shenandoah valley he united all his forces for an advance upon General Banks, who had retreated from his advanced position to Strasburg. In this advance, with an admitted loss on his part of 68 killed and 329 wounded, Jackson claimed to have captured two guns, 9,354 small arms, and 3,050 prisoners. General Banks admits a loss in his retreat through Winchester to Williamsport of 38 killed, 155 wounded, and 711 missing. This does not include the loss of the sick and wounded necessarily left behind, and that occasioned by the total rout of Colonel Kenly near

Front Royal. In this unfortunate affair our loss was quite 700 prisoners; a section of rifled 10-pounders, and a large amount of stores. By special orders from Washington, General Fremont, by a march which none but such men as he was could have made, moved 15,000 men down from the mountain region into the valley; while General McDowell moved out two divisions of his army at Fredericksburg, into the same region, to intercept Jackson. It was now the turn of this bold and daring commander to run a race for dear life himself. By a succession of wonderful dodges between his two assailants, and after losing a battle, but gaining an opportunity to retreat, at Cross-Keys, and gaining one in a fight of some 8,000 Confederates against 3,000 Unionists, he finally escaped from the toils in which he was ensnared. Two circumstances, as General McDowell testifies, however, prevented his capture—the want of energy in General Ord in pushing his division on to Strasburg, and that of General Shields, under false information subsequently obtained, moving upon the same place upon a different road from that on which he had been specifically commanded to move. But for these two circumstances, two divisions from McDowell's command would have intercepted Jackson at Strasburg, and with forces larger than his would have held him in check until the arrival of Fremont with an army 15,000 strong. These would have rendered the capture of the Confederate forces a certainty. General Fremont, it should be remembered, reached Strasburg June 1st, but a few hours after Jackson had passed through the place. The facts we here state were sources of the deepest regret to both McDowell and Fremont.

A grand mistake.

At the time when General Jackson advanced up the Shenandoah, General McDowell, with an army most admirably trained, and fully 41,000 strong, was in readiness to move down from Fredericksburg, and assume a position before Richmond on the right of General McClellan, and had advanced to some distance one division of his army for the purpose designated. At this time the President and Secretary of War came down to Fredericksburg, and,

contrary to the most earnest remonstrance of General McDowell, required him on their return to Washington to detach two divisions of his army to co-operate with General Fremont in disposing of General Jackson, and thus suspend his movement upon Richmond. "This order," says General McDowell, "was a crushing blow for us all." He had, as he informed us in a personal interview, given his army a special training in reference to rapid marches, and had everything in readiness for a most speedy movement upon Richmond. The presence of Jackson and Early with the best portion of the Confederate army, away off from its proper centre, and at such a distance as Winchester, was all that could have been desired for an effective movement and assault upon Richmond and the Confederate forces remaining there. In short, the presence of Jackson at Winchester was the golden opportunity for the Union army. In these views General McDowell is unquestionably correct, and the fears of our President and his Secretary dictated an order most calamitous to the destiny of the campaign. Had McDowell been permitted to make the movement which he had planned, and which, with the full consent of the President and his advisers, had been determined on, Jackson would have passed up the Shenandoah more rapidly than he did when fleeing from the meshes which his antagonists were throwing around him. He would have been too late, however, to aid in the defence of Richmond. General Fremont, also, with the 15,000 men whom he brought with him from Western Virginia, and with 10,000 more from General Wadsworth's command, might have been speedily sent after McDowell, and thus rendered our army about Richmond all powerful for offensive or defensive operations. All that could have been required for the protection of Washington under the circumstances would have been the forces under General Banks located at Manassas, and what would have remained under General Wadsworth in and about the city.

There is but one consideration which throws doubt over the results of the dispositions under consideration, had they been made in full, as we have indicated. This consideration is found in the palpably revealed character of

General McClellan. Would he have consented to have co-operated with General McDowell, the latter retaining a separate command, even supposing his forces to have been rendered 65,000 strong? Would he have moved at all, and acted efficiently, had all these forces been placed under his command? We confess to candid and serious doubts relatively to each of these questions. He had previously sent on to Washington an absolute request that McDowell should not be sent down at all unless he was placed under his (McClellan's) entire command. Would he have co-operated with an independent auxiliary force imposed upon him in opposition to such remonstrance? Then what act of his previous command presents the remotest indication that, with the addition of 40,000 or even 60,000 men to his army, he would have acted at all against the Confederates? Palpable non-fidelity to absolute pledges previously given annihilated all rational confidence in any pledges he might give. When before Yorktown, for example, he sent an absolute pledge to Washington that if Franklin's division should be sent to him it should be promptly employed in a flank movement north of York river. When that division did arrive, it was suffered to lie two whole weeks in the transports at the mouth of the river without doing anything at all. When lying on the Chickahominy, he sent a similar promise that as soon as General McCall's division should arrive he would move upon Richmond. When that division arrived, it was sent off to Mechanicsville, and settled down there as if for a year to come, and no intent to move as promised was manifested. An addition of 40,000 to his army would raise his effective force to about 155,000 men, and this with upwards of 200,000 in the army opposed to him. Would he have acted against such imagined odds? The idea that he would have done so is rendered absurd by all the facts of his previous military history. But one deduction remains to us, to wit, any army, however large, under such a commander as George B. McClellan, is doomed; and our military authorities ought to have perceived this before he had remained three months under their immediate observation. More of this in another connexion.

Statement of some immaterial and material facts.

When General McClellan was lying before Yorktown, and we had looked over the distribution of our forces under the separate commands of Generals McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, we expressed the full conviction that the Confederates would employ the leisure afforded them in falling separately upon these isolated bodies, and that the first effective blow would fall upon Banks. Hence, our breathless inquiry on going down from the college to the city was, "Have you heard from Banks? Any news from Banks?" When the blow predicted had fallen, and Jackson had returned to the vicinity of Richmond, we predicted that the immobility of McClellan and the sickly state of his army would induce the Confederates to take the initiative, and precipitate themselves upon our forces; and gave it as a positive opinion that their first blow would fall upon McCall at Mechanicsville. All the corps of our army but that of General Porter had been transferred to the south side of this stream; and this single corps, like those of Keyes and Heintzelman on the other side, was distributed as if on purpose to be suddenly assaulted and "gobbled up" by the enemy.

We now invite very special attention to some interesting facts, and to the explanation of the same facts, which had a material bearing upon the calamitous events which followed. It will be remembered that General Stuart, with 1,500 cavalry, crossed the Chickahominy June 12-13, and passed quite round our army north of this stream, and after dispersing a body of cavalry, burning two schooners laden with forage, and fourteen waggons, taking off 165 prisoners and 260 mules and horses, recrossed the stream below our army, and returned in safety; and that the forces which moved out from Richmond crossed this stream, and having formed a junction with Jackson coming from the west, fell unexpectedly to our army upon McCall's division at Mechanicsville. It will also be remembered that one of our regiments of cavalry, the Illinois 8th, was left, after the retreat of our army to James river, in an isolated position up the Chickahominy, and escaped capture by passing round the

Confederates *viâ* Yorktown. It was between this body of cavalry and our main army that Stuart, in the first instance, and then Longstreet and his divisions, crossed unopposed and unnoticed that stream. How did these singular events occur? Soon after McClellan arrived upon the north side of this stream, General Stoneman with a brigade of cavalry was stationed to our right up this stream. After acquainting himself with the state of things around him, he informed the General in supreme command that if reinforced by a body of infantry, he (General Stoneman) could not only accomplish what was expected of him, but do much essential service for the general cause. Instead of being reinforced as requested, one regiment after another was taken from him, until he was left alone with the one above referred to. In passing down to make his reports, General Stoneman also noticed that between him and the main army there was an interval of quite four miles, which was left wholly unguarded in any form, no pickets even being there. Impressed with the peril in which the right wing of our army was left, General Stoneman urged at head-quarters that such exposure be remedied. No notice whatever being taken of his suggestions, he went to a division commander whose forces lay so near that he could readily supply, and urged him to supply the perilous deficiency. After repeated solicitations to do so, this officer replied that if General Stoneman would attend to his own duties, other Generals would care for theirs. Thus matters were left until, finally, Longstreet and Jackson's forces were united against the single corps of General Porter, on the north side of that stream, before our commanders were at all aware of the presence of an enemy in that vicinity, the forces under Longstreet passing through the unguarded interval above referred to. We are indebted for the above information to Rev. L. C. Matlack, chaplain of the Illinois 8th Cavalry. Such facts in connexion with the early exposure of Keyes and Heintzelman on the south side of this stream, palpably indicate the reckless carelessness with which our affairs were managed under the command of General McClellan.

The seven days' fight, and the cowardly flight.

On the 26th June General McClellan awoke to a distinct consciousness that the Confederate army was divided into two parts, and located at a distance of more than twenty miles from each other: the one part, as it turned out, consisting of the divisions of Huger and Magruder, lying between him and Richmond; and the other, and by far the greater and most important part, consisting of the divisions of Jackson, Ewell, Longstreet, and the two Hills, on the north of the Chickahominy, and about to fall with crushing force upon General McCall and the single corps of General Porter,—in all, about 27,000 strong. Now was the golden opportunity for our “Young Napoleon.” The enemy was in the precise condition in which all wise and energetic commanders desire to find antagonists. Here lay our army, 115,000 strong, between the divided parts of the enemy's forces, and one part, June 27th, in inseparable collision with Porter's corps, and at but a few miles from our main army, nearly 90,000 strong. Suppose that, early in the morning, June 27th, two corps of our army had been passed over to the north side of the Chickahominy with orders that as soon as the battle was fully joined between the Confederates and General Porter, said corps should participate themselves upon the enemy. The certain result undeniably would have been the utter rout and capture of this one part of the Confederate army. The other part, and with it Richmond, would then have been at our mercy. There is not a commander of ordinary capacity and energy on earth who would not, under the circumstances, have promptly adopted the measures above indicated. The stupid inactivity of McClellan on that occasion is an exception in the history of war; an advantage being put into his hands, of which no other General in the history of the world is known to have neglected.

Equally stupid and cowardly was his order for a flight of his whole army on the next day. The battle of the 27th had revealed the fact that a force which had been held at bay by less than 30,000 men for nearly a whole day, a force exhausted by long marches and two days'

fighting, and this with their ammunition nearly expended, could have made no effective resistance to two of our army corps sent over from the south side of this stream, and falling upon the said forces on the morning of the 28th. In such an arrangement, Porter's corps would have been held as a reserve to aid the two on each side of the stream, as exigencies might have required. Suppose that while the annihilation of the divisions of Jackson, Ewell, Longstreet, and the Hills was being perfected, the two corps south of the Chickahominy had been attacked from Richmond, and even compelled to retreat over that stream,—preparations for such an event having been previously made. Our army, flushed with victory, would have been prepared to recross the stream and plant our flag on the Confederate capital at Richmond. The spectacle is horrible as it is humiliating, the spectacle of a great army nearly 90,000 strong standing idly by while 9,000 out of 27,000—the number stated by General Porter in our hearing in his defence before the court marshal—while 9,000 of their brave associates were being ruthlessly slaughtered. Still more humiliating is the spectacle which facts present, after the withdrawal of all our forces to the south side of the Chickahominy, and breaking down all the bridges across the stream,—the spectacle of upwards of 100,000 men retreating with all precipitation from the presence of 25,000; the only force which, according to the highest Confederate authority, lay between the former and Richmond. “Had McClellan,” says General Magruder, “massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at Austerlitz under similar circumstances by the greatest captain of any age, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond; and consequently the city might have been his reward. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent.” The entire movements of the Confederates in the case under consideration are characterized by infinite folly and presumption, but upon the condition that they were made against a General known to possess the

precise characteristics which peculiarise General McClellan. In this case, those dispositions evince the highest wisdom.

It does not fall in with the plan of this treatise to detail the facts of that retreat from the Chickahominy to Harrison's Landing, with the various battles on the way; battles in which our forces were invariably victorious, and as invariably made a precipitate retreat before a defeated foe; battles in every one of which the smallness of the Confederate army was made undeniably manifest, and the illusion of the immensity of the forces opposed to us passed from before every eye but that of Gen. McClellan. As far as he is concerned, we have no evidence but one form, hereafter to be presented, that he is not yet under the vivid impression that the Confederates in his front were always at least 115,000 strong when he was in command at Washington, and that their army had swelled to 200,000 when he arrived at the Chickahominy. Such was his conduct during the retreat under consideration that such a General as the brave Kearny openly affirmed that the army of the Potomac was controlled by cowardice or treason. It induces heart-sickness to call to mind the amount and the uselessness of the slaughter of our brave men during those memorable seven days. About the 20th June General McClellan reported 115,102 as present for duty. After his whole remaining force was collected at Harrison's Bar, he reported, as "present for duty," 88,665 men,—making a difference of 26,437!

Causes of the failure of this campaign.

That this campaign was a total and disastrous failure no one doubts. But two causes have ever been assigned for that failure—the failure of the Administration to grant the promised reinforcements, on the one hand; and the indecision and incapacity of the General in command, on the other. In respect to these causes we invite here special attention to the following facts and considerations.

1. No person can show, and no one pretends, not even General McClellan himself, to furnish, evidence that the Administration ever promised to send him a single soldier more than he actually took with him when he left Washington for the Peninsula. The army of the Potomac was

before him, and he was told, before he started on his expedition, just how many men he could take with him, and how many must be left behind for the defence of Washington; and there was no intimation given him that any of the reserved forces should afterwards be sent to him. Nor did General McClellan furnish any new information of the strength of the Confederates, information rendering necessary the sending forward of additional forces drawn from those reserved. Generals Burnside and Butler had each a known and specific amount of force put under their command when they sailed on their respective expeditions. In case of failure, either or both of them might as properly have charged their failure to infidelity in respect to promised support, as General McClellan. When he knew what forces he could take with him, and the amount he must leave behind, then was the time, and the only time, for him to make his election between going forward or turning back, and giving the direction to the campaign which the Administration had previously advised and still, as he well knew, preferred. In choosing to go forward, and to do so with the forces entrusted to his command, he assumed, for himself alone, the responsibility of results, and deserves the deep reprobation of the nation for charging the disgraceful failure of his expedition to infidelity to its pledges on the part of the Administration, when that failure had but one cause, a criminal neglect on the part of the General in command to employ the forces committed to his care as he had in a special order promised the army, the Administration, and the nation that he would do.

2. The Administration actually furnished General McClellan more men than he asked for before he left Washington. All that he asked or planned for, in addition to what he did take, were Blenker's division and the corps of General McDowell. Had all these been furnished him, his army, at the utmost, would not have amounted to over 160,000 men. According to an official report, made June 26th, the aggregate of his army consisted of 156,838. Add to this sum all that had died of disease, all that had been killed in battle, and all that had been taken prisoners, and no candid mind will estimate the forces furnished General

McClellan at less than from 175,000 to 180,000 men. The infidelity of the Administration to its promises is manifest in this, that it had furnished this man more than 60,000 men over and above all it had ever pledged him, and about 20,000 more than he asked when he started on his campaign. A General that under such circumstances will endeavour to excuse his own inexplicable and criminal inactivity by a graceless endeavour to fasten upon the Administration which had committed to him the most important and honourable of all its trusts the charge of infidelity to its sacred pledges, we confess that we hold in very low esteem.

3. Had General McDowell been finally sent down as intended (his only excuse for not acting at that time), General McClellan's relative strength against the Confederates would not have been as great as it was when he first arrived on the Chickahominy, and his actual effective force would have been less than it was before his army had been diminished more than one-third by sickness and death. Had McDowell come down as intended, the effective force under General McClellan would have been about 155,000 strong. When he arrived on the Chickahominy, he had under his immediate command upwards of 125,000 men, with 10,000 more within calling distance from the commands of Wool and Burnside. During the interval between the period last designated and that in which McDowell was expected, the Confederate army had undeniably been, from all sources, reinforced by more than 30,000 men. Granting, then, that McDowell had come down, the relative strength of our army would have been less than it actually was when it first came into the presence of the enemy.

Another important fact here presents itself. By this stupid and criminal inactivity nearly or quite as many men were lost to our army by sickness and death as could have been made up to it by the addition of McDowell's corps and the 15,000 whom Fremont brought down from the mountain department. On the 20th June, 41,763, a few excepted under arrest and on special duty, were in the hospitals, or absent almost or quite exclusively on account of sickness. Of those who had been brought down by

sickness in those swamps, with little but swamp water to drink, it is safe to affirm that one in four had died. It is perfectly safe to affirm, therefore, that while lying before Yorktown, and on the Chickahominy, the effective force of our army had been diminished by the loss of upwards of 50,000 men. Our only son, who was there as a First Lieutenant, assured us that hardly one in three in that army who were reported as present for duty were, in reality, fit for any hard service. He himself, on the morning of the battle of Gaine's Mill, arose from a sick bed, and, contrary to the absolute prohibition of his physicians, went with his company into the scene of carnage. There he stood with his men during that day, until all his fellow officers, and 40 out of 56 of his men, were dead or disabled around him. As soon, after the order to retreat was given, as he had led those 16 survivors beyond the enemy's fire, the strength of the brave boy gave way, and he fell helpless upon the ground. He was saved from capture by the kindness of his Major, who placed upon his own horse his helpless associate. Eternal thanks for that act to that benefactor! To return from this digression. We would here say that we regard with unspeakable reprobation the conduct of a General who will compel his army to remain idle for more than two months in a condition when it was, and could not but be, far more diminished by disease than by two general battles. Here we find, and not in the infidelity of the Administration, the real cause of the disastrous failure of this campaign, as far as the want of men is concerned. Take one other item, as illustrative of the above statements. On the 20th July, such had been General McClellan's reinforcements, his army numbered in the aggregate, according to the returns in the Adjutant-General's office, 158,314 men. Of these, including the few on special duty and under arrest, 46,623—more than one-third of the whole—were in hospital, or absent almost exclusively from sickness. Is it not just to charge the Administration with grave faults for not putting more men under the command of such a General?

4. If there was any failure on the part of the Administration, as we have seen that there was not, in sending reinforcements to General McClellan, he alone, by his

fabulous representations of the number of men in the Confederate army, is responsible for that failure. The lowest estimate, as we have seen, which he ever put upon the amount of forces confronting him at Washington was 115,000 men. The forces which confronted him before Richmond he uniformly estimated as 200,000 strong. This was the estimate submitted to the President by McClellan and his Generals when the President visited the army at Harrison's Bar. Now the preservation of Washington was a matter of far greater importance to the nation than the capture of Richmond. In view of the data furnished by McClellan himself, and these were the only data for the Administration to act upon, the wonder is, not that so few, but that so many reinforcements were sent to the army of the Potomac. Why, the question is often asked, was not McDowell sent down, after the retreat of Jackson down the Shenandoah? If there was an army 200,000 strong before Richmond, every prudent military man would have concluded that Jackson's raid was made by the advanced body of an army of 100,000 men, that he had merely fallen back upon the main body, and would soon be back again in full force for the capture of the national capital. To send McDowell away under the circumstances would have been most presumptuous. The perpetual cry of McClellan for more men looks far more like a deliberate intent to uncover Washington to the Confederates, than the call of a prudent commander for what should have been granted.

To understand rightly this whole subject, we need to ponder carefully here the question whether General McClellan did, in reality, credit his own avowed estimates of the number of men in the Confederate armies. To suppose him sincere in those estimates, I, for one, am compelled to regard him as one of the most stupid Generals that ever commanded an army; palpable facts which were constantly presenting themselves always demonstrating the real number to be less by one half, at least, than the estimated one. Now facts quite significant pretty clearly indicate that he had one estimate for the Administration and the public, and quite another and different one for his own private use. On the 8th March, for example, he gave a formal estimate of the Confederate forces in his

front as consisting of 115,000 men. According to General Barnard's pamphlet on the Peninsula Campaign, in the council of war held six days previous to this date General McClellan located, "in the language of Victor, vol. iii., page 48, the enemy's force with such precision as to prove himself to have been in possession of full information of the enemy's disposition and strength. In that exhibit he figures 50,500 men as the utmost aggregate of the troops in his front." When at Harrison's Bar, for example, he proposed to move directly upon Richmond, provided he could be reinforced by 20,000 men; the Confederate forces there being, at the same time, estimated by him to have been 200,000 strong. Would he, assuming him not to have been demented, have seriously entertained the idea of moving with 120,000 men against an army really estimated as 200,000 strong, and such an army behind most formidable entrenchments, and commanded by such a General as Lee?

5. But one real cause can be rationally assigned for the failure of this campaign—the unaccountable indecision of its General in command. No man had ever before been placed over such an army as that of the Potomac, and no General ever had more golden opportunities to cover himself and army with immortal honour, than General McClellan; yet whenever such opportunity presented itself, he was not ready to avail himself of it. In every exigency his army was too small, and that of the enemy too large for him to risk a battle. His mental state, when such opportunities occurred, is well illustrated by that of a certain hunter the first time he stood in the presence of a deer. The man had in his hands a splendid rifle, and there stood a splendid buck in open daylight, but a few rods away, and with his broadside fully confronting his antagonist. As soon as the hunter saw the majestic animal, however, he began to soliloquise thus with himself: "Oh, my good fellow, if I only had a gun now, would I not send a blue pill through your sides, about the quickest? I tell you, if I only had a gun, how soon would I bring down that deer!" Well, the animal standing until his patience was quite exhausted, "took up its legs" and moved off, leaving the hunter to find

his gun as best he could. So with General McClellan. When before Washington with 200,000 brave men around him, and an enemy well known to him to be not more than 50,500 strong, he was, as he felt, without an army. He must have at least 240,000 before he could safely advance. When before Yorktown with more than 100,000 men, and but 11,000 in his front, he could not turn the position by a flank movement. He had not an army with which to make the movement. If McDowell could be sent down, at least Franklin's division, then he should "have a gun," and all would go right. As soon as Franklin did arrive, however, our veteran commander again forgot that he "had a gun," and all was quiet before Yorktown until the enemy chose to retire. The same farce was repeated before Williamsburg and on the Chickahominy. If McCall's division should come down, he would act. As soon as McCall had arrived, however, he forgot again that he had an army, and called for McDowell. When about to take final leave of the Chickahominy, he sent this querulous message to the President:—"Had I 20,000, or even 10,000, fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and *personnel* of the army." When he sent this he was encircled with more than 100,000 men, not one-third of whom had been in battle for a long time; and the enemy was less than 50,000 strong in his rear, and wearied out at that, and not over 25,000 strong in his front. Yes, General McClellan, when the occasion presented itself, you always forgot that you "had a gun," and this was the sole cause of the sad failure of your great campaign.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL HALLECK'S MEASURES AND CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI.

ON the 12th November General Halleck assumed command in the Western Department; General Buell about the same time assuming command in Kentucky. But for the absolute order of the President requiring our armies to make a positive advance by the 22nd February, 1862, we have, from what was actually done, no good reason to suppose that had McClellan, Halleck, and Buell been continued undisturbed in their respective commands, and had the war been thus protracted, all would not have remained, even unto this day, "quiet on the Potomac," quiet in Kentucky, quiet in Missouri, and all the West. That either of these men seriously intended, without absolute compulsion from their superior in command, to move against the enemy, cannot be shown from any of their acts. In Missouri, after Hunter, with more than 40,000 men, had fled from the presence of Price, who had been retreating before General Fremont, and had in command an army less than 30,000 strong, Price was allowed to re-take and hold quiet possession of all South-western and Central Missouri, to re-occupy Lexington, burn Warsaw, and to break up nearly 100 miles of railroad in the southern part of the State, and to perpetrate untold barbarities on the defenceless Union citizens in all the territory referred to. In addition to all this, the spirit of rebellion instigated by the presence of Price in the State became so general that martial law had to be declared even in St. Louis; and the burning of bridges, breaking up of railroads, and destruction of property, became so general that an order was

issued by General Halleck to shoot any individual found engaged in such outrages. Yet, while Price was allowed to remain for long months in undisturbed possession of the territory of which he had repossessed himself, the available forces under General Halleck outnumbered those under General Price as three to one at least, and the former had merely to lead an army 40,000 strong, from Rolla, or on the track pursued by General Fremont, to Springfield, to free the State totally from all Confederate armies and disturbances, as previous and subsequent events absolutely verify. Yet, as these long months dragged their slow lengths along, not a movement was made, or projected even, to disturb the Confederate commander; while he was recruiting and sustaining his army, and, through his subordinates, soldiery, and adherents, perpetrating untold outrages upon men, women, and children, for the exclusive reason that they were Unionists.

Similar was the aspect of affairs in Kentucky. "About the middle of September," says Mr. Pollard, "General Buckner, with a small force of about 4,000 men, which was increased the 15th October to 12,000, entered Kentucky. The enemy's force then," he adds, "was reported at the War Department at 50,000." Of the truth of these statements no one doubts. Forces less numerous, as we have before stated, advanced into Eastern and Western Kentucky; their entire force on all this line, of nearly 300 miles in extent, always falling below 40,000 men. Yet these small forces made themselves to appear to our Generals in command as most formidable hosts. General Sherman, who commanded in this State from the early part of October until the arrival of General Buell, assured the Secretary of War and General Thomas, when they visited him on the 18th of this month, that "it would require 200,000 men to recover and hold Kentucky." General Buell acted upon the truth of this estimate after his arrival, and, consequently, let the Confederates hold quiet possession of the vast territory which they had taken possession of. Hence it was that an army 660,000 strong lay listlessly idle in the immediate proximity of the enemy, lay listlessly idle during all these fall and early winter months, and this while our forces everywhere out-

numbered the Confederates more than two to one. A true patriot, pained, as he must be, when his country is dishonoured, and afflicted in all her afflictions, is at a loss to determine which sentiment should predominate, contempt or reprobation, at such stolid immobility of Generals who have been entrusted with resources more than ample for the accomplishment of all that was expected and required of them. What a humiliating fact it is that the aggregate of all the forces which, during all these long months, confronted McClellan, Buell, and Halleck, and kept at bay an army upwards of 600,000 strong, did not amount in all to 120,000 men.

AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENTS IN MISSOURI.

After "the stagnant idleness" of our great armies had rendered the national heart sick with the pains of "hope deferred," a ripple upon the dead-level surface of events in Missouri excited universal attention. On the 7th December General Pope was put in command of all the national troops between the Missouri and Osage rivers. At this time General Price was coming up from the south, and 5,000 volunteers were advancing from the northern parts of the State to join him. General Pope's first object was to prevent the junction of these converging forces. In his command he found a considerable portion of Fremont's forces, which had fallen back from Springfield. Uniting with these such other forces as he had in hand, General Pope swept in between the bodies referred to, and at Blackwater and other places put to flight all resisting Confederate forces, captured upwards of 1,500 prisoners, and large quantities of arms and supplies, prevented the junction of Price with his expected reinforcements, occasioned the dispersion of the latter, and Price's retreat south. In this raid the Union infantry marched more than 100 miles, and the cavalry twice as far, in five days. Such energetic action, with its marked results, occurring, as it did, amid the general stagnation of military affairs, secured for General Pope a very high position in national regard.

As the time drew near when the order of the President

rendered further inaction criminal, General Halleck, about the middle of February, collected at Lebanon, north-west of Springfield, an army composed of four divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Asboth, Siegel, Davis, and Prentiss, all commanded by General S. R. Curtis. As Curtis advanced, Price fled before him, until, passing through Springfield and over the Arkansas line, he left Missouri to its fate. These facts clearly evince what would have occurred had Fremont, in the early part of November 1861, been permitted to pursue Price as Curtis pursued him in the middle of February 1862; and what would have occurred in two weeks after Halleck assumed command in Missouri, had he promptly recombined Fremont's forces, and did what Curtis afterwards performed, and that with an army no larger than that which Fremont led to Springfield.

In pursuing Price over the line into Arkansas, General Curtis at length found himself, March 3rd, in the presence of forces much larger than his own, forces commanded by General Van Dorn, who outranked General Price. Finding himself in command of forces outnumbering those of General Curtis nearly as two to one, General Van Dorn assumed the offensive, and in successive conflicts of three days' continuance fought the memorable battle of Pea Ridge. In his advance he first struck at General Siegel, who was holding Bentonville, some eight to ten miles from General Curtis's centre near Mattsville, on the road from Fayetteville to Springfield. The retreat of Siegel, sustained by his unconquerable Germans, constitutes one of the most signal events of the war. Assaulted by overwhelming odds, the dauntless German, sending his train ahead under escort, would make a stand on a favourable position, and send a tempest of grape and shell and bullets into the pursuing masses, until they would recoil in disorder. Then he would lumber up and advance to the next position, where the first scene would be repeated. So he continued from morning until near 4 p.m., when he was reinforced by General Curtis, and rested for the night.

General Curtis, as the night drew on, perfected his dispositions for the conflict, which was certain to commence the next morning, his position being on an elevated plateau, cut by ravines, and occupying a bend of a stream called

Sugar Creek. On awaking in the morning, however, he found the enemy, not in his front, as he expected, but practically in his rear, and holding all his communications. Promptly changing from front to rear, he fell upon the Confederates before they had time to perfect their dispositions. The battle, which continued with terrible fury during the day, resulted with no important advantage on either side, the lines of the enemy being somewhat advanced beyond where they were in the morning. All their forces, however, had been engaged, while one-third of ours had not come up. The next morning all our army was on the ground, and the fire, particularly of the artillery, was such that Van Dorn soon drew off his forces, and retreated in the direction of portions of the country not exhausted by his previous advance; and General Curtis returned to Missouri. Our entire loss was 1,351; 701 from the single division of General Carr, the division which bore the brunt of the entire battle of the first day. While the Confederate loss must have been as numerous as ours, it was greatly enhanced by the death of Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, Generals Price and Slack also being among the wounded. After his return to Missouri, General Curtis, largely reinforced, returned to Arkansas, took a zigzag route through the State, and finally brought up, nearly 30,000 strong, at Helena on the Mississippi. Such expeditions in Arkansas, and elsewhere, expeditions which characterised the conduct of this war, we do not give in detail, because they were useless in themselves, and had no bearing upon any of the main issues.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL PLAN OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

THE immutable condition of understanding a campaign is a comprehension of the idea in which the *plan* of the campaign had its origin. The aim of the Confederate authorities was to protect their territory against the invasions of the Unionists. The aim of the Union authorities was to restore the unity of all our States by suppressing the Rebellion in the States which constituted the Confederacy. In respect to the end proposed, each party had its idea in regard to the plan by which that end should be accomplished. We have now arrived at a stage in our discussions where we can understand and appreciate the original plan of the Confederate, on the one hand, and that of Union authorities on the other. To a consideration of these plans, their merits and demerits included, very special attention is invited.

Original plan of the Confederates.

The original plan of the Confederates is quite manifest, and may be very readily comprehended. It was to make the border slave States, such as Maryland, Northern and Western Virginia, Kentucky, Northern Arkansas, and Missouri, the battle-ground of the war. The fundamental element of the original idea was the capture of Washington, and making it the centre of operations east of the Alleghanies. Failing in this, their plan was to keep all military operations as far north and west of Richmond as possible. The original plan in regard to Washington as manifest in the early attempts of the Confederates, and in

the successive invasions of Pennsylvania and Maryland by General Lee. In view of the above suggestions, we can understand the principles on which the invasion of Kentucky was made, together with the movements of General Price and his associates in Arkansas and Missouri. This plan had but two features worthy of commendation—the rendering the army of General Lee the central force of the Confederacy, and the securing the command of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi rivers, by means of the fortifications of Donelson, Henry, Columbus, and Island No. 10. Had the army which invaded Kentucky expended all its strength in rendering Cumberland Gap impassable to our armies, and thus secured Eastern Tennessee from invasion, and in rendering Forts Donelson and Henry and the other fortifications impregnable, most essential service would have been done to the Confederate cause. As it was, that invasion turned out to be a great calamity to that cause. The entire Confederate plan was, in such particulars as the following, fundamentally defective.

Fundamental defects in the Confederate plan.

1. It rendered their *line* so extended that it could not but have been weak at every point, and strong nowhere, and thus always liable to be broken at essential points, leaving their armies to be destroyed in detail. Think of an army broken up into parts, and those parts located at unsupporting distances on a line extending from the seaboard, through Virginia, Kentucky, Northern Arkansas, and Western Missouri as far north as the Missouri river; and think of such dispositions made as the best means of defending the Confederacy from the invasions of the Union armies. Had it been the object of the Confederate authorities to have ensured the collapse of the Rebellion at the earliest period possible, they could not have adopted a plan better adapted to this end than the one under consideration.

2. This plan located the main Confederate forces at the greatest distances from their own proper centres, and brought them into immediate proximity to the Union armies, which always outnumbered their antagonists as two to one at least. Thus, when on a line so extended

that they could be strong nowhere, the Confederates were always exposed to be broken up, and destroyed in detail, by the least possible efforts on the part of the Union forces, on the simple condition that our armies were skilfully and energetically employed.

3. In respect to life and treasure, this plan was the most expensive, for the conduct of the war, that could have been adopted by the Confederate authorities. For the reasons here indicated, armies should always be kept as near as possible to their bases of supply. The Confederates, in the worst form conceivable, reversed this principle, and that to the fatal injury of their cause. The defects of this plan are too palpable to require further elucidation.

The plan which the Confederates should have adopted.

The plan which the Confederate authorities should have adopted, the one the like of which they would have adopted had the highest wisdom determined their counsels, may be stated in few words. It embraces, among others, the following elements:—

1. Having rendered their seaboard at most essential points perfectly secure, points such as Willmington, Charlestown, Savannah, and New Orleans, they should have rendered their fortresses at Donelson, Henry, Columbus, Island No. 10, and other points on the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi, as nearly impregnable as possible; rendering by such means their exterior and interior secure from invasion by means of water communications.

2. In the interior, they should have fortified but a very few, and these fundamental strategic, points, such as Richmond, Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville; and these should have been most strongly fortified, the fortified posts being permanently occupied by as few men as possible, forces always being in readiness to be thrown into any one of them, as exigencies might require.

3. With the exceptions indicated, the entire military power of the Confederacy should have been combined into two central, and ever movable, armies; the one located in Virginia, covering Richmond, and the other in Tennessee, in the vicinity of Nashville. Both of these armies should

have been rendered exceeding strong in field artillery, and overpoweringly so in cavalry.

4. In every advance of the Union armies, the object should have been to have drawn them as far as possible into the interior, and away from their own proper centres and bases of supply. While their advance should have been embarrassed by every possible means, in breaking up of roads, breaking down of bridges, etc., and while resistance should have been offered at every favourable point, and decisive battles fought but when and where success was most probable, the cavalry should have been omnipresent in front, on the flanks, and in the rear of the invading force, capturing stragglers, cutting off supplies, and breaking up communications.

5. At a point selected and proposed beforehand, and at which all possible forces had been collected, a general battle should have been fought, and that under circumstances in which a defeat of the invading army would have ensured its destruction.

Had the war been carried on upon such principles by the Confederacy, the Union armies being guided by such blank stupidity as did command them, I do not see how the union of the States ever could have been restored.

The plan of the Union authorities.

The plan of the Union authorities, as far as they had any, may now be stated in few words. It embraced, among others, the following items:—

1. That the enemy should be everywhere confronted by superior forces, and on a line parallel to, and co-extensive with, his own. As the Confederate main line extended from the seaboard through Virginia, east and west, through Kentucky, Northern Arkansas, and Missouri, as above stated, our forces were to confront theirs over a line of corresponding length.

2. Our advance upon the enemy was to be simultaneous on this whole line. This evidently was the plan agreed upon by Generals McClellan, Buell, and Halleck, prior to their assumption of their respective commands. Hence "all was quiet on the Potomac," and on the whole line, because the time for concerted action had not arrived.

The 22nd February, for the reason that it was Washington's birthday, was fixed upon by the President for the grand and simultaneous advance. This idea of a simultaneous advance on a line of immense extent obtained with the Union authorities throughout the war. After General Grant, for example, assumed supreme command, it was, as we shall see hereafter, agreed in a council of war that all our armies should rest during the winter, and on the opening of spring should, on a line some 1,500 miles in extent, move simultaneously upon the enemy. As our line was to be longer than that of the Confederates, our forces were to draw round theirs and crush them all together. This was the "Anaconda Idea" of which so much was everywhere said during the first years of the war, and which had its origin with General Scott.

3. Another element of this plan, the only additional feature of it to which we now refer, was that as far and as fast as the enemy was driven back, the territory acquired should be permanently occupied by our armies, and this with such forces as to render future insurrections and invasions impossible. Hence it was that after we had redeemed Missouri and Kentucky, and taken possession of Tennessee and portions of Louisiana, Virginia east and west, the Carolinas, and Florida, quite two-thirds of the 1,000,000 of men we had in the field were employed in doing nothing else than guarding the immense extent of territory referred to.

Essential defects in this plan.

No plan conceivable is more utterly defective than that above indicated. One of the best known principles of weakness in war is operation upon a widely extended line; while the known condition of strength is concentration of force so as, in the language of Napoleon, "to be the strongest at the essential point." An army 100,000 strong distributed on a line like that occupied by the Confederates in Kentucky and Northern Tennessee, would be readily routed by a concentrated and ably commanded force of one-half their number. Nothing, also, can be more absurd than the idea of a simultaneous advance of half a million or a million of men on a line more than a thousand miles

in extent, and especially to determine the time of such movement by the day on which some celebrated man happened to have been born. The time and the form of army movements should always be determined, as all strategists well understand, by the circumstances of each particular case. Circumstances may present themselves absolutely demanding the prompt movement of one army upon an enemy, and as absolutely require another army, 500 or 1,000 miles distant, to defer, for a time, any such movement. The "Anaconda Idea" has place in regard to single armies, and only thus in cases where a vast army moves upon a far inferior one. Nothing is more absurd, however, than the idea of drawing an army round half a continent, and after driving the enemy in upon a common centre, to crush them there. It was one thing, for example, for Napoleon to draw his army around that of General Mack, and coop it up and capture it in Ulm. It would have been quite a different affair had he attempted in a similar manner to encircle the whole kingdom of Prussia, and coop up and crush all its armies at once. When General Scott would make a circle with his hand, thumb, and fingers, and add, "Thus let us encircle the Confederates, and then crush them," suddenly clenching his fist to illustrate the idea, he seemed to those who did not duly consider the facts to have announced a very sublime and practicable conception. Yet, as we stated in the paper read before President Lincoln, our anaconda, when stretched around the whole Confederacy, would be found to be a miserable tapeworm, that would be broken into a thousand fragments the first wrench it should make. It was thus that, from beginning to end, the conduct of this war was under the control of a totally false idea. Extension of line on the part of an invading army has all the elements of weakness and exposure to defeat, by breaking the line and destroying the dissevered parts in detail, that a similar line has for defensive operations. Nor is it possible to conceive of a worse policy in war than that which obtains when armies are divided and scattered for the occupancy of acquired territory, while the main armies of the enemy are in the field. It was for this reason mainly that we were necessitated to bring into the field at least 2,500,000

men to put down this Rebellion ; whereas an able General would have accomplished this end in less than one-third the time which we spent in doing it, and with one-fifth of the forces which we employed.

The plan which should have been adopted by our military authorities.

We are now prepared to indicate distinctly the essential elements of the plan for the conduct of the war, the plan which the highest wisdom required that our military authorities should have adopted. War, in all its forms, is, in reality, a conflict of military forces, and always ends when the military force of one enemy succumbs to that of the other. Hence a wise General contemplates and determines all dispositions and movements as a means to one exclusive end—the destruction of the military power of his opponent. Fortresses are besieged or passed by, and territory is occupied or not, with exclusive reference to this one end. The Germans, for example, stopped with a great force to besiege Metz, because the central army of France was within those fortifications. Had the French escaped, as they intended to have done, but a very few, if any, men would have been left behind by the invaders to besiege the place. The Crown Prince moved away from Paris when the city lay at his mercy, because the second army of France was concentrated at Sedan. With every wise commander, the locality of the main army of the enemy is his centre. Such commander, also, always distinguishes between what may be called the *main* and the mere *side* issues of war. With Wellington and Blucher, for example, the main issue of their campaign, as they well and wisely understood, lay, not at Waver, but at Waterloo. Hence, but very few forces were left at the former place, while all their main ones were concentrated at the latter. Nothing is more unwise than the idea that wherever any forces of the enemy may happen to be located, there he must be sought out and assaulted.

Had either of our Commanders-in-Chief been a great strategist, he would have perceived at once that the soul and strength of the Confederacy lay, not in its seaports or inland fortified places, but in its armies, and that the

end of all his dispositions and movements should be, not the capture of Willmington, Charlestown, Savannah, Richmond, Vicksburg, Corinth, Chattanooga, or Atlanta, not to take or hold territory, but to crush out the *military power* of the said Confederacy. He would also have perceived, with equal distinctness, that that war had but two main or central issues—the main army commanded by General Lee, the army the mission of which was to defend Virginia and the Carolinas, on the one hand; and the army commanded by General Johnston and his predecessors, the army whose mission was to defend the Confederate States lying between the Savannah and the Mississippi rivers, on the other. Hence he would have made no raids into North Carolina, Florida, the interior of Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. All his forces, on the other hand, would have been mainly centralized into two great armies for the crushing out of the two Confederate armies referred to. Under such a commander, furnished with an army 500,000 strong, the war would not have continued six months after our forces were put into the field, inasmuch as the entire Confederacy would have collapsed at once as soon as these two armies were destroyed. In the conceptions of our Commanders-in-Chief, the power of the Confederacy lay, not in its armies, but in Richmond, Willmington, Charlestown, Savannah, Vicksburg, Corinth, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and in its vast territories; and that their great mission was to capture these places, and take piecemeal and hold the Confederate territory. Hence the long continuance of this war, and the unexampled expenditure of life and treasure in bringing it to a close.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY, AND EVENTS WHICH FOLLOWED.

Defeat of Marshall and Crittenden in Eastern Kentucky.

IN the early part of the year 1862 some events occurred in Eastern Kentucky which deserve a passing notice. Colonel Garfield, with two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, assaulted Humphrey Marshall near Prestonburg, Floyd county, and put to flight the General and his force, 2,500 strong, driving them into Virginia, where Marshall dropped into a long oblivion. About the same time, January 17th, General Thomas, at Mill Spring, in Wayne county, was attacked by greatly superior Confederate forces commanded by General Crittenden. After a terrible resistance, Crittenden's forces were totally routed, and on the following night escaped capture by crossing the Cumberland, leaving behind them, in addition to two previously abandoned, ten guns, with caissons and many small arms, nearly 1,500 horses and mules, with tents, blankets, and all the material of their army. Our loss was 39 killed and 207 wounded. The Confederates lost 192 killed, 62 wounded, and 89 unhurt prisoners, aside from the many wounded which they carried from the field. General Zollicoffer, shot by Colonel Fry, was left dead upon the field. The conduct of this battle marked out General Thomas as one of the best Generals in our army; and its results were the disappearance of the Confederates from Eastern Kentucky, and the full preparation for the opening of the campaign in the middle and western part of the State.

The campaign in Middle and Eastern Kentucky, and in the States farther south.

We have already referred to the occupancy on the part

of the Confederates of Bowling Green, Forts Donelson and Henry, Columbus, and Island No. 10. These constituted the Confederate line after their discomfiture in Eastern Kentucky. No campaign was ever better planned than was that of the Union commanders for breaking this line, and putting the enemy to rout. The plan embraced these simple elements: first of all, to capture the two central positions at Donelson and Henry, and then to strike, on the right or left, at the enemy in Bowling Green and Columbus, as occasion might require. The opening of the campaign was entrusted to General Grant, in command of the land forces, amounting to about 30,000 men, and to the ironclad fleet, got in readiness at the close of January 1862, and commanded by Commodore A. H. Foote, of whom Mr. Prentiss truly said that "in all this nation there is no better soul than the soul of our Foote."

We stop here for a moment to answer the inquiry as to the originator of this plan. That the nation owes the fleet which did so much service to the Union cause to General Fremont, no one doubts. Two considerations render it evident that to him, also, the nation is indebted for the original idea of the plans under consideration. In the first place, in a communication dated September 8th, 1861, and addressed to the President, General Fremont gave in detail the substance of this identical plan. In the next place, General Smith, who originally suggested the plan to General Grant and Commodore Foote, and aided them in fully developing it, affirmed that he was indebted to General Fremont, when the latter was in command of the Western Department, for the idea. When history shall do full justice to facts and men, it will be universally acknowledged that General John C. Fremont was the only real strategist who had command of any great department during the progress of this war; that he only evinced the capacity to look over and comprehend a vast field of operations, to determine all the means and appliances requisite on such a field for the production of the best results, and then to plan a vast campaign and determine the dispositions and combine the movements of a great army so as to ensure the results referred to.

To give efficiency to operations, General Halleck assigned to General Grant the territory east of the Mississippi and west of the Cumberland river, and to General Buell the territory east of the river last named. Commodore Foote would, by this arrangement, co-operate with General Grant.

When Generals Grant, Smith, and Commodore Foote had fully developed their plan for the capture of Fort Henry and Donelson, they communicated the said plan to General Halleck, with an urgent request for permission to make the contemplated movement at once. After a tedious delay, no answer being received, a joint communication from the individuals above named was sent, and leave was obtained for the movement desired. As a means of deceiving the Confederates, threatening demonstrations were first made in the direction of Columbus, and other points, when the united fleet and army sailed up the Tennessee river to assault Fort Henry. The army, with the expectation of advancing by land and investing the fortress, disembarked several miles below it; while the fleet, advancing with much caution, came within firing distance. After a cannonade of several hours, General Tilghman, commander of the fort, surrendered at discretion, having previously sent the most of his men to Fort Donelson. In the fight a 24-pound shot pierced the ironclad *Essex*, burst her starboard boiler, and filled the vessel with burning steam, killing her two pilots, and seriously scalding her commander, Captain W. D. Porter, and 40 of his men. In the rest of the fleet, but one was killed, and 9 wounded. Among the prisoners taken were the General and his staff, 143 men, with barracks and tents and other material for the accommodation of 15,000 men. The most important of all the captures was the fort itself, securing to us, as the event proved, the uninterrupted navigation of the river for many hundred miles. In the capture of this fort, the army took no part; and the manner in which the ironclads withstood the fire of the 12 heavy guns from the two batteries at the bank of the river, one of these guns being a 10-inched columbiad, three of them 64-pounders, and the rest 32-pounders, in addition to the heavy guns of the fort, and the field batteries of the

garrison, evinces most clearly the perfection with which they were built.

As the army had taken no part in this conflict, and as Fort Donelson, some twelve miles distant, was a far more important position than that just captured, General Grant most wisely determined to move at once upon the former place. Crossing over the Tennessee General Smith's division, and moving with this directly upon the road leading thither, he completed the investment of the fort on the land side; while the fleet, with the rest of his army, passed down the Tennessee and up the Cumberland river, to reinforce and aid the division referred to. The force occupying the fort has been variously estimated at from 13,000 to 18,000 men, all under the command of General John B. Floyd. The force under General Grant, in addition to the armed fleet, amounted, according to the best authorities, to from 30,000 to 40,000 men. If anybody can discover any material fault in the plan or conduct of the assault, either on the land or water side, they are possessed of more wisdom than the author of this treatise. In their advance, the ironclads, after they had driven most of the enemy's gunners from their batteries, were obliged to retire for repairs. On the land side, the fight having been continued from the 12th to the night of the 15th February, General Buckner, left in command by the flight of Floyd, who took with him some 1,500 men on two steamboats, General Forest having also escaped with about 600 cavalry,—General Buckner on the 16th surrendered at discretion. The Confederate loss in prisoners, including some 2,000 killed and wounded, approached 10,000 men, with 40 pieces of artillery, and a large amount of horses, mules, and stores of various kinds. Our loss in killed and wounded, though not accurately reported, must have been quite as large as that of the Confederates, we having been the assailing party. We would here remark that Pollard gives the Confederate loss in prisoners at 5,079, giving the number of regiments, and the number of men in each regiment. In this he may not have included the wounded. As we have no official statement to rebut this, the correctness of Pollard's statement remains undisputed.

The situation, and the course which events should have taken, after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson.

By the fall of the forts above designated, the Confederate army in Kentucky was dissevered and divided into two widely separate parts, the one located at Bowling Green, and the other at Columbus, with the rivers Cumberland and Tennessee, and our fleet and army which had captured the forts, between the dissevered parts referred to. South of Bowling Green, and directly in the rear of General A. S. Johnston, who now commanded at this place, lay Nashville, in an almost totally defenceless state, and containing, it is said, provision and stores for the Confederate army, amounting in value to some \$10,000,000. West of Fort Henry lay Columbus, which could have been invested on the land side by the army of General Grant, crossing over from the vicinity of said fort, and on the water side by the fleet. What any wise commander in the position then occupied by General Halleck would have proposed to himself, would have been the capture of the two Confederate armies under consideration, and especially that under General Johnston. As a means to this end, the fleet with General Grant's army on board, and reinforcements sent after them, would have been ordered to proceed at once to Nashville, and, having captured the city, to have faced Johnston in his retreat south, with General Buell pressing upon his rear. Johnston having been crushed between these two masses, Columbus, if not previously abandoned, should have been invested as above indicated. Nothing short of, or diverse from, these two results would any commander of common judgment have proposed to himself; and none can doubt the full practicability of such a plan.

The course which events did take in the circumstances.

The plan above indicated, the plan by which all possible fruits of prior advantages might have been reaped, was the identical one proposed by Commodore Foote, General Grant, and their advisers. Commodore Foote, while tarrying with his brother at Cleveland, Ohio, after his wound, expressed the deepest reprobation that those who advised

were not permitted to carry out this plan. Such a course on the part of the Union fleet and army was actually expected by the Confederates. Every possible effort, as soon as the fall of Donelson was known, was made to remove from the city all the materials and supplies designated. Instead of ordering what the circumstances required, our commander retained the main portion of the fleet, and of the army of General Grant, where they were; sent forward Commodore Foote with two gunboats up the Cumberland as far as Clarksville; while General Smith with his division moved by land to the same place, and while General Buell, General O. M. Mitchel in advance, was sent after General A. S. Johnston, who had retreated from Bowling Green. To the least reflecting mind it must be perfectly evident that had it been the specific design of our Generals to induce General Johnston to retreat, and to render that retreat perfectly safe, measures better adapted to that end could, by no possibility, have been adopted. The result was as might have been anticipated. Johnston did make a perfectly safe retreat, all the Confederate stores both at Bowling Green and Nashville having been previously removed or destroyed; and passing through the latter place, assumed a new position and concentrated his forces at Corinth, Mississippi, a position on the Tennessee and Charlestown railroad east of Memphis, and a few miles west of the point where the Tennessee river turns from its western in a northern direction. To reach this point from Bowling Green requires a six weeks' march over muddy roads of more than 300 miles. On the 24th February our forces took possession of Nashville, where General Buell arrived soon after, and quartered his army around the city. From Nashville General Mitchel was sent, with a force inadequate to any permanent and important results, down into Alabama, where he did considerable damage to the Confederate interests, capturing Huntsville and other places, and manifesting such energy that he could not be endured in Buell's command, and was hence transferred to Port Royal, S. C., where he died October 20th.

After a few days' rest, General Grant, with his main army reinforced to nearly or quite 40,000 men, passed by land over to the Tennessee river, where his troops were taken

on board the fleet, and conveyed finally, no notice being taken of the Confederates at Columbus and vicinity, to a place called Pittsburg Landing, a place located on the west side of the river about twenty miles north-east from Corinth, where the Confederate forces under General Johnston were concentrated.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.

At this place occurred, April 6th and 7th, a scene, the battle bearing each of the above designations,—a scene for the leading characteristics of which, with the preceding facts, no impartial historian can offer a single excuse or apology for the General in command of our army. That army, it must be borne in mind, had lain in this position from March 12th to April 6th, a position but about twenty miles distant from the central western army of the Confederacy, an army commanded by one of their ablest Generals, and who was concentrating his forces at Corinth to resist and repel the invasion of which the army of General Grant was the advanced force. No army was ever in a position where it was more likely to be assaulted by superior numbers than was ours in the circumstances under consideration. General Johnston would deserve the contempt of the world, if he had not taken advantage of the opportunity which the advanced and isolated position of our army presented, to strike a crushing blow before the expected reinforcements should arrive. No commander, therefore, had more constraining motives to so fortify his position as to render it as secure as possible against assault, and to keep such a perpetual and sharp outlook as to render surprise impossible. Nor was there ever a position which could have been rendered impregnable with less labour, or more readily guarded against sudden and unexpected assault. The country around was an almost unbroken wilderness, and covered with such a thick growth of underbrush that, in a few hours, the approach of the enemy, except by the open roads, might have been rendered nearly or quite impossible, while a few batteries judiciously located would have effectively barred all approach on said roads. The absolutely known principles of the science of war, as well as its most common and

invariable usages, demanded of our General in command every precaution against surprise and successful assault.

What was done in these very peculiar and perilous circumstances? Everything, we answer, to render surprise, defeat, and capture most practicable, and nothing whatever to prevent such a catastrophe. In front, as all witnesses and historians fully agree, not a single entrenchment or abatis was raised, nor a single tree or shrub in the surrounding forests and groves cut down to impede or hinder the approach of the enemy in any direction whatever. The divisions of the army were also as carelessly distributed as possible. "Sherman's divisions," says an eyewitness, the correspondent of the *Cincinnati Gazette*, and his testimony is undisputed, "extended from the extreme right to extreme left of our line, while four other divisions had been crowded in between, as they arrived." The state in which the enemy actually found our army on the morning of April 6th is thus very correctly and impressively described by Mr. Greeley:—

"Though the vicinity of the enemy was notorious, not an entrenchment nor defence of any kind, not even an abatis, here so easily made, covered and protected our front; no reconnoitering parties were thrown forward to watch for and report an advance of the enemy; and even the pickets were scarcely a musket-shot from the tents of our foremost regiments; some of which, it was asserted, had not even been provided with ammunition, though the woods, scarcely a mile away, had suddenly been found swarming with Rebel scouts and sharp-shooters in such strength as to forbid observation on our part. Low but ominous whispers and meaning glances of exultation among the Rebel civilians in our rear had already given indications that a blow was about to be struck; and alarmed Unionists had sought the tents of our Generals with monitions of danger, which were received with sneering intimations that every one should stick to his trade. General Grant was at Savannah, superintending the reception of supplies. Such was the condition of our forces on Saturday evening, April 5th." The utter neglect of all precautions, universal in all well-regulated armies, to prevent surprise, was a matter of utter astonishment to the Confederates.

Under such circumstances, it is not at all surprising that that night the enemy, more than 40,000 strong, their presence not being even suspected, encamped within less than four miles of our lines,—that, by a very early advance, those lines were surprised when our men were just engaged in dressing or getting ready their breakfasts; that when General Grant arrived upon the field at about 8 a.m., his army was, in reality, beaten; that by 12 o'clock the camps of all the divisions of our army but one were in the enemy's hands, and two out of five divisions were driven back, and the other three routed; that, in the language of Mr. Greeley, "at half-past 4 p.m., our surprised but over-matched army, apart from Lew. Wallace's division, had been crowded back into a semicircle of three or four hundred acres immediately around, but rather to the left of, the Landing;" that when this position was assaulted at 6 o'clock, nothing saved our army from utter rout or capture but the timely arrival of Lew. Wallace and one of General Buell's divisions, together with the aid of two gunboats; and that nothing but the aid of General Buell's army, which came up in force during the night, enabled our forces to drive the enemy off from the field on the next day; while nearly 15,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, were lost on our side, and upwards of 10,000 on the part of the Confederates, whereas no battle at all would, in all probability, have been fought but for the reckless carelessness of our General and his subordinates in command. We should add here that the death of General Johnston, which occurred about 2 p.m. of the first day, prevented a more vigorous subsequent advance of the Confederates on that day. On each of these days our commanders and their men did all that could have been done to prevent defeat, rout, and capture, and to ensure the victory which was finally gained. Such facts, however, offer no excuse whatever for the reckless disregard of all the prudential measures which devolve most sacredly upon all commanders of armies, or free them from full responsibility for the lives and limbs of thousands of brave men sacrificed through criminal neglect of known duty. There is not a military power in Europe which would, for a single day, continue in command a

General who had done, and neglected to do, what our commander did during the three weeks which preceded this battle.

The following extract from an article on Sherman's "Memoirs," an article which appeared in the *Washington Capital*, deserves a place in history, as throwing clear light upon the criminal conduct of Generals Grant, Sherman, and others,—conduct which occasioned the slaughter of about 15,000 of our brave men. History does not state the actual condition of some of those men in that Bachanalian feast referred to in the extract which follows:—

"The unnecessary slaughter of thousands, that sent desolation to householders throughout the land, was due to reckless incapacity of the General in command. The most striking illustration of this is to be found in his treatment of the battle of Shiloh. While advancing on to that fatal locality, separating his force so as to allow the enemy to attack it in detail and to make a disaster inevitable, placing the advance on the wrong side of the river in the presence of the enemy, we come upon the following paragraph, page 226, vol. i., which reads:—'Among my colonels I had a strange character—Thomas Worthington, colonel of the 46th Ohio. He was a graduate of West Point, of the class of 1827; was therefore older than General Halleck, General Grant, or myself, and claimed to know more of war than all of us put together. In ascending the river he did not keep his place in the column, but pushed on and reached Savannah a day before the rest of my division. When I reached that place I found that Worthington had landed his regiment, and was flying about giving orders as though he were Commander-in-Chief. I made him get back to his boat, and gave him to understand that he must hereafter keep his place.' This is all. The 'strange character' thus briefly described comes and goes in this mysterious manner, so far as the Memoirs are concerned. The reader unacquainted with the ugly events that followed wonders why the 'strange character' is introduced at all. But the mystery vanishes before those who know that Old Tom of the 46th Ohio was thereafter to be an ugly shadow, haunting through life the hero of these lame reminiscences. Old Colonel Tom was

a queer character, but this was not his worst feature—he was an ugly customer, who did know something of war, and knew that Sherman and Grant were pushing their divisions into the jaws of a bloody defeat. The night before the battle, so called, of Shiloh, he found himself on the extreme right, and going into camp, found that no precaution whatever was taken against a surprise, and, uneasy and restless, he went to head-quarters to remonstrate. He found head-quarters under the influence of a hearty dinner and utterly oblivious to all danger. Returning, this ‘strange character,’ who thought he knew so much of war, threw out his own pickets, and constructed, as well as he could, a rough breastwork. The next morning the Confederates were upon them, and the only point held during the day and until Buell came to the relief, by the startled, confused, and slaughtered army, was that commanded by this ‘strange character.’ His obstinate absurdity saved all that was saved of that badly-handled army. But Old Tom had not sense enough to keep silent. He was disgustingly loud and offensive in his denunciations, and instead of being promoted for his gallant conduct, was cashiered for telling the truth.”

*General Pope and Commodore Foote at New Madrid and
Island No. 10.*

The fall of Forts Henry and Donelson rendered, in the judgment of the Confederate commanders, Columbus no longer tenable. It was accordingly abandoned, and, under the direction of General Beauregard, one of the best engineers in the country, very strong fortifications, very heavily mounted, were erected at more favourable points still farther down the river, especially at Island No. 10, New Madrid in Missouri, and Tiptonville in Kentucky. The capture of these strongholds was entrusted to General Pope with an army about 40,000 strong, and to Commodore Foote with his ironclads. This expedition was conducted with the same energy and skill as was that against the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland. The first place to be assaulted was New Madrid, which was defended, not only by strong fortifications on the land side, but by formidable floating batteries or armed

steamers on the river side. These vessels were so located that they swept the whole country for several miles round, and rendered the retaining the fortifications, if captured, impracticable. Under these circumstances, four 24-pound size guns were sent for, and with these, March 13th, a fire, at 800 yards range, was opened upon the works and vessels, and with such power that the vessels were drawn off and the place surrendered on the following morning. So precipitate had been the retreat of the enemy that very little of their material was taken away or destroyed, even their tents being left standing. Thirty-three cannon, several thousand small arms, and a large amount of other material, were left behind uninjured.

To understand the situation now, it must be borne in mind that while New Madrid is about 20 miles north of Island No. 10, the former place is this distance farther down the river than the latter; the river, at the island, turning northward, and at the former place taking a directly southern course. On the capture of New Madrid, General Pope consequently found himself wholly destitute of transports to take his army in any direction, the fortification on the island keeping our fleet in the river above them. To remedy this evil, nineteen days were spent in cutting a canal twelve miles long across the Missouri peninsula, one of the wonders of engineering; Commodore Foote being employed in the meantime in bombarding, with no decisive results, the forts on the island. By means of transports brought over through this canal, two ironclads having also passed down by the island, one in a thick fog and the other during a thunderstorm in the night, General Pope pushed across the river one division of his army, at a point several miles below Tiptonville, thus completely flanking all the Confederate fortifications above the point of crossing. While our commander was preparing, April 7th, to cross with the remainder of his army, the Confederates, sinking their gunboat *Grampus* and six transports, abandoned Island No. 10 and all their other fortified places near, and retreated eastward. General Pope was in time, however, to make important captures. In a report of the fruits of all these victories, he gives the following summary:—"Three generals, 273 field and

company officers, 6,700 prisoners (troops), 123 pieces of heavy artillery—all of the very best character and latest patterns—7,000 stand of small arms, several wharf-boat loads of provisions, an immense quantity of ammunition of all kinds, many hundred horses and mules, with wagons, harness, etc., are among the spoils.”

These events, while they added much to the glory of Commodore Foote, and elevated General Pope to a very high place among our Generals, spread consternation throughout the Confederacy. One fact is now quite evident, namely, that had General Grant, instead of being prematurely sent south, been sent west to the point where General Pope crossed the river, and been sent there to co-operate with him in the capture of all forces and fortifications above that point, not merely 7,000, but from 15,000 to 20,000, prisoners would have been captured, and a disgraceful loss of nearly 15,000 men at Pittsburg Landing would have been prevented. The bloodlessness of the victories under consideration is one of its most wonderful peculiarities, less than 50 being killed and wounded at New Madrid, and hardly more than this elsewhere.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL HALLECK AT PITTSBURG LANDING AND AT CORINTH.

ABOUT the time when General Pope and Commodore Foote had completed their conquests at New Madrid and Island No. 10, General Halleck left Missouri and passed up to Pittsburg Landing, and assumed direct command of the army, whose mission it was to seek and defeat the enemy in the vicinity of Corinth. Before making an advance, he awaited the arrival of General Pope, whose coming, April 22nd, rendered our army concentrated at this point somewhat upwards of 100,000 strong. Before proceeding to detail and criticise the events which did follow, we will consider what a real strategist would have proposed to himself under the circumstances, and the means and dispositions by which he might have accomplished his plan.

What should have been done in the circumstances then existing.

Immediately after the arrival of General Buell at Nashville, and General Grant at Pittsburg Landing, it became perfectly manifest that General Johnston had selected Corinth as the point where he would concentrate his main army for repelling the threatened invasion. What a real strategist would have proposed to himself would have been, not the driving of the enemy from this position, not his mere defeat, but *capture* there; and never was an enemy in a position more exposed to such a catastrophe than was General Johnston at the point under consideration, and never was a strategist in circumstances more favourable to ensure the accomplishment of his plan than was General Halleck at this time. By the union of Pope

with Grant at Pittsburg Landing, an army 80,000 strong might have been concentrated at that point. By sending Buell down to Decatur, and uniting him with Mitchel there, another army 50,000 or 60,000 strong, Buell in command, could have been assembled in that vicinity. Johnston would thus have been exposed to the strokes of two armies, one of which was equal and the other much superior to his own. By ordering Buell to move upon Johnston's flank and rear, so as to cut off his retreat to the east or south, and precipitating Grant and Pope upon him from the north, nothing could have saved his army from being driven to the Mississippi and captured there. It was by just such dispositions that the Prussians were cooped up and captured at Ulm, and the French at Metz and Sedan, and by which General Bourbaki, with about 100,000 men, was driven into Switzerland by Marshal Manteufel. By a single stroke wisely directed, General Halleck could, without failure, have ended the Rebellion as far as the States between the Mississippi and Savannah rivers are concerned; an event which would speedily have terminated the war. Prior to the final accomplishment of these dispositions, General Pope, with Commodore Foote, might, or might not, have been sent as they were down the Mississippi, there being but little choice between the two arrangements.

The plan which was adopted.

What our General did propose, as the highest end which he hoped to reach, is quite manifest. It was simply this, and nothing more or less; to wit, to capture the post at Corinth by expelling Beauregard from the place. The ultimate aim of our leading commanders during the war seems to have been, not to wipe out the armies of the Confederacy, but to take and hold territory, to capture fortified places irrespective of their strategic relations, and simply to take the positions at any time occupied by the enemy's armies. The movements of General Halleck upon Corinth were as if himself and army had been smitten with a paralysis. For about two weeks after the arrival of General Pope, he stood still where he was; for three weeks

more he crept along at a less rate than one mile a day; our nearest batteries, at the end of this period, being three miles distant from Corinth. Having held our army at bay thus long, General Beauregard, now in command, completed the evacuation of the post on the night of May 29th. On entering the place our army found some piles of provisions in flames, and one full warehouse undamaged, but no guns or small arms. On the barracks they found everywhere written, "These premises to rent. Enquire of G. T. Beauregard." General Pope, with no material results, pursued for a short distance the enemy in his retreat, and then rejoined the army. While our army remained at Pittsburg Landing, and more especially during its advance amid the marshes which lie between that place and Corinth, a horrid pestilence, more destructive than a battle could have been, broke out among our men. While many died, and many more lay in hospitals, at least 500 per day were sent down the river for their homes, presenting everywhere through the Western States the most ghastly appearance conceivable. Nothing could have given the people such a horror of the war as the aspect of these men did. What was singular about the matter was the common sentiment of reprobation in which they all held the General in supreme command. We never saw, or heard of, a man from that army who spoke well of him. One of our captains, sent home on account of sickness, gave to us personally this statement, as illustrative of the spirit with which our army was governed in the interest of slavery:—"At one time," he said, "I was sent off into the country in command of two companies. We started after breakfast, taking no provisions with us, being told that the provision wagons would overtake us in the afternoon. They did not arrive, and we encamped at night dinnerless and supperless. In the afternoon of the second day the hunger of the men became intolerable, and perceiving a flock of sheep on a slave plantation near by, a sufficient number were taken for present relief. On the third day the promised provisions arrived. When the facts became known to the General in command, we, the officers of these companies, were fined two hundred dollars, which we paid, for not restraining our men from thus satisfying the crav-

ings of hunger. On another occasion, when on a march where the men had no opportunity to fill their canteens but from the brooks which they passed over, they stopped to fill them at the well of a planter, a well which stood in his yard near the road. The proprietor stepped out upon his piazza, and imperiously ordered the intruders to leave his premises. The officer in command bid them get what water they needed, but do no damage to the place. For that order, or permission, that officer was tried by a court marshal. He was cleared, however, because tried by patriot associates. Such was the spirit with which our armies were ruled by General Halleck and his chief subordinate in command." Here we have one among the many reasons why the commander of the Western Department was held in such disesteem by his army and in the Western States.

In regard to the benefits which resulted from the capture of Corinth—an event which cost us the disaster at Pittsburg Landing, and many thousand lives through sickness—we have this to say, that the place was about as valuable to us, in a strategic point of view, as a cow-pen; that the event simply changed the locality of the Confederate army from a position where they could do us the least harm, and the Confederates the least good, to another locality from which it invaded Kentucky a second time, and on its return south fought, among others, the bloody battles of Murfreesboro', Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Nashville, and did the Union cause infinite evil. To magnify the idea of the advantages resulting from the event, it being impossible to designate any real benefit, General Halleck telegraphed to Washington that it was "*reported* that General Pope had taken 14,000 prisoners," and a vast number of stands of arms, and that "all was going as he could desire."

The final dispositions made after the capture of Corinth.

If events did take the course which our General desired, they certainly did not eventuate in accordance with the requirements of the Union cause. After the capture of Island No. 10, the army and fleet moved down the river and laid siege to Fort Pillow (Wright), some 40 miles above

Memphis. After remaining before the place for about two weeks, the army being unable to do anything on account of the high water, and the fleet effecting little, General Pope was called to Corinth, and after four weeks of ineffective cannonade on both sides, Fort Pillow, on the fall of Corinth, was abandoned. During this interval, however, there was a severe battle between ours and a Confederate fleet of four vessels, one of them a very powerful ironclad ram, and the others boats of less power. The result of the battle was the disabling of the Confederate fleet, with the sinking of the ram, the burning of one of the boats, and the drifting of the others in a crippled condition under the protection of the forts. At this time, Commodore Foote was necessitated to retire from his command, on account of the wound received at Fort Donelson. Commodore Davis, left in command, steamed down to Memphis, where he encountered and destroyed a Confederate fleet of eight vessels with which he was there assailed; but one vessel escaping. Memphis was now surrendered. The capture of this city, with the fall of Corinth and the opening of the Mississippi thus far down, seemed to have fully accomplished the plan of General Halleck. His army was, accordingly, in reality dispersed; General Buell being sent back to his command, General Grant placed in command at Memphis, and the rest of the army being distributed at intervals on lines extending nearly or quite 200 miles. In other words, this army, more than 100,000 strong, was so distributed as to be rendered powerless for any offensive operations whatever.

CHAPTER X.

GENERAL HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

WHILE our army lay at Corinth, an event occurred which determined the conduct of the war for another eighteen months. We refer to the appointment of General Halleck, July 23rd, as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United States; General Grant being thereby left in command of our army at Corinth. This event, which did more than anything that had previously occurred to paralyze the hope of the army and people, an appointment more universally reprobated than almost any other that could have been made, occurred in this manner. We give the facts as we received them directly from Mr. Sumner; he receiving them with the same directness from President Lincoln. Soon after the arrival of our army under McClellan at Harrison's Landing, the President visited the place. In a council of war General McClellan and certain of his corps commanders advised a movement from that point upon Richmond, General Lee's army there being represented as 200,000 strong, and General M. offering to make the movement provided he could be reinforced by 20,000 or 30,000 men. After the council broke up, a General in command of a division (his name we cannot recall) assured the President that it would be absolute presumption to make that movement unless the army of the Potomac was increased by at least 100,000 men; this assurance being rendered exceedingly plausible and impressive by the estimate previously given in the council of war, that there was at that time in Richmond under General Lee an army 200,000 strong. Under such circumstances, "My mind," said the President to Mr.

Sumner, "became perfectly perplexed, and I determined right then and there to appoint a Commander-in-Chief who should be responsible for our military operations, and I determined further that General Halleck should be the man. I accordingly, as soon as I arrived in Washington, telegraphed to him to come here, and assume the responsibilities of that office." These are the identical circumstances under which that disastrous appointment was made, an appointment which never should have been made but after the maturest and most careful consultations with the wisest men in the nation had been taken. The determination of the President was taken under the perplexed impression that circumstances demanded instant action, and that the Administration of the individual selected for the high office had been a comparative success. "So much do circumstances tend to make us what we are."

We are now to consider the movements of our armies as mainly directed by one mind, that of the individual under consideration. The visit of the President to Harrison's Landing was on the 8th July. Three days after this, July 11th, General Halleck was called to Washington to assume "the command of the whole land forces of the United States as General-in-Chief."

CHAPTER XI.

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

THE raid of General Jackson, and the confusion resulting from the action of three independent commanders upon the same field, with no controlling mind to unify their forces, at length convinced the Administration of the great error which had been committed in the arbitrary divisions and separations which had been made of the army of the Potomac. It was accordingly determined to unite the corps of Fremont, McDowell, and Banks, and other reserve forces in and about Washington and in Northern Virginia, into one body under a single commander. To such command General John Pope was called, June 26th, the day preceding that on which occurred the battle of Gaines' Mill. This appointment was exceedingly offensive to the three Generals above named, and indeed to the entire army of the Potomac. This fact, together with the meagreness of the means placed under his command, induced General Pope to request to be relieved from his new position and be restored to his old command. This request being denied, he set about the work of reorganization and a new disposition of his forces, so necessary in existing circumstances. The new organization took on the name of the Army of Virginia. As a field force, it amounted, in all, to about 42,000 men,—an army quite too small for any effective offensive service. The very first measure of the Administration, and of our new Commander-in-Chief, who was appointed fifteen days after General Pope, after the organization of this new army should have been to render its strength quite double what it then was. All this could readily have been done, one

half the number required being furnished by the union of General Cox's division with the corps of General Burnside, and the remaining 20,000 drawn from other departments. Before the close of July a force 80,000 strong might undeniably have been concentrated in the vicinity of Culpepper. With this army at this point, and the army at Harrison's Landing, then consisting, by official report, of an effective force 101,691 strong, no new dispositions could have been required for an advance upon Richmond. The true policy unquestionably was to have kept the army under McClellan where it was until that of Virginia was prepared as above stated. All things being in readiness, McClellan should have crossed the James river at Burmuda Hundred, we think, and having fortified that point, have seized Lee's communications south of Richmond; our forces being so disposed that McClellan's left should, as early as possible, have been brought into communication with Pope's right wing. The results of the campaign thus conducted, cannot be a matter of rational doubt. If any one is disposed to doubt the practicability of reinforcing the army of Virginia as above indicated, let him consider the following facts. At this very time there lay at Helena, Arkansas, on the Mississippi river, an army wholly unemployed, and numbering upwards of 20,000 men—the army commanded by General Curtis. This army could have been put upon the transports, then in readiness, and forwarded to Washington by the time when their presence was required. At the same time 20,000 more men could have been spared from the army assembled at Corinth, and this without endangering any interests in that quarter. Consider, still further, the strength of the American army at this time. According to the report of the Secretary of War, submitted to Congress on the 1st December of that year, our army consisted, according to the last returns, of upwards of 750,000 men, all "well armed and equipped." In the July previous, that army must have been not far from 700,000 strong. We should stiltify ourselves if we should question the fact that from all these immense forces 40,000 men could have been drawn for the army of Virginia, and 20,000 or even 30,000 more for that of the Potomac.

There can have been no valid excuse for not having rendered both these armies fully adequate in numbers to all the responsibilities devolved upon them. While the reinforcements above referred to were being brought up, the army of Virginia, with absolute directions to fight no important battle, should have been employed in making threatening demonstrations in the direction of Richmond, and all for the purpose of drawing off to the north as many of General Lee's forces as possible. At the same time, General McClellan's army should have made no demonstrations in any direction, the newspapers being filled with reports that he was to be speedily united with the army of Virginia for the protection of Washington. Should General Lee show a disposition to move north still farther, into Maryland and Pennsylvania, none but an apparent resistance to such a movement should have been made. Any General having the forces at his command that General Halleck had, would have built all the bridges above Harper's Ferry that General Lee could desire, provided the latter would have agreed to pass his army over them. In neither of those invasions would any wise Commander-in-Chief, as we shall see, have permitted a single division of General Lee's army to have recrossed the Potomac.

The campaign of the army of Virginia.

Let us now consider the campaign of the army of Virginia as actually conducted by General Pope. In judging of the merits and demerits of a General, we must consider, not only what he accomplished, and failed to accomplish, but more especially the amount of forces put under his command, together with the character of the commanders opposed to him, and the amount of forces which they brought into the field. We must bear in mind that General Pope was compelled to take the field with an army but about 40,000 strong; that at no time did he have under his immediate control over 60,000 men; that he had opposed to him the best Generals known to the Confederacy, with the crushing masses of General Lee's army under their control. The public generally have the impression that the army of the Poto-

mac came to the aid of that of Virginia, and that, with the united forces of both armies under his command, General Pope suffered an inglorious defeat. We must bear in mind here that while an army consisting of 101,691 men present for duty did, two corps excepted, come up with General McClellan, but 20,500 of these were ever present under General Pope's command, and that quite one half of these, General Porter's corps, in consequence of what General Pope truly designated as "unnecessary and unusual delays, and flagrant disregard of his orders, took no part whatever except in the action of the 30th August."

When he first took command, General Pope issued a number of imposing orders which needlessly offended the army of the Potomac on the one hand, and the Confederates on the other. When asked, at the time, what we thought of these orders, our reply was, that the proper answer depended very much upon the number of men General Pope had under his command. If his force was 100,000 strong, those orders were boastfully ostentatious, but endurable. If, on the other hand, his army numbered but about 50,000 men, then the same orders were contemptible. To judge rightly of these orders, we must take into account, not only the forces under his immediate command at the time, but the reinforcements pledged him from the army of the Potomac. It should also be borne in mind that the issuing of just such orders has been a quite common infirmity of great commanders of all ages. Such facts, therefore, should be left out of the account when we would judge of the real merits of any General as a military man.

The specific mission of the army of Virginia when General Pope took the field, it having been then determined to remove the army of the Potomac to the vicinity of Washington, was to hold the army of General Lee in check until our two armies were united, when, with their concentrated force, they might fall upon the Confederate army and crush it. What were the successive dispositions and movements directed by General Pope for the accomplishment of these ends? The first position which he assumed was on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, south of the Rappahannock, having called the corps of Banks and Fre-

mont, that of the latter now commanded by Siegel, from the Shenandoah valley, to the east of the Blue Ridge. The avowed object of this disposition of his forces was to prevent an advance of the Confederates into the Shenandoah on the one hand, and in the direction of Washington on the other. While these are the very ends at which he should have aimed, a careful examination of the maps furnished by the Committee on the Conduct of the War will most fully evince that no disposition of his forces better adapted to ensure these ends could have been made. Prior to the battle of Cedar Mountain, General Banks, with his corps, some 8,000 strong, was sent forward to this point; General McDowell, with one division of his corps, that of Ricketts, was placed three miles in the rear of General Banks; while General Siegel was ordered to move from Sperryville to Culpepper Court House: all parts of his army being placed in easy supporting distances from each other, and the whole on a line best adapted to secure the ends above designated. On August 9th, General Jackson, having crossed his army over the Rapidan, advanced upon General Banks's position. Up to nearly 5 p.m. nothing occurred but desultory firing between the outposts of General Banks and the advanced forces of General Jackson. About this time, General Banks made an imprudent advance of quite one mile from the strong position which he had occupied, and fell upon the Confederates, who had come up with far greater force than was anticipated. At first the enemy was driven back with great slaughter. At length numbers prevailed, and General Banks was gradually pushed back to his original position, where, after the most terrible fighting for the space of about an hour and a half, General Pope with Ricketts's division came up, when the Confederates in their turn were driven backward. That evening and early the next morning the whole of General Pope's forces were on the field, and ready to renew the conflict. On account of the excessive heat of the day, neither army assumed the offensive. In the evening and night following, however, General Jackson made a precipitate retreat back to Gordonsville, "leaving," in the language of General Pope, "many of his dead and wounded on the field and on the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange

Court House." Thus, when Jackson and Pope first met, the former found himself outgeneraled and overmatched by his new antagonist. For the generalship manifested in thus foiling Jackson in his first advance upon our lines, and compelling him to make a precipitate retreat to the position from which he started, General Pope, and most justly, received the warmest commendations of the military authorities at Washington, General Halleck very promptly sending him a most congratulatory letter.

General Pope's dispositions north of the Rappahannock.

After this battle, General Pope was reinforced by a division, 8,000 strong, from General Burnside's command, a division commanded by General Reno. In one of his cavalry raids, the Adjutant of General Stuart was captured, and with him was found, in the language of General Pope, "an autograph letter of General R. E. Lee to General Stuart, dated, at Gordonsville, August 15th, which made manifest to me the position and force of the enemy, and their determination to overwhelm the army under my command before it could be reinforced by any portion of the army of the Potomac." This important revelation induced General Pope to withdraw at once from the position he then occupied, and redistribute his army behind the Rappahannock. The fundamental object of this new disposition and location of forces was to hold back, for the time being, the army of General Lee, on the south of that river, on the one hand, to keep open his communications with Aquia and Alexandria, from whence his reinforcements from the army of the Potomac were anticipated. Another object was to render his line so short and compact that the enemy could not break through it and thus destroy our army in detail. These are the identical ends which good generalship demanded. How did our General accomplish these results? On this subject we will permit General Pope to speak for himself:—"I directed," he says, "Major-General Reno to send back his trains on the morning of the 18th, by way of Stevensburg, to Kelly's or Burnet's Ford, and as soon as the train had gotten several hours in advance, to follow them with his whole corps, and to take post behind the

Rappahannock, leaving all his cavalry in the neighbourhood of Raccoon Ford, to cover this movement. General Banks's corps, which had been ordered on the 12th to take position at Culpepper Court House, I directed, with its train preceding it, to cross the Rappahannock at the point where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses that river. General McDowell's train was ordered to pursue the same route, while the train of General Siegel was directed through Jefferson, to cross the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs. So soon as he had been sufficiently advanced, McDowell's corps was directed to take the route from Culpepper to Rappahannock Ford; whilst General Siegel, who was on the right and front, was directed to follow the movement of his train to Sulphur Springs. These movements were executed during the day and night of the 18th, and the day of the 19th; by which time the whole army with its trains had safely recrossed the Rappahannock, and was posted behind that stream, with its left at Kelly's Ford, and its right about three miles above Rappahannock Station; General Siegel having been directed, immediately upon crossing at Sulphur Springs, to march down the left bank of the Rappahannock until he connected closely with General McDowell's right."

It is hardly conceivable that an army nearly 50,000 strong could have been moved with more prudence and dispatch than this was, or how the new disposition of forces could have been improved. Hence, when General Lee had brought up his whole army, and attempted to force a passage in his front over the Rappahannock, he was everywhere readily repulsed. The position of General Pope, however, while it rendered his left secure against a flank movement in that direction, was manifestly exposed to a similar movement on his right. The distance from General Lee's position to Warrenton, *viâ* Sulphur Springs, Thompson's Ford, and Waterloo, was but a few miles greater than by the several routes in his front. To this liability General Pope was fully awake, and made beforehand all needful preparations to meet it, should it occur. Still, the question arose whether it was not best to retire still nearer the reinforcements expected from the army

of the Potomac and other sources, and there await the approach of General Lee. On forwarding such questions to Washington, he received positive instructions to remain where he was, instructions accompanied with the absolute assurance that in forty-eight hours all the reinforcement needed both for defensive and offensive operations would reach him. On the 18th General Halleck, by telegram, said: "Stand firm on the line till I can help you. Fight hard, and aid will soon come." On the 21st General Halleck sent again: "Dispute every inch of ground, and fight like the devil till we can reinforce you. Forty-eight hours more and we can make you strong enough. Don't yield an inch if you can help it." Such instructions and promises left no alternative but to wait and fight as required. Yet, up to the 25th, four days later, all the reinforcements received amounted to only 7,000 men,—a brigade 2,500 strong under General Reynolds, and Kearny's division, 4,500 strong. Finding that the enemy was moving in force upon Warrenton, *via* Sulphur Springs, a choice remained between two courses,—to cross the Rappahannock, and assail the forces still remaining in his front; or, by a movement to his right, to move his forces upon that portion of Lee's army which had crossed the river. The former, though hazardous, was determined on. Accordingly on the evening of the 22nd all arrangements were perfected for crossing the river the next morning. During the night, however, a heavy storm of rain raised the river some seven or eight feet, carried off the bridges, and rendered crossing in either direction impossible. This event, while it precluded the possibility of a passage of the river on the part of either army for at least thirty-six hours, exposed, during this period, the portion of the Confederate forces which had crossed at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, to the crushing blows of all the forces under General Pope's command. To accomplish this result, General Pope at once moved his whole army still farther up the river; his advance, under Sigel, supported by the corps of Generals Reno and Banks, occupied Sulphur Springs, while a cavalry force took possession of Waterloo. It was now found that the forces of the enemy which had crossed the river at these places had

retired, their advance being but a feint to mask a *detour* still farther north.

RELATIONS EXISTING AT THIS TIME BETWEEN THE ARMY
OF VIRGINIA AND THAT OF THE POTOMAC.

As all the future operations of the army of Virginia were connected with those of that of the Potomac, we now invite special attention to certain facts connected with the movements and dispositions of the army last designated. On the 5th August General McClellan received an absolute order, which he was assured would not be revoked, to remove his army "with all possible promptness" to the vicinity of Washington. That this end might be accomplished with all practicable dispatch, General McClellan was authorised to avail himself at once of all the vast fleets of war vessels and transports on the James river and in Chesapeake Bay. How was the order obeyed? It was an order, to be sure, which General McClellan disapproved. This fact, however, made no change whatever in respect to his duty.

Important statement of Rev. Lucius C. Matlack.

Perhaps the following statement, made to the author of this treatise by Rev. Lucius C. Matlack, who up to the time when General McClellan received the order above referred to had been the chaplain of the Illinois 8th Cavalry, and afterwards accepted the office of Major in an Illinois infantry regiment, may be of interest to my countrymen. Mr. Matlack, permit us to add, is now a leading minister in the Methodist Episcopal Church, and is a man whose veracity has not yet been questioned. On board a steamer from James river to Baltimore, our chaplain found himself in company with two other officers from the Potomac army, one of these having been a clerk on the staff of General F. J. Porter. This clerk remarked to his associates that there were four Generals in the Potomac army who would not co-operate with General Pope, nor obey his orders, when they should come within his department. We refrain from giving the names of these Generals. The reader, however, will be able to determine their

names, in view of facts hereafter presented. This clerk affirmed that he had heard these men converse together upon the subject, and knew that they had agreed together to act as above stated. After the close of General Pope's campaign, this clerk remarked to his associates that they could now understand how perfectly his statements corresponded with the facts which had just occurred. We do not here affirm that any such agreement ever existed between these Generals. We think, however, that the testimony of Rev. L. C. Matlack is adequate evidence that the existence of that agreement was affirmed prior to the facts referred to, and that the occurrence of the facts was afterwards presented in verification of said affirmation. The question now before us is this : taking that statement as one of our guiding lights, how far will it enable us to explain the facts before us? The plan of the Confederates to move upon Washington and capture the city before the army of the Potomac should be removed thither for its defence, was, through spies in Richmond, early communicated to the authorities in Washington, and urged upon General McClellan as a most imperative reason for the greatest possible despatch in pushing forward his army to the threatened capital of the nation. How far did he fulfil these pressing obligations? We must bear in mind that, according to his own statements, he transferred his army, 120,500 strong, in about thirty days. With the most abundant means of transportation at his command, it took him full twenty days to transport to Alexandria and push forward to Bealton and Warrenton, so as to co-operate with General Pope in the defence of the national capital, 20,500 men; and that these were all that were brought forward so as to fire a gun in any of the battles in which they were expected to take a part. When these forces did arrive, they were in as bad a condition as can well be conceived, The corps of General Heintzelman when it arrived at Warrenton was destitute of artillery, and was furnished with only four rounds of ammunition per man; the corps of General Porter being furnished with only forty rounds for each man. It would seem as if they were sent into the field with the deliberate intention that they should do as little effective service as possible. Yet these two corps

were sent into the field thus powerless for any service in open opposition to an express order sent on from Washington, namely, "By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition," and to the pledge implied in McClellan's own reply, to wit, "I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time." One of the difficulties which Heintzelman's corps suffered was the want of the promised supply of ammunition.

But why this unheard-of tardiness in getting his forces into the field? On the first day of August, McClellan received positive instructions to remove his sick and wounded, their number, according to his own report, being about 12,500, 4,000 of whom were able "to make short marches." Not one of these had been removed on the 5th, when he received the absolute command to transport his entire army to the department of Washington. When this order was received, the entire fleet put under his control was put into exclusive requisition to send off the 12,500 men referred to. On the 16th, at 11 p.m., he telegraphed that "all the sick will be away to-morrow night," and that "the movement had commenced by land and water." The movement referred to was not the embarking of troops, but the commencement of an upwards of three days' march to their places of embarkation. Prior to the 12th August, as General McClellan was informed by a telegram from General Halleck, "Burnside moved nearly 13,000 to Aquia Creek in two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you." Yet, notwithstanding all that could have been said by command, urgency, and reproof, all being intermingled in the telegrams sent down from Washington, and notwithstanding the revealed peril of the army of Virginia, and the national capital, not a single division could he be induced to put aboard one of these, or any other transports, until about the 20th of the month; while the 20,500 that were then sent forward, the only troops that he could be induced to send into the field at all, were, in opposition to absolute command and promise, sent forward in the helpless condition above stated. We challenge the world to explain these facts but upon one of two hypotheses—that

General McClellan is a blind and self-willed imbecile, or that he deliberately intended that the army of Virginia should be crushed by that of General Lee, and that whatever the consequences pertaining to the national capital might be. These deductions will become still more evident in the sequel.

The new movement of the Confederates, and the new distribution of forces made by General Pope.

We now return to a consideration of the new movements made by General Lee on the one hand, and of General Pope on the other, from their respective positions on the Rappahannock. Having been foiled in his attempt to force a passage across the river in his front, and to turn General Pope's right wing by crossing said river at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, General Jackson was commanded to move several miles west of the places last designated, then to march north, *viâ* Salem, then turn to his right, and passing through Bull Run mountains by Thoroughfare Gap, to move from thence directly east in the direction of Gainesville; General Lee in the meantime making all practicable arrangements to move his whole army as soon as possible in the same direction, it being necessary, for the protection of his flank and rear, to retain on the Rappahannock the main body of his army as long as he was confronted by General Pope. The movement of Jackson was no surprise to his wakeful antagonist. From signal stations the number of regiments (36) which Jackson had with him was accurately determined, together with his batteries and cavalry, and also the specific direction of his column. From these facts, the plan of General Lee became perfectly manifest; which was this, to interpose Jackson between the army of Virginia and Washington, to hold Pope in check until Lee should come up in full force, then to fall upon the former and crush him, and, lastly, to make a rush for the national capital. The counter plan of General Pope was instantly taken, and all the requisite arrangements were promptly ordered. His own plan, which was communicated to Washington, was, in substance, this: to throw his own army upon Jackson's rear, and cut off his retreat,

thereby also preventing any reinforcements reaching him from General Lee; to confront and hedge in Jackson with adequate force sent out from Alexandria and Washington, and then crush him between the two forces thus advancing upon him; and, last of all, with the united armies of Virginia and of the Potomac to fall upon General Lee and make a final disposition of him and of his army. Such, in fact and form, was the plan of General Pope, a plan worthy of the greatest General of the age. What were the dispositions and arrangements made and ordered by him for the accomplishment of this plan?

Dispositions and arrangements made and ordered by General Pope for the consummation of his plan.

These dispositions and arrangements may be stated in a few words. He had just received word (August 23rd and 24th), direct from head-quarters, that reinforcements, consisting of Sturgis's division, 10,000 strong, Cox's, 7,000 strong, and the corps of Generals Heintzelman and Franklin, 10,000 each, 37,000 in all, would be forwarded to him that afternoon or early the next morning. Of the forces thus promised he forwarded an order that one of the strongest divisions (10,000) should stop at Manassas and hold the fortifications there, and that Franklin's corps should be forwarded with all despatch to Gainesville; the remainder promised, with Porter's corps already on the ground, being deemed sufficient for the work which General Pope had immediately in hand, as the forces with him would be much superior to those under Jackson. Of the other forces promised, none but the single corps of General Heintzelman and General Piatt's brigade of Sturgis's command did arrive at all; and this body came out from under the direct cognizance of General McClellan, without artillery and without ammunition, as above stated. How and why all the remainder were kept back from moving at all we shall see hereafter. The forces under his immediate command were, in the language of General Pope, to "be assembled along the Warrenton turnpike between Warrenton and Gainesville, and give battle to the enemy on my right or left, as he might choose." Suppose now that

Gainesville and Manassas had been occupied as directed, and that General Cox had been forwarded as promised, and consequently calculated upon, we may ask any military man to point out a single defect in the plan under consideration, or to show how it might have been improved. Can there be a reasonable doubt that had these directions been complied with Jackson would have been utterly routed, and that Lee would never have seen, with his army, Maryland or Pennsylvania?

Movements of General Jackson.

The distance which General Jackson, on account of the obstructions which General Pope presented by his dispositions on the north side of the Rappahannock, was necessitated to march in reaching Gainesville, was nearly or quite twice as great as the direct one which lay open to the latter. As long as General Lee with his main army, however, continued in General Pope's front on the south side of the river, the latter was necessitated to keep his main army where it was. Had General Pope turned upon Jackson while he was in his (Pope's) immediate rear, Lee and Jackson would, both in front and rear, have fallen upon the army of Virginia and "ground it to powder." Becoming fully satisfied, by the evening of the 26th and early the next morning, that General Lee had gone in the direction which General Jackson had taken, General Pope set his entire army in motion for the accomplishment of his plan for the destruction of the army of the latter.

While General Pope had been thus detained, General Jackson had proceeded by forced marches for the accomplishment of his masterly flank movement. On arriving in the vicinity of Gainesville, he found no enemy at all confronting him in the direction of Washington or Alexandria. He accordingly divided his army, sending Ewell to the south-east to cut the Orange Railroad, near Kettle Run, some five or six miles east of Warrenton Junction, and from thence to move towards Bristow Station and Manassas Junction, destroying the bridges and breaking the railroad in his course; while Jackson himself proceeded directly to the junction last designated. In both directions his movements were a success. No enemy was encountered by

Ewell. At Manassas Junction the Confederates found themselves opposed by but a feeble garrison, which was easily captured, and with it, as one of their historians states, "several trains heavily laden with stores, ten first class locomotives, fifty thousand pounds of bacon, several thousand barrels of flour, and a large quantity of oats and corn." Such was the position of Jackson's forces on the evening of August 26th.

General Pope's movements in the direction of Jackson.

By the morning of the 27th General Pope's army, now 54,000 strong, with an enfeebled and worn-out cavalry amounting to 4,000, was in motion in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas Junction. General McDowell, with his own and the corps of Sigel, and the division of Reynolds, was directed to move upon Gainesville on the Warrenton turnpike, and to reach his destination that night; which was done. On the same evening, Reno, followed by Kearny, was required to be at Greenwich, a point a few miles south-west of Gainesville, and from thence to communicate with and support McDowell. With Hooker's division, General Pope marched in the direction of Manassas Junction, directing General Porter to remain at Warrenton Junction until the arrival of General Banks, who was coming up from Fayetteville, some six or eight miles distant, and then to move upon Gainesville, where it was then expected that the great battle would occur. About four miles west of Bristow Station, Hooker encountered Ewell's division, and by severe fighting drove it back to Broad Run, a short distance east of the station referred to. About 300, killed and wounded, were lost on each side, Ewell "leaving his dead, many of his wounded, and much baggage on the field of battle." An absolute order was, about dark, sent back to General Porter at Warrenton Junction, where his corps had rested all that day, to march at 1 o'clock that night for Bristow Station, and report to General Pope there at daylight the next morning; the officer who carried the order being directed to wait and act as guide to Porter in his march. This order Porter totally disregarded, not marching even at early dawn, and arriving at Bristow Station at half-past 2 o'clock. Had

Porter come up as required, he and Hooker united would have been moved upon Ewell and Jackson, and held them back until they would have been fallen upon and defeated by Pope's centre and left, which were advancing for that purpose. As it was, Jackson made a safe retreat to Centerville.

The following are the positions of the Union and Confederate forces on the evening of the 27th August: Jackson, with his own old and Hills' corps, was at Manassas; while Ewell was on the east side of Broad Run, at a short distance east of Bristow Station. On the opposite side of the stream lay Hooker's division. At Warrenton Junction, some eight or nine miles west, lay Porter's corps, with Banks in his immediate rear. Near Greenwich, some six or seven miles north-west of Hooker, lay the divisions of Reno and Kearny. At and near Gainesville, on Pope's extreme left, lay McDowell and Sigel. A better distribution of forces, under the circumstances, is inconceivable; Jackson being completely separated from Lee, and the Union forces being in the best conceivable condition to render the destruction of the former complete. Suppose, now, that Franklin had been at Centerville, and Sturgis and Cox at Bull Run (and a not difficult day's march would have brought all their forces to the places designated),—where would have been the hope of General Jackson? Had he attempted to retreat south, he would have been easily intercepted by Porter, Banks, Reno, Kearny, and Hooker, and finally by Sumner, then at Aquia Landing. Had he turned north, he would have been crushed between the forces of Sturgis, Cox, and Franklin, on the one hand, and those of Hooker, Kearny, Reno, McDowell, and Sigel, on the other. Had he given battle where he was, he would have been overwhelmed by the crushing forces precipitated upon him from all directions. Why were not these forces in the positions designated, to say nothing of others more favourable, which might have been secured for Franklin, Sturgis, and Cox? For no other reason, as we shall see hereafter, than flagrant and treasonable disobedience on the part of General McClellan, to absolute orders from General Pope on the one hand, and General Halleck on the other.

“At 9 o'clock,” says General Pope, “satisfied of Jack-

son's position, I sent orders to General McDowell to push forward at the very earliest dawn of day towards Manassas Junction from Gainesville, resting his right on Manassas Gap railroad, and throwing his left well to the east. I directed General Reno to march at the same hour from Greenwich direct upon Manassas Junction, and Kearny to march at the same hour upon Bristow Station. Kearny arrived at Bristow about 8 o'clock in the morning; Reno being on his left, and marching direct upon Manassas Junction. I immediately pushed Kearny in pursuit of Ewell towards Manassas, followed by Hooker." It is perfectly evident that had the order sent to McDowell been as promptly and energetically followed as were those sent to Kearny and Reno, Jackson would have been caught at Manassas, and forced to fight a great battle there. At half-past 7 o'clock in the morning, however, General Siegel, who commanded McDowell's advance, and who had received an order to move at 2 o'clock upon Manassas, was at Gainesville. McDowell had also, without Pope's knowledge, sent one division of his corps, Ricketts's, in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap.

At about 3 o'clock in the morning Jackson began to evacuate Manassas, directing his flight to the north, towards Centerville. At 12 o'clock, August 28th, General Pope, with Kearny's division and Reno's corps, reached Manassas Junction, one hour after Jackson himself had left. These forces, with Hooker's division, were pushed forward in pursuit of Jackson towards Centerville; word being sent to McDowell to move his whole force in the same direction, while an order was sent to Porter to advance to Manassas Junction. Near evening, Kearny drove Jackson's rear guard out of Centerville, and occupied the place, with his advance beyond it. In retreating from this place Jackson's forces divided, one part moving north-west towards Sudley Springs, and the other part taking the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. On this road Jackson's advance encountered the forces of McDowell moving upon Centerville, and at 6 o'clock in the evening a severe action occurred, each party maintaining its ground.

Positions of both armies on the evening of August 28th, and the battles of the day following.

The following are the positions of the opposing armies on the evening of the 28th August. The main forces of General Jackson were distributed along the turnpike from Centerville to Gainesville. Heintzelman and Reno constituted General Pope's right wing, at and near Centerville confronting Jackson's left and left centre. Siegel on the Warrenton Road confronted Jackson's right centre; while McDowell was still farther on Pope's left, with Ricketts's division some seven or eight miles in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap. General Porter, who had been commanded to advance to Manassas Junction, and was, of course, supposed to be there, was about midway between that Junction and Bristow Station, about seven or eight miles in the rear of Pope's left. At daylight, August 29th, General Pope learned that King's division, which occupied his extreme left, had fallen back in the direction of Manassas. This rendered new dispositions and movements of his whole line necessary. Heintzelman, with the divisions of Kearny and Hooker, and these supported by Reno, was directed to move at early dawn towards Gainesville, establish communications with Siegel, and fall upon the enemy wherever found. Siegel, supported by Reynolds's division, was directed to make an attack as soon as the dawning light rendered the enemy visible. A joint order was sent to McDowell and Porter, to move with all their forces and with all speed upon Gainesville, and assault Jackson's right. A special order to the same effect was sent to General Porter. The attack made by Siegel and Heintzelman was a great success, Jackson being driven back several miles, and yet so closely pressed that about noon he was compelled to make a final stand, with his left in the neighbourhood of Sudley Springs, and his right at some distance south of the Warrenton turnpike; every part of his line being confronted by that of General Pope.

Waiting for McDowell and Porter to come up on his extreme left, General Pope suffered his men from twelve until after four o'clock to rest in their positions, and resupply themselves with ammunition; several skirmish-

ings occurring all along the lines whenever the enemy showed the least disposition to retreat. At half-past 4 General Porter was absolutely ordered to assault the enemy's right, and if possible to turn his rear. An hour later, when Porter should have been engaged, and General McDowell was on the field, an attack on the whole line was ordered. The attack on the enemy's centre, and right especially, was made with such fury that Jackson's left was doubled up on his centre, and our forces "occupied the field of battle with the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands." When McDowell had advanced about three-fourths of a mile in front of our lines, he encountered a determined and effective resistance from the advance of Longstreet. Thus matters stood at the close of the day. Jackson's left and centre had, by dint of hard fighting, with the most terrible bayonet charges, been driven back some three or four miles, with his dead and wounded as above stated. At no point had our line been forced back beyond its position in the morning. During the night, the enemy fell back, and were nowhere visible along our front in the morning.

If we raise the enquiry, Who were the victors on this day? we have but one answer to give, namely, that we have higher reasons for claiming a victory for General Pope on this day, than we have for a similar claim in behalf of General McClellan at Antietam. In the former case, both the enemy's left and centre were driven much farther back than his left was in the latter. In the former case, the enemy withdrew from our front in the night; whereas, in the latter, he remained where he was the evening before until the next evening, and leisurely retired. If we should call both of them drawn battles, we should not greatly err. In view of all the facts, however, we cannot but agree with General McDowell's remarks upon the winding up of the bloody conflict:—"These were the finishing strokes of the day, which we could now safely claim as ours."

If we enquire still further, Why was not this victory consummated into a Waterloo defeat of the Confederate forces? but one answer can, in truth and justice, be given. All was owing exclusively to one cause, to wit, the

cowardly and treasonable disobedience to absolute orders on the part of General Porter, deliberate disobedience by which full 12,000 fresh troops were held back and retired from attacking the enemy's right at the critical moment, when his left was being rolled up upon his centre. Porter was then upon the field with his own full corps, and General Piatts's brigade of Sturgis's division left under his command. Mr. Swinton offers this poor apology for Porter:—"Before he arrived upon the field, and by 10 in the morning, the advance of Longstreet had come up, and, taking position on Jackson's right, drew an extension of the Confederate line across the Warrenton turnpike and Manassas Gap Railroad, thus covering all the lines of approach by which the column of Porter might advance towards Gainesville." The facts were, indeed, as here stated, and here we have the most absolute reasons why Porter should have done what he had been absolutely ordered to do, namely, assault this extended line, and prevent its flanking Pope's left, and rolling it up upon his centre. He stood still, however, and when he knew that his brave associates were falling by thousands, basely refused to take a step, or strike a blow, for their relief. In a dispatch to Porter, at 4.30 p.m., General Pope says:—"Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds." "I believe—in fact, I am positive," says General Pope, "that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th General Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy." Again, if "he had made a vigorous attack upon the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently reinforced to have made any effective resistance." Who is right here, Mr. Swinton or General Pope? Let it be borne in mind that when General McDowell, after finding that Porter would not advance, had taken from the latter King's division and, uniting it with that of Ricketts, had come upon the field at half-past 5 p.m., this extended line

which Mr. Swinton would have us believe was sufficiently strong to resist the advance of 12,000 men, had made no move whatever to turn General Pope's left. We must also keep in mind that when McDowell on his arrival assaulted this line, King's division drove it back nearly three-fourths of a mile, before that division met with a stubborn resistance. We stultify ourselves when we entertain the idea that this line had sufficient strength to have resisted for an hour the united corps of McDowell and Porter; that is, a force of upwards of 20,000 men. Whether there were few or many men in that line, Porter's duty as a soldier was to have made the attack ordered. For refusing to do it, in connexion with his other acts of flagrant disobedience to orders, he has been justly pronounced by an impartial court martial unworthy of a place in the army of his country, and of any office in the gift of the nation.

THE BATTLE OF THE 30TH AUGUST.

Two events occurred on the morning of this day, events which demand special attention, as evincing most palpably the spirit of the men who determined the destiny of this campaign. When Porter was moving up into position, early this morning, General Griffin, who commanded one of Porter's divisions,—Griffin, without the knowledge of General Pope, without the knowledge of, or authority from, any one but himself and Porter, turned aside, and sneaked off to Centerville, taking with him Piatts's brigade, which had been placed under the command of the former. Thus about one half of Porter's corps was secretly placed where it could, by no possibility, be of any use whatever on that day. When General Sturgis perceived the treasonable trick which was being played, he promptly took from Griffin Piatts's brigade, reported to General Pope, and did excellent service during the day. On the morning of this day also, General Pope received from General Franklin, at Anandale, some six miles from Alexandria, the following epistle,—a letter which, in the language of Byron, had nothing but "a laughing devil in its mein":—

"August 29th, 1862. 8 p.m.

"I have been instructed by General McClellan to inform you that he will have all available waggons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all the cars, also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train.

"Respectfully,

"W. B. FRANKLIN."

Had the escort been sent down, which would have occupied quite one day, McClellan would unquestionably have been as long in getting the waggons and cars off as he had been in getting Franklin off to Anandale.

During the night after the battle on the 29th, and up to half-past 10 o'clock the next day, General Pope, and the commanders under him, fully believed that the enemy was retreating. Two courses were now before the army of Virginia—to follow up the enemy, who was obviously falling back upon his own reserves; or to fall back upon Centerville, where our own reserves were at last concentrating. The latter undoubtedly was the course demanded by the highest wisdom, and would have corresponded to Wellington's retreat from Quatre Bras to Waterloo. The former course, as was natural in the circumstances, was adopted, although we had but about 40,000 fighting men upon the field. Hence the second battle of Bull Run, which was commenced about 2 p.m., and raged with terrible fury until darkness separated the deadly combatants. "By dark," says General Pope, "our left, where the heaviest fighting was, had been forced back about half or three-quarters of a mile, but still remained firm and unbroken, and still covered the turnpike in our rear." At 8 o'clock, in accordance with written instructions, our army retired in perfect order to Centerville, to which point the corps of Sumner and Franklin had advanced. Here the campaign of the army of Virginia really ended, the enemy afterwards only making demonstrations, as feints, to cover his ultimate designs, which now were, the idea of capturing Washington being abandoned, to move across the Upper Potomac into Maryland and Pennsylvania. In

justice to General Porter, it should be said that on the last of these days of horrible fighting he was himself again, and with the one half of his corps which he had not sent off where they could do nothing, he did effective service on the field. Up to this time his presence had been nothing but an eating cancer upon the body of that army, and the morning of the 30th he had, as stated, recklessly sent away 5,000 men, whose presence, at the crisis of the battle, might have changed materially the fortunes of the day. The losses during these three days, though not accurately stated, were fearful on both sides; General Pope estimating our loss on the 29th at about 7,000, the loss on the side of the Confederates being supposed to have been greater than on ours. To flagrant disobedience to orders, disobedience by which 12,000 men were prevented firing a gun for two days, and 5,000 rendered useless for the third,—to such disobedience one half, at least, of this loss must be charged.

Causes of the disasters of this campaign.

No candid mind can entertain a doubt that had General Porter been as prompt in obedience to order, and as energetic in action, as, for example, General Heintzelman was, and had 10,000 men been placed in the fortifications of Manassas Junction, and 12,000 been sent to Gainesville, as Pope positively directed, Lee would never have reinforced Jackson, nor Jackson rejoined Lee; nor would Lee have crossed the Potomac, unless as a prisoner of war. Nor can any such mind doubt the perfect practicability of the full accomplishment of every order which General Pope gave. His orders to Porter were just as plain as were those to Heintzelman, and obedience in one case was just as practicable and sacredly binding as in the other. We should stultify ourselves if, for a moment, we should entertain the idea that 10,000 men might not have been placed in the fortifications at Manassas Junction, before Jackson arrived there, and that 12,000 men might not have been sent to Centerville or Gainesville, as General Pope ordered. Who can believe that it was needful to employ, for eighteen days, all the available fleet and transports of the United States, in transporting from McClellan's quarters to a

place of safety 12,500 sick and wounded men, 4,000 of whom were reported able to make short and easy marches? Who can believe that after orders had been given to remove that army with the greatest possible dispatch, fifteen days need to have transpired before a single man capable of taking the field was sent off to the place required? Say not that the fleet was employed in carrying off the sick and wounded. The portion of the fleet which, in two days, conveyed Burnside's corps, 13,000 strong, from that vicinity to Aquia, was immediately sent back to McClellan, and was not needed to carry away the sick. By availing himself of this fleet, he might, undeniably, between the 12th and 20th August, when his first reinforcements were sent off, have forwarded to Aquia and Alexandria at least 50,000 men. Who, let us ask again, can believe that in twenty-five days, after the absolute order was given to forward reinforcements with all possible haste, but 20,500 men could have been sent to the army of Virginia? We are not fools; and we should make fools of ourselves, if we should admit that there was all diligence, that there was anything but intentional delay, in this case.

Look now at the facts which transpired after the arrival of McClellan at Alexandria. He was specifically directed, as we have seen, to be certain that all the men he sent off were well supplied with ammunition, and had avowed himself well able to comply, and absolutely pledged himself to comply, with the requisition. Yet, not a corps or division did he send off that was furnished with ammunition adequate for a single battle, the uniform average being but forty rounds per man. On the 23rd August, General Pope received a message from the Commander-in-Chief that "heavy reinforcements would begin to arrive at Warrenton Junction the succeeding day." On the 24th, General Pope received word from Colonel Haupt, railroad superintendent at Alexandria, "that 30,000 men had demanded from him transportation, and that they would all be shipped that afternoon or early the next morning." The forces specifically promised "consisted of the division of General Sturgis, 10,000 strong; the division of General Cox, 7,000 strong; the corps of General Heintzelman, 10,000 strong; and the corps of General Franklin, 10,000

strong,"—37,000 in all. Of these, General Pope directed that 10,000 should stop at Manassas Junction, and 10,000 be forwarded to Gainesville. To accomplish these directions required no change of railroad arrangements whatever. The cars containing the first 10,000 would stop at Manassas; those containing the second would diverge from thence on the Manassas Gap Railroad to Gainesville; while the remainder would have moved directly on to Warrenton. Of all these 37,000 reinforcements thus in fact and form promised, not a man, with the exception of Heintzelman's corps and a single brigade of General Sturgis's division, ever came to Warrenton, or was sent out of Alexandria as pledged; and Jackson took unresisted possession of Gainesville and Manassas Junction both. Why were all the rest of these forces kept back? The men were on the ground, and had demanded transportation. Ample means of transportation were on hand, as Colonel Haupt affirmed. Yet about 25,000 of the promised reinforcements remained in Alexandria. For this fact but one cause can be assigned—flagrant, if not treasonable, disobedience to orders from the Commander-in-Chief on the part of General McClellan. Not a man could move until the latter ordered it. What were the orders which he did receive on this subject? On the 27th, at 10 a.m., he received from General Halleck an order "to have Franklin's corps march in the direction of Manassas Junction as soon as possible." At 10.40 a.m., McClellan replies: "I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform as to his means of transportation." At meridian, General Halleck telegraphs again, "Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad." To this, the following reply was immediately sent: "My aid has just returned from General Franklin's camp; reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He gave orders to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once." August 28th, General Halleck sent the following order to Franklin: "On parting with General McClellan, about 2 o'clock

this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day towards Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the General has not yet returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this." At 1 p.m. McClellan, not Franklin, replies: "Your despatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery, he shall go." To this, General Halleck replies: "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible to Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope, before the enemy is reinforced." At 4 p.m. McClellan replies: "Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning." At 10 30, August 29th, McClellan telegraphs Halleck again: "Franklin's corps is in motion: started about 6 a.m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry." "I do not think Franklin is in a condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders last night." Under what orders, as far as General Halleck was concerned, did Franklin move? We know, in view of those orders, how the message "Franklin's corps is in motion" was understood by the authorities at Washington. Under what secret orders from McClellan did he move? This, and nothing more—to march, not for Manassas, or Pope's army, but as far as Anandale, some six miles from Alexandria, and then stop. Was not the declaration, made as it was in reply to an absolute order that Franklin should move on to Manassas, and accompanied as it was by the secret order under consideration,—was not the declaration "Franklin's corps is in motion" a black and treasonable falsehood? We can make nothing else out of it. With what coolness was the following telegram to General Halleck, a message sent at noon of this same day, dictated: "Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve, ammunition, and without transportation." The facts, and the telegrams before us, render it palpably evident that in the face of absolute orders from the supreme authorities, orders given both to McClellan and Franklin, on the one hand, and

absolute pledges and affirmations on the other, nothing whatever had been done even to prepare Franklin to move, that there had been a deliberate intention not to get him ready, and not to have him move at all. Franklin was "without reserve." Yet, Cox was there with 7,000 veterans, with whom he would gladly have directly moved upon the field, or as a reserve to any force that was thus moving. Nearly or quite 7,000 of Sturgis's division were there, and these could as readily have been sent out as the division of Cox. Franklin "was without ammunition." Yet, McClellan, as he himself had affirmed, had an abundance of ammunition, and had been absolutely commanded, and had as absolutely promised, not to send any into the field not abundantly furnished with ammunition. Franklin "was without transportation." Yet, as the master of transportation affirmed, the means of transportation were abundant in Washington, and Franklin or McClellan could, at any moment, have had all that was needful by simply "asking for it." Franklin "was without reserve, without ammunition, and without transportation," simply because McClellan deliberately intended that if he moved at all he should go out in this identical state, a condition in which he could have been of no use anywhere. Can we wonder that when General Halleck was informed that General Franklin was at Anandale in that state, and with no intent to go any farther, he charged McClellan to his face with open and flagrant disobedience to orders? In any military country on earth but this, any General who should be thus guilty would be promptly tried at court martial and shot. On the 28th, for example, General Halleck sends this telegram: "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is reinforced." At this moment, aside from thousands of other forces not designated, those of Franklin, Cox, and Sturgis, as above designated, with large forces at Falmouth, were under McClellan's immediate command, and all in a movable condition. Yet all, in the face of such orders as the above, were deliberately held back.

McClellan's telegram to the President, August 29th, and his message through Franklin on the same day, de-

mand special notice here. "I am clear," he says to the President, "that one of two courses should be adopted; first, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once to use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe." Learning from Washington that the army of Virginia was suffering from want of provisions, he directs Franklin to write to General Pope that if he will send a cavalry escort to Alexandria, General McClellan will, on their arrival, "have all the available waggons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all the cars also." The army of Virginia, of whom the above was said, and to whom the above message was sent, an army which was within twenty-five or thirty miles distance from McClellan's quarters, and was then in a death-grapple with superior forces, and in this condition was hunger-smitten,—this army, we must bear in mind, was an American army, and was composed wholly of McClellan's old companions in arms, or of men who had been trained and had acted under him; and he was in full hearing of the thunder of the cannon by which these men were being slaughtered. To say that a commander under such circumstances can coolly talk of such an army "getting out of its scrape" the best way it can, and can mock at their hunger by such a message as the above,—to say that such a man has, or can have, a human, an American, or a soldier's heart in him, is to belie human nature, to vilify American patriotism, and to slander the heart of every true soldier on earth. Multitudes of facts of the same character as the above might be adduced. But we forbear. Of this we are perfectly confident, that no candid mind can take into full account all the facts of the case without coming to this immutable conclusion, that the disasters which did finally befall the army of Virginia are wholly attributable to one exclusive cause—a deliberately predetermined plan on the part of certain commanders, a plan carried out with remorseless fidelity, to withhold from that army the aid which it needed, and which was ordered to it; not to co-operate with General Pope, or to obey his orders upon the field, but to leave him alone, and solitary, to the tender mercies of Jackson and Lee, and

let the nation endure the consequences. There are, in the cold and gloomy recesses of certain minds, capacities for such plans and purposes as the above, and such capacities did undeniably exist in certain leading minds in the army of the Potomac.

Retirement of General Pope.

After the bloody and unfortunate battle of the 30th at Bull Run, and the orderly retirement of our exhausted and bleeding forces to Centerville, General Pope found himself at last in the presence of reinforcements which enabled him to turn round and boldly face his antagonist once more; the corps of Generals Sumner and Franklin having at last been sent forward thus far. While our army lay here, Lee made no attack in front, but attempted to turn our right by a movement by Chantilly, a village some five or six miles north of Centerville. At this place the enemy was assaulted by General Pope, and amid a terrible thunder-storm a battle was fought, with the advantage decidedly on our side. In this battle, aside from the loss of about 500 killed and wounded, we suffered an irreparable loss in the deaths of Generals Kearny and Stevens. After this no fighting of any importance occurred, the army of Virginia being brought within the fortifications about Washington; while General Lee was left free to carry out the second feature of his plan, the first, the capture of Washington, having been defeated, namely, to carry the war into Maryland.

Having fully accomplished his mission, the saving of Washington, General Pope requested, and at length obtained, permission to retire from a command to which he was called in opposition to his own urgent request, and to reassume one at the West, where his services had always been appreciated. How many are to be reckoned among the killed, wounded, and missing in the army of Virginia while it existed under his command, only a proximate estimate can be made, no complete official returns ever having been published. The Confederates confess to a loss on their side of upwards of 15,000 men, and their estimates were never too high, being made, at the time, for effect upon the Southern mind. Our loss from all

causes, must have been considerably upwards of 20,000 brave men. In the winding up of the campaign of this army, we have to confess, in a certain form, a second Bull Run defeat,—a defeat, however, in which nothing can be designated which is not most honourable to the army which suffered. Of the campaign of this army we would say that of no other campaign which occurred during the war is the national mind so little informed and so strangely misinformed as of this. With very few exceptions, we believe that our best read citizens, in common with the people generally, conceive, for example, that in this second battle of Bull Run General Lee actually met and defeated the united armies of Virginia and of the Potomac. What a different aspect is put upon the whole case when we become distinctly aware that even in this battle there were not 15,000 men from the latter army actually engaged, and in no other were there as many as 12,000. It is literally true that with the exception of this “little help,” and in circumstances in which the army of Virginia might have had, and but for treasonable disobedience to orders would have had, the aid of at least 50,000 veteran troops, it was ruthlessly left to “tread the winepress alone;” and never did an army with more patient endurance and self-sacrificing fidelity pour out its blood for its country.

In regard to the commander of this army, and it never had but one, we would say, that he is not the first eagle that has been “hawked at and killed by a mousing owl.” General Fremont, to whom the Western Department is more indebted than to any other man, was suddenly cut short in his most brilliant career. Yet history, though the people more than surmised, does not tell us for what, or for whom, this was done. It was at the suggestion of General McDowell that all those railroad connexions between the north and the south of Washington were perfected, connexions so beneficial during the war. While General McClellan was Commander-in-Chief, and confined by sickness in Washington, General McDowell, as directed by President Lincoln, proposed a specific plan for the future campaign, a plan which if carried out with vigour would have insured the capture of Richmond, and the destruction of the Confederate army in Virginia, within the space of a

few weeks. When our vast army was lying before Washington "rooted and grounded in mud," and its commander was awe-struck with the fearful array of quaker-guns at Centerville, Fairfax, and Manassas, General McDowell submitted in writing a definite plan, not only for the bringing out of ours upon dry land, but for the capture of the Confederate army. When the removal of our army from the front of the enemy down to the Peninsula was determined on, General McDowell and other corps commanders submitted a written protest against the measure. "For having, out of regard to the best interests of my country, dared to do such things," said General McDowell to us personally, "I, a ruined man, am here under the dark cloud which hangs over me." When General Pope, at the close of his campaign, reported in person to the General-in-Chief, the Secretary of War, and the President, "Each of these high functionaries," said General Pope, "received me with the greatest cordiality, and expressed in the most decided manner his appreciation of my services and of the conduct of my military operations.

"Great indignation was expressed at the treacherous and unfaithful conduct of officers of high rank who were directly or indirectly connected with those operations; and so decided was this feeling, and so determined the purpose to execute justice upon them, that I was urged to furnish for use to the Government immediately a brief official report of the campaign." Notwithstanding these palpable facts, and notwithstanding a minor offender was afterwards punished, General McClellan was reinstated in full command of the army of the Potomac, and General Pope was sent in apparent disgrace to the Western Department. Yet, when history shall present the facts of this war as they were, it will be "read and known of all men" that no one of all our other campaigns was conducted with more consummate ability than this, and that to no General does the nation owe a deeper debt of gratitude than to Major-General John Pope. But for his masterly dispositions, watchful diligence, and tireless energy, the national capital would undeniably have been in the hands of the Confederates before a man would have been got up for its defence from the army of the Potomac. The object of

Jackson's advance from Gordonsville across the Rapidan is obvious; to wit, to seize the fords and bridges across the Rappahannock, and thus secure for the entire Confederate army an uninterrupted advance to Washington. Had this end been secured, or had General Lee been able to force a direct and immediate passage across the river last named, the army of Virginia would have been scattered before him as chaff before the whirlwind, and Washington would have been at his mercy. Nothing but General Pope's masterly dispositions, first north of the Rapidan, and then north of the Rappahannock, held back the advance of the Confederate army in its entirety from the 5th to the 30th August, and thus rendered it impossible for McClellan's slowness, and the "treacherous and unfaithful conduct" of himself and certain of his subordinates to prevent the successful protection of Washington. When General Pope's plans, and the special dispositions and movements of his forces, shall become the subject of full and impartial criticism, none but very poorly read strategists and tacticians will pretend to discover any special defect in them, while all who understand the subject will award them their deep and almost unqualified admiration. No General ever conducted a campaign under greater embarrassments, or made a better use of the forces under his command. When, for example, Jackson made his detour round through Thoroughfare Gap to Manassas Junction, his object was to intervene between the army of Virginia and that of the Potomac, and to hold them apart until the arrival of Lee with his whole army, when both should fall, first upon Pope and crush him, and then turn upon the forces of the army of the Potomac, and crushing that, seize Washington. The plan of General Pope, on the other hand, was to throw his army between those of Jackson and Lee, and while the latter was coming up, to crush the former between his own and the army of the Potomac, and then, with both united, to fall upon Lee and crush him. The duty of Lee as a soldier, on the one hand, and of McClellan as a soldier and under absolute orders, on the other, is obvious. The duty of the former was to push his army with all possible dispatch to Jackson, that the plan of the Confederate commanders might have been a success.

That of the latter was to do all he possibly could to forward adequate reinforcements to Pope, and to perfect the dispositions requisite to consummate the plan which he had propounded. Lee did all that human energy could have done to reinforce Jackson. McClellan, on the other hand, did all he could to prevent adequate reinforcements reaching General Pope, and to prevent all dispositions requisite to the carrying out of his plans. In the final result, Lee, while he did inflict bleeding wounds upon his antagonist, failed to crush either the army of Virginia or of the Potomac, and in his ultimate plan for the capture of Washington. General Pope, on the other hand, while treachery and disobedience to orders prevented his doing all that he had most wisely planned, did inflict terrible blows upon Jackson, rescued his hungry, weary, and bleeding army from the encircling folds of the entire Confederate forces, brought that army in order and safety to Centerville, where he found himself encircled with forces which his antagonist dared not meet, and thus placing an impregnable bulwark between the national capital and the Confederacy, rendered his campaign a glorious success. These facts are undeniably true of General Pope in the conduct of this campaign. When he had forces under line, forces adequate to the accomplishment of what was needed, his plans for the accomplishment of that end were faultless, and were executed with the quickness and force of the thunderbolt. When new and unexpected exigencies arose, exigencies demanding new dispositions of his forces, his adjustments were of the promptest and most unerring character. When help was promised, expected, calculated upon, and not received, he never in a single instance, *à la mode* McClellan, stopped in his career, and did nothing but show his teeth at the supreme authorities, but instantly set about making the best possible use of the resources actually under his command.

CHAPTER XII.

GENERAL LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND.

AT the commencement of our civil war, the sentiment of the State of Maryland was almost exclusively with the South. It was from the first the fixed belief of the Confederate authorities that the presence of General Lee with a large army, more especially if Washington were previously captured, would induce a general rising of the people in favour of the Rebellion. Failing in his direct attempt upon the national capital, the Confederate commander still believed that by an advance into this State his army would be so increased that he might yet capture Washington by moving upon it from the north. With this end in view, he turned aside from General Pope, moved his army to Leesburg, crossed it over the Potomac near that place, and on the 6th September concentrated his forces at Frederick, meeting with no resistance anywhere. From this place he issued a most stirring and seductive address to the people of Maryland, calling upon them to rally around his standard, and thereby vindicate for themselves and their State their proper and desired place in the sisterhood of the Confederacy. While the people of Maryland were in heart as disloyal as General Lee supposed, they had, by the hard instruction of adamant facts, learned discretion. Hence the appeal of the Confederate commander, while it excited universal sympathy, failed to draw volunteers around his standard, the number of desertions from his ranks surpassing the increase from enlistment. For this reason General Lee, before our army approached to drive him on, determined to retire back to Virginia, and had, as we shall see, given his orders accordingly.

When the fact of General Lee's invasion became known to the authorities in Washington, General McClellan, the army of Virginia being blended into that of the Potomac, was put in full command of all our forces, now known again as the army of the Potomac. The mission of McClellan now being the expulsion of Lee, all our forces in and about Washington, at and in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, and within calling distance everywhere, were placed under the command of the former, the only exception to the above grants being that none of the forces under General Heintzelman, now left in command at Washington, should be withdrawn without leave of the President.

What should have been done in the circumstances.

Before advancing to a consideration of the course which events actually did take, we will stop for a moment to consider the course which they would have taken under the directions of any able strategist. The army which General Lee had with him in the State of Maryland constituted, with few exceptions, the entire army of the Confederacy that had been collected in the State of Virginia; all the important corps and divisions, and all the leading Generals in that army, being present with General Lee, and this army, even according to the extravagant estimate of General McClellan, numbered, while at Antietam, less than 100,000 men. What was the amount of available forces under the control of our commander? When General McClellan moved out from Washington, he took with him an army quite 100,000 strong. At the same time, upwards of 100,000 veteran troops were left behind under General Heintzelman, as stated to us by himself personally, for the defence of the national capital. As confirmatory of these statements, we notice the fact that on the 30th September, thirteen days after the battle of Antietam, General McClellan officially reported as present for duty in the army of the Potomac 173,775 men. During this month, he had lost, at Harper's Ferry, South Mountain, and Antietam, between 30,000 and 40,000 men. At the same time, there was left two full corps, quite 30,000 men, in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe. Nor will any one

doubt the practicability of assembling at Harrisburg, from the Western Departments, in time to have taken an effective part in the campaign, at least 30,000 regular troops. Such was the field before our commander, and such were his resources on that field. What would a strategist have done under such circumstances? By his advance into Maryland, General Lee had most fully uncovered Richmond, just as Buonaparte uncovered Paris by moving his own between the armies of Blucher and Schwartzburg, in his attempt to fall upon their communications. A strategist in General McClellan's circumstances would, first of all, have turned his thoughts towards Richmond. Under the command of Generals Wool and Keyes, there were present in the Peninsula about 30,000 men. By sending 20,000 men to Yorktown, and ordering General Wool to move thither with all his available forces, General Keyes would have marched into Richmond with about as little loss as General Lee suffered in his advance from Leesburg to Frederick. The capture of Lee would then only have been a question of time.

Suppose, however, that the first movement determined on had been upon General Lee. What would have been the single end which a strategist would have proposed here? Not the expulsion of Lee from Maryland and Pennsylvania, but the prevention of his return to Virginia on the one hand, and the capture of his army on the other; and all movements and dispositions would have been ordered with exclusive reference to this one single end. In moving out from Washington, his left would have been advanced to Harper's Ferry, and at least 40,000 men would have been stationed there. His centre and right, the former kept in supporting distance with the force first designated, would have been extended in the direction of Baltimore and Frederick. Having thus placed an impassable barrier between Lee and Richmond, nothing now, in the matter of direct assault, would have been hurried. Every available force from every part of the country would have been, with all possible dispatch, hastened to the scene. Those from the east and south would have been brought up directly to the army of the Potomac. Those from the west would have been hastened on to

Harrisburg; while volunteers, as in the case of the invasion of Burguoyne, would have been concentrated at the same point. As soon as all was in readiness—and all could have been done in a few days—our great army would have drawn its folds around the invading force and crushed it. Not a division of General Lee's army would have escaped into Virginia. We very cheerfully submit the above suggestions to the verdict of our countrymen and the world. We boldly affirm, what we did affirm at the time, that had ordinary strategic wisdom controlled our military councils at Washington at this time, the termination of this Maryland campaign would have been the collapse of the Rebellion, the life of the Confederacy being indissolubly linked with the existence of the army of General Lee.

What General McClellan and our military authorities did propose.

In the presence of this golden opportunity, an opportunity which almost never occurs to a commander during the progress of the ages, what did General McClellan and our military authorities propose to do? Just this, and nothing more. Not to inflict any positive injury upon the Confederate army at all, much less to capture it, but simply to prevent the capture of Washington and Baltimore, and the invasion of Pennsylvania, and to drive the invading force out of Maryland. Such is the specific interpretation which McClellan himself gives of the plan under consideration. "The movement from Washington into Maryland," he says, "which culminated in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a part of an offensive campaign. Its object was to preserve the national capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland. These purposes were fully and finally accomplished by the battle of Antietam." In other words, a set of unruly cattle had broken through our inclosures. The object of our movement upon them was, not to hurt, capture, or pound the cattle,—compassionate creatures that we were!—but to head them, and get them out of our fields, put up the fence behind them, and let them do as they might, and break into our inclosures again as opportunities might

present themselves. We blush with shame for our country when we call to mind the fact that such a mind as that, for so long a period, planned our campaigns, and determined the movements of our great armies.

The campaign as conducted by General McClellan.

The carrying out of the plan under consideration was a very plain and simple affair. All that our commander had to do was to select from the immense forces around him an army out-numbering that of General Lee, to pass up between him and Baltimore, and thus head him back towards the sacred soil, to follow him at a respectful distance, to strike him only when he should stop or move too slow, and to continue the process until the enemy had passed over from ours into his own borders. Historians greatly err in their representations that the forces led by General McClellan in this campaign were selected from two wearied and dispirited armies. That of the Potomac had had full two months' quiet rest and recuperation. We, of course, except the small part that had acted with General Pope. The army of Virginia had had several days of severe marching, and two of terrible fighting. The perfect order in which it came off from the bloody field of Bull Run, however, evinced anything but dispiritedness and demoralization. Neither army had endured hardships not common to all regular armies in times of war. No General had ever led a better army, or one better able and prepared to do and to dare, than that led by General McClellan when he went forth to drive General Lee out of Maryland. The army led forth on this mission, the forces under Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry included, amounted, according to its commander's reckoning, from 110,000 to 120,000 men. At Antietam, he had, as he officially states, a force of 87,164 men. Quite 14,000 arrived the next morning. Add to these the 11,583 captured at Harper's Ferry, and what had been lost at South Mountain and other places, and the number remains as above stated.

In moving out from Washington, the march of our army was very slow, averaging about six miles a day. The reason assigned for this was the uncertainty of the enemy's whereabouts and plans. In the early advance a

difference of opinion obtained between Generals Halleck and McClellan, not, as Mr. Swinton states, in regard to the *rapidity* of the movements of the latter, but in respect to the disposition to be made of the forces under Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry; the former requiring that they should be left where they were, and the latter that they should be united with his forces. If the final object of the campaign was the capture of General Lee's army, then the last thing that should have been done was the abandonment of the fundamental strategic point under consideration. The force at this point, instead of being removed, should, as we have stated, and as it might, have been rendered at least 40,000 or 50,000 strong. If, on the other hand, the object of the campaign was as General McClellan understood it, viz., to drive Lee out of Maryland, then the last place that should have been retained was Harper's Ferry. Every ford and bridge over the Potomac and north of Leesburg should have been left free for General Lee to retreat over. General Halleck, the Secretary of War, and the President, did believe that heavy blows, at least, should fall upon General Lee while he was being driven out of Maryland. Hence they unitedly contended that the troops at Harper's Ferry should be reinforced, and not removed. When the plan of McClellan was fully understood, and when it was too late to remedy its defects, full power was given him over the forces under Colonel Miles. Nor did General Halleck ever complain, as General McClellan and Mr. Swinton state, that the latter moved too fast, or too far from Washington. "In respect to General McClellan going too fast, or too far from Washington," says General Halleck before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, "there can be found no such telegram from me to him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac; that he was pushing forward his right too fast relatively to the movements of his left, not that the army was moving too fast or too far from Washington. The only telegram from which the story that General McClellan was complained of as "moving too fast, and too far from Washington," is the following, bearing date September 14th: "Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac, near Leesburg. If so, I fear you are exposing

your left flank, and that the enemy can cross in your rear."

On the 12th the advance of General McClellan's army, after a severe skirmish with General Lee's rear, entered Frederick. While here, September 13th, our commander obtained a copy of a general order from General Lee, an order giving, in detail, the direction which every corps and division of his army was to take in a general retreat from Maryland back into Virginia. The plan of General Lee included two essential features, both being distinctly stated or implied in the order—the capture of Miles's force at Harper's Ferry, and the concentration, after that, of his entire army at some point where a general battle might be safely risked with our army, future movements to be determined by the results of said battle. The carrying out of his plan necessitated General Lee to divide his army into two nearly equal parts, the parts to be located for a time on opposite sides of the Potomac, and at a distance of from 30 to 40 miles, as the forces must march, from each other. In accomplishing the plan of capturing Harper's Ferry, Jackson moved with four divisions of Lee's army, those of Ewell, A. P. Hill, Jones, and Lawton, moving with these through Boonsborough, and crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and advancing upon Miles from the west. The divisions of McLaws and Walker were to move down from Lee's left; the former to take possession of Maryland Heights on the west side of the river, and the latter to cross at Cheek's Ford below, and seize Loudon Heights south of the junction of the Shenandoah and the Potomac rivers. Thus quite one-half of Lee's army was to be concentrated at this one point. The other portion, under Longstreet's command, the divisions of Anderson, D. H. Hill, and Stuart's cavalry, were to move to Hagerstown and Boonsborough, to which points Jackson was to return, after having disposed of our forces at Harper's Ferry. Such were the startling facts which suddenly presented themselves to our commander. His main forces were at Frederick, Franklin's corps at the south-west of this point, between it and the point where Jackson, McLaws, and Walker were to meet. Nearly midway between the distant points where the divided forces of Lee were to be located, and but about 23 miles directly in

front of ours under McClellan, lay Sharpsburg, connected, as we shall see, with Frederick by highroads over which our army could march by day and by night. All this is rendered absolutely evident by the following fact, stated in his report, by General McClellan himself: "Humphrey's division of new troops," he says, "in their anxiety to participate in the battle which was raging when they received the order to march from Frederick at about half-past 3 p.m. on the 17th, pushed forward during the entire night, and the mass of the division reached the army the following morning." By a single day's march then, McClellan might have occupied Sharpsburg, and rendered the reunion of Lee's separated forces an utter impossibility. This, undeniably, is just what a skilful strategist would have done. Miles would have been commanded to hold out to the last possible moment, and this for the purpose of keeping Jackson, McLaws, and Walker at Harper's Ferry, until the movement to Sharpsburg was perfected. This end having been accomplished, the last white elephant that Jackson and his coadjutors would desire to have upon their hands would have been Miles and his forces, and all hopes of reuniting their divided armies would have totally died out of the minds of Jackson and Lee both.

Another and perhaps a still better movement was practicable to General McClellan. While he had sent a small portion of his forces after General Lee, he might with his main army have moved by his left, have crushed the divisions of McLaws and Walker, have rescued our forces under Miles at Harper's Ferry, and then have moved, the distance being but 10 or 12 miles, on the east side of the Potomac up to Sharpsburg, and there interposed his army between those of Jackson and Lee. Each movement would have been equally fatal to the Confederacy. What did General McClellan do under such propitious circumstances? Instead of making any attempt whatever to interpose his army between Jackson and Lee, instead of advancing his main army in the direction of Harper's Ferry and crushing, as he might have done, McLaws and Walker, who were moving thither on the north and east side of the Potomac, he directed his main forces on the highroads which the main army of Lee had taken, all of that army but the divi-

sions under McLaws and Walker; and he advanced his right wing so as to compel Lee to move on through Hagerstown and Boonsborough to Sharpsburg; Franklin being left to care for Harper's Ferry. The advance of our army upon the heels of General Lee being more rapid than the Confederate commander had anticipated, brought on a severe engagement between Franklin's advance and the force of McLaws at Crampton's Gap, and that of McClellan's centre and right at Turner's Gap, in South Mountain. In the engagements at both these points, the enemy was finally driven back with great loss; that on our side also being quite severe. Our loss in both engagements amounted in killed and wounded to 2,101; that of the enemy from similar causes being nearly as large, with the addition of nearly 2,000 prisoners. These engagements occurred on the 14th, and by the evening of that day the passes of the mountains were in our hands. Franklin failed to push on to Harper's Ferry in time to save Miles; whose force, he having been previously killed, surrendered at 8 a.m., the enemy capturing 11,583 men, 73 guns, 13,000 small arms, 200 waggons, and a vast quantity of tents and camp equipage. By 8 a.m. of the 15th, Franklin learned from the cessation of the firing that Miles's command had surrendered, and so informed General McClellan.

The victory of South Mountain had an extactic effect upon the mind of General McClellan, and greatly inspirited his army. At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 15th, being fully aware that he had defeated the forces of D. H. Hill, Longstreet, and McLaws, and that they had disappeared in his front, he sent the following telegram to General Halleck: "The enemy disappeared during the night; our troops are now advancing in pursuit." At 8 o'clock the same morning he sends the following telegram: "I have just learned from General Hooker, in the advance, who states that the information is perfectly reliable that the enemy is making for Shepherdstown in a perfect panic, and General Lee last night stated publicly that he must admit they had been shockingly whipped. I am hurrying everything forward to endeavour to press their retreat to the utmost." At 10 the same morning he telegraphs again: "Information this moment received completely

confirms the rout and demoralization of the Rebel army. General Lee is reported wounded, and Garland killed. Hooker alone has over 1,000 more prisoners. It is stated that Lee gives his loss as 15,000." When these telegrams were circulated throughout the country, the nation, of course, was electrified. This excitement was somewhat cooled by the intelligence which immediately followed, that we had lost in prisoners, in one body, nearly 12,000 men, making our admitted loss in killed, wounded, and missing, nearly as large as the falsely reported one of General Lee. General McClellan had just before assured the authorities that Lee had in his army at least 120,000 men. Yet, our commander absolutely assures us, a few hours after the battle, that an affair between merely our advance and the rear of the enemy, an affair in which not 30,000 men had been engaged on either side, and in which we had lost but 2,000 men, had involved the utter panic, rout, and demoralization of that great host. More than this. At early dawn after that battle, General McClellan gives a professedly authentic report of the substance of the speech which his wounded rival had publicly made immediately after the battle, and of Lee's estimate of his losses in the same. The amazement which we felt, at the time, at the credulity of our military authorities, and of the nation, in crediting such absurd reports, and the disesteem then induced in our mind for the commander who sent them forth as reliable verities, have not yet suffered any diminution.

Grand movement proposed and urged by General Heintzelman at this crisis.

When General Heintzelman learned of the facts pertaining to our victory at South Mountain, and of the retreat of General Lee, he proposed to the military authorities in Washington that he should be permitted with 60,000 of the more than 100,000 troops in the city to move into Northern Virginia and seize all Lee's communications across the Potomac, our forces then to close in upon him from all directions, and capture his army. Of the wisdom of the plan proposed, and of its full success had it been adopted, there can be no reasonable doubt in any reflect-

ing mind. This plan, however, was rejected by the Secretary of War, under the advice of the military authorities around him; and to General Lee, after the battle of Antietam, was kindly granted an unimpeded retreat back to his old position. We make these important statements on the authority of General Heintzelman himself.

The judgment which we must form of General Lee in view of the facts before us.

The carrying out of the general order issued to his army by General Lee on the 9th September, involved, as we have seen, the separation of that army into two nearly equal parts, and the separation of the same at a marching distance of from 30 to 40 miles from each other. To accomplish this separation required nearly a four days' march on the part of the corps of General Jackson, and a lateral movement of the divisions of McLaws and Walker in the direct front of our army. While this separation placed the Potomac between the divided parts of his army, General Lee was fully aware that by a march of 23 miles over highroads, General McClellan could place his army between the parts referred to, and render their reunion impossible. What must we think of a General that in such circumstances will thus divide his army in the presence of a hostile force known to be superior to his own? We must regard him as being what Buonaparte would have called an "ass of a General;" or we must suppose him one of the great commanders who perfectly understands and holds in utter contempt his antagonist. No other alternative is left. On one or the other of these hypotheses we must explain the fact that General Lee, in the immediate presence of our army, first placed the Chickahominy and then the Potomac between the divided parts of his own army. No General of common understanding ever did thus divide his army in the presence of a General whom he respected.

What should have been and what was done immediately after the battle of South Mountain.

By 9 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, Franklin made known to McClellan the fact of the capture of our

forces at Harper's Ferry. At this time, it was known to our commander that Jackson, McLaws, and Walker were at Harper's Ferry, and that Lee, with the remainder of his army, was retreating through Boonsborough towards the Potomac. At this time, a march of but from six to eight miles on a highroad would have brought Franklin's corps to Sharpsburg. Directly in front of McClellan, on another road, at not more than six or eight miles distance, lay Keedysville, a place about half-way between Sharpsburg and Boonsborough. By ordering Franklin to move by a forced march upon the former, that place would have been in our hands before Lee could have advanced as far as to the latter, and Franklin would have been free to act from that fundamental position, as exigencies might require. By moving his main forces, not after Lee to Boonsborough, but directly to Keedysville, McClellan would have anticipated Lee at the latter place, or would have struck him there when on his line of march,—the most unfavourable condition of an assailed party possible; and in connexion with Franklin moving out from Sharpsburg, would indeed have produced an utter "panic, rout, and demoralization of the Confederate army." Of not one of these great and palpably manifest advantages did our commander avail himself. On the other hand, while Franklin occupied the day in moving up in front of Sharpsburg, McClellan followed directly after Lee in a detour round through Boonsborough and down the valley of Antietam; Lee, late in the afternoon, taking position on the heights of Sharpsburg, west of the valley designated and the stream of the same name, and but about two miles east and north of the Potomac; while our army took post in front of Lee, and on the east side of the stream and valley referred to. Thus matters stood at the close of September 15th, and thirty-six hours prior to the famous battle of Antietam.

THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.

The battle of Antietam was one of the most bloody which occurred during the war, and, as far as the Union cause is concerned, one of the most useless that

ever occurred in the history of war. To the Confederates it secured a safe passage across the Potomac back into Virginia, and an undisturbed repose of nearly three months, in which to repair their losses, reorganize their forces, and make full preparation for any new exigencies that might arise. To them, certainly, this was not a lost battle. To us, its final results were a succession of disasters which issued in a second invasion of our territories, and another equally bloody battle.

At 10 o'clock on the morning of the 15th September, General McClellan electrified our military authorities at Washington, and the nation, by the announcement that in the battle of the previous day General Garland had been killed and General Lee wounded, and that the wounded Confederate commander and his army, with the confessed loss of some 15,000 men, were flying, panic-stricken, routed, and demoralized, through Boonsborough towards the Potomac, and that his own army were on the heels of the flying foe, in hot pursuit. This retreat and pursuit were continued without interruption, our forces capturing some 250 prisoners at the place last named, until, a little past the middle of the afternoon, when on the heights in front of Sharpsburg, our wounded Confederate, with his panic-stricken, routed, and demoralized little army, suddenly turned round, faced his pursuers, and boldly defied them to advance another inch in their hot pursuit.

Every commander of ordinary intelligence would have perceived at once that a more propitious opportunity to annihilate an enemy never presented itself to any General than Providence had now thrown into the hands of General McClellan. More than one half of the Confederate army was far away on the other side of the Potomac. Here, in a corner where defeat was utter annihilation, were, as our commander well knew, merely Longstreet's corps and the division of D. H. Hill, with a majority of Stuart's cavalry; a force which had never during the day been able to stand for a single hour against our advance. What did prudence demand under the circumstances, our army having previously marched but some ten or twelve miles? We should bear in mind that A. P. Hill's division, after an almost quick-step march of seventeen miles, arrived at about the same

hour in the afternoon of the battle of Antietam, and immediately entered and did effective service in that battle. Our forces, after their march of ten or twelve miles, could certainly have, at least, opened the conflict that afternoon and evening. None but a General of the feeblest capacity would have deferred the general assault, in full force, after the dawn of the next morning. Our commander, however, as he had ever done before, as soon as the great prize stood out in full view before him, forgot that he had a gun. With him, it was far more safe to fight the whole of Lee's army with the whole of his own, than to fight less than one-half of that army with two-thirds of his own. Hence the whole of what remained of this afternoon, and all of the next day, a slight affair just at evening excepted, were spent in getting up reinforcements, and making preparation for the conflict which was to open in terrible earnestness on the morning of September 17th. This was all that General Lee desired; and the interval allowed him was well improved in getting his whole army together, raising his entrenchments, digging rifle-pits, locating his batteries, and distributing his forces. Hence, by the morning of the day of the battle, within the Confederate lines "there was a place for every thing, and every thing was in its place;" General Lee, by the evening of the 15th, having fully recovered from the wounds which he had received on the preceding day. Nor was our commander idle. By the evening of the 16th all his forces which were expected to take part in the coming battle had come up, and all the corps and divisions were in the positions from whence they were to advance upon the enemy, and all the batteries of heavy guns were fully prepared for the death-doings to which they were assigned. The battle, it should be understood, was to be wholly defensive on the part of the enemy, and as exclusively offensive on our part.

Relative amount of the hostile forces engaged in this battle.

In considering the case of any considerable battle, one of the first questions which interests the reader is the relative amount of the hostile forces engaged in the conflict. Of the number present on our side there can be no doubt; that number, as officially stated by General McClellan,

and with unquestionable correctness, was 87,164 men. General McClellan gives the number of the Confederate army present on the occasion as 97,445, a number given as the result of information obtained by General Banks in Washington prior to the battle, and gained from deserters, prisoners, and spies. The account bears upon its face the clear marks of utter incredibility. How could General Banks have obtained such specific information about the exact number of men Lee had at Frederick, and then just how many he had lost by death, wounds, capture, and desertion, on his way from that city to Sharpsburg? If the estimate had been given in general terms, it would not appear so absurd as it now does. Pollard, in his "Southern History," says of this battle, "It was fought for half the day with 45,000 men on the Confederate side, and for the remaining half with no more than an aggregate of 70,000 men." No Confederate account intimates that their army was larger than this, and, in general, all give a lower estimate. Lee, when he claims to have fought the battle with 40,000 men, unquestionably refers to what he had under his command in the early part of the day. It is quite safe, then, to state that our army on the field outnumbered the Confederates as 87,000 to 70,000, or, more near the truth, to 60,000.

The Battle-field.

To understand the field on which this battle was fought, let the reader conceive a village standing upon a somewhat elevated position, which may be called, for the want of a more definite term, a plateau, or hill. Several miles west of the village comes down the Potomac, running with a serpentine course, almost due south. Near a village called Shepherdstown, the river takes an east and south-east course for several miles, and then turns south again, passing by Harper's Ferry. About one mile east of Sharpsburg passes down, from the north, Antietam Creek, which passes centrally through a valley which takes its name from the creek referred to, the creek entering the Potomac some distance above the point where the river takes the last southern direction designated. Above the river, and for some miles above Sharpsburg, the creek is

too deep and muddy to be forded, and is crossed by four stone bridges. The southern one, on the turnpike road from Frederick, and which is joined by the road from Harper's Ferry, crosses the stream about a mile to the south-east of the village. About one mile north of this is the bridge on the highroad from Keedysville and Boonsborough. About one mile farther up the stream is the third, and at about the same distance still farther north is the fourth, bridge. Directly from the north of the village comes down the highroad from Hagerstown. On the heights in front, and to the south-east and north-east of Sharpsburg, General Lee had located his army, with Longstreet on his right, D. H. Hill in the centre, J. Jackson with his divisions on his left, and McLaws in reserve. Lee's right extended about one mile below the road which crosses the south bridge designated. At his extreme left, about one mile west of the Hagerstown road, and near a bend in the Potomac, were stationed Stuart's cavalry. Of our line, Burnside occupied the left; Cox's division, on his extreme left, being located south of the Frederick turnpike. Porter with his corps was in the centre, in front of Sharpsburg. On our extreme right was Hooker with his corps, and between him and Porter was Sumner, in command of his own and Hamilton's corps. Franklin, not yet up, was to act as exigencies should demand. Such was the field, and in general the distribution of the forces of these two armies on the evening of September 16th. The line of General Lee, from his extreme right to the position occupied by Stuart's cavalry, was upwards of four miles; the length of ours being quite as great.

The Battle.

The three bridges directly in front of our line were too strongly defended and too much exposed to the fire of the enemy's batteries to be taken by a direct assault. It was accordingly determined that Hooker, followed by Mansfield, should cross the stream at the upper bridge, which was wholly unguarded, and after turning Lee's left, should so press his centre that the other portions of our army might effect a passage over the bridges in their front. The passage over the upper bridge Hooker and Hamilton

made on the evening before the battle, and after a severe conflict with the enemy's left advance occupied positions more than one mile west of the place of crossing. The battle, which opened with such fury the next morning, and ended with the closing in of the darkness of the night following,—the battle, as conducted on our part, has very singular peculiarities, which seem to have been taken from the first battle of Bull Run. The latter was fought by sending regiments in succession, regiments who should fight for a time and then retire for the advance of others. In the battle of Antietam, very much the same thing was repeated by army corps. At early dawn, Hooker, sustained by Mansfield, assailed Jackson, whose men were greatly aided and protected by woods and outcropping ledges of rocks, and whose batteries, advantageously located, made fearful slaughter among the assaulting force. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, our men, after various advances and reverses and waverings first of ours and then of the Confederate lines, at length pressed the enemy back quite across the Hagerstown road. Jackson now brought up his reserves under Lawton, and fell upon our forces with such fury that they were driven back in a quite demoralized condition. In an attempt to rally his men, Hooker was wounded, and soon after had to retire from the field,—a great calamity to the Union army at that crisis of the battle. Mansfield's corps now advanced, took the place of Hooker's, and after meeting with similar successes and reverses, was driven back, with its commander mortally wounded and in as bad a condition as that of its predecessor. At this juncture Sumner advanced, and after successes and reverses like those who had gone before him, found himself, with the loss of near 5,000 men, in as crippled a condition as his predecessors. Thus, in the language of Mr. Swinton, "three out of six corps of the army of the Potomac, and they the strongest, had been drawn into the seething vortex of action on the right; and each in succession, while exacting heavy damage of the enemy, had been so punished as to lose all offensive energy; so that noon found them simply holding their own." All accounts of the battle agree in the above statements. In the course of the afternoon, General

Franklin, contrary to the original plan to have him act upon our left, was sent forward to regain what Hooker, Hamilton, and Sumner had gained and lost. In his early advance Franklin was successful; but when he had formed his line and organized his forces to capture the rocky woodland west of the Hagerstown road, he was recalled by Sumner, who held command of our right. Thus the battle, in this part of the field, the principal part, ended with the setting in of darkness; we having this advantage, that our forces occupied the largest portion of the battle-field in this quarter.

On our left, Burnside delayed his advance until after 1 o'clock, at which time all of Lee's right had been withdrawn to support his left, the single division of General Jones, 2,500 strong, excepted. With a heavy loss, the bridge was carried, and two hours later, the crest above; one battery, from which our line had suffered not a little, being also taken. At this time, when matters looked dark for the Confederates in this part of the field, the division of A. P. Hill, which Jackson had left behind at Harper's Ferry to receive the surrender of our forces there, came upon the ground, and being united with the troops under Jones, assumed the offensive, recaptured the battery, and forced Burnside back over all the ground he had gained, to the shelter of the cliff beyond. Thus the battle closed all along the line. On our right, we had gained considerable ground, but had been brought to a stand. On our left we had also gained much ground, but finally were forced back over the ground we had gained, Burnside's forces, however, remaining on the west side of the bridge which they had carried. Both sides claimed the result as a victory, each for itself, and with equal truth and equal error; the battle, as almost or quite all authorities now agree, being a drawn one. To understand more fully the tactics of our commander in this battle, we state the following fact, not before related by any historian. At the time when General Burnside began to be pressed back, General Pleasanton, with 4,000 veteran cavalry, and upwards of 20 pieces of field artillery, stood on the heights east of the bridge over which Burnside had passed, and observed, the whole scene being perfectly visible, that between him and the Potomac

west of both armies, there were no Confederate forces whatever. He accordingly went to General McClellan, and asked leave to pass his cavalry over the bridge, and take the enemy in flank and rear, and thus roll up the whole of the right wing of General Lee's army; there being an abundance of troops present, and unengaged, to fill the vacancy which would be made by the advance of the cavalry force. This movement, which would have rendered inevitable the utter rout, if not capture, of the right wing of the Confederate army, General McClellan absolutely prohibited.

Essential errors in the conduct of this battle.

There was one very grave error common to the commands of both armies, an error which writers who have visited the field and carefully examined its localities have all noticed. At the right of Hooker's position when he opened the conflict, and on Jackson's left, there is an elevated position which completely commanded our right and the Confederate left. Had Hooker, or Sumner after him, occupied this position, and planted his batteries there, it would have been utterly impossible for Jackson to have continued where he was for a single hour, and our right would have advanced with very little loss. Had Jackson occupied in force this same position, his batteries would have enfiladed the whole field over which our right must have advanced, and rendered a successful assault of the Confederate left and, consequently, of their whole line, impossible. That position, visible to all, was, strange to relate, wholly neglected by our commanders during, and by those of the Confederate army to near the close of, the day. So vain is human foresight! This oversight is more discreditable to the Confederate Generals than to ours, the position having been visible to them all the while they were laying their plans and distributing their forces for the battle; whereas the advantage presented could not have been known to ours until after they had come upon the field.

The sending forward of our forces "in dribblets," as General Sumner expressed it—that is, a corps at a time—as was done all day upon our right, where the main issue was joined, was a capital error not only of the grossest

but of the most uncommon character. All our corps but the two of Burnside and Porter should, as General Sumner also affirmed, have been at once pushed over after Hooker and Hamilton. Our extreme right should then have passed round and closed up upon the Confederate left, and rolled it up on their centre and right, and thus cornered up Lee's whole army between the Potomac and the Antietam valley and creek. No well-informed tactician will question the fact that such a use of our army would have resulted in the destruction or capture of that of General Lee. As it was, the battle occasioned a great loss to both sides, with no decisive advantage to either. The retreat of the Confederates over the Potomac was not caused by this battle, but would have resulted had no battle been fought.

In our judgment, also, no attack across the lower bridge and upon Lee's right, while it should have been threatened, to induce an extension of his line in that direction, should have been contemplated or made. Suppose that both wings of the Confederate army had been turned,—an event which could in no contingency have occurred until late in the day, as the battle was conducted. In that case, a safe retreat would still have existed on the highroad from Sharpsburg, south-west, to the crossings of the Potomac at Shepherdstown. On the other hand, the divisions of Porter's corps should have occupied our left and centre, and Burnside with Franklin should have been united with Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner in bearing down with a crushing force upon the enemy's right and right centre. In that case, our extreme right, in closing round upon Lee's left, would have seized the Shepherdstown road, and cut off all retreat from the Confederate army. The battle, thus conducted, would have been in full accordance with the tactics of Moltke, Buonaparte at Ulm, and Washington and his French allies at Yorktown, and we should never have had a second invasion of Maryland.

Union and Confederate losses in this battle and in the Maryland campaign.

General McClellan gives officially, and we have no reason to question the correctness of his report,—gives

officially, we say, our loss in the battle, in killed, wounded, and missing, as 12,469, and in the whole campaign in Maryland as 15,220. Among the killed and wounded are included, as General McClellan states, ten Generals, and a vast number of officers of lower grades. If we add to these the 11,583 who surrendered at Harper's Ferry, and the 250 subsequently captured and parolled by Stuart, our total loss in this campaign will be 27,053 men; quite as many as the army of Virginia lost under General Pope. The Confederate official reports give the Confederate loss in killed and wounded in the Maryland battles as 10,291 men. The reports of Lee's corps and division commanders give their aggregate loss in killed and wounded as 11,241. If we estimate their loss in prisoners and desertions at 5,000 or 6,000 men, probably the estimate would not be far from correct. We must bear in mind that, in both the battles of this campaign, we were the assailing party, and fought the enemy under circumstances in which nothing but a miracle could have prevented our losing three in killed and wounded where the enemy lost two. To admit the fact that our loss in killed and wounded was thus much greater than that of the Confederates, while it reveals the courage and endurance of our soldiery, presents nothing whatever to their discredit, or to that of their commanders.

Events after the battle.—The exit of McClellan.

The character of generalship is always most clearly manifested by what is done after a battle, and especially after a victory. After the battle, September 19th, 3.10 a.m., General McClellan sent this telegram to Washington: "Our victory was complete. The enemy is driven back into Virginia. Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe." On the morning after the battle he received an accession of about 14,000 fresh troops. Of those present with him on the field, Porter's corps, acting as the reserve, had hardly fired a gun, while the corps of Franklin and Burnside had done little until the after part of the day. All of Lee's forces, on the other hand, had, the most of them, been engaged during the whole day, and all the strength he had was well known to have been put forth. Yet, our

commander, notwithstanding some of his leading Generals strongly advised a renewal of the conflict on the morning of the 18th, suffered the day to pass away with hardly a reconnoissance. On the morning of the 19th he awoke to find that his adversary with his army was safely over the river, and was there coolly awaiting an advance on our part. The reasons which General McClellan assigns for not renewing the battle on the morning of the 18th were, the weariness of his troops, the indecisive results of the conflict on the day preceding, the demoralization of two of his largest corps, the doubtful issue of a second battle, and the disastrous results of a defeat of his army. He failed wholly to weigh duly the palpable facts and considerations which, on the other side, demanded the promptest action, as, for example, that now at least his army far outnumbered that of the enemy; that he had upwards of 25,000 fresh troops, while Lee had none; that however weary a part of his forces might be, all of Lee's were in a far more exhausted condition; and that while a defeat of our army would be a great calamity to us, a defeat of Lee's would not only be the annihilation of his army, but the ruin of the Confederate cause. Such considerations, however, had no weight with our "Young Napoleon," who was found at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 18th at Keedysville, some four or five miles from the battle-field. Napoleon always, so he said, slept upon the field where his army had fought the day previous.

But not only did McClellan fail to avail himself of the advantages which Providence put into his hands on the morning after the battle, but in the face of palpable facts demanding an onward movement, of the encouragements, exhortations, entreaties, and absolute orders of the authorities at Washington, he suffered the remaining portion of September and all of the month succeeding, the best part of the year for the movement of armies, quite forty days, to pass by before he could be induced to pass his army over the Potomac, and then his movements were as slow and measured as if he and his army had been lame in their feet and palsied in their limbs; the night of the 7th November finding him at Rectortown, where and when he received a dispatch from Washington superseding him and appointing

General Burnside in his place,—one deadening incubus being thus removed from the breast of the nation.

CHARACTER OF THE EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED BETWEEN
THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM AND THE RETIREMENT OF
GENERAL McCLELLAN.

When General Lee had crossed the Potomac, he kept his army at no great distance from the river until ours had passed over, his head-quarters being in the vicinity of Charlestown and Winchester. He waited here, undoubtedly under the expectation that as our army was crossing, he might fall upon it, when one part was on the north and the other on the south side of the river. Our army, however, was in little peril of such a contingency as that while it remained under the command of McClellan, the only peril to which it was subject under him being dissolution from inaction. To understand fully the character of the events which occurred during the period under consideration, two fundamental facts must be set in the clearest light before the mind. We refer to

*The relative strength and location of the hostile forces during
this period.*

The location of General Lee's army we have indicated with sufficient distinctness. The army of the Potomac was divided into two great central forces: those with General McClellan centrally located at and near Sharpsburg, with small bodies on the river at different points from Williamsport down to Harper's Ferry; and those under General Heintzelman in the vicinity of Washington. Lee's army consisted of the forces which he took with him in his retreat from Maryland and the very small reinforcements which he may have subsequently received from Richmond. No rational estimate will give him an army of over 70,000 men. What was the strength of the army of the Potomac at this time? On the 20th September, three days after the battle of Antietam, General McClellan, as certified to by the Adjutant-General of the United States, S. Thomas, officially reported the army of the Potomac as consisting of 293,798 men. Of these 164,359 were present for duty,

24,315 were sick, on special call, or under arrest, and 105,124 absent by leave. This force does not include the command of General Wool at Fortress Monroe and those left behind in the Peninsula under General Keyes, nor the corps, about 9,000 strong, under General Dix at Baltimore. On the 30th of this month this army, according to official reports made and certified to as above, consisted of 173,745 present for duty, 28,458 sick, etc., and 101,756 absent by leave; making a sum total of 303,959 men. On the 20th of the next month, according to a like report, 207,036 were present for duty, 42,298 sick, etc., and 91,275 absent on leave; the aggregate being 304,609 men. One fact peculiarizes this army from all others that ever existed—the comparative number of its absentees, this number uniformly equalling quite one-third of the whole army. This army presents the spectacle of the continued average absence of 100,000 men, all doing nothing and yet receiving the full pay of men on the field. What must have been the character of the commander of this army and of the military authorities over him? Nowhere else but in connexion with the command of this one General can such appalling facts be found. We must bear in mind also that the number of absentees was greatest just at the very time when all the forces the nation could command were most imperiously needed, and when the commander of the army in which this evil assumed such monstrous proportions was most beseechingly calling upon the military authorities for reinforcements, and was charging said authorities with delinquencies in duty for withholding the aid asked for, it being uniformly true that his absentees far out-numbered all the forces he required.

What ought to have been done under the circumstances.

We must bear in mind that during all the fifty days which intervened between the battle of Antietam, a period in which, aside from quite 30,000 men at Baltimore and in the Peninsula, there were always present for duty in the army of the Potomac from 164,000 to 207,000 men, and never in the army of General Lee over 70,000, Richmond still remained completely uncovered; and a force 70,000 strong moving out from Washington, with a simultaneous

advance on the part of McClellan, would have rendered the retreat of the Confederate army to that city impossible, and its capture a certainty. A two or three days' march of 70,000 men from Washington would have enabled them to reach Warrenton, where they would have had full command of all General Lee's lines of retreat.

Two most propitious opportunities here once more presented themselves to the commander of the army of the Potomac and our military authorities—a move upon Richmond, and the capture of the Confederate capital, while its protecting army was too far away to do anything for its defence; or, what would have been better, a direct and simultaneous movement upon this army and the destruction of it, leaving Richmond to fall of itself, as it must have done after that. Nor did it require great military capacity to discern these advantages, the facts being so palpable that nothing but uncommon stupidity could have overlooked them. Stupidity prevailed, however, and the opportunities were lost, and, as a consequence, hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of treasures were lost to the nation.

The course which events did take under the circumstances.

In contemplating the course which events did take during the interval under consideration, this fact will not fail most deeply to impress the mind of the thoughtful reader, that nothing whatever was done, or appeared to have been contemplated, to capture Richmond while it remained thus visibly uncovered, or to capture, or even to inflict a serious wound upon, the army of General Lee while it lay openly exposed to deadly blows from our overwhelming forces. As soon as the Confederates had gone over the river, on the other hand, one thought seemed to have taken exclusive possession of the mind of our General in command—the providing of clothing and shoes for his great family for the coming fall and winter. As the spectre of the overwhelming power of his antagonist had done before, so now the idea of the approaching cold and frost chilled his military ardour, blighted his courage, and froze up all his activities. Hence his cries for clothing and shoes for his men and horses for his cavalry were

now just as great and bitter and constant as were his former calls for reinforcements. To every exhortation and entreaty and absolute order to cross the river and assault the enemy, he replied by sending back the monotonous call for shoes, and coats, and vests, and pants, and army blankets, and horses. Shortly after the battle of Antietam, for example, the President visited our army at Sharpsburg, and finding the troops full of ardour, and in a good condition for an advance, gave, through General Halleck on his return to Washington, this order, bearing date October 6th: "I am instructed to telegraph to you as follows: 'The President directs that you cross the Potomac, and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good.'" To this General McClellan replies by making an inquiry about the troops that he might be reinforced by on the two routes, one of which, after passing Winchester, he must take; and requesting the Commander-in-Chief to make special inquiries about the Alexandria and Leesburg and Manassas Gap railroads. On the next day he sends down the following cool enquiry: "What arrangements are in progress in regard to supplying the army with hospital tents? Are there any on hand in Washington? If so, be pleased to let me know the number. If there are none, how long would it take to have them manufactured and delivered here in considerable amount, say three or four thousand?" By just such replies, all entreaties and orders for an onward movement were bluffed off until the 2nd November, forty-six days after the battle of Antietam, when the passage of his army over the river was perfected. He then, without an attempt to strike the enemy at all, moved slowly down on the east side of the Blue Ridge; General Lee moving leisurely in parallel lines down the valley beyond, until our advance approached Warrenton, when, November 7th, at Rectortown, the command of the army was passed over to General Burnside. During all the preceding interval General McClellan appears to have formed no definite plan whatever for the future conduct of the campaign. On the other hand, he states definitely in his communications that when he should arrive at Warrenton he would be able to determine whether his army could

be supplied by means of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. If this could not be done, he should transfer his army to the Fredericksburg road, or back again to the Peninsula. What was to be hoped from such a General? Yet he would have us understand that his removal was a great calamity to the nation, because he was then about to attempt an important movement against General Lee, as the old scientists all died just at the moment when they were on the eve of discovering the philosopher's stone.

Concluding reflections upon General McClellan as a military commander.

In our introductory remarks upon General McClellan we expressed the opinion that neither he nor his successor, General Halleck, ever revealed a capacity in planning a campaign to do anything but to blunder, and that neither of them ever blundered upon a plan that ought to have been adopted. Nothing in the history of General McClellan's military life indicated in the remotest degree that he ever had, in his own mind, a well-digested plan of operation. All his seeming plans were only guesses in the dark. When lying among the quaker-guns at Manassas, he guessed that it would be best to transfer his army to the Peninsula; but what specific movements should be made after he was there, he appeared to have had no idea at all. After he had lain for a time on the Chickahominy, he guessed again that a change of base from that place to some point, what one he knew not, on James river, would improve his situation, and accordingly made the change to the point on which he happened to fall; but what should be done when the situation was changed, of this he seemed to have been utterly ignorant. When at Harrison's Landing, he guessed a third time that his situation would be improved by removing his army from the north to the south side of the river. When passing down from Sharpsburg south, he guessed that he would be able to determine, on his arrival at Warrenton, whether he could support his army by means of a single railroad,—not considering at all what might be done in addition by means of waggons, the only mode of supplying armies known sixty years since; and that if this means should be inadequate, it

would be best to transfer his army to the Fredericksburg Road, or to the Peninsula. Beyond the idea of such changes, his mind seems never to have, in reality, planned anything.

In executing a campaign and ordering a battle his imbecility is equally manifest. Here almost everything was entrusted to his subordinates. Not one of the seven-days battles of the Peninsula was fought under his immediate direction. The same was true of those at South Mountain. At Antietam, the battle commenced in earnest at early dawn; yet he did not leave his night quarters, and look over the field, until quite 8 o'clock in the morning. This is the only battle which, for the most part, really did occur under his immediate direction, and this, as we have seen, is, on his part, one of the worst conducted battles known in history. When he moved his army, he did so with unexampled slowness, and stood still for the greater portion of his time, and that for the seeming reason that he did not know what steps should next be taken.

His weakness—and he never seemed to have consciousness of power to accomplish anything worthy of a soldier,—his conscious weakness always resulted from one and the same cause, an appalling over-estimate of the amount of the hostile forces in his immediate front, those forces uniformly, in his terror-stricken imagination, outnumbering his own as three to two, and commonly as two to one. What was worst of all in his management of his forces was the fact that while he was continuously calling upon the authorities to reinforce his weakened army, he was perpetually diminishing that army by leave of absence to such an extent that a real increase of his forces by any reinforcements which could be sent him was nearly or quite impossible. Of what use is it to send 10,000 men to a commander, for example, when on the arrival of them 10,000 are sent away on a visit to their homes? He bitterly complained that McDowell's corps was not sent to him, when his absentees nearly or quite outnumbered that corps. When, in reply to his bitter complaints that he was not adequately reinforced, the President asked him to give an account for the vast number of his absentees, McClellan coolly replied that he thought that at least one half of said absentees might be

properly called back to the army. Yet he made no effective call for that purpose, but depleted his army by this very means, as we have seen, to the number of upwards of 101,000 men.

In his example of want of respect for authority, and of palpable disobedience to absolute orders from his superiors, he is undeniably, we judge, without a parallel in history. One of the specific reasons assigned by General Scott for his resignation of his post as Commander-in-Chief, was the utter disregard manifested for his wishes and orders. A command received on the 6th October, to pass the river at once and fight the enemy or drive him south, was coolly met, as we have seen, by the inquiry how soon some 4,000 hospital tents could be made or furnished, while no attempt was made to obey that order during the space of about twenty-five days. Full twenty-five days elapsed after he received an absolute order to transport his army at the shortest period possible from the Peninsula to the vicinity of Washington before a single man was embarked. These are but examples of his relations to the supreme authorities of the nation. McClellan, in short, was the spoiled child of the Union army, and come what might, his will was his law.

No commander of ancient or modern times ever made such a show, or ever moved amid such "pomp and circumstance" as did our "Young Napoleon." The sons of ancient kings "prepared but fifty men to run before them." The staff of General McClellan numbered between 2,500 and 3,000 men, and more than one-third of these were uniformly at home on leave, visiting the ladies, and that during the period which intervened between the invasion of Maryland and his removal from command. On the 30th September, for example, he reported of his staff 1,171 present for duty, 266 on special duty, sick, or under arrest, and 1,037 absent.

No General was ever petted by a Government as was General McClellan. The idea propagated by the opposers of the Administration, that it was jealous of his growing reputation, and therefore withheld from him promised aid, is one of the absurdest and grossest slanders ever uttered. When McClellan, for example, forwarded his flaming dis-

patches after his victories at South Mountain, what was the prompt reply he received from the President? It was this: "Your dispatches received. God bless you, and all with you. Destroy the Rebel army if possible." All that the President ever exhorted or commanded him to do was to act so that his reputation with the nation and the world might be "as ointment poured forth." No man ever had a brighter future opened before him, and no man ever commenced his career with the more unqualified and universal good-will of the Government and people, than was true of General McClellan; and because, and only because, he utterly and hopelessly disappointed the just and fond expectations reposed in him, this must be said of him, that "he departed without being desired."

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNDER GENERAL BURNSIDE.

ON the 8th November, 1862, General Burnside very reluctantly assumed the command of the army of the Potomac. At this time this army, as officially reported on the 20th of the month preceding, numbered 304,609 men. Of these, 207,036 were present for duty, 42,298 were sick, etc., and 91,275 were absent. Whether General McClellan communicated the plan which he was about to put into operation, or kept the same concealed in his own mind, we do not know. Whether the new commander was, or was not, informed upon the subject, one fact must be confessed, that the plan which General McClellan affirms himself to have developed was the very plan which should have been adopted in the circumstances; while that which General Burnside did adopt was one of the last that should then have been thought of. To understand the subject we must call to mind the fact that General Lee had, at this time, divided his army into two grand divisions, the first commanded by General Longstreet, and the second by General Jackson. Longstreet with his grand division was at Culpepper, while Jackson, with his, one division excepted, was, at quite a distance off, over the Blue Ridge in the valley of the Shenandoah. The plan of General McClellan, as he avows, his army being now in the vicinity of Warrenton, was, by a rapid march, to interpose between Lee's divided army. The carrying out of this plan with proper vigour would have secured the event intended, or would have brought on a general battle. The result in either case could hardly have been a matter of doubt, and would have been ruinous to the Confederate army.

General Burnside, forgetting that the mission of his army was, not the mere capture of Richmond, but the overthrow of the army which defended the city, and overlooking the fact that his great prize was in his immediate presence, determined to transfer his army from its only true position and direction, to another line of advance, the very worst possible, excepting that originally selected by his predecessor. One of the most fundamental principles known in the science of war is that, in advancing upon an enemy, our line shall be so directed that, while our own communications shall be protected, we may seize those of the enemy; that our point of attack shall be where he is weakest, and where our blows shall fall with the most fatal effect. All these conditions would have been most obviously fulfilled had General Burnside moved right on in the direction in which his army was then moving. In that case, his own communications and Washington itself would have been practically in his rear. Any attempt on the part of the Confederates to disturb his communications or attack the national capital must have been in the direction of Fredericksburg, the most difficult line of advance possible; while the enemy, if he should make an attack upon Washington, would approach it at the point where it was most impregably fortified, and where the raiding force would be always exposed to be cut off and annihilated by the left wing of our army. As soon as our army, on the other hand, had arrived at Gordonsville, it would have completely commanded all the Confederate communications on the north of James river, and as soon as our right wing should have passed over the river we should have held all his communications in every direction, that single one through Petersburg excepted. In our closing up upon Richmond, then, General Lee would either be shut up in the city and captured there, or he would have made a precipitate retreat down the eastern shore of North Carolina, leaving the city of Richmond, and all west and north-west of the same, in our hands.

In taking the Fredericksburg road or the Peninsula route, we, of necessity, advance upon a line where we are certain to receive the greatest annoyance and damage from the enemy, with the least sacrifice on his part,—where we

approach Richmond on the side where it is most strongly fortified, and where all its important communications are left perfectly intact; on the side, consequently, where the most prolonged siege would be certain, and where egress for a perfectly safe retreat is always open, when the siege can no longer be endured. By moving on either of these lines, also, Washington must be left so uncovered that we should have been necessitated to leave behind a protecting force almost as great as the one in the field. The first step of General Burnside, then, involved a fundamental strategic error. The question which now arises is, How did he execute his own plan?

The immediate measures of General Burnside.

After assuming the duties of his high office, General Burnside spent some ten days in re-organizing his army, and getting the mastery of his new situation. His first measure was to consolidate the six corps of his army into three grand divisions, General Sumner being placed in command of the first, General Hooker of the second, and General Franklin of the third. His plan was, to move from the position he then occupied to Fredericksburg, and to act from thence upon Richmond as circumstances might permit. His divisions, Sumner's in advance, were directed to move to Falmouth, on the north side of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg. The army was then to pass over on pontoon bridges to the city last-named, Sumner receiving specific orders "not to cross." But here was the difficulty. Our army, before it moved, was near Warrenton, and the materials for the bridges were at Harper's Ferry. Arrangements were made between Burnside and Halleck at Warrenton,—arrangements, as it afterwards appeared, misunderstood by each,—by which the army and the materials for crossing the river were to be at Falmouth at the same time. As it was, Sumner arrived at the place designated on the 17th, and Hooker and Franklin two or three days later, while the pontoon train was a week later still in arriving. General Sumner was very desirous of taking possession of Fredericksburg at once, and expressed that desire to his superior in command, there being then several fords just above the city,

at the time, where our whole army, had it been necessary, might have crossed. General Burnside replied "that he did not think it advisable to occupy Fredericksburg until his communications were established." This enabled General Lee to locate his whole army on the heights south of the city, and to erect there all the fortifications he desired, before our commander was ready to attempt a crossing; full twenty days being spent in getting open the communications referred to.

The battle of Fredericksburg.

What might have been done without firing a gun on the 17th November had become most palpably impossible on the 11th, 12th, and 13th December following. What General Lee feared above all things at the first period mentioned, he as strongly desired on the second, namely, a crossing over of our army in front of his bristling fortifications. When, before any rumour of the results of the battle had reached us, we heard of the manner in which the laying of the pontoon bridges was resisted, we said to our pupils, and to not a few individuals in the community, that one of two things was true,—that Lee had retreated and left only his rear guard to delay our crossing, or that he was making a feigned resistance to decoy Burnside over; and that if General Lee was, with his army, on those heights, a most disastrous and bloody defeat was just as sure to Burnside as anything future. Nothing but the infatuation of patriotic ignorance can shield our commander from the voice of the blood of those 13,771 brave men so senselessly slaughtered in that presumptuous battle. It is to the credit of General Hooker that he required repeated and most imperative orders from General Burnside before he would order his men across into the field of the dead.

To form an apprehension of the field of battle, let the reader conceive of the Rappahannock as running for some distance an almost due east course, and then at the village of Falmouth, located on the north side of the river, turning a south-easterly direction. From one to two and a half miles below Falmouth, and on the south side of the river, is the city of Fredericksburg. In the river, from one to two

miles west of Falmouth, is located Beck's Island. Opposite, and just south of this island, commences a series of irregular heights running parallel with the river for the distance of about four miles, until they are broken by the valley formed by the Massaponase Creek. On these heights, which were capable of being impregably fortified, General Lee located his army, and had diligently employed the twenty days allowed him by Burnside's delay in perfecting his defences, placing in position his 300 heavy guns, and locating his forces. This period Burnside had spent in perfecting his communications with the Potomac at Aquia village. By the 10th December all was in readiness for the fatal crossing, which was favoured by the nearness of the banks to the brink on the north side of the river. One entire day, the 11th, was spent in laying down the pontoon bridges, the delay being occasioned by the hot fire of the sharpshooters located in the brick houses in the city, houses near the shore. These being dispersed by troops ferried over the river, by the morning of the 12th the means of the passage of the army were perfected. Sumner's grand division passed over opposite the city, and deployed into the rising plain beyond for the purpose of storming the heights above them; Franklin with his own grand division and one of Hooker's corps, about half the army, passed over about two miles below the city; while Hooker with his other corps remained as a reserve.

The most essential features of the plan of General Burnside were that the first and most effective assault should be made by Franklin, who was to turn Lee's right, and having carried the heights near Massaponase Creek, was to roll up the enemy's line upon his centre and left, when Sumner was to advance and storm the remaining portion of the position. This was the only plan that presented the remotest promise of success. The order to Franklin, however, was so indefinite as to imply that he was to act as above stated, or to make a demonstration in his front, and wait for final orders. He and his two corps commanders adopted the last and cowardly exposition as the true meaning, and hence one half of the army did not even attempt anything effective during the day. The absolute duty of

Franklin was, the meaning of his order being uncertain, to have sent a currier to Burnside for definite instructions, which could have been done in less than one hour. Such acts, however, were not to be expected from such a General as Franklin, especially after "his master," McClellan, "had been taken from his head." Burnside, also, when he found that his intended instructions were not obeyed, should have hastened to his left, and seen that the vital movement was made; at least, he should have sent a special and positive order to that effect. The only movement which rendered success possible was not made, and hence, if for no other reason, the disasters which everywhere followed.

On our right, Sumner's division was deployed opposite a stone wall which ran along near the bottom of the heights in their front. Behind this wall Longstreet's forces were securely located, and shot down our men at their leisure, while the artillery above completed the death-doings of the day. Our only son held his company in one of those lines until he was hit by a rifle bullet, and was then thrown ten feet into the air by a large clod of earth hurled against his breast by a cannon ball which struck the ground near him. For some time he lay upon the spot where he fell, apparently dead. At length, a fellow officer, observing that his associate was still breathing, had him put into an ambulance and sent across the river; that officer then going back to the ranks, probably to fall as his associate had done before him. Our son lingered on till the next June, and then died from the internal injuries received as above stated, and when dying expressed his full satisfaction that his life had been sacrificed for his country. On the failure of Sumner's efforts, Hooker with his remaining corps was ordered over. After crossing the river and surveying the field around him, Hooker hastened back, and entreated Burnside to call off his army, and not to continue the useless slaughter any further. Burnside was inflexible, and ordered an onward move. Hooker's corps then went in to be slaughtered as Sumner's had been. Thus ended this dreadful day. Through a strange infatuation, our commander determined to renew the battle on the next day. That determination was met by such an unanimous remonstrance from the Generals under him, that he finally

desisted; and after the two hostile armies had confronted each other for two more days, ours recrossed to their original position.

Subsequently, General Burnside made an attempt to cross his army above Fredericksburg, and turn Lee's position by falling upon his communications,—the only proper movement which should have been attempted at all. When his army had arrived at the banks of the river, and when success seemed certain, crossing, and a further prosecution of the enterprise, were rendered impossible by a fearful winter's storm and flood. Finding afterwards that leading Generals of his army had secretly leagued together for his removal, and had visited Washington to secure the result, he prepared a general order to dismiss or relieve from service Major-Generals Hooker, Franklin, Smith, and Brig.-Generals Brooks, Newton, Cochrane, Ferrero, and Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor. The President, however, after consultation, relieved General Burnside, appointed General Hooker in his place, silently relieved General Franklin, and General Sumner at his own request, General Burnside being continued as a Major-General in the army.

That General Burnside was a pure patriot, an honest man, and an able corps commander, facts render quite manifest. That he had any capacity to plan and execute a great campaign, or fight a great battle, we have no evidence from any facts known to history.

CHAPTER XIV.

MOVEMENTS IN TENNESSEE, KENTUCKY, AND MISSISSIPPI.

THE appointment of General Halleck as Commander-in-Chief of all our armies, July 23rd, 1872, left General Grant in supreme command of our army, then concentrated at Corinth, Mississippi. The utter fruitlessness of our conquest in the capture of that place soon became manifest by the events which followed. Our army, instead of attempting anything effective against the enemy, who had quietly retreated from the place, was, as we have formerly stated, scattered in various directions, and so located as to be rendered everywhere too weak to be of service to the Union cause. The Confederate army, intact, had moved south, and was soon ready to recommence operations. Through their cavalry under Forrest and Morgan, raids were everywhere made in the rear of our army, raids in which such places as Murfreesboro' and Clarksville, Tennessee, and Lebanon, Henderson, and Cynthiana, Kentucky, were captured, and with these several thousands of prisoners and an immense amount of provisions, military stores, and other property; just what always occurs when places are taken by armies advancing on single lines into an enemy's country, and the hostile army escapes unhurt. Had Halleck merely shut up Bragg and Beauregard in Corinth, and confined them there with their forces, we might have been the raiders, and ultimately starved out the enemy. As it was, we, after capturing a place utterly useless to us, and after scattering our forces as stated, were powerless for offensive operations, while the enemy could swarm all around us, and inflict upon us almost any injuries he might desire.

During the month of June, General Buell left Corinth and moved in the direction of Chattanooga. General Bragg, now in supreme command, moved from Tupelo, Mississippi, and with his army raised by conscription to some 45,000 men, took post in Chattanooga before our army arrived there. Was it not a great gain to us to have secured, through the loss of thousands of brave men, a transfer of the Confederate army, and that with increased strength, from Corinth to Chattanooga? We shall now be able to gain a full knowledge of the value of the conquest referred to. General Bragg, after lying at the place last named long enough to induce a retirement from it of General Buell, determined upon a new invasion of Kentucky, his army being now nearer the State than ours. As preparatory to this campaign, he organised his army into three corps, commanded respectively by Hardy, Bishop Polk, and Kirby Smith. The General last named moved his corps from Knoxville over the Cumberland range into Eastern and Central Kentucky. Near Rogersville, he encountered and utterly routed a Union army nearly or quite as large as his own, an army under command of General Manson. Smith puts our loss at 1,000 killed and wounded, and 5,000 prisoners, and his own total loss at 500 men—a near approximation, no doubt, to the truth. He then entered in triumph, and with the shoutings of Confederate sympathisers, Lexington, and from thence moved through Paris to Cynthiana, where Louisville and Cincinnati lay, for some time, in appearance, at his mercy.

General Bragg having thus completely turned General Buell's left and passed into his rear, now moved, with the main portion of his remaining corps, quite to the east of Nashville, and passing Glasgow, Kentucky, seized the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which was our chief means of supply and reinforcements for our army, now far off at the south. At Mumfordsville, where the railroad crosses Green river, as he claimed, with a loss of 50 killed and wounded, he captured some 4,000 prisoners, as many muskets, with many guns and much ammunition; we having previously lost in killed and wounded upwards of 700 men. From thence he marched, nobody resisting, to Frankfort, the capital of the State, where, as General Lee

did at Frederick, Maryland, he issued a flaming appeal to the people of Kentucky, and inaugurated a sham Government for the State, placing a feeble old man, Richard Harris, over it as governor. All this even Pollard admits to have been "a pretentious farce."

This invasion stirred the lethargy of General Buell. Leaving a strong garrison, September 15th, at Nashville, he marched to Louisville, 170 miles, in from ten to fifteen days, where his army was rendered by reinforcements about 100,000 strong. Here he remained, after the example of his prototype McClellan, until October 6th, to reorganise his army. Under the assurance that if he did not move his command would be taken from him, he moved with steadiness to Springfield, 62 miles from Louisville; General Bragg harassing his advance, but not risking a battle, the object of the latter being to gain time for a safe retreat with his immense train, consisting chiefly of Union army waggons, which were very heavily loaded with spoils gathered up at our depôts and in the State. At Perryville, General Bragg turned round, and with a part of his army faced our advance under General McCook. Here a battle was fought, in which the advantage, on the whole, was on the side of the Confederates, but which was terminated by the darkness setting in. General Bragg admits a loss of quite 2,500 men, but claims to have forced our army back for two miles, and inflicted upon us a loss of 4,000 men and 15 guns. General Buell admits a loss on our part in all of 4,348,—the real number, no doubt. General Buell has been greatly blamed for remaining in his tent within hearing of the battle, a few miles distant, and not until 4 p.m. sending reinforcements, which when sent arrived upon the field only at nightfall.

During the night, General Bragg drew off his forces, and never turned round again until he was safe back in Tennessee. In his retreat he left at Harrodsburg some 1,200 of his sick and wounded, with 25,000 barrels of pork and other stores. Such, and justly so, as all candid minds most admit, was the deep dissatisfaction of the authorities at Washington with such a fruitless termination of this campaign, that, October 30th, General Buell was

relieved from command, and Major-General Rosecrans put in his place.

There is but one place in which General Buell did effective service during his entire command, and that was on the second day of the battle of Shiloh. Everywhere else he manifested an irrepressible reluctance to strike the Confederates but with feeble and ineffective blows, and everywhere acted as if he had a special mission to protect the persons and property of acknowledged Rebels, and particularly to enable them to hold fast to their slaves.

It would seem that the progress of events in the history of this war up to the time of which we are now speaking, must have revealed to our commanders in the field, and to the military authorities at our national capital, just wherein the great strength of the Confederacy did lie, and what was necessary to be done in order to destroy that power. The military eye of Europe looked on, saw just where this power lay, and the world wondered that our commanders and military authorities did not comprehend the situation. Europe saw that the power of the Confederacy lay, not in Richmond, Nashville, Corinth, Chattanooga, or Vicksburg, nor in its seaports, but wholly in two armies—the one commanded by General Lee, and the other, at the time of which we are now speaking, by General Bragg; and that all we had to do was to wipe out these two armies, and the war was ended. With us, on the other hand, the great power under consideration lay, not in these armies, but in the cities and ports referred to. Hence our vast armies and navies and national resources were occupied and expended for years in vain endeavours to settle mere side issues, without a serious attempt to settle the two main ones upon which all others depended. On this account our war has no parallel in history. In all others, the issues of war have had but two centres, the locations of the hostile armies, each making the other its issue and the location of the other its centre. With us, the repossession of territory and the capture of all the enemy's strongholds was the first issue to be attended to, and the wiping out of the armies the very last, if that were thought of at all. Take the palpable facts of this Western Department in illustration. When the Confederates held

Central and Southern Kentucky, one thought held exclusive possession of the minds of our commanders,—not the capture of these scattered forces, which could most readily have been done, but the pushing of them out of Kentucky and Tennessee. When these forces were concentrated at Corinth, the capture, not of the enemy there, but of the mere position it occupied, became the exclusive aim of our authorities. When that post was occupied, two objects of supreme importance now presented themselves, objects neither of which was the Confederate army at Tupelo, just south of us, but Chattanooga, away off to the west, and Vicksburg at the south. Hence our great army, three or four times as numerous as that of the enemy, was divided into three parts; one sent in the direction of Chattanooga, the other in the direction of Vicksburg, and the third was broken up and scattered about and located in distant localities, and in such small bands as to be powerless for anything, leaving the enemy perfectly free to make raids all around us, to break up our communications, to make a second invasion of Kentucky, and there to inflict upon us a loss of more than 20,000 brave men, and property to an untold amount. What were the results of the policy that was pursued? After a campaign of more than a year subsequent to the capture of Corinth, having lost in such bloody battles as Murfreesboro' and Chickamauga, in marches, and sieges, by sickness and accident, not far from 100,000 men, we found ourselves the triumphant possessors of Chattanooga, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson, with the Confederate army intact and strong as ever. We had succeeded in opening the Mississippi, and created thereby the necessity of keeping in garrisons, on its banks, 100,000 men to keep it open; but we had not settled a single issue of the war.

Suppose, now, that when General Bragg had invaded Kentucky, all our forces south of the State had been turned upon his rear, and that for the purpose of preventing his return and capturing his army; we placing upwards of 100,000 men between him and his 45,000 troops and Tennessee,—moving, at the same time, upon him from the north with all the regular and volunteer forces that could have been collected. We know well that in such a case

not a debris of that army could have escaped. We know, also, that that army being captured, all the Confederate States between the Mississippi and Savannah rivers, with all their strongholds and rivers, would have been at our mercy. So, at any time, if all our vast forces in this department had been concentrated upon this one army, with the absolute determination not to rest, nor let it rest, until it was swept out of existence, the same results as above indicated, our forces being so overwhelmingly superior to those of the enemy, must have followed in a very short period. Then the Carolinas, with all their ports, would have fallen at once into our power, as our great western army would have turned to the east, where, as it entered Virginia and came up on Lee's rear, the only remaining army of the Confederacy would have been taken, and the Rebellion would have collapsed at once.

MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL GRANT.

It is with pain that we turn from such considerations as these, to notice the course which the campaign did take under the immediate direction of General Grant. From the time when the command of the Western Department, of Tennessee and Mississippi, specially fell into his hands, Vicksburg was the central object of all his aims. After the delay caused by the invasion of Kentucky by General Bragg had been terminated, our commander bent all his energies to the settlement of what he and most of our military authorities regarded as the main issue of the war. All things being ready, General Grant moved his main army from the Grand Junction to Oxford, Mississippi. While he lay here preparing to move upon Vicksburg, the Confederates, under General Van Dorn, did what might have been expected, their armies being left intact—made a damaging movement upon our communications. Holly Springs, on the railroad between Grand Junction and Oxford, had been made our present depôt of provisions, arms, and munitions. Van Dorn captured this place, and with it nearly 2,000 prisoners and some \$4,000,000 worth of provisions and other property, which they carried off or destroyed before our forces arrived to retake the place.

By this disaster General Grant was, or supposed himself, necessitated to retrace his steps, move west to Memphis, and take his army down the river to Vicksburg.

The day following our disaster at Holly Springs, General Sherman moved from Memphis down the river, by our fleet, with our right wing, about 30,000 strong, sailed up the Yazoo some twelve miles, and having landed his forces there, moved them up to attack Vicksburg on the land side. Deploying his army into line, he sent his men, as Burnside led his at Fredericksburg, directly upon the fortifications in his front. As was inevitable, about 2,000 brave men were vainly slaughtered in the mad assault, the Confederates losing in all but 207. After obtaining leave to bury our dead and remove our wounded, General Sherman, all hope being abandoned of capturing the city by even a combined attack with the fleet from below, embarked his army, and sailed down to Milliken's Bend. When he had returned to this point, his superior in command, General McClelland, arrived, and while waiting the coming of General Grant with our main army, made an expedition up the Arkansas river, and captured and dismantled Fort Hindman, taking there, as he reports, about 5,000 prisoners. Thus matters stood until General Grant arrived, and commenced the siege in due form. As the conduct of this siege belongs to the order of events in 1863, we turn to consider our naval operations up to the close of the year 1862.

CHAPTER XV.

EXPEDITIONS ON THE SEABOARD AND OCEAN.

Expedition to North Carolina.

WE have already noticed General Burnside's expedition into North Carolina. Others of greater or less importance now claim attention. August 26th, 1861, General Butler, with three 50-gun frigates, four smaller vessels, and two steam transports having on board 800 soldiers, sailed from Fortress Monroe on a secret expedition. At the entrance, through Hatteras Inlet, of Pamlico Sound, they captured Forts Hatteras and Clark, with 715 prisoners, 25 cannon, 1,000 stand of arms, and a considerable quantity of provisions and stores. Such expeditions as these, while they affected little for the general cause, acted as irritants upon the surface of the Rebellion, and sent far more volunteers into the field against us than we captured from the enemy.

Expedition to Port Royal, South Carolina.

On the 29th October of the same year, an expedition of great importance sailed from the same point as that above designated. This expedition consisted of a land force of 10,000 men commanded by General T. W. Sherman, and a naval force under Commodore Dupont, consisting of the steam frigate *Wabash*, 14 gun boats, 22 first-class and 12 smaller steamers, and 26 sailing vessels. After a stormy passage our fleet approached Port Royal, South Carolina, and after proper soundings and reconnoissances, found the entrance to the harbour barred by a fort on each side, that on Hilton Head Island, called Fort Walker, and that on Philip's Island, named Fort Beauregard. On the 7th November, at 9 a.m., the bombardment commenced, and presented one of the most sublimely awful spectacles

of war. With Commodore Dupont on the *Wabash* in the lead, the fleet moved in due order, one vessel after another, first by Fort Beauregard on the right, each vessel delivering its fire and receiving that of the enemy in return, and then wheeling round, paid to and received from Fort Walker the same terrible compliments. The smaller gunboats at length found positions where they could deliver an effective fire at the weaker points of the enemy's positions, and where they were subject to very little damage in return. Thus the battle continued for about five hours, with dreadful carnage to the Confederates, and very little loss on our part. Finding all resistance vain, the forts were abandoned by their defenders, and left in our possession. In a short time, all the islands from the Tyler, which with Fort Pulaski commanded the entrance to Savannah river, to the Edisto, some miles west of the entrance to Charlestown Harbour, fell into our hands. Our forces found these islands entirely abandoned by their white inhabitants. Some 7,000 or 8,000 slaves, all the efforts of their masters to induce them to leave proving vain, remained behind, and became independent labourers in the raising of Sea Island cotton, and finally owners, for the most part, of the soil which they cultivated.

Aside from the occupancy of these islands as stated, and the establishment of a naval depôt at Hilton Head, no improvement was made of the advantages we had gained, improvement at the time or during the war. At the time, both Charlestown and Savannah were unfortified on the land side, and either of them lay at the mercy of General Sherman. Had he been reinforced by 10,000 or 20,000 men from our vast army lying idle near Washington, both of these cities might have been permanently captured and held by our forces. Nothing of the kind, however, was attempted, or seems to have been thought of. What is still more singular, and unaccountable but upon the hypothesis of a strange stupidity on the part of our military commanders, not the least use, excepting as a mere naval depôt, was made during the war of this most favourable *point d'appui* for a most effective movement into the heart and centre of the Confederacy. But a few miles north of our

forts, there ran the great railroad between Savannah and Charlestown, and constituting for a long time after we captured Knoxville the only available avenue of communication between the Confederate States east and west of Savannah river; yet even this road was never touched by our forces from the period when we took possession of Hilton Head until Sherman moved out of Savannah in his advance from Georgia into the Carolinas, a few weeks before the surrender of Lee and Johnston. Such was the kind of foresight which characterised the conduct of this war from its commencement to its close. The communications of the enemy seemed to have been, in the judgment of our commanders, sacred things which were never to be touched. When, in January 1863, we pointed out to President Lincoln the strange fact that this only remaining artery of communication between the eastern and western portions of the Confederacy,—when we pointed out the fact that this road, which lay almost in sight of our forces at Hilton Head, and always directly and readily accessible to them, had never been touched, his reply was that we took and held the place merely as a means of naval supply. That is, inasmuch as the post was held for one special purpose, it would be a sin to use it for any other, however important. So our military authorities seemed to have regarded the subject. Suppose now that the 100,000 brave men so stupidly lost in the Peninsula, in the army of Virginia, in the Maryland campaign, and at Fredericksburg, etc., had been sent down to Hilton Head, and while the army of the Potomac was confronting General Lee, this force at Hilton Head had moved out into the Carolinas, and after capturing Charlestown, Willmington, and Columbia, had, as Sherman finally did, moved up upon Lee's rear. Before the midsummer of 1862 the Rebellion would have been utterly wiped out in the Carolinas and Virginia, and all this with the loss of not over 30,000 men. God took wisdom from our military authorities, not to destroy our nation, but to make us the free people we now are.

While our forces at Port Royal were engaged in reducing Fort Pulaski, which fully commanded the entrance to Savannah river, Commodore Dupont sailed with a land orce to the coast of Florida, captured St. Augustine,

Jacksonville, and other important places, together with the principal forts on that coast, such as Forts Clinch and Marion, McKree, Barrancas, and others, almost the entire coast of Florida being abandoned by the Confederates, and its most important ports occupied by the Union troops.

EXPEDITION IN THE GULF OF MEXICO: CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.

During the autumn of 1861, General Butler, in command of the department of New England, bent all his energies to raise a volunteer force for an expedition still farther to the south-west, New Orleans being his central aim. In the latter part of February 1862 he set sail with a large fleet commanded by Commodore Farragut, and a land force nearly 15,000 strong, to which afterwards was added a fleet of bomb vessels commanded by Commodore Porter. This force first took possession of Ship Island, on the coast of Mississippi, and regained and garrisoned Fort Floyd, re-naming it Fort Massachusetts, on the same island. When all things were in readiness, the fleet and armament sailed up the Mississippi river, until they were stopped by Forts Jackson and Philips, located on opposite sides of a bend of the same about 75 miles above its passes. These forts were manned with 150 heavy guns each. After the bombardment of these forts had continued for several days with no material results on either side, Commodore Farragut determined to run the gauntlet between the two forts and the batteries on the shores; his fleet consisting, in the language of Mr. Greeley, "of 47 armed vessels, 8 of them large and powerful steam sloops-of-war; 17 heavily armed steam gunboats, 2 sailing sloops-of-war, and 21 mortar schooners, each throwing a 215-pound shell,"—the whole number of guns and mortars being 310. As preparatory to the final passage, the obstructions in the river above the forts having been removed, the mortar sloops were towed up nearer Fort Jackson, and for several days continued such a fire upon it that it was almost disabled. At length, at 1 o'clock a.m. April 24th, the fleet, in three lines, the night being very dark, started on their perilous enterprise. When they

came within range of the fire of the forts, one of the most terrible scenes known in the history of war ensued, all the guns in the ships and in the forts and in the batteries doing all that could have been done by powder and ball and shell for mutual destruction, even the fish in the river being killed by the convulsion of the elements above and around them. While this scene on land and water was going on, the Confederate fleet, their fire ships being first sent down, came down and mingled in the strife, two of their vessels being powerful ironclad rams. The fight was as short as it was terrific, the morning revealing the hostile fleet in flames, or wrecked, and our main fleet safely above the forts. In the meantime, General Butler, landing some 6,000 men on Sable Island, 12 miles in the rear of Fort Philips, and landing them with small crafts on the main shore, joined our fleet at the quarantine above. The commander of the forts, Colonel Huggins, perceiving that all was lost, surrendered to Commodore Porter. Our armament now sailed up the river and captured New Orleans, the Confederate forces having first destroyed what cotton and sugar they could, retreating with the silver and gold in the banks and national treasury, and other movable stores. General Butler now assumed command of this new department, and held the people in subjection to the national authority with great ability, as all admit, and, as some affirm, with an iron rule, until December 11th, 1862, when he was superseded by General Banks.

The above survey of our maritime operations evinces the fact that from Fortress Monroe all along the shores of the entire Confederate States we, by midsummer of 1862, held possession of almost all the most important points for assailing the Confederacy on its water side. At that time we, having absolute command of the ocean, and being possessed of fleets capable of conveying any amount of force to any point desired, had only to land an army, 80,000 or 100,000 strong, at Newbern or Port Royal, and the Carolinas, and with them, as we have shown, Virginia and its capital and army, would have been at our mercy. By landing an army 50,000 or 60,000 strong at any important point which we held on the coast of Georgia or Florida,

or at New Orleans, and with these forces acting in concert with the army of the Cumberland, and other forces in its vicinity and on the Mississippi, all the Confederate forces between this river and the Savannah could have been captured or utterly scattered in a very few weeks. From the points referred to, also, most important and effective winter campaigns might have been always carried on. Yet, no use whatever, such as above designated, was made of these advantages, though their palpable use was most persistently urged upon the military authorities,—no use, excepting in a single instance, to be hereafter noticed, just at the close of the war. While no proper use was made of the advantages which the holding of these positions gave us, it required the perpetual employment, in scattered fragments, of from 100,000 to 150,000 men to hold these places and keep open our communications on the Mississippi; a force which, if concentrated and employed in co-operation with our other armies, would, in a very few months, have subjected the whole Confederacy to our control. We were always, during this war, weak at our main points and issues, because a vast majority of our forces were ever located at unsupporting distances, in positions where they could do nothing to settle the main issue of the conflict.

General results of the conduct of the war thus far.

Two results followed from the palpable facts which the conduct of the war thus far revealed—a very extensive distrust of the ability of the Administration, and of the party which sustained it, to carry the war to a successful issue; and the Proclamation of Emancipation sent forth on the first day of January 1863. The sentiment of distrust referred to manifested itself in the fall elections of the year preceding. In these elections the States of New York and New Jersey elected democratic governors, and the ten States west of New England gave a majority of ten representatives in Congress on the same side; the solid vote of New England, and that alone, securing for the Administration a working majority in the House of Representatives, so near had palpable imbecility and unwisdom in the conduct of the war brought the Union to final dissolution. Under this influence, extensive conspiracies were organized

throughout the Northern States to put down the war by force, conspiracies which issued in the year following in the New York riots. General Lee's second invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland was induced by the expectation and assurance received that such invasion would be attended with a general uprising against the Administration. This conspiracy had its organized ramifications throughout all the Northern States, out of New England. So assured had the conspirators become, that during the sessions of the legislature of the State of Michigan in February 1863, a member of each House affirmed, before the body of which he was a member, that within a very few weeks the war would be ended by a general uprising of the people throughout the Northern States. When called to order for such treasonable utterances, they were repeated with the defiant declaration that in a very short time blood would flow in torrents throughout the nation. We were in Lansing when those utterances were given forth. A single fact will indicate the extent and spirit of these organizations. With an Irishman who had for years been employed about the college, we had formed quite a strong friendship. At length he began to talk ominously about the uprising that was soon to occur, and of the blood that was then to flow. After this he stated that in a few days blood would be shed. "Well," I replied, to test his spirit, "if such an event should occur, you would not injure me, your friend?" With a wolfish growl he replied: "I would take your life, sir, as soon as I would that of any other man." We immediately hastened down to the city, and stated the facts and our apprehensions to Major Cole, who had retired from the army on account of wounds received. "It is true," he replied, "that these conspiracies exist, and that these uprisings are contemplated. But do you know what exists on the other side?" "No," we answered. "Let me assure you that Unionists throughout the Northern States are perfectly organized, armed, and equipped, with all their officers appointed and their signals and places of rendezvous all agreed upon. Should a rising occur in this city, for example, at certain strokes of the bell every man will be in his place; and let me assure you that after the first blow shall fall, the treason will never be repeated." It was, we repeat, with a full

knowledge of these treasonable organizations, and of their promised uprisings, that General Lee made his second invasion, and fought the desperate battle of Gettysburg.

But the most important result of the conduct of the war was the Proclamation of Emancipation, and the Constitutional Amendments which followed that event. It has been said that "if we had not had a McClellan, we should not have had a Grant." It is equally true that if McClellan, Halleck, and Buell had not been substituted for Fremont and others of kindred spirit and ability, we should never have suffered the unexampled defeats and calamities which rendered that Proclamation, in the judgment of the Administration, and that contrary to all previous plans and expectations, an absolute national necessity. But for the calamities which followed, in the year 1863, under General Halleck as Commander-in-Chief, the coloured man would not have become a soldier, and up to this time we should not have had more than the Thirteenth Amendment. A letter received from Mr. Sumner in the latter part of the year 1862, we having fully expressed to him, in successive letters, our views of the conduct of the war, and who had laid the same before the President,—a letter from Mr. Sumner, we say, contains these words (the first sentences have been given before):—"I have, from the beginning, been profoundly impressed with your views. A Government more quick and positive than ours would have adopted them early, and the war would have been ended long since. Perhaps, however, these delays and disasters may result in consequences which you and I value more than we do any present victories and advantages." These were considerations which, all along, rendered us hopefully patient, in view of the events which we have detailed.

CHAPTER XVI.

MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN THE MONTH OF JANUARY 1863.

HAVING, as stated in the Introduction, made the science of war a subject of careful study from my youth, and having fully acquainted myself with the characteristics of the leading campaigns of past ages, particularly those of the present century and of the preceding one, and having done so for the specific purpose of attaining to a clear understanding of the chief causes of the successes and failures of such campaigns, and having observed that the entire conduct of the war under consideration was, on our part, in palpable violation of all the known principles and examples of successful warfare, and in equally palpable accordance with the very worst principles and examples known to the science of war, or represented in history, or representable in thought, I felt it a sacred duty to present my views of the subject to the military authorities at Washington. I accordingly, immediately after the first disaster at Bull Run, entered into correspondence with such individuals as Secretary Chase, senators Sumner, King, and Chandler, and members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. In these communications, special criticisms were made upon the general conduct of the war, developing its fundamental errors, and showing what ought to have been done. Similar criticisms were presented of the different particular campaigns as they occurred. These views were laid before the President particularly, and pressed upon his consideration. The following communication from Secretary Chase will interest the reader. It was sent in reply to a very long

communication containing the main criticisms found in the preceding pages. In this communication I made this general statement, that if it had been the fixed and deliberate aim of our military authorities to conduct this war in accordance with the worst principles condemned in military science, and the worst examples known in history, or representable in human thought, they could not have succeeded, in my honest judgment, better than they had done. To this communication the Secretary sent the following reply. The letter was, of course, confidential at the time, reasons for privacy being now removed :—

“TREASURY DEPARTMENT, *Oct. 29th, 1862.*

“MY DEAR SIR,—

“I have attentively read your letter, and agree with you entirely in regard to the management of the war hitherto. In my judgment, no General has a right to be continued in service an hour after it becomes evident that success cannot be achieved under his lead. I have often expressed views substantially similar to yours to the President, but other counsels have better approved themselves to his judgment. I think that experience has wrought some change in his views, though not so complete a change as I could wish. The substitution of Rosecrans for Buell is a beginning. The appointment of Mitchell to the department of the south is also good. Other changes, I think, will be made, and a greater vigour in every direction may be expected. If disappointed in this, I shall almost despair; but I do not expect to be disappointed.

“I shall be glad to receive any practical suggestions you may make. They will be instructive to me, and may be useful to the country.

“Yours very truly,

“S. P. CHASE.”

After receiving such communications, and after the terrible defeat at Fredericksburg, I determined to visit Washington, and through the influence of my friends there, lay my views before the President and Secretary of War.

I arrived there on the last day of December 1861, and spent most of the next forenoon with Secretary Chase. Through him a hearing was obtained with Secretary Stanton. In the opening of our communication with the latter, we commenced a criticism on the past conduct of the war. This the Secretary interrupted, saying that he had understood from Secretary Chase that I had developed a plan for the future conduct of the war and he wanted to hear that. We then gave him a full statement of the plan. "Where is your General," exclaimed the Secretary, "to carry out such a plan as that?" "I did not come here, Mr. Stanton, to furnish a General, but to develop a plan by which this war can be brought to a speedy and almost bloodless termination." "Well, give us a General," responded the Secretary; "the best plan that can be proposed is the worst, if you have not a General capable of carrying it out." "I should suppose, Mr. Stanton," I replied, "that if a definite and practicable plan were submitted, a General capable of carrying it out might be found." "Give us a General; name your man," was the reply of our Secretary of War. So the interview ended, and with it all hope of any favourable results from that department. I then spent a full half day with senators Wade and Wilson, laying before them my criticisms on the conduct of the war thus far, and my plan for the future. Both the criticism and plan were unqualifiedly endorsed by both, each saying that he now understood the whole subject as he had never done before. By agreement, we spent the next evening with the President, who, with great interest, listened to all I had to say. He then requested that I would reduce my views to writing, saying that he would give them a most careful investigation. After preparing the document, and reading it to the senators, they accompanied me a second time to the President's office. After an attentive hearing of the document, and a full discussion of its presentations, the President addressed Messrs. Wade and Wilson in these words: "Gentlemen, I am in earnest in what I am now about to say to you. If you senators advise it, I will adopt this plan, and appoint a new Commander-in Chief to carry it out,"—

naming the same individual whom the senators had previously designated as the man to accomplish the result. It was understood that certain other senators were to be consulted before final measures were adopted. In the meantime, another paper was prepared and read before the President; a paper the object of which was to demonstrate the utter unwisdom of the measure which was then avowed as the next great movement of the war, namely, "the opening of the Mississippi and the plugging up of the southern ports." What was urged in this paper was that the next movement should have one supreme end, the wiping out of the armies of the Confederacy, the armies of Lee and Johnston particularly. At this meeting it was unanimously agreed to submit these papers to the careful scrutiny of some leading General; and General McDowell was as unanimously selected as the officer best qualified to give judgment in such a case. After hearing the papers read, and spending four or five hours in discussing the principles and facts presented, General McDowell gave a written endorsement of the plan developed, as being the best that he had heard suggested. All now felt sure of securing the arrangement desired. One ominous fact became known during the day prior to the evening for a final interview with the President, to the senators who were in consultation, a fact which, in their judgment, threw dark shadows over the future, the fact that the Secretary of War and General Halleck were closeted, during the day, with the President, he receiving no other company.

On meeting with the President and handing him the paper from General McDowell, we were all, the senators excepted, surprised at the change which had occurred in the views of our supreme executive. Of the plan under consideration, he assured us, his views were unchanged. It was, unquestionably, the best plan that had yet been submitted. It was attended, however, with one fundamental difficulty—the utter impossibility, in the existing state of our railroads, to concentrate at Fortress Monroe the needful forces, and to do this in time to render the movement effective. "In the present state of these roads," he added, "it is impossible to transport over them an army

of 10,000 men in the space of four weeks." I reminded him of the fact that Mr. Covode, the superintendent of the Pennsylvania Central, and the master of transportation on the same road, had each, but a few days before, submitted to the Committee on the Conduct of the War an independent opinion, based upon the most careful calculations, that by putting all their rolling stock in requisition they could convey over that single road an army of 50,000 men, with all their appointments, and that in the space of *four days*. Members of the Committee present fully confirmed the above statements. In the face of all this evidence, the President absolutely adhered to the opinion which he had before expressed, the opinion which Stanton and Halleck had fixed in his mind. At length, he said to us: "Gentlemen, I have pledged to you my word that if you advise it I will adopt this new plan. I hold myself still bound by this pledge. I assure you, however, that I have no confidence whatever in the practicability of the plan." Thus the meeting broke up, the senators deeming it unadvisable to recommend a plan to which the Secretary of War was avowedly opposed, and the practicability of which the President thus distrusted. On taking leave of the chairman of the Committee, he expressed himself, on account of the immobility of our military authorities, in almost blank despair of the Republic. One of the senators, after I left, went down to Falmouth, and in a council of war held by General Burnside with all his corps commanders, laid the plan before them. Every such commander strongly advised the adoption of the plan. General Burnside replied that he fully endorsed the plan. He had one of his own, however, which he desired first to try. If that failed, he would adopt the new one. He tried his own, failed, and was superseded; but afterwards expressed to the senator his regret that he had not followed the advice of his corps commanders. One year from the next July, a Major-General from the army of the Potomac, made, in the city of Rochester, New York, this statement to Mr. Lawrence, proprietor of our principal hotel, then on a visit to that city:—"A year ago last January, a gentleman from your State, I forget his name, came to Washington, and laid before our military autho-

rities a plan for the future conduct of the war. All our corps commanders strongly advised the adoption of that plan. Secretary Stanton and General Halleck, however, prevented its adoption, Halleck saying that "it would never do to have a civilian plan our campaigns." The reader may now be somewhat interested to know something of the papers under consideration, together with the plan therein developed. The papers were divided into two parts, a criticism on the conduct of the war up to that time, and a fully developed plan for the future conduct of the same. After giving the specific criticisms which have been so greatly expanded in the preceding portion of this treatise, I gave the following general summary of the fundamental defects in our campaigns as conducted up to that time.

"Fundamental errors in the conduct of the war thus far.

"Were I to sum up in few words the fundamental defects which have obtained in the conduct of the war thus far, I should specify the following as among the more prominent:—

"1. Making it a fundamental aim to capture and hold *places*, instead of aiming our blows at the heart and centre of the Rebellion, the *army* of the Confederacy. The movement upon Corinth, all our movements upon Richmond, and our expeditions south, wear but one and the same aspect—the taking and holding some particular places. Now we may overrun the whole Confederacy, and occupy all its chief cities and strongholds, and as long as the army of the Confederacy remains intact, and presents the prospect of ultimate success, we have done really nothing in putting down the Rebellion. Smite its armies, on the other hand, and the Rebellion is dead, and all its chief places fall into our hands without further bloodshed.

"2. Scattering our forces, and locating them in unsupported localities for mere defence, instead of centralizing and concentrating them for main issues, is an error which, to an alarming extent, has characterised the conduct of the war thus far. I have often said that it would require 2,000,000 men, distributed as our army has hitherto been, to put down this Rebellion; whereas 500,000 effec-

tive forces properly centralized is the utmost amount that was ever required for this purpose.

“3. Aiming our blows at the extremities instead of the vital centres of the enemy’s power is another error equally fundamental and equally common in the conduct of this war. Victories gained upon the borders, and localities gained and held, over which the nation has so often exulted, and in the results of which it has, of course, so often been disappointed, what are they, as determining final issues, so long as the army of General Lee moves before us with victory crowning its banners?

“4. Moving upon fortified places, and attacking them in front when they can be successfully turned by flank movements in which all the communications of such places can be taken and held, is another error equally common and fundamental in the conduct of this war. Never were positions more exposed to this form of attack than were those of the enemy at Manassas, Bowling Green, Columbus, Corinth, and Richmond, for example. Yet they were all approached on their strongest sides, and their communications left intact. I cannot recall one single movement of any importance to which the above remarks are not strictly applicable.

“5. Moving our forces on single lines into a hostile country, where we, by advancing from our own centres, and that under the necessity of guarding our communication, become, of necessity, weaker and weaker, and the enemy, by falling back on his, becomes relatively and really stronger and stronger,—moving on such lines instead of concentrating our forces upon him from different points, and this when he is in positions from whence he cannot escape, has characterized thus far the conduct of this war. A movement yet remains to be made, which has the appearance of a design to capture any one army of the Confederacy. This capital error I have fully elucidated in my preceding criticisms.

“6. Another of the most noticeable and capital errors which has characterized the conduct of this war thus far, is the attempt to strike the foe, scattered, as he is, over half a continent,—endeavouring to strike the foe, I say, at all points at one and the same time, instead of centralizing

our forces upon some one great and central issue, and doing a finishing work there, and then concentrating upon other vital centres until the whole work is finished. We may realize the idea of the anaconda in respect to mere localities and single armies; but when we attempt thus to encircle half a continent, and by a single wrench or two to crush the enemy, we shall find, as we have hitherto done, our fancied constrictor to be a miserably rotten tapeworm, that is itself broken into fragments the first contraction it makes. Instead of acting for the realization of such an absurd idea, had our main forces been concentrated for the finishing up, by one great movement, the work in Virginia, and then in some other central locality, the Rebellion would long since have been wholly wiped out. No war was ever conducted to a successful issue that was waged upon the principle of extension and simultaneous action over half a continent, such as has obtained in the conduct of this war. In taking up this idea our Commanders-in-Chief have wholly ignored and repudiated all the principles by which all successful Generals have obtained their victories.

"7. The want of systematic unity and co-operation of forces is still another fundamental error which has, to a very great extent, characterised the conduct of this war. In the campaign of Bull Run, for example, forces enough lay within calling distance to have rendered, had they been called in, that campaign a glorious success, and that beyond a contingency. Yet all these multitudinous forces were left in inglorious inaction, while a single mass was precipitated, alone and unaided, upon the enemy. The same, as we have seen, was true of the campaign in Maryland, and so, with exceptions few and far between, everywhere. All great commanders concentrate their forces before fighting a decisive battle. We leave ours scattered as before, and suffer those who happen to be present on a given field to decide the destiny of the nation.

"8. I refer to but one other fundamental error which has, thus far, characterised the conduct of this war. Our army has being for one exclusive purpose, not defensive, but offensive operations—the putting down of the Rebellion. Yet a majority of our forces have been scattered over the

country, and employed exclusively for the former purpose. More than 200,000 men, for example, were, in this vicinity, employed for the space of eight months for no other purpose than mere defence and protection against fancied attacks from less than 70,000; and our army here was as badly distributed for such an absurd purpose as any I ever read of. The same holds true of our forces at the West. At the present time masses of disciplined troops which might be effectively employed in offensive operations for vital issues, are simply holding territories, and guarding particular localities against imaginary raids, when offensive operations for central issues would be effectual preventatives against such evils. It is only when armies are lying still that raids occur. On the other hand, whenever they are striking crushing blows at the central power of the enemy, then an universal concentration of forces occurs, and raids are impossible.

“The errors above enumerated are perfectly fundamental, and must be abandoned, or we are for ever a divided people. Of these errors the nation complains, and for their correction earnestly prays to the God of heaven, and turns beseechingly to our supreme executive.

“To escape the appalling consequences of such errors, entirely new principles must obtain in the future conduct of this war. Every movement must be directed in accordance with some well-digested and all-comprehending plan, a plan in which our entire forces shall be unified and centralized for the final settlement of main and fundamental issues. One fixed and exclusive aim must determine all dispositions and movements, *the destruction of the armies of the Confederacy*. Places and territory must be taken, held, and abandoned, and raids and invasions prevented or endured for the time being, as this one great issue demands.

“In accordance with these principles and aims, I will now propose a plan for the finishing of this war and a total suppression of this Rebellion, by two short and decisive campaigns, one to be accomplished first, and then the other. It will be admitted as self-evident that if the army of General Lee and the forces of the Confederacy now in the valley of Mississippi were annihilated,

the Rebellion would be practically ended. I propose, then, as the object of the first campaign, the destruction of the army of General Lee, and, as that of the second, the annihilation of the other forces referred to."

The plan proposed for the campaign against the army of General Lee.

The plan of the first campaign was a very simple one, one readily comprehended, and which can be stated in few words. At Fredericksburg lay General Lee with an army less than 80,000 strong. At Falmouth, on the opposite side of the Rappahannock, lay General Burnside with an army outnumbering that of his opponent as more than three to two. No addition to our forces, nor any change in their dispositions, here was required. At and near Fortress Monroe were two army corps, numbering in all from 20,000 to 30,000 men. It was proposed simply to increase this force, by a reinforcement of at least 60,000 men, to upwards of 80,000, rendering our army, at this point, quite equal to that of General Lee at Fredericksburg. When all things were in readiness, this army was to be landed at Bermuda Hundred, or at some point selected, and seize all Lee's communications south of James river. As soon of General Lee should divine this movement, he of course would retreat from Fredericksburg. In anticipation of this event, General Burnside was to move the main body of his army to the near vicinity of the convenient crossings above the place, to press the enemy, with all energy, as soon as his retreat should commence; Burnside keeping his right wing so advanced as to compel Lee to fall back into Richmond. At the earliest possible moment, the right of Burnside was to be brought into communication with the left of our army south of James river. By such an arrangement Richmond, and Lee in Richmond, would be encircled by an army two or three times as numerous as that within the city, and so encircled that all parts of our two armies should at all times be in supporting distances from one another.

Under such circumstances, should General Lee have fought a battle he would have been crushed at once by the over-whelming forces precipitated upon him; should

he remain in the city, famine then would have compelled his surrender in a few weeks. In any event, the destruction of his army would have been a fixed certainty. No military man, nor any individual of common intelligence, to whom the plan has been unfolded, has expressed to me the remotest doubt of the validity of the above deduction. General Rosecrans, when the plan was unfolded to him, promptly replied that that plan ought to have been adopted. Rev. W. W. Lyle, a chaplain in the western army, and author of the "Lights and Shadows of Army Life," stated to me that officers in high command in that army had often expressed to him their astonishment that a plan identical with this had not been adopted for the destruction of the army of General Lee.

The last feature of this plan was this. In case a portion of Lee's army should perchance escape into North Carolina, their only possible line of retreat, a fleet was to be held in readiness to move a sufficient force round to Hilton Head to intercept the retreat of the body under consideration, and preventing their crossing the Savannah river. Between this force and the army of the Potomac in pursuit, the capture of this body would result. Wilmington, Charlestown, and Columbia, etc., would then be at our mercy, and the Rebellion in the Carolinas and Virginia would be for ever suppressed.

The plan for the second and finishing campaign.

Equally simple and practicable was the plan for the second and finishing campaign. While the operations against General Lee were going on, provisions and means of transportation necessary for the movement of an army of 40,000 or 50,000 men were to be conveyed round to Pensacola, or to some point most convenient for the movement of said force into Georgia, Alabama, or Mississippi, as circumstances might require. When General Lee should be disposed of, and matters settled as above stated, an army, as above indicated, was to be sent round to Florida, while the army of the Potomac, after reinforcing that of the west, was to moor through the Carolinas, cross the Savannah river, and capture Savannah and Augusta. All matters being arranged, this army, with that in Florida

and the army of the west, were to move simultaneously upon the army then under General Bragg and other forces co-operating with him, and crush out these between the immense masses precipitated upon them. These forces being finally disposed of, all ports and fortified posts between the Savannah and Mississippi rivers would at once fall into our hands, and the Rebellion in all the States east of the river last named would be completely suppressed. A proclamation was then to be issued promising amnesty to all who would lay down their arms and return peaceably to their homes within a designated period, and rendering it a capital crime for any officer to remain in command of any body of men in rebellion after the termination of that period. Such was the plan for the suppression of the Rebellion, as fully developed in the papers read before the President as above stated, and which now lie before me.

Was the carrying out of the plan possible?

The only objection urged against the plan, even by Messrs. Stanton and Halleck, was the utter impossibility of carrying it out. If they were right here, their memory should be to the nation "as ointment poured forth," because they alone prevented its adoption. If they were wrong, and palpably so, then no nation ever suffered more from the errors of two men than ours in this case. What are the real facts bearing upon our inquiries here? According to the report of the Secretary of War, made to Congress December 1st, 1862, the army of the United States then in the field "constituted a force of 775,336 officers and privates, fully armed and equipped. Since the date of the returns," the report adds, "this number has been increased to over 800,000 men. When the quotas are filled up, the force will number a million of men, and the estimates for next year are based upon that number." At the time when the above plan was submitted, we had then an army in the field, an army between 800,000 and 1,000,000 strong, "fully armed and equipped." What must we think of the idea that out of this immense army 60,000 men could not have been furnished to reinforce the two army corps at and near Fortress Monroe,

and that the railroads and fleets of the United States could not afford facilities to convey these 60,000 men to their desired destination? It was not denied by the Secretary of War at the time when the facts were stated to him that all the forces needed to make up this amount were then in the Carolinas, in the Kanahway valley, in the State of Kentucky, and other localities equally near.

Let us now consider the army of the Potomac itself. According to official returns made, as we have seen, October 20th, 1862, the army of the Potomac, exclusive of the forces at Baltimore and Fortress Monroe, consisted of 304,609 men. Of these 207,036 were present for duty, 42,298 sick, ect., and 91,275 absent. The deduction is quite safe that by January 1863 this army consisted of from 210,000 to 220,000 men present for duty, and that over and above those lost at Fredericksburg. Of these, about 120,000 to 130,000 were with General Burnside, leaving about 80,000 doing garrison duty. A force 60,000 strong might undeniably have been taken from these and sent down to Fortress Monroe, the places of those sent being supplied by others brought in from abroad, in time to prevent any peril to the national capital. The forces required for the consummation of the plan under consideration, might, undeniably, have been brought to the point where they were needed in less than three weeks after the plan was agreed upon. The certain result would have been, the termination of the War of the Rebellion during the first six months of the year 1863, and that with the loss of but a very few thousand lives. Had this plan been adopted, Fredericksburg would have, unquestionably, been our last defeat, and our last very bloody battle, and our national debt would now be less than \$1,000,000,000. We shall see, hereafter, how the idea developed in the plan under consideration influenced the subsequent campaigns of the army of the Potomac, and finally brought the war to a successful termination.

CHAPTER XVII.

WINTER CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL ROSECRANS.

ON the 30th October, 1862, General Rosecrans assumed the command of what was afterwards designated the army of the Cumberland; General Buell having been previously relieved from the command of this army. On entering upon his duties, the new commander found that under his predecessor that army had been subject to depletion in the same form in which that of the Potomac had been diminished under General McClellan, 26,482 of the former army being found to be "absent by authority," and 6,484 "absent without authority." General Rosecrans, on assuming command, found his army, formerly 100,000 strong, now reduced to about 65,000 men, and located at Bowling Green; General Bragg's army, in the meantime, making, with its immense trains, a circuitous retreat round through East Tennessee. As our army was dependent for its supplies upon the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, our commander was not able to reach the latter place and assume the offensive until after General Bragg had concluded his long march and reappeared in our front at Murfreesboro'. In the meantime the Confederate cavalry, greatly superior to our own, and commanded by Generals Morgan and Wheeler, swarmed in all directions around our forces, breaking up our communications, cutting off our supplies, gobbling up stragglers, and at Hartsville capturing about 2,000 prisoners.

When General Rosecrans was ready to take the field, he found himself at the head of 46,910 men, divided into three grand divisions commanded by Generals McCook, Thomas, and Crittenden. After three or four days marching, with some severe skirmishing and fighting, the two armies,

on the evening of December 26th, confronted each other, their main forces lying between two streams, Stone river and Overall creek, which united with each other several miles north-east of our position; the battle-field being located from two to four miles north-west of Murfreesboro', the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad running nearly through the centre of both armies. Our line, stretching from nearly north to south some three to four miles, was deployed in the following order: Crittenden, about 13,000 strong, on our left; Thomas, with an equal force, in the centre; and McCook, with about 15,000, on our right. Of the Confederate line, Hardee occupied their left, Polk the centre, and Breckinridge the right north and west of Stone river. The plan of General Rosecrans was to have McCook hold his own if possible, fight desperately, and retreat slowly, if too hard pressed; while our left and centre were to fall upon Breckinridge, crush him, and rolling up the Confederates upon their centre and right, to interpose between them and Murfreesboro', and thus cut off their retreat. The counter plan of General Bragg was to concentrate a crushing force upon McCook, roll up his divisions upon our centre and left, interpose between our army and Nashville, and thus insure its final capture. Each plan was well conceived, and, what was singular, each commander became, during the night, fully possessed of the other's intentions; General Bragg, unfortunately for us, making the earliest move. At four o'clock in the morning, December 31st, Hardee, greatly reinforced and sustained by the central division under Polk, suddenly emerged from the thickets in McCook's front, while another force assailed his right division in flank, soon hurled his divisions in mingled masses upon our centre, even his left divisions, under J. C. Davis and Sheridan, after the most desperate resistance, being driven back into the rear of our centre. By 11 a.m. more than one-third of our army was almost utterly routed and demoralised, and about half the ground held by us at daylight was occupied by the Confederates, while their cavalry was making sad havock among our stragglers and supply trains between our rear and Nashville.

Our centre, under the indomitable Thomas, now felt the

full force of the Confederate left and centre, even McCook's left division, under Sheridan, falling back, its ammunition being exhausted, behind Thomas. Such was the force of the attack here that Thomas was necessitated to withdraw his two right divisions, under Negley and Rousseau, to a more open and favourable position behind his centre; a movement very ably executed, but with heavy loss, a battalion of regulars losing 530 men. The new ground taken, however, like Thomas's last position at Chickamauga, was held against every effort of Bragg to take it. So matters stood at nightfall, when darkness put an end to the conflict.

At the close of the day our army, while it held its final position, had lost half the ground it occupied in the morning and, including its killed, wounded, and missing, full one-fourth its number, and quite an equal proportion of its guns; while the Confederate cavalry held full possession of our communications, and were plundering at will our baggage and supplies.

The next day both armies remained quiet in their respective positions, a few artillery duels excepted. The second battle, January 2nd, was in most respects a repetition of the first; the Confederates in this instance assailing in great force our left and left centre, and driving them back as they had before done with our right and right centre, until they encountered our batteries, which ploughed through and through them, and compelled them to fall back with the loss of four guns and a considerable number of prisoners. Night setting in prevented any pursuit on the part of our commander. Heavy rains prevented any special movements of either army until the evening of January 3rd, when General Bragg retreated so quietly that even our pickets did not suspect the movement until the next morning. On the day following, our army entered Murfreesboro', where it found about 1,500 of the enemy's sick and wounded left, with medical attendants, in hospitals there.

In these two days' battles Rosecrans admits a loss on our part of 3,778 killed and wounded. Bragg puts his loss at 10,000 in killed, wounded, and missing, and claims to have taken from us on the field and by his cavalry raids,

between Murfreesboro' and Nashville, 6,273 prisoners, 30 guns—he losing 3—6,000 small arms, and vast stores of valuable spoils, besides burning upwards of 800 army waggons, with all their contents. The loss on our part was undeniably far greater than on that of the Confederates. Their retreat, however, leaves the claim of victory to our brave army and its able commander. During the winter following, raids were the order of the day on both sides; the Confederates, on account of their superiority in cavalry, doing us far more injury than they received from us.

Aside from the honour of final mastery of the field, the battle of Murfreesboro' was wholly barren of results on either side. The armies, being nearly equal in number and discipline, slaughtered each other to more than one-fourth their number, and then the Confederates went on their way, and the Unionists returned to Nashville. Yet, with no blame whatever to General Rosecrans, no other excuse can be offered for such a battle than the most stupid ignorance on the part of our Commander-in-Chief. We had, as we have seen, at the time when, with an army less than 50,000 strong, Rosecrans moved out from Nashville,—we had in the field quite 1,000,000 men, “fully armed and equipped;” and next to the sphere of the army of the Potomac, that of the Cumberland was the most important in the war. What excuse was there, then, in compelling, as he was really compelled to move, the commander of this army to fight a great national battle with an army less than 100,000 strong. Had this amount of force been furnished our General, the battle of Murfreesboro' would practically have ended the Rebellion, as far as the Confederate States between the Savannah and Mississippi rivers are concerned. But with the stupid unwisdom which controlled our war counsels, 60,000 men could not be at the time furnished for the army of the Cumberland, or for that of the Potomac.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON.

ON the 16th October, 1862, the department of General Grant was enlarged, so as to include both West Tennessee and Mississippi. On receiving this command, he at once commenced preparations for the capture of Vicksburg. On the 4th July, eight and a half months from that time, our army entered the city, and took possession of its strongholds. The capture of this post has been regarded by perhaps a majority of the people of this country as a feat of masterly generalship, and did, in connexion with the short command of General Grant at Chattanooga, elevate him to the supreme command of our armies, and finally secured for him two elections to the Presidency of these United States. We have never agreed with the estimate placed upon the military character of this transaction. To us, it wears, for the most part, the same dull aspect which generally characterized the conduct of this war. Leaving, in his advance from Grand Junction to Oxford, his depôt of arms, munitions, and provisions, containing property valued at \$4,000,000, at Holly Springs, guarded but by an effective force of about 1,000 men, when it was well known that the enemy was watching every opportunity to fall upon our communications and cut off our supplies, cannot but be justly regarded as a very gross blunder. Then, on account of such a disaster, which was at once repaired, to abandon the important line of advance by Jackson, and make that long detour round to Memphis and down the Mississippi, seems indicative of a palpable want of military wisdom. Then, Sherman's assault upon Vicksburg, an assault in which

column after column of infantry were hurled against impregnable defences, involved not only a useless but imprudent and most excuseless slaughter of brave men. In his criticisms on the siege of Vicksburg, General Sherman remarks that had General Grant continued, as he undeniably might have done, his advance upon the place, in the direction in which he was moving when he retreated back from Oxford, and made the detour round through Corinth, Memphis, and down the Mississippi, he would have captured the place in January instead of the following July. In this statement, General Sherman is undeniable correct. These fundamental errors deprive General Grant of all just renown in this campaign, namely, leaving his immense supplies behind him under guard of but about 1,000 men, where his guard and supplies were certain to be seized by the enemy; making the loss of those supplies the occasion for the abandonment of the only proper line of advance, and taking the wide detour under consideration; and, finally, locating his great army where it could do nothing whatever having the remotest tendency to secure the object of the campaign, and then utterly wasting six months' time in doing, as we shall see, the most senseless and absurd things of which a commander can conceive.

We must bear in mind also that the investment of Vicksburg was effected on the morning of the 19th May, and that prior to this time the city had in no sense or form been besieged, the siege proper continuing but forty-five days. What had our great army been doing during the previous six months? Without making any approaches towards the city, or erecting batteries which could reach any of its defences, our immense forces during this entire period were lying in idleness, dreaming of some "good time coming," or were most senselessly employed in canal and ditch digging, for the purposes of cutting the city off from the mainland by flanking the fortifications at Haines's Bluff on the Yazoo, or conveying our fleet round through dead lagoons into the Mississippi below the city. The number of these ditches and canals thus built is too numerous to be described. A notice of one, and that the most important, must suffice. Some

160 miles in direct line above the city, quite 200 by the river, Moon Lake approaches within a few miles of the Mississippi on the east side. Out of this lake the Yazoo Pass enters a small river named Cold Water. This, a few miles below the Pass, uniting with another stream, forms the Tallahatchee, and this some sixty or seventy miles below unites with the Yallabusha, and forms the Yazoo river. All these are narrow and slow streams, sufficiently deep, however, to float ironclads. At the expense of months of time and immense labour, a ditch was dug from the Mississippi into the lake designated, and a passage was opened for our vessels into the Cold Water. The object of opening this new line of communication was to flank the Confederate fortifications at Yazoo City and Haines's Bluff, fortifications too strong to be captured by assaults from our fleets and land forces by a movement from near Vicksburg up the Yazoo. At length, after untold labour and the loss of months of time, the expedition sailed, or rather steamed off; three toilsome days being spent in getting through Moon Lake and Yazoo Pass. The armament consisted of a division of land forces 5,000 strong under General Ross, of two large gunboats, five smaller ones, and eighteen transports; two mortar-boats being afterwards sent down. This expedition, whose preparation had been long before announced to the nation and world through the press, and was fully understood throughout the Confederacy, was expected, after "finding out its uncouth way" for more than 150 miles down these narrow and tortuous rivers, to capture, right in the presence of General Johnston's army, first Fort Pemberton, at the junction of the Tallahatchee and Yallabusha rivers, then the strong fortifications at Yazoo City, and finally to move down, and in connexion with the fleet from below, to assault and capture the still stronger fortifications at Haines's Bluff. The Confederates of course looked on and laughed at the folly, and our grand flotilla, with its 5,000 land forces, at the point where it encountered the first battery erected to resist its progress, was driven back, with two of its ironclads not a little crippled, and slowly returned from its "Tom Fool's errand" to its point of departure. This was the third and most de-

terminated effort made to flank the defences of Vicksburg. We may claim the merit of having put a stop to these stupid proceedings. A letter written to Mr. Sumner contains these statements: "This whole ditch-digging business is a disgrace to us, in the just judgment of the Confederacy and the world, and is an insult to the intelligence of this century; and President Lincoln is bound, from respect to the honour of the country which he represents, to put a stop at once to such senseless proceedings." Immediately after that letter reached Washington, an absolute order, so the papers announced, was sent on to stop all works of the kind.

What now remained, after six months had been thus worse than wasted, was to do what might have been done in less than four weeks after our fleet and forces reached Milliken's Bend—the running of a sufficient number of ironclads and other vessels by the Confederate fortifications, and crossing our army over the Mississippi below Vicksburg. Why this movement, as the only one proper to be made, had not before occurred to Commodore Porter and General Grant and other officers in the army and navy, appears singular; especially when we consider the facts that ironclads had safely run by the formidable fortifications at Island No. 10, above Memphis, and a fleet of ordinary war steamers had safely run the gauntlet of Forts Jackson and St. Philip below New Orleans. The experiment was made on the night of April 16th, and accomplished with great stillness and success; and eight ironclads and a sufficient number of transports safely passed the forts and batteries on the hostile shore, and our army, at a distance of 60 or 70 miles below Vicksburg, was safely landed on the eastern side of the great river. Too much can hardly be said of the conduct of our army and its commanders in the advance now made in the direction of Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, and from thence directly west to Vicksburg. In the successive battles of Port Gibson, Fourteen Mile Creek, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hills (the most important and bloody of all), and Big Black river, where Pemberton made a final stand before his retreat into Vicksburg, our total loss in killed, wounded, and missing was upwards of 4,000 men.

Nowhere did the enemy, even when in the strongest positions, resist, hardly for an hour, the fire and charge of our forces. During this march of twenty days, our army lived almost wholly upon provisions picked up on the way, not more than five days regular rations having been dealt out to them. On their arrival at Vicksburg, our forces found the fortifications at Haines's Bluff and Yazoo City soon after, abandoned, and full communications with our fleet at the mouth of the Yazoo, and thus a ready supply of provisions and other necessities, were secured.

As soon as our forces were drawn completely around the city from the line of the river on the north to the south side, a scene occurred, May 19th, and was repeated three days after,—a scene at the thought of which every true patriot is affected with heart-sickness. We refer to the successive assaults made by infantry columns upon the lines of Confederate fortifications in our front. The first assault was made mainly by General Blair's division of Sherman's corps, and resulted in capturing several outer works and holding them until nightfall, when our men retired by word of command. On the 22nd, the assault was made by our army in force along the entire Confederate lines. Sustained by a heavy cannonade in their rear, our infantry climbed up the heights in their front, until they stood in open form before the impregnable batteries of the enemy. Here they received a deadly fire which no troops could withstand, and fell back under cover of the heights which they had ascended, some 3,000 of their companions being left dead or weltering in their blood upon the field. The siege now commenced in due order, with few casualties on either side, until, on July 4th, the day after the battle at Gettysburg, the place, as we have before stated, was surrendered, and occupied by our army. Upwards of 30,000 prisoners, 213 cannon, 35,000 stand of arms, and a vast amount of military stores, were the results of this surrender.

The surrender of Vicksburg was followed, four days after, by that of Port Hudson. This place was fully invested by General Banks May 26th, a few days after General Grant had completed the investment of Vicksburg. The siege in the former, like that in the latter, case was

characterised by a vain and bloody assault upon the enemy's lines, we thus losing upwards of 2,000 men. In this assault, two regiments of coloured troops so distinguished themselves as to receive, from the General in command, the highest commendations before the nation. In the surrender of this place, 6,458 prisoners, 15 heavy siege pieces in good condition, 61 field pieces, about one half in reparable order, 10,000 muskets, 5,000 of these being fine English rifles, and a vast amount of ammunition, fell into our hands; the Confederates losing in the two places Vicksburg and Port Hudson about 40,000 men surrendered as prisoners of war.

The immediate and ultimate results.

The victory of our arms at Gettysburg, and the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, all occurring within the space of five days, of course electrified the Union States, and induced the general belief that "the end had come," and that but a few weeks could elapse before a final collapse of of the Rebellion must occur. We did not sympathise at all in these apprehensions. The victory of Gettysburg had simply ended, not the war, as we saw, but an invasion. The opening of the Mississippi had ceased to be a matter of any great moment in deciding the issues of the war. In the early era of the war, the armies of the Confederacy had been to a great extent supplied with men and provisions from the States west of the river. These supplies had now almost totally ceased. Neither soldiers nor provisions were, to any great amount, now being drawn for the eastern armies from those States. We were practically, on the other hand, carrying on a war with two peoples who had but little intercourse with one another, and neither of whom received much aid from the other. Hence it was that while it required the continuous presence of from 50,000 to 100,000 men to keep the river open, it was not to us a channel of commerce, nor a means, to any great extent, for the transportation of our armies, or their supplies, while the real damage done to the Confederacy was the loss of men and munitions of war. This damage was immediately repaired on the part of the Confederates, by a professed exchange of the prisoners whom they and

we had captured and released on parole, and by a consequent immediate reconscription of these men into their army. Thus it was that the 40,000 men whom we had cooped up in Vicksburg and Port Hudson, became an active force against us in the field; while the main part of our forces which had been employed in the field had to be kept stationary to guard the widely-extended communications which we had opened.

But what, in our judgment, threw the most lurid glare over the future, as far as these results were concerned, was the full assurance which we felt that the advantages which these successes had given us would be wholly unimproved under the authorities which then controlled our military affairs. As soon as we heard of Lee's second invasion of our territories, we instantly wrote a letter to Secretary Chase, a letter containing the following statements: "Now is the golden opportunity for the nation. Not a division of the invading army ought to be permitted to recross the Potomac. If our military authorities in Washington do not know how to secure such a result, I am ready to give them a plan which will ensure it. I will now venture to predict what will occur under these authorities, if no higher wisdom is sought to determine their counsels. No important reinforcements will be called up from Fortress Monroe, or anywhere else; nor will any plan be devised to capture the army of General Lee. All that will be done, on the other hand, will be to gather up the troops that happen to be available in and about Washington, to send these round and head the invaders, and drive them back into Virginia, just as we drive out a herd of unruly cattle who have broken into our grain field; and while General Lee shall escape with all his plunder, his expulsion will be proclaimed as one of the great events of the war, and as the sure prelude of the speedy fall of the Confederacy."

Immediately after the victory at Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, we wrote a long communication to the *New York Times*, a letter containing among others on the then existing status of our national affairs, the following statements, the substance of which we gave in the Introduction: "Any individual well acquainted with military affairs must be aware that the

advantages which should be reaped from our recent victories will depend almost wholly upon the use which shall be promptly made of the army under General Grant. If this army shall be at once united with that of the Cumberland for a crushing movement upon the forces under General Bragg, or with that of the Potomac for a similar movement against General Lee, the war will soon be ended. I will venture a prediction, however, as to what will occur under our present military authorities. All our vast armies will now remain in comparative idleness, no effective movements being attempted until the opening of the campaign next spring. While this general inactivity shall continue, indecisive advantages gained here and there will be magnified into great and decisive victories, while the papers will be crowded with statements that the Confederacy is 'on its last legs,' and is 'on the eve of a final collapse.' While this dull status of our affairs shall continue, the Confederacy will have full time to recover from the stunning blows it has received, and to readjust itself to its new situation. As a consequence, after an interval of nine or ten months of stupid inaction, the war will be recommenced as in the beginning." All who will call to mind the events of the period under consideration will readily recognise the accuracy with which those events were foreshadowed. We never found it difficult, as soon as we understood the direction of any of our leading campaigns, to predict the results; and in such predictions, as multitudes will bear us witness, we never erred. We always, even in the darkest hours of the Republic, predicted the ultimate collapse of the Confederacy; but always affirmed that the end would be reached with a most needless, exhaustive, and wasteful expenditure of blood and treasure. This expenditure was what we perpetually endeavoured to prevent

CHAPTER XIX.

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

ON the 26th January, 1863, Major-General Joseph Hooker assumed the command of the army of the Potomac. Such facts as the following will sufficiently indicate the state of this army at that time. Desertions were occurring, it is affirmed authoritatively, at the rate of 200 per day, while the number absent from their regiments from various causes, mostly by permission, amounted to 2,922 commissioned officers, and 81,964 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The elation of the Confederates and the depression of the Union army at this time is manifest in the frequency and boldness of the raids of the cavalry of the latter quite within our lines, and the almost unresisting apathy with which such insults were endured on the part of our commanders. On this subject Mr Greeley thus speaks. "One of these raids was made by J. E. B. Stuart across the Rappahannock to Dumfries, when 25 waggons and some 200 prisoners were taken; and thence towards Alexandria and around Fairfax Court House, burning the railroad bridge across the Accotink, and returning in triumph with their spoils; another by a party of Imboden's troopers, farther west from the valley to Romney, where the guards of a supply train were surprised and routed, 72 men, 106 horses, and 27 waggons taken and carried off; a third by Fitz Hugh Lee, across the Rappahannock, near Falmouth, surprising a camp and taking 150 prisoners, with a loss of 14 men; a fourth by General W. E. Jones, in the valley, routing two regiments of Milroy's cavalry, and taking 200 prisoners, with a loss of 4 men only; while

a more daring raid was made by Major White, of Jones's command, across the Potomac at Poolsville, taking 77 prisoners. Lee further reports that Captain Randolph, of the Black Horse cavalry, by various raids into Fanguier county, captured over 200 prisoners and several hundred stands of arms; and that Lieut. Mosebey (whose name now makes its first appearance in a bulletin) "has done much to harass the enemy, attacking him boldly on several occasions and capturing many prisoners." One or two minor cavalry exploits, recited by Lee in "General Order No. 29," read too much like romance to be embodied in sober history; yet such was the depression on our side in Virginia, such the elation and confidence of the other, such the very great advantage enjoyed by Rebel raiders in the readiness of the white inhabitants to give them information, and even to scout in quest of it, throughout that dreary winter, that nothing that might be asserted of Rebel audacity and Federal imbecility is absolutely incredible."

The reason for the Confederate elation and the Union despondency will appear truly mysterious when we compare the amount of forces in General Lee's with that of the army of the Potomac, and of the entire Union forces of the nation at this time. When I was in Washington in January of this year, none of the authorities there entertained the idea that the entire available forces of General Lee for the defence of Richmond and "the sacred soil of Virginia" amounted to over 120,000 or 130,000 men at the utmost; and subsequent official information evinces the truth that this estimate was much too high. According to official report made to the Adjutant-General of the United States, October 20th, 1862, the army of the Potomac, as we have seen, consisted of 304,609 men of all arms. Of these, 207,036 were present for duty, 42,298 sick, under arrest, and on special duty, while 91,275 were absent on leave. These did not include the corps, about 9,000 strong, under General Dix at Baltimore, and the forces at Fortress Monroe, and the two corps under Generals Keyes and Peck in the Peninsula. According to the report of Mr. Stanton, our Secretary of War, the report made to Congress December 4th, 1872, the entire

Union army would amount by January 1863 to quite 1,000,000 men, "well armed and equipped." With all these forces at command, our Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of War, as we have also seen, persuaded President Lincoln that 60,000 or 70,000 men could not be brought to the vicinity of Fortress Monroe to ensure the conquest of Virginia and the destruction of the army of General Lee. The forces under the immediate command of General Hooker, and available for active service, amounted to from 125,000 to 140,000 men. All the above facts should be kept distinctly in mind, as a means of forming a correct judgment of the events now to be considered.

As soon as he assumed command, General Hooker set about, with all diligence, making all necessary preparations for the great campaign to be opened in the early spring. As a means, and a fundamental one, to this end, General Burnside with the 9th corps, the command of which he had reassumed, was sent down to Fortress Monroe, to conduct the projected movement on the south side of James river. The plan which I had laid before the President and others in the early part of January 1863, of seizing General Lee's communications, by an adequate force, on the south side of this river, while his position at Fredericksburg should be turned by a flank movement of the army of the Potomac, was most heartily approved by General Hooker, as soon as he was made acquainted with it, and was adopted by him, on assuming command, as a fundamental feature of his plan. Hence the transfer of General Burnside and his corps, as above stated.

By the middle of April, full preparation was made for the great movement under consideration. On the 26th of the month preceding, however, an event occurred which changed the whole face of affairs, and rendered it necessary for General Hooker to readjust his whole plan for the campaign. At the date designated, General Burnside was appointed over the department of Ohio, which includes Kentucky, and was ordered to take his corps with him. By this one order, General Hooker's left arm was violently broken, and all his prior calculations were defeated; it being utterly impossible in the absence of this corps to make any

effective movement on General Lee's communications south of James river. The available force of General Hooker was also rendered 30,000 less than it was when he took command. In view of the palpable facts of the case, but one motive can be assigned for this order, a deliberate intent to defeat, or rather prevent, this great movement upon General Lee's communications. This movement, or one of this identical character, had been by myself personally, as we have seen, submitted to the Secretary of War, and by him and General Halleck had been condemned and reprobated and argued against before President Lincoln. Now this very plan was about to be visibly carried out under the eye of the nation; and the success of the plan, if permitted to be carried out, no sensible man will doubt. The ostensible reason for this order was an anticipated invasion of Kentucky. Who can doubt that out of the 1,000,000 men in the field, 30,000 could have been furnished to prevent that invasion had it occurred, which it did not, and this corps have been left where it was? It is undeniable that not a shadow of necessity existed for that order; and I challenge the world to assign any motive for it but that under consideration. This, also, may be added, that General Halleck was a personal enemy of General Hooker, and for this reason, as we shall see hereafter, acted as his "evil genius." It is a noteworthy fact that when the proposition to concentrate some 60,000 to 80,000 men at Fortress Monroe was under consideration, the utter impossibility of furnishing the means of transportation was urged upon the President by General Halleck and the Secretary of War, as an absolute reason why the invasion should not be attempted. The ready removal, in a very few days, of 30,000 troops from Fortress Monroe to Cincinnati, and that under the orders of these very men, absolutely demonstrates the hollowness of their reasonings in the former case. This, also, should be considered here, that as soon as General Burnside arrived with his corps at Cincinnati, that corps was taken from him and sent down to Vicksburg; the great invasion of Kentucky which did occur, the invasion to repel which he and his corps were professedly taken from their proper sphere, having been repelled by a few hundred cavalry and infantry

then in the interior of the State. In judging of General Hooker as the commander of a great army, we should bear in mind the fact that just as he was on the eve of carrying out the only plan of a great campaign which he was ever permitted to attempt to realize, that plan, in one of its most essential features, was defeated by his Commander-in-Chief. To plan and successfully execute a new campaign under such circumstances is one of the most difficult and perilous tasks that any General can be required to undertake. Had the plan which he originally projected been carried out, and Burnside's corps been united with those at Fortress Monroe and the Peninsula, an army nearly or quite 60,000 strong would have been organized for the fundamental movement south of James river, and General Lee would have found himself assailed, in front and rear, by forces outnumbering his own about two to one. As it was, he had only the single army under General Hooker to dispose of. How General Hooker did conduct himself under his new and most unfortunate circumstances, unfortunate to himself, and far more so to his country, remains to be considered.

The first problem to be solved by General Hooker was the transfer of his army from its camp at Falmouth on the north side of the Rappahannock river, and directly opposite to General Lee's position at Fredericksburg on the opposite side of the same river, to a position favourable for future operations on the south side of said river. As preliminary to his immediate and ultimate purpose, he, April 13th, despatched, on a surprise expedition, General Stoneman with almost the entire mass of the Union cavalry, 13,000 men, as General Hooker stated before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. General Stoneman was ordered to move up on the north side of the Rappahannock, cross over, at discretion, above the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and, in the language of Mr. Greeley, "strike Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry brigade (computed at 2,000) near Culpepper Court House, capture Gordonsville, and then pounce on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad near Saxton's Junction, cutting telegraphs, railroads, burning bridges, etc., thence towards Richmond, fighting at every opportunity, and harassing by every

means the retreat of the Rebel army, which, it was calculated, would now be retiring on Richmond." "Let your watchword be fight," ran the order, "and let all your orders be *fight, fight, fight*; bearing in mind that time is as valuable to the General as the Rebel carcasses. It devolves upon you, General, to take the initiative in the forward movement of this grand army; and on you and your noble command must depend, in a great measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution, are everything in war; and especially is it the case in the command you have, and the enterprise in which you are about to embark."

There was a cavalry officer in General Hooker's army, an officer to whom such an important command and such an order might have been given with the rational expectation of realizing the intended results. We refer to General Pleasanton. "It is hard," as Mr. Greeley justly remarks, "to repress a suspicion that irony lurks in such language, when addressed to an officer like George D. Stoneman."

Without stirring the suspicion of the enemy, this expedition moved for two days up the river, and had commenced crossing over when excessive rains, flooding all the streams and rivers, not only necessitated the recall of the troops which had crossed, but a delay of further advance, and also of the intended movement of the grand army until the 27th of the month. Stoneman's great raid, the greatest of the kind, we believe, made during the war, while it should have been a great success, was, in fact, in all details a most miserable failure, accomplishing little to the injury of the enemy, and less for the interest of the Union cause.

Here we would beg leave to submit a very important question to the military authorities of our country. It was one of the striking features of this war, as conducted equally by both sides, a feature which peculiarizes it from the wars carried on by other nations, that in very few, if any, of our important battles did the cavalry act an essential part. With the exception of Fremont at Springfield, and, through General Pleasanton's special influence,

at the battle of Gettysburg, General Sheridan was the first if not the only General who made essential use of this arm on the battle-field. On such occasions, with very few exceptions, our cavalry were off on raids and similar expeditions. Now the question which we would submit is this: Is it wise at the opening of a great campaign, and especially on the eve of a great battle, to send off, for any purpose, the mass of the cavalry of an army? Should not, with exceptions very few and far between, the entire army be kept present and intact, for the settlement of such issues? With 13,000 cavalry present and well used at Chancellorsville, and that in connexion with a proper force of infantry and artillery, not only would the rout of our 11th corps have been prevented, but the annihilation of that of Jackson and the utter defeat of Lee's army would have been insured.

The manner in which General Hooker transferred his army from the north to the south side of the Rappahannock, utterly deceiving and out-generalling such a commander as General Lee, and getting his command, without loss, over all the fords of the river, evinces the former as possessed of masterly military ability. The moment selected for the full opening of the campaign was most propitious. General Longstreet, with three divisions of General Lee's army, was absent on an expedition against a Union force 14,000 strong at Suffolk. Thus an effective force of but about 50,000 men was present with General Lee at Fredericksburg. Preparatory to the passage of his main army over the river above Fredericksburg, General Hooker sent General Sedgwick with the 6th, and General Sickles with the 3rd, corps, with orders to lay pontoons, and make a crossing some two or three miles below the city, and at Pollock's Mill, still lower down. Under the impression that it was Hooker's intent to pass his whole army over at these points, Lee's attention was wholly diverted in this direction, and our commander was left free to pass his main force across the river at Banks, U.S., and Ely's Fords, and establish himself on his enemy's flank at Chancellorsville, some ten or twelve miles west of Fredericksburg. In another fundamental respect was General Lee deceived and out-

generalled. As soon as the movement upon Chancellorsville was perfected, General Sickles was ordered to follow with rapid marches, and form as a reserve in the rear of Hooker's immediate command. This move of Sickles, which was visible from Fredericksburg, induced Lee to infer that the show below the city was a mere feint, and that all our forces at that point had gone to Hooker. Hence Lee, leaving his rear almost wholly unprotected, moved his whole army to Hooker's front. This was as the latter desired and anticipated.

So far the success of our commander was complete. On April 30th matters stood thus. Hooker had under his immediate command, at and near Chancellorsville, a force of nearly 70,000 men. At the same time, Sedgwick was safely established on the south side of the river, with a force consisting of his own corps and 6,000 men left under his order at Falmouth, a force nearly or quite 30,000 strong. General Lee in the meantime, now fully aware of his enemy's real designs, had moved his entire army, a very small force excepted, out of his fortifications at Fredericksburg, and established himself midway between that city and Hooker's position at Chancellorsville. The plan of General Hooker was a very simple, and not unwisely projected, one. It was to form his own lines in front of the enemy, wait there until Sedgwick should move up, a distance of but six or eight miles, and open the battle by an attack on Lee's rear. Hooker was then to precipitate his whole army upon the enemy, and crush him between these two masses. Nothing appeared more practicable than the accomplishment of such a result. How could 50,000 men in an open field where the advantages were equal for either party, sustain the shock of 70,000 men on one side, and 30,000 on the other? It was not without seeming good reason that our commander said to his associates, as he rode up to the spacious brick mansion and tavern at Chancellorsville, "I now have Lee's army in one hand, and Richmond in the other." The blasphemous utterance with which this boast is affirmed to have been accompanied, however, would have led any prudent man, who believes in God and in an overruling Providence, to anticipate the disasters

which followed. When the elder Napoleon faced the admonition, "Man proposes, but God disposes," with the impious boast, "I propose, and I dispose," the utterance itself revealed the fact that his mind had lost its balance, and that his fall was near.

General Hooker's plan, we would say, has very important precedents in its favour, one of Buonaparte's most signal victories in Italy having, for example, been gained, and that in very perilous circumstances, in accordance with this identical principle. The plan, however, unless prosecuted with very great vigour, and unity of action on both sides, is obviously a most perilous one. How it was carried out in this case will be seen hereafter. There is still another plan which deserves special consideration, provided we would correctly understand what is best to be done under similar circumstances. After the safe crossing of his main army had been secured by the feint of Generals Sickles and Sedgwick below Fredericksburg, suppose that the corps of each of these Generals, instead of that of the former, had been brought around to Chancellorsville. General Hooker would, in that case, have had all his forces under his immediate command, and would have been able to precipitate an overwhelming force directly upon his antagonist, and would have saved all peril of having his subordinate first and then himself assaulted successively by the army of General Lee. This, under the circumstances, was, unquestionably, the preferable plan of the two. Buonaparte, when he ordered the movement to which we have referred, *knew* his men, and knew well that his orders would be obeyed implicitly, and executed with the utmost vigour. Hooker did not know, and had good reasons for not intrusting too much to his subordinates, and hence would have done better had he kept all his forces under his immediate command.

There was still another plan submitted to and urged upon the adoption of General Hooker, a plan submitted by General Pleasanton, which our commander should have very deeply pondered. In passing with his cavalry in advance of the army over the Rappahannock, he captured a number of prisoners, and among them an officer of General Lee's staff and board of engineers. In the

pocket of this officer was found a journal containing a record of the doings of the Confederate army for a long time previous. In this journal was recorded a visit of General Lee and his Generals to Chancellorsville, and of the conclusion to which they arrived, namely, that the next great battle would, in all probability, be at that place. In this journal, also, was an account of the preparation of a circular road, commencing at a point midway between this place and Fredericksburg, and running round to the west of Chancellorsville. Apprehending, at once, that the object of the road was a military one, he conjectured, very naturally, that said object was to enable the Confederates, by a flank movement around our right wing, to attack our army in front and rear at the same time. He accordingly went to General Hooker, and urged that the 11th with another corps should be deployed on the road from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania; that, this latter place being taken possession of, our line of battle should be formed, with our left resting upon the Rappahannock, and our right upon Spottsylvania. By this disposition, all our forces would have been in proper battle array, for purposes of offence or defence, and could, at the proper moment, have been as a united force concentrated upon the enemy in front. As matters stood, our various corps lay about in scattered fragments hardly capable of united action. As our line would then have lain directly across the road referred to, the possibility of any flank movement upon our right, or anywhere else, would have been rendered impossible. By our occupancy of Spottsylvania, also, the retreat of General Lee in the direction of Richmond, in case of defeat or a desire to escape from his present position, would have been rendered impossible. While our forces were thus arranged, I remark once more, General Hooker could have held his position until Sedgwick, had he been defeated, as he was, could have been brought up with 30,000 men from Falmouth and united them with our army at Chancellorsville. The preponderance of force on our side would then have been so great as to render the total defeat of General Lee a certainty. Every consideration demanded the prompt adoption of this wise advice. General Hooker's mind,

however, was too much occupied with what was immediately before him, as he was waiting the hearing General Sedgwick's guns in General Lee's rear, to give heed to any such advice. The results can be readily detailed.

On May 1st, General Hooker, having ascertained, by reconnoissance, that for three miles in his front no Confederates could be found, advanced Syke's regulars (3rd division, 5th corps) down the old 'pike towards Fredericksburg. This force was followed by a part of the 2nd corps, and by two other divisions of the 5th corps, on a road still farther north. The 11th, followed by the 12th, were deployed still farther in a westerly direction from Chancellorsville. The intention of General Hooker was to have advanced his main forces some two or three miles forward in the direction of Fredericksburg. General Sykes had not advanced one half this distance, however, before he met the enemy advancing in numbers far greater than his own. After a severe conflict, in which there was considerable loss on both sides, our forces were, under orders from General Hooker, required to fall back. The initiative was thus in favour of the Confederates. This, however, was a matter of no concern to our commander, as he was waiting for the time to make the contemplated assault upon the enemy in conjunction with General Sedgwick, who was expected, in conformity with the plan of the campaign as understood by him and General Hooker, to cross his entire force over the river, and move without a moment's delay to the rear of General Lee's army and open the battle as soon as the required position was reached. During all the day, May 2nd, our commander waited in breathless expectation to hear the sound of his subordinate's guns, when 30,000 men were to be precipitated upon the enemy by a front attack. The day passed, however, without anything being heard from Sedgwick. At 9 in the evening, a positive order, received two hours later, was forwarded, requiring General Sedgwick to move instantly, or at 12 in the morning, upon Chancellorsville, and open the battle as above stated. General Warren, the bearer of Hooker's message, made known to Sedgwick the former's critical condition, and urged an immediate movement. At 3 o'clock in the

morning, General Warren found General Sedgwick across the river, but with his army motionless. It was quite 11 a.m., however, before Sedgwick's arrangements were completed for storming the heights of Fredericksburg, although at an early hour he was reinforced by General Gibbon with 6,000 men, who had crossed over and entered the city. The heights referred to were readily carried, but a small force having been left. So was an advanced position, Marye's hill, beyond, where the enemy had concentrated all his available forces. 200 prisoners and some guns were captured by these movements. The way now being open, our General, with strange stupidity leaving General Gibbon with his 6,000 men at Fredericksburg, moved forward to Salem church, some three or four miles in the direction of Chancellorsville, arriving at this point at 5 p.m. instead of 6 a.m., as he was ordered to do, and undeniably might have done. The night, it must be borne in mind, was a very clear moonlight one, a night in which troops could be moved about as readily as in the daytime. Yet no movements whatever were made until quite eleven hours after it was required to be commenced. At 5 p.m., General Lee, released from all heavy pressure in his front, was able, by forces sent to his rear, not only to stop the farther advance of our General, but, on the next day, to drive him, with the loss of 4,601 brave men, across the Rappahannock. Thus 30,000 of our best forces were worse than lost to our army in this campaign, and that on account of inexcusable dilatoriness on the one hand, and open disobedience to positive orders on the other; and these at the most critical moment of said campaign. In any country but ours, such acts would be treated as high crimes and misdemeanours. In ours, however, Generals high in command became, *à la mode* McClellan, schooled to a stolid indifference to orders received; such acts, also, being no real crimes with our supreme military authorities. While numbers of our commanders were reeking with such crimes, and the nation was bleeding at every pore as a consequence, but one such criminal received even the semblance of punishment. General Sedgwick was a brave and able corps commander on the field when under the immediate control of a superior in command. For a

separate command, to say the least, he most palpably evinced fundamental disqualifications. Had General Sedgwick promptly obeyed the order under consideration when that order was first presented to him,—that is, at 11 p.m., May 2nd, or at 3 o'clock the next morning, when compliance was urged upon him by the most weighty considerations possible, and urged by such a messenger as General Warren,—and had the former kept his forces intact, as he should have done, it is undeniable that by 8 or 10 o'clock, May 3rd, 30,000 men would have been precipitated upon the rear of General Lee at a moment when, in consequence of Jackson's corps, 25,000 strong, being miles away on our right flank, the latter could have had but little if any more than 30,000 men under his immediate command, and when the mass of these were in a death-struggle with superior forces in their front. The deduction is undeniable that but for disobedience to positive orders and inexcusable delay on the part of General Sedgwick, the destruction of General Lee's army would have been inevitable.

Let us now direct our attention to the events which did occur, May 2nd, on the field at Chancellorsville. In our immediate front very little fighting occurred, as General Hooker was, as we have said, waiting to hear the sound of Sedgwick's guns in the rear of General Lee. Early in the day, General Jackson, with his veterans, 25,000 strong, commenced his celebrated flank movement to the rear of the right wing of our army. His forces marched, of course, on the wide circular road to which we have referred. To mask this great movement, a considerable force, but very much smaller than the main one, moved, parallel with the latter, on the old road which lay between our army and the circular one on which Jackson's main force was moving. With this smaller force, and with it only, our scouts and reconnoitering parties came in contact, and sharp fighting on both sides ensued. At 10 a.m. a rifled battery opened upon this body, threw it into confusion, and compelled it to abandon the road on which it was moving. At 1 p.m. General Birney, with his division, followed by another, of the divisions of Sickles's, corps which had been advanced between the 4th and 12th corps, charged the passing

column with such force that he captured and brought off 500 prisoners. At sunset Birney formed his division in hollow squares on this interior road, all supposing that the advance of any other forces of the enemy was effectively barred. While these minor conflicts were going on on this interior road, the Confederates were marching without the least molestation, or suspicion, on our part, of the main movement which was being made. Never was a great movement more skilfully planned, more wisely and perfectly worked, and more effectively executed, than was that under consideration. While our commander and his subordinates were aware that a flank movement in the direction of our right wing was being made, none had the remotest suspicion of its gigantic proportions, until the avalanch descended with crushing weight upon the 11th corps of our army. Early in the morning, as Hooker rode along in front of his right wing, he expressed an apprehension that it was too far extended, and not strongly posted. Generals Slocum and Howard, however, assured him that they were ready and adequate for any emergency. Still later, as he states, he cautioned General Howard to be on his guard against a flank attack.

Thus matters stood till about 6 p.m., when Stonewall Jackson fell with his corps, 25,000 strong, upon the exposed flank of that of Howard. At Shiloh, the Confederates, as they emerged from the forest and opened the attack, found the commands of General Sherman and others quietly cooking their breakfasts. At Chancellorsville, Jackson found portions of the first division which he struck, that of General Devens, as quietly and unsuspectingly, with their arms stacked, preparing their suppers, and all without any apprehensions whatever of approaching danger. In neither case were any pickets or reconnoitering parties out to guard against the possibility of a surprise. Such palpable and culpable negligence, however Generals may afterwards have redeemed their reputation, deserves the deep reprobation of the nation. This division was, of course, overwhelmed at once, its commander being wounded, and every one of its Generals and Colonels either killed or disabled, and one-third of its number slaughtered or captured. As the fugitives rushed over the ground occupied by the next

division, that of General Schurz, they found that that division had fled without waiting to form to shoot, or be shot at, at all. All attempts to rally proved abortive, and despite Howard's frantic efforts, on rushed the confused mass upon the third division which lay in their way, that of General Steinwehr. Here the semblance of an organization was maintained. The mass of the 11th corps, however, wildly rushed down the Chancellorsville Road, spreading everywhere a panic and threatening a stampede of our whole army.

The corps of General Sickles, originally located as a reserve behind Chancellorsville, and subsequently, as we have seen, far advanced between the 11th and 12th corps, was placed in a very critical position by the stampede of the 11th corps and the rapid pursuit of Jackson—the liability of being wholly cut off from our army. Birney, with his division, was too far away to be of present use, and Sickles's 3rd division was employed by General Hooker, and could not be withdrawn.

At this crisis General Pleasanton, with his cavalry, 500 men, and field artillery, appeared upon the scene, and threw himself directly in front of Jackson's advance. Picking up, as far as he was able, the guns and ammunition abandoned by Howard's corps, and adding these to his own, he formed a battery of twenty-one guns, all doubly and some trebly shotted with canister, and carefully pointed, so that every shot was likely to take effect; the open ground in front of this battery, the ground over which the Confederates must advance, being about 200 yards wide. This was a little before dusk. Perceiving that his guns could not be got into position and made ready before the Confederates would be upon them, and that nothing but a charge of cavalry could keep the enemy in check for the time needed, General Pleasanton turned to Colonel Keenan of the 8th Pennsylvania, and gave out this order: "You must charge into those woods with your regiment, and hold the Rebels" (25,000 strong) "until I can get some of these guns into position. You must do it at whatever cost." With a calm smile, the brave Colonel, well knowing what obedience would probably cost him and his equally brave associates,—with a calm smile, the old patriot replied, "I will," "and into the

jaws of death rode the five hundred." In ten minutes he was dead, and very many of his associates lay dead or bleeding around him. The time requisite for full preparation was gained, however, and the Confederates emerged in force from the woods. They appeared at first with a Union flag, and cried out, "Don't fire. We are your own men." On discovering, which they soon did, that they were known, they took down this colour, raising half a dozen or a dozen of their own flags, and poured fire upon our men. At this moment, on the word of command from General Pleasanton, our whole line of guns was simultaneously discharged. The turn had now come for the Confederates to bleed and to run. Their whole advance disappeared in an instant, the few that remained standing fleeing back into the woods. Three times Jackson's column advanced upon those guns, once approaching within fifty yards of them; and three times the masses of those who were pushed forward were mowed down by the annihilating fire to which they were subjected. At length, as darkness closed over the scene, the enemy, weary with being slaughtered, and that to no purpose but self-destruction, fled precipitately and in confusion. For a considerable distance they were pursued by our infantry, who, on coming upon forces far outnumbering their own, returned, bringing quite a number of prisoners with them.

It was directly under and within full range of this fearful fire of our artillery, the fire above described, that the brave General Jackson fell. When being borne off on a litter, one of the bearers was shot down, and the General fell heavily to the ground, receiving very severe injuries in addition to his previous wounds. The Confederates claimed that their General fell through an accidental fire of their own men. A Confederate officer, one of Jackson's staff, and who was near him when he fell, stated to General Pleasanton after the war, that there was no reasonable doubt that their General, as well as his litter bearer afterwards, received his mortal wounds through the fire of the Union guns. Be that as it may, the loss to the Confederates in this one man overbalanced all their gains through this celebrated movement. Through the prisoners above referred to, General Pleasanton was informed of the

fall of Jackson and other of his leading officers. Darkness now put an end to the conflict until the next morning. To General Pleasanton belongs the high honour of having, at the most critical moment of the conflict, stopped and driven back Jackson's advance, and inflicting such an irreparable loss upon the Confederate army and cause. Not long after this, General Sickles returned from his advance, and posted his corps behind General Pleasanton's battery, increasing the number of its guns to upwards of forty.

While this flank movement of Jackson had been in progress, General Lee had been drawing his main forces near to our front and left flank, filling the forests with sharp-shooters, and stationing his artillery upon elevations favourable for effective service in the conflict which was expected on the next day. At dawn the next morning, while heavy columns were pushed forward, and a teasing fire was opened along our whole front, no decisive attacks were made in these directions. General Lee was waiting for a decisive effect, through the attack on our right rear, just as General Hooker was waiting to hear the sound of Sedgwick's guns. No body of men ever made more strenuous efforts to accomplish the part assigned them than did the remainder of Jackson's corps on the morning of May 3rd, led as that corps now was by General J. E. B. Stuart, General A. P. Hill having been disabled soon after Jackson was, and that under the fire of Pleasanton's guns. Time and again did those veterans rush upon Pleasanton's battery, now, as we have said, increased to upwards of forty guns, all managed with the greatest determination and ability. Those columns, however, as often as they came within the sweep of those guns were shattered and broken to pieces, and scattered, with dreadful slaughter. Thus the carnage continued, regiment after regiment melting away, as they charged up to the muzzles of those guns, until, his ammunition beginning to fail, General Sickles sent to General Hooker for reinforcements. When Major Tremaine, who bore this message, arrived at head-quarters, he found that our army was without a commander, and returned without an answer, General Hooker lying senseless, and by his staff supposed to be dying, on account of a stunning shock which he had

received by means of a cannon ball striking a pillar against which he was leaning. Sending for help a second time, and receiving no response, the ammunition of his guns being now totally exhausted, General Sickles withdrew to his second line of defences. The Confederate forces had been so shattered and broken to pieces in their previous assaults, that a full half hour passed before they approached our forces in their new position. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Sickles affirmed, and that for the best of reasons, that had aid, as requested, even 10,000 of the 30,000 troops that stood idle near him, been sent to him, a signal victory would have been obtained. This aid General Couch, who ranked next to General Hooker, and who now had full command, refused or neglected to send, hesitating to assume the authority now actually in his hands, and which no one but himself could assume.

All the aid which General Sickles received was from two divisions of Couch's corps, those of Generals French and Hancock, who forced back the left of the attacking force, then threatening General Meade's front. Aside from this little help the whole that remained of Jackson's corps bore down upon Sickles. After sustaining the shock until his ammunition was almost wholly exhausted, and after, with five terrible bayonet charges, repelling the advances of the enemy and capturing eight flags, our General drew off his corps a second time. In this dreadful conflict, this single corps which "bore the burden and heat of the day" had two of its division commanders, Generals Berry and Whipple, killed, and one other General wounded, General Mott, of the New Jersey brigade, and lost in killed and wounded upwards of 4,000 out of 18,000 of its brave men. It lost, however, not a single gun, save one at daylight, and no prisoners; while it took several hundred, and not a few flags from the enemy. At length, General Couch, who failed in resolution and bravery to order needful help, help lying directly before him, to his associates who were being pressed by overwhelming forces, did evince the sublime courage to order a retreat of our main forces, one mile from Chancellorsville, back towards the Rappahannock.

At noon General Hooker was restored to consciousness, and reassumed the command of his army. At this time this memorable battle of Sunday was practically ended, and General Lee felt himself at liberty to turn his attention to Sedgwick, holding him in check for the remainder of the day, and on Monday, May 4th, assaulting him in force and, as we have seen, driving him headlong and at a fearful loss over the Rappahannock, at Bank's Ford. At evening General Hooker held a council of war with his corps commanders, with no decisive results. On the morrow, apprehending a flood which might carry off our pontoon bridges and occasion a total failure of provisions, our army was safely recrossed to the north banks of the river which, a few days before, it had passed over with such high hopes and assurances. In their return they brought back one more gun than they took with them, and inflicted upon the enemy an injury which they were less able to bear than we were to endure what we received. Our loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to the enormous sum of 17,197 men, just 83 more than one half of this number being lost by two corps, those of Sickles and Sedgwick. One of the most remarkable events connected with this battle is the fact that an army 70,000 strong stood by and saw a single corps of 18,000 men, bleeding at every pore, bearing up against overwhelming odds, and sustaining the main burden of the conflict; and all this without sending any needful aid, though often solicited to do so. How great was the numerical loss of the Confederates is not known. On the field at Chancellorsville, they must have suffered more than we did, they, for the most part, being the assailing party, and in their assaults the masses of their forces were pushed forward, as if for the purpose of being slaughtered.

Of the extent to which General Hooker is to be held responsible for the failure of this campaign, we are now able to approach a correct judgment. The error of sending off the mass of his cavalry at the commencement of the campaign, while it should be set down as a capital error, was an error equally common with the ablest Confederate and Union commanders, an error which peculiarized the conduct of this war, in almost all the armies on

both sides. The fact that General Hooker at the opening of the campaign fully out-generalled such a commander as General Lee, evinces the former as a strategist of no ordinary character. Had General Sickles been in General Sedgwick's place, there can be no reasonable doubt that the campaign of General Hooker would have been, throughout, a great and most decisive success, and the plan of the latter in dividing his forces as he did would be set down to his great credit in history. Nor can it be set down to his discredit that he misjudged Sedgwick, all that was known of this General marking him as trustworthy as far as energy and obedience to orders are concerned. Nor can he be held responsible for Howard's error. The misfortune which happened to our army in consequence of its being without a head for so many hours during the forenoon of May 3rd, cannot be charged as a fault in its commander, but must be set down as a great calamity incident to war everywhere. Nor, we remark finally, did he act unwisely, but prudently, in withdrawing his army to the north side of the Rappahannock, at the time and under the circumstances in which he ordered that movement. The rising flood threatened to carry off all the pontoon bridges in his rear, and to render fording and all other means of crossing impossible. He had not provisions to subsist his army four days longer in the place where he was, and could not have drawn the necessary supplies from the country around him. Every consideration of wisdom and prudence required him to act as he did, and to leave his reputation to posterity. One mistake he did make, and that was not complying with the advice of General Pleasanton to extend his right wing across that circular road, and thus prevent the possibility of Jackson's raid.

Three causes adequately account for the failure of this campaign, causes for neither of which can General Hooker be held responsible. The first and most important of all, and one which is fatal in any great movement, is Sedgwick's disobedience to orders and excessive dilatoriness. To say that he could not have got his corps in marching order in four hours, and have been ready to have started at three in the morning, is to evince blind-

ness to the most palpable facts of energetic warfare. Wellington's army was in motion in one hour after he heard of Buonaparte's advance. Such is the promptitude of action in war generally. Four hours is the utmost that can be asked for General Sedgwick. Had he started thus early, he would have encountered less obstacles in his advance than he did meet, and would not have found McLaws across his path on his arrival at Salem church. In other words, had he started as he might have done, he would, by 8 or 9 a.m., have fallen directly upon General Lee's rear, and insured his disastrous defeat. The second cause was the rout of the 11th corps by means of Jackson's raid. The character of General Howard as a soldier and a man we hold in deep esteem. That he brought a great calamity upon our army by permitting his corps to be taken by surprise, is undeniable. The last cause is the criminal failure, or refusal, of General Couch, at the critical moment when General Hooker was disabled, to assume command and order needful help to a corps which was contending against such fearful odds, and when the fate of the day obviously turned upon sending the help asked for. Either of these causes is, of itself, sufficient to account for the loss of a battle. All taken together, most fully account for the failure of a great campaign.

No historian with whom we are acquainted has explained the secret of the wonderful success of this celebrated raid of General Jackson. To give the reader a distinct understanding of the subject, we will now recur to it again. For the special information which we have received upon the subject, we are indebted to General Pleasanton. In the next movement of our army upon Richmond, General Lee of course understood that there would be an attempt to turn his position at Fredericksburg by a flank movement over the river, either above or below the city. Several miles above the city are three fords, at no great distance from each other. Over each and all of these an army can be readily passed when the water is not high, and at all times, excessive floods excepted, by means of pontoon bridges. At these points it was obvious that our army, should it cross above the city, would attempt at least a passage. All the roads from these fords unite at Chancel-

lorsville, as their common centre. Hence the Confederate commanders concluded that should our army cross at these fords it would be concentrated at this one point, and that almost of necessity. They accordingly surveyed with the greatest care all these grounds, calculated the probable location of the parts of our army, their facilities for offensive and defensive operations, and their exposures to successful assaults. It became manifest to those commanders that on the arrival of our army at Chancellorsville the main and almost exclusive attention of our commander and his associates would be fixed in the direction of Fredericksburg, the only point from which the remotest danger would be anticipated; that, as a consequence, our rear would be very likely to be left, for the first day or two at least, carelessly guarded; and that if our forces, our right wing especially, could be effectively assaulted in the front and rear at the same time, the most fatal results to the Union army would most probably arise. It became obvious that on the old road running westward, and south of Chancellorsville, from the point to which General Lee's first advance from Fredericksburg would be made, a contemplated flank movement could not be effected, that road lying too near our army. If, on the other hand, a new road should be prepared, a road circling round from the point referred to, to the west of the position where our army would be located, this great flank movement might be made, and our army might be kept in perfect ignorance of what was being done until the crushing avalanche should descend upon us. It was in view of such a contingency that this road was fully prepared long before our army crossed the Rappahannock. It was on this road that Jackson moved his columns, keeping, at the same time, small bodies moving on the old road referred to, and this as means, which proved effective, of diverting the attention of our Generals from his main movement. When these small forces were assaulted and driven off, and Birney's division was formed in hollow squares across this old road, all suspicion of any peril to our rear was wholly allayed. This was as General Jackson anticipated. Here we have the only apology or excuse for General Howard for the unguarded state in which all his outposts ~~we~~ ^{he} found when

Jackson's assault was made. The above facts render fully evident the great wisdom and foresight of the Confederate commanders, on the one hand, and as fully explain the secrets of Jackson's success in the movement under consideration, on the other.

Here we have fully evinced the fundamental error of our commanders in their attempted movements in single lines upon Richmond, in the directions taken by Generals Burnside, Hooker, and Grant. At every defensible point on the roads where their advances must have been made, they were certain to be confronted by the whole Confederate army located behind the most formidable fortifications, prepared long beforehand for such contingencies. When General Grant, for example, arrived at Spotsylvania, he found General Lee there with his army distributed behind impregnable earthworks prepared long before, and sodded for future preservation. So it was, as we shall see hereafter, at every point at which General Grant met General Lee, in the march of the former from Culpepper to Petersburg. Our commander literally led forth his great army as "sheep for the slaughter," to be "killed all the day long," and that for no available purpose. Had General Burnside, with an unavoidable sacrifice of much of his army, succeeded in driving the Confederates from Fredericksburg, he would, immediately after, have encountered General Lee at Spotsylvania, behind fortifications just as formidable as those which had been previously carried, and so on at every defensible point on our advance to Richmond; the certain result being, that before its arrival at the city named it would have melted away and become powerless for effective service, just as that of General Grant did in its wild and stupid and desperate march above referred to. The excuse for General Hooker is that by moving his army as he did to Chancellorsville he necessitated General Lee to fight a decisive battle in the open country, a battle in which a defeat of the Confederates would have insured their capture, or rendered them powerless for future resistance. We should also bear in mind that Richmond was always approachable from other directions, where no such obstacles existed.

CHAPTER XX.

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL.— GETTYSBURG.

IMMEDIATELY after the triumph of the Confederates at Chancellorsville, General Lee determined on a second invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland. The immediate considerations which determined him to adopt this bold measure were the mustering out of about 20,000 of our forces under General Hooker, in consequence of the expiration of their term of service, on the one hand, and the addition to his own army of about 25,000 men, in consequence of the return of General Longstreet's corps, on the other. The main consideration was the assurance which the Confederate authorities had unquestionably received, that should they advance into Pennsylvania and gain a signal victory over the Union army there, there would be an immediate uprising of the Copperhead element of the Northern States, the element so bitterly opposed to the war itself, and to the emancipation measures of the Government. To these considerations General Lee refers in his report, in which he gives his reasons for the measure under consideration. Having given the military considerations, he adds: "*In addition to these results, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success.*" Having perfected all preparations, the Confederate commander, June 3rd, put his army in motion; A. P. Hill, with his corps, being left behind, with instructions to make all possible demonstrations to mask the great movement which was being made with all possible expedition on and up the south side of the Rappahannock. Our commander, however, was soon made

aware that General Lee was moving in force to the west, and around our right. General Pleasanton, now in command of our cavalry, was sent with his cavalry and an infantry force to Catlett's Station, on the Alexandria railroad, to ascertain what was going on in that quarter. Passing his force over the Rappahannock, and moving in the direction of Culpepper Court House, he soon found himself confronted with the main army of General Lee. In a very severe engagement with General J. E. B. Stuart, in command of the Confederate cavalry, aided by a large force of infantry, a conflict occurred in which we lost about 500, and the Confederates, as they officially acknowledged, lost upwards of 600 men. Having fully accomplished the object of his bold and hazardous reconnoissance, General Pleasanton recrossed the Rappahannock, and reported the facts to General Hooker. Still our commander, yet in doubt about the real intent of his antagonist, remained stationary, leaving General Pleasanton to watch the foe, determine his movements, and hold terrible fights with his cavalry. On June 14th and 15th, however, events occurred which revealed the purpose of the enemy and the peril of the Union cause to the eyes, not only of our commander and the Government, but of the whole nation. At this time our army, 10,000 strong, under General Milroy, at Winchester, was suddenly assaulted by the Confederate army and driven headlong, with the loss of quite half its number, across the Potomac. Immediately after this, the Confederate army, from 70,000 to 90,000 strong, passed over from the sacred soil of Virginia on to the free soil of Pennsylvania. At this time, our Government taking the alarm, the President issued a call to the States of Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, and Ohio, for 120,000 militia to drive back, or to aid in driving back, the invaders; about 50,000 in all responding in time to have been effectively employed in the campaign. On June 18th General Hooker began to move his army northward, keeping between the enemy and Washington, which the former showed some disposition to attack. On the 26th he crossed the Potomac near Edward's Ferry, and moved to Frederick.

As soon as the fact of this invasion became known, I wrote a communication to Secretary, the late Chief Justice,

Chase, a communication containing the following statements: "Now is the golden opportunity for this nation. Not a debris of the invading army ought to be permitted to recross the Potomac. If our military authorities do not know what to do to insure that result, I will myself, if requested to do it, present a plan which will, with perfect certainty, secure this end, and thus, at one blow, close up this war. I will now, however, frankly tell you what will be done under the ruling of the military authorities at Washington. The thought of capturing General Lee's army will not be entertained at all. Nor will there be any concentration of the national forces; not even a man will be brought up from the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, or from any other point, for this or for any other purpose. On the other hand, General Hooker's army, just as it is, and 'be the same more or less,' will be sent round to head that of General Lee, and drive it back again over the Potomac, at the points where it crossed. General Lee will thus escape with all his plunder. In other words, our military authorities will do with the invading army what our farmers do when herds of unruly cattle break into their fields of grain, namely, head the intruders and drive them out at the places where they entered, and then send them forth to repeat the mischief as opportunities may present. This is just what and all that will be done in the presence of this golden opportunity." Such is the statement which we made in that communication. We shall see how the prediction contained therein was afterwards verified.

Every reflecting mind must perceive that as soon as General Lee's army crossed the Potomac, the heart and soul and all the vitality of the Confederacy lay, under the eye of the nation, in the State of Pennsylvania. Had this one army been annihilated or captured, the Confederacy must of necessity have collapsed in less than three months, as it did immediately after the surrender of Generals Lee and Johnston, two years subsequent to this. All the Confederate forces in the Carolinas and Virginia, a few excepted to do garrison duty, were with General Lee, on free soil; only a single brigade under General Wise having been left in Richmond for the protection of the capital of the Confederacy.

What was the amount of forces within calling distance, and fully available for the accomplishment of the results referred to? General Hooker's army, reduced as it had been from the causes designated, still numbered quite 90,000 men, the number that fought at Gettysburg. In the fortifications in and about Washington were quite 60,000 more, kept there to protect the capital in case our army was defeated in the expected battle with General Lee. A force 11,000 strong was then located at Maryland Heights. Quite 6,000 men were located in Baltimore. At Suffolk, as we have seen, were 14,000 men under General Peck, and another quite as large at Yorktown, and the White House above, in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe. Then from 5,000 to 10,000 more might have been brought up from the Carolinas, and sufficient forces have been left behind for garrison duty. It is perfectly undeniable that, at the least, 30,000 men might have been drawn from the Carolinas and the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, and brought up to Baltimore in full time to have taken an effective part in this campaign. If to these we add the 11,000 at Maryland Heights, and the amount which might have been furnished at Baltimore, we have a force of between 40,000 and 50,000 men, a force with which our army that fought at Gettysburg might have been reinforced at that point, and prior to the time when the battle there occurred. While the 50,000 militia were being called into the field, no sensible man will deny that at least 30,000 of the regular army might have been drawn from the Western Departments, brought to Harrisburg, and united with the Pennsylvania militia force, in time to have acted an essential part in a grand movement upon the army of General Lee. In a single week, General Pleasanton brought a considerable body of infantry, cavalry, and artillery from St. Joseph, Missouri, to Washington. We should stultify ourselves if we should question the fact that from an army of 1,000,000 men 30,000 could have been furnished by the Western Departments, and brought to Harrisburg in the time designated. Suppose now that while an army of 140,000 men had been concentrated under General Hooker, or Meade, in the vicinity of Gettysburg, and another 60,000 strong under another General had been

organized at Harrisburg, both armies ready at the right moment to be precipitated upon the enemy on our soil, 40,000 men had been sent from Washington up the Potomac, and had seized all the passes where General Lee could have recrossed that river back into Virginia. Surrounded by such a circle of fire as this, what would have become of his army? That army entire, we say, without fear of contradiction, would have been inevitably captured, and that without the loss of 10,000 men on both sides. Nothing in war can be more practicable than the combination of forces above indicated, and this was the identical plan we had distinctly in mind when we wrote to Secretary Chase. Such a plan, however, no plan of any kind for the capture of an army, whatever the facilities for that end might be, ever had a place in the mind of our Commander-in-Chief, or in that of any of his immediate advisers in our national capital. Hence, all things occurred in exact accordance with the predictions contained in the communication under consideration. By not a single regiment was our army under Hooker, and then under Meade, reinforced by men called in from any of the departments around, 2,100 from the middle department excepted. Not a man was moved out from Washington to impede the retreat of General Lee. Nor was any effective use made of the militia that were furnished. The entire burden, as we stated it would be, was, in fact, rolled upon the single army that fought at Chancellorsville, an army reduced to a little over 90,000 men. One thing was done. General Dix, commanding at Fortress Monroe, was directed to make a demonstration on Richmond. General Keyes accordingly sent about 5,000 men from the White House above Yorktown; more than that number, for what reason nobody can conjecture, being reserved and kept back. This force moved out a short distance, sent a body of cavalry to burn a railroad bridge over the South Anna, which was done, and then beat a hasty retreat. After this grand demonstration, "all was quiet" in the Peninsula and in the Confederate capital. It is absolutely undeniable that had General Peck with his corps, 14,000 strong, and all other available forces in the Peninsula, been brought up, Richmond, defended as it was but by a single brigade, might have been captured

and occupied by an Union army 25,000 or 30,000 strong on the day on which Vicksburg was surrendered or General Lee was defeated at Gettysburg. In this case, also, the destruction of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania would have been insured, all excuse being taken away for not employing our whole force at Washington for this end. "Blindness in full always happened" to our military authorities whenever such decisive opportunities presented themselves.

The Campaign.

We will now consider the campaign as actually conducted by the only army that was allowed to move against the invaders. On the 26th June, General Hooker, as we have stated, crossed the Potomac, and advanced to Frederick. On the march he visited Maryland Heights, and found General French there with an effective force of 11,000 men. He accordingly requested of General Halleck that this force should be placed at his (Hooker's) disposal. This request was, June 27th, half-past 10 a.m., positively refused; whereupon General Hooker requested to be relieved from his command. He was relieved accordingly, and, less than one week before the commencement of the great battle then pending, the command was transferred, June 28th, to Major-General G. Meade. What the historian will find himself utterly unable to account for, but for the basest of reasons, is the fact that the order transferring the command to General Meade placed him in full control of the 11,000 men who, less than twenty-four hours previous, had been, for reasons affirmed to be permanent and fundamental, denied to General Hooker. The refusal of this force to one and granting it to another, under the circumstances, the transference of command from a General whom the army knew, confided in, and desired to fight under, and who had a national reputation, to one of whom said army knew but little, and could not have had confidence in, and who was comparatively unknown to the nation, and all this when there was a daily expectation of a great battle on which the destiny of the nation depended so much, are "facts stranger than fiction."

On assuming command, General Meade committed two

fundamental errors, and would, as we shall see, have committed a third but for the most earnest remonstrance of General Pleasanton. Having withdrawn the 11,000 men under General French from Maryland Heights, he brought them up to Frederick, and "left," in the words of Mr. Greeley, "7,000 of them standing idle there, sending the residue as train guards to Washington, and actually apologised to General Halleck, on meeting him, for having moved them at all." Of the militia force furnished him, a force of which from 30,000 to 40,000 might have been made effective, he refused to make any use at all. As soon as he assumed command, he also issued an order to General Pleasanton to go off with the main body of his cavalry on a raiding expedition, just as Stoneman had been sent off by General Hooker. Against this order General Pleasanton most earnestly protested, and finally refused obedience to it, unless, what he had a right to require, he was furnished with written directions in respect to where he was to go, and what he was required to do. To these expostulations and reasonings General Meade finally yielded; and thus, as will appear, the defeat of our army was prevented, and its victory consequently secured at Gettysburg. Suppose, now, that the 11,000 men under General French, and 30,000 of the militia under General Couch, had been brought up, as all might have been, to the vital point, prior to the battle, a skilful commander would have made such use of them during the battle as to have secured a decisive victory without the fearful loss which our army did suffer on that occasion. Nor would our army, at the close of the battle, even in the judgment of General Meade, have been so exhausted as to have prevented its being precipitated upon the Confederates after their defeat, and insured their utter disorganization. But suppose that this force, upwards of 40,000 strong in all, had been held as a reserve, and not employed at all during the battle. At its close, and when our victory was insured, with this force, our cavalry, quite 12,000 strong, and our other reserves which had not been engaged, and such portions of the army as were not in a greatly exhausted condition, might have been united, and upwards of 60,000 men might have been precipitated upon General

Lee's exhausted and disordered columns, their ammunition also being nearly expended, and insured the capture or utter dispersion and demoralization of his army. As it was, when the victory was gained—and it was barely gained—our army was deemed to be in too exhausted a condition to reap the proper fruits of this advantage. So much for incapacity in war.

That we may understand the facts pertaining to the great national battle in respect to which we are about to speak, we need to recur here to the use which General Pleasanton did make of his cavalry. Having, at Frederick, perfected the organization of his command, and appointed over his brigades and divisions such Generals as he could depend upon, he first of all enquired the whereabouts of General Stuart and his cavalry, and promptly determined on movements which would defeat the plans of his skilful antagonist. After General Lee had entered Pennsylvania, he, very unwisely, as he afterwards admitted, detached General Stuart with the mass of the Confederate cavalry on a raiding expedition. Stuart passed between our army and Washington, and having collected an immense amount of plunder, and captured a large number of negroes, was moving with his long train of waggons, etc., around east of our army, with the intent of joining General Lee at or near Gettysburg. General Pleasanton, anticipating this plan, and for the specific purpose of defeating it, sent Generals Custer and Kilpatrick with a large body of cavalry, directly east or nearly so, from Frederick to Hanover, Pennsylvania; this latter place being on the line of Stuart's detour. General Kilpatrick, who was in advance, entered Hanover before General Stuart did, and was assaulted there; General Farnsworth's brigade losing 100 men. When General Custer came up, however, Stuart was driven off, losing about 100 of his waggons and much of his plunder. This rebuff necessitated the Confederate leader to move still farther east, and make a far wider detour than he had intended, a detour round near Harrisburg and by Carlisle. On this account Stuart did not join General Lee until the three days' fight was too far advanced for the former to be of much use to the latter in the battle. By this one movement of General Pleasanton, General Lee was, in fact,

deprived of the essential aid of the main portion of his cavalry in that battle, while ours was there, and did, as we shall see, most essential service in it. Mr. Greeley tells us that our cavalry were "considerably astonished" at meeting General Stuart at Hanover. We have the highest authority for affirming that Generals Custer and Kilpatrick were sent to that point for no other purpose than encountering General Stuart as they did there.

Nor was this all that was done by our cavalry. Another body moved out, and struck and repulsed another column at Littlestown. Another division moved directly to Gettysburg, and there held back, as we shall see, the advance of the enemy to occupy the place until our advance came up, and prevented that catastrophe. In all these movements, which were most wisely ordered, and efficiently executed, our entire cavalry force was constantly kept within calling distance of the main army, and were, hence, present, and did, as we will show, fundamental service in the great battle.

While General Hooker remained in command, he manœuvred in the direction and with the intent of taking General Lee's communications, and thus compelling him to fight at a disadvantage, and on a field which our commander should select. This was, unquestionably, the plan demanded by the highest wisdom. As soon as General Meade assumed command he changed the plan of his predecessor, moving several of his corps to the north-east, with the intent to head off General Lee, and driving him back to Virginia, on the one hand, and, on the other, of fighting the expected battle on the line of Pipe Creek, about fifteen miles south-east of Gettysburg. Unexpected events, however, brought on the encounter earlier than was anticipated, and rendered the latter place the scene of one of the greatest and most bloody battles of the whole war.

General Lee, having for some time traversed south-eastern Pennsylvania, was advancing eastward, July 1st, with the intent, as some supposed, of crossing the Susquehanna river and capturing Philadelphia. As he was approaching Gettysburg, a rural village in Adams county, his advance, under General Heth of General Hill's corps, encountered and was driven back on its division by

a body of General Pleasanton's cavalry, under the command of General Buford. On approaching the main body of the advanced Confederate forces, nearly 30,000 strong, our cavalry was, of course, in its turn, driven back. General Buford, being aware that General Reynolds, with the 1st and 11th corps, 22,000 strong, was rapidly approaching, made in his retreat, at every favourable point, masterly dispositions of his small force for the purpose of delaying the advance of the enemy. At every such point he would station his artillery and deploy his cavalry, dismounted, behind stone walls, and other defences which the country afforded, and as the enemy approached, would open upon them a vigorous fire. This would induce the Confederate General to stop and deploy his forces in battle array. As soon as the attack was commenced, General Buford would retreat to another like position, where a similar scene would be enacted. Thus was the Confederate advance retarded for quite four hours, until General Reynolds with his command arrived, and opened the conflict in good earnest. As General Wadsworth, who led our advance, was deploying his division, 4,000 strong, General Reynolds, who went forward alone to reconnoitre, fell and died in a few moments, having been shot in the neck by a sharp-shooter. Half-an-hour after the death of General Reynolds, General Doubleday, arriving with another division of the 1st corps, assumed command. The Confederates now advanced in force, driving back Wadsworth, who, by suddenly whirling his right around the pursuers, brought off General Archer and 800 prisoners. Doubleday fell back to Seminary Ridge, a range of hills lying west and north-west of Gettysburg, and here made a determined stand. Here he was joined soon after by the residue of the 1st and the whole of the 11th corps under General Howard, who assumed command, placing his own corps under General Schurz. In the fight which now ensued, Doubleday with the 1st corps occupied the ridge referred to; two divisions of the 11th being placed on an elevated position to the right of Doubleday, and the third, General Steinwehr's, as a reserve in Gettysburg. In the early part of the fight, our forces, having the advantage of position, had matters almost altogether their own way, there being

also but one corps of the Confederates, that of General Hill, on the field. At length General Ewell arrived with his corps, and with overwhelming forces assailed our right, the Confederates on the field now outnumbering us more than two to one. Howard's advanced divisions, not in this instance to their dishonour, but by mere force of numbers, were a second time overwhelmed, and driven back in confusion by Jackson's veterans, now under Ewell. By the rout of the 11th corps, the 1st, which had thus far stood firm against immense odds, was obliged to fall back also. In their retreat to Gettysburg the two bodies became intermingled, and, under a heavy fire from the enemy, rushed tumultuously through the village, leaving their wounded and many prisoners in the hands of the enemy. The retreat of our forces was covered by General Buford with his cavalry, he everywhere showing so bold a front that the enemy, though they had still two hours of daylight, did not pursue their advantage beyond the village. On Cemetery Hill, just south of the village, and at the apex of our position in the great battle two days after, General Howard halted, and reformed his broken columns; General Sickles, with the 3rd corps, having just at this time arrived by a forced march from Emmitsburg, and taken a strong position on Howard's left. The conduct of General Sickles entitles him to a perpetual and grateful remembrance on the part of his country. He, in common with the other corps commanders, had received orders when at Emmitsburg, to move to the line of Pipe Creek, and was preparing to move his corps in the required direction. At 2 p.m., when on the eve of moving in the opposite direction, he received a despatch from General Howard saying that the 1st and 11th corps were at Gettysburg, and there in danger of being overwhelmed by superior forces. Meade was ten miles away, and to wait for counter orders from him would expose two corps of our army to almost certain destruction. Without hesitation our brave General promptly moved his corps for the point of danger, and arrived in time to prevent the catastrophe that was feared. Our loss on this day, in killed, wounded, and missing, was indeed fearful. Of the 4,000 whom General Wadsworth led into the field in the morning,

he brought but about 1,600 back. Other divisions suffered very severely, but not so badly as this. On this day, the 11th corps and its brave commander fully regained the credit which they had lost at Chancellorsville.

During the afternoon of this day, and the night following, all our army, Sedgwick's corps, which was quite thirty miles away, excepted, was concentrated at Gettysburg, the corps referred to arriving by a forced march at 2 p.m. July 2nd. That the reader may form some apprehensions of the character of the successive conflicts which occurred on July 2nd and 3rd, the following description of the field may be deemed expedient. Gettysburg, as has been stated, lies on the northern slope of a hill, which rises just south of the village to an apex called Cemetery Hill. From this point branches off two ridges, one to the east, and the other to the south-east; the latter, which is much the longer, from two to three miles in extent, terminating in a rise called Round Top, and the former in one called Culp Hill. Through a valley to the east of the village and the ridges referred to, runs a stream called Rock Creek. Beyond this creek, to the south-east of the village, and north-east of Culp Hill, is a ridge called Senner's Hill, a ridge running parallel with the creek. Still farther south is another rise named Wolf Hill. North of the village is a rise called College Hill. Through a valley west of the village and Cemetery Hill, a valley which finally winds around between the village and College Hill, flows Stevens's Run, which enters Rock Creek to the north-east of the village. West of the valley through which Stevens's Run flows rises Seminary Ridge, which commences at the north-west of the village and terminates some distance to the north-west of Round Top. Near Cemetery Hill branches off another ridge running more to the west of south, and uniting with Seminary Ridge. Between the ridge last described and Cemetery Hill and Round Top is a valley through which passes the Emmittsburg road and a small stream called Plum Run, flowing to the south. About six miles south, on the Baltimore railroad, was the general depôt of our army. The following was the disposition of our army, as perfected July 2nd and 3rd. Howard occupied Cemetery Hill.

On his right was General Slocum with the 12th corps, occupying Culp Hill, with one division east of Duck Creek, and south of Wolf Hill. On Howard's left the other corps were distributed in order, General Sickles occupying the centre, and General Sedgwick Round Top on our extreme left. General Hancock commanded on General Howard's immediate left, General Sickles next, and General Sedgwick last. The cavalry corps under General Pleasanton was divided into three divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Custer, Kilpatrick, and Buford. After the close of the first day, General Pleasanton withdrew Buford's division and placed it as a guard at the depôt referred to, and brought his two fresh divisions to the field. It being well known that one essential part of General Lee's plan was to flank our army on its right or left, and seize our depôt of supplies, and that the valley and roads east of Senner's and Wolf Hills were most favourable to such a movement, General Pleasanton located Custer's and a portion of Kilpatrick's divisions in this most exposed position; while the latter with the remainder of his division was placed on our left, in the valley between the Emmitsburg road and Plum Run.

The Confederate line was thus constituted. Their right, consisting of Hill's and Longstreet's corps, occupied Seminary Ridge; the former on the extreme right, and the latter in the more central position. A portion of Hill's corps extended across Emmitsburg road. Ewell, on the left, stood opposed to Slocum, while several divisions were stationed in Gettysburg, directly opposite to Howard.

A careful survey of the field occupied by these two armies will convince any reflecting mind that ground better adapted to fight a successful battle could hardly have been selected than is that occupied by our army on this occasion. Nor can we well conceive a better disposition of forces than was that made by General Meade on this field. The position itself, and the arrangement of the forces, afforded the greatest facilities for the best possible use of the reserves, for perfect unity of action of all the parts of the army, and the ready transference of adequate forces to any point where our line might be too hardly pressed. In case of defeat, however, it was one of the

worst positions conceivable, a position on which a defeated army could hardly avoid being pressed into a mingled mass, and becoming utterly demoralized. The Confederate position, on the other hand, while far less favourable than ours for fighting a successful battle, was far more favourable for a successful retreat in case of defeat.

In the early part of July 2nd, Sickles advanced his command from the ridge on which it, in common with those of Hancock and Sedgwick, had been located, to the interior ridge above described. This advance was made without orders, and was censured by General Meade when he came upon the ground. There was no remedying the mistake, however, because the battle had already been opened by the fire of General Lee's batteries, hardly half a mile distant, on Seminary Ridge, and the advance of Longstreet's columns, which assailed ours under Sickles in front and on both flanks, the enemy making desperate efforts also to reach and occupy Round Top. The result was, of course, to our no small disadvantage. Sickles's corps was driven back in confusion to the place it at first occupied, and Round Top was saved but by the most desperate fighting. At length Hancock closed in from Sickles's right, and parts of the 1st, 6th, and 12th corps assailed the enemy in front. These combined assaults were successful, the Confederates in their turn being driven back with great slaughter. On the withdrawal of a division from Slocum, the remainder of his corps was assailed by Ewell with superior forces, and some portion of his rifle-pits were taken. The right of Howard was also assaulted, and the right face of Cemetery Hill was occupied by the enemy. No decisive advantage, however, was gained by the Confederates in this part of the field. General Custer also had very severe fighting in his position to the east of Duck Creek, the enemy attempting by a flank movement to get possession of our supplies. Here the Confederates were at length driven back with such loss that they ceased from all further attempts in this direction.

At the close of this day, July 2nd, our army stood, in order of battle, in the exact positions originally intended by General Meade. On the part of the Confederates, Longstreet occupied the ridge from which Sickles had been

driven, and Ewell was in advance of the position he occupied in the morning, considerably nearer our right. Thus far, the advantage was, as all admit, on the side of the Confederates, our losses having been much greater than theirs. Still, the advantage of position, and the greater facility for unity of action, and, as the facts of this day demonstrated, the ready employment of the different parts of the army for the support and relief of each other when any one part was too hardly pressed, was most obviously on our side, and far more than over-balanced the advantages gained by the enemy. Being fully satisfied that all danger of an attempted flank movement on our right, and east of Duck Creek, was passed, General Pleasanton on the evening of this day moved the main portion of Custer's command over to our left, and thus greatly reinforced Kilpatrick, where the principal peril in the great battle to be fought the next day obviously lay. The collection of so large a force on his right, a force the character of which General Lee could not, in the wooded state of the country there, distinguish, and the bold demonstrations which this large body made, with its artillery especially, induced him to infer that General Meade had massed a very large force there for the purpose of a great and decisive flank movement round the right wing of the Confederate army. To prevent such a catastrophe, General Lee, as he stated in his report of the battle, kept in reserve and held back from the main conflict a large reserve force, a force believed to be about 10,000 strong. The keeping back of this reserve relieved our weakened line from a pressure which would, very probably, have been too strong for it. Thus it becomes undeniably evident that one of the chief causes of our final victory at Gettysburg was the action of our cavalry there, during each of the three days in which the battle continued. During the battle this day General Sickles had a leg shattered by a cannon ball, and was thus disabled for further service in this campaign. It has been asserted by some, that the real object of General Sickles in the unfortunate advance which occasioned the conflict and our reverses on this day was to prevent the retreat of our army from, and to ensure the final battle on, this field; the retreat which was undeniably contemplated, if not determined on,

by General Meade. Whatever the facts of the case may be, that advance did necessitate the fighting of the final battle on this field, it being obviously too late for a retreat, after the conflict on this day had commenced. In his report, General Lee thus speaks of the results of this day's battle:—"After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground" (the ground to which Sickles advanced, and from which he was driven). "Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed; and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark. These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day."

On the next day, July 3rd, Slocum, having received back his division from our left, opened the battle by a forward movement to recover his lost rifle-pits. After a sharp conflict, this end was attained, and our line on this part of the field was restored to its original position. In the early part of the day General Lee reinforced Longstreet with one division from Ewell, three brigades under Pickett, who on the day before arrived from Chambersburg, and two others from Hill's corps. Thus the day wore on, each commander being busily employed in stationing his batteries and organizing his infantry for the final issue.

At 1 p.m. 115 guns from Hill's and Longstreet's front, and as many more from the batteries on Seminary Heights, Senner's Hill, and other localities, opened upon our position, the centre of which was Cemetery Hill. Our guns were fewer in number than those of the enemy, but replied with terrible effect upon their exposed positions. For about two hours this dreadful fire continued. At length the firing on our part nearly ceased, orders having been given to cease firing and cool the guns. During this period our infantry concealed themselves as best they could behind projections and in the hollows, awaiting there the expected advance of the columns of the Confederates. Nor did they wait long, after the fire of our guns had ceased. From behind their batteries, their lines, from two to three miles in length, emerged into view, and moved, directly, fearlessly, and confidently, upon the bat-

teries and seried the ranks in their front; their right extending near to Round Top, and their left to Cemetery Hill. As these ranks, mostly in three lines, passed the Confederate batteries, and were well in the fight, their guns ceased firing, while quite fifty of ours ploughed through those columns with a terrible fire of shell, grape, and canister. As General Pickett with his division leading the columns of the enemy, the large division of Pettigrew on his left, reached the Emmitsburg Road, they encountered a heavy fire from a line of our skirmishers stationed behind a stone wall. This impediment was soon overcome, but not without great loss, our men holding their ground with great tenacity, retreating slowly, and keeping up a deadly fire upon the advancing foe. When the enemy reached the Emmitsburg Road, they opened a withering fire upon our forces, those of Hancock especially, in their front. Soon our guns were silenced, and on moved Pickett's splendid division, with the best of Hill's corps in support, upon our infantry. Hancock having been wounded, Gibbon commanded now in this part of the field. The brave Gibbon walked along our line, requiring his men to reserve their fire until the Confederates, three lines deep, should approach within point-blank range. "At last," to adopt the language of one of our most distinguished correspondents, Agate, as cited by Mr. Greeley, "the order came. From thrice three thousand guns, there came a sheet of smoky flame, a crash, a rush of molten death. The line literally melted away; but there came the second, resistless still. It had been our supreme effort—on the instant, we were not equal to another. Up to the rifle-pits, across them, over the barricades—the momentum of their charge, the mere machine strength of their combined action—swept them on. Our thin line could fight, but it had not weight enough to oppose to this momentum. It was pushed behind the guns. Right on came the Rebels. They were upon the guns—were bayoneting the gunners—were waving their flags above our pieces. But they had penetrated to the fatal point. A storm of grape and canister tore its way from man to man, and marked its track with corpses straight down their line! They had exposed themselves to the enfilading guns on the

western slope of Cemetery Hill: that exposure sealed their fate.

"Pettigrew's large division, on the left, was the first to recoil under this dreadful fire. In a short time the whole body broke, and fled in confusion in the direction of the rear of that of Pickett. Strong bodies of our infantry in rapid pursuit begin to close round the ranks of the enemy, who are holding possession of our batteries. Their whole lines consequently retire, with ours in pursuit. A whole regiment of infantry at once laid down its arms, and passed within our lines; all along our front,—smaller bodies surrendered in a similar manner. "Webb's brigade," said Agate, "took 800; taken in as little time as it takes to write the simple sentence that tells it. Gibbon's old division took fifteen stand of colours." With this decisive repulse the battle was over, as no hope remained to the Confederates of reaping victory by anything that could have been done on any other part of the field. As a matter of fact, General Lee had deliberately staked the issue of the day upon this one movement, and, to render its success certain, had drawn so heavily upon all other of his army corps as to render them powerless for decisive action.

After this repulse of General Lee's main forces, almost all fighting ceased at once, our army resting upon their arms, and the Confederates falling back and preparing for their final retreat. From Round Top a single brigade, under General Candless, did advance for one mile over the ground which had been occupied by General Hill, drove off an unsupported battery, captured 260 prisoners, and recovered all our wounded, who, up to that time, since Sickles's repulse, had lain upon the field uncared for. This slight advance made manifest the fact that this wing was left almost totally defenceless, the main portion of Hill's corps having been withdrawn to support the main attack. The remainder of this day, and all the night, General Lee lay undisturbed in the presence of our army, and then, as morning dawned, moved off, "a sadder and a wiser man," in the direction of "the sacred soil," from which he had made such an imposing advance. Our army, with the exception of sending at length a portion

of cavalry in pursuit of the retreating foe, remained four or five days stationary upon the bloody field which it had so bravely and so dearly won.

In this battle of three days our loss, as officially reported by General Meade, amounted to 23,186 killed, wounded, and missing; the latter being 6,643, who were mostly lost on the first day of the conflict. He reports also three guns, forty-one flags, and 13,621 prisoners, a majority of them wounded, captured from the enemy. If we suppose the Confederate loss in killed and wounded to be equal to ours, which is a very safe reckoning, then their loss amounted to quite 23,000 men. This invasion undeniably cost the Confederates little if any less than one-third of all the forces which they had in Virginia and the Carolinas; and, with the loss of quite 40,000 men at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, rendered the final collapse of the Rebellion only a question of time.

As we have intimated, the plan of the battle on the part of our commander was faultless, the nature of the ground occupied by our army almost necessitating such a plan. The plan of the Confederate commander, we are constrained to say, was fundamentally defective, and insured his defeat. The issue of the conflict was, by him, staked upon the results of a single attack made by infantry moving upon a line of from two to three miles in extent; infantry who, in their advance, were first subject to the direct fire of all our batteries in front of their extended line, had then to receive the deliberate fire of our whole line of infantry, and finally, when they had forced their way into our line, were subject, in addition to the continual fire of our infantry, to be swept off by the enfilading fire of batteries most favourably located for such purposes. Under such circumstances, a line of battle of the extent of that under consideration could not fail to be broken somewhere; while such a catastrophe would ensure the defeat of the whole attack, and the consequent loss of the battle. In no battles under the conduct of great commanders of other nations can we find any precedents to justify the plan of attack adopted by General Lee on this occasion.

Great commanders are not more distinguished for

winning battles than for improving victories when gained. Tried by this last test, our commander undeniably ranks quite low in the scale of generalship. What was the state of the two armies at the crisis when the defeat of the Confederate line became manifest, to wit, at 5 p.m. on this memorable day? It must be borne in mind that none of our soldiery, artillerists excepted, were in a wearied condition, none of our infantry having been engaged much, if any, over two hours. While no part of our line had been broken at all, the entire left of that of the Confederates was utterly routed and disordered. On our left were two corps, the 5th and 6th, the latter of which had hardly fired a gun during the day, while the former had done very little fighting at all; and these corps were not confronted by any force which would in the least have retarded their advance. The validity of these statements is fully verified by the fact that, as we have stated, a single brigade under General McCandless passed, as ordered, along the entire front of these corps, and was confronted by no forces which seriously impeded its advance. The mass of General Lee's retreating army was in the immediate front of our centre, with their wings thus open and exposed. Suppose now that, while our centre had been precipitated upon the retreating foe, our right and left had been as promptly closed up around the exposed wings of the enemy's line; our cavalry in the meantime, after the example of Wellington at Waterloo, being thrown between the defeated mass and the reserves behind. Not a shadow of doubt can for a moment rest upon the results of such a combination of our forces. The main body of Lee's army must inevitably have been rolled up into a mingled mass, and utterly demoralized, if not captured; the capture of the largest portion being certain. What remained would have been pushed off into the country, away from their only lines of retreat—pushed off into the country, destitute of provisions, where their final capture would be only a question of time. Another equally inevitable result would have been the capture of the main portion of Lee's guns, then located on the inner ridge from which the infantry advance was made. Finally, by a proper use of the army on the field, of the militia at

command, of our forces at Frederick, Washington, and in the Peninsula and elsewhere, all the remainder of the Confederate army might have been captured, and the war in fact ended, before that army could have marched 150 miles from that battle-field. It was in view of such results—results so palpably manifest—that General Pleasanton, standing by the side of General Meade at Round Top, at the time when the defeat of the enemy became manifest, urged our commander to precipitate at once his whole army upon the retreating foe, saying to him at the same time,—“Now is your time, General Meade, not only to gain the greatest victory of the war, but to assure for yourself a place in history among the great Generals of the age.” “The Lord, however, kept back our General from honour.” Feeble commanders are always paralyzed by the spectacle of victory, and as a consequence never improve the advantage gained.

What was done by the commander of our victorious army, after his victory was insured, reminds us of the utterance of a celebrated prize-fighter, as he, yet in the full vigour of his strength, saw his bleeding and fainting antagonist reeling up to the scratch. Turning to the seconds of the poor creature, the strong man exclaimed: “Take your man away, I don’t want to maul him any more.” So our commander practically said to General Lee: “Do take your fainting, bleeding army off from this field. ‘Must the sword devour for ever? Will it not be bitter in the latter end?’ ‘All my mother comes into my eyes, and gives me up to tears,’ at the thought of inflicting upon your weakened and discomfited forces another blow.” In the same spirit, and that by word of command, was the entire pursuit of the retreating army conducted, as far as our infantry were concerned. Never did soldiery act more bravely than did ours during that battle of three days’ continuance, and never were soldiery more eager to be permitted to render their victory a crushing defeat, than were ours when their final success became manifest. Masses of troops rushed up to the commander of our central corps, and begged the privilege of being permitted to pursue the retreating foe. By absolute word of command, however, our brave army was held back, and

the enemy was permitted a quiet retirement to their cantonments, there to determine, at their leisure, upon a subsequent renewal of the conflict, or a final retreat.

During the entire day after the battle, our army remained in position, General Meade wishing to know with certainty whether the enemy intended to retreat or not. This he did, notwithstanding he was absolutely assured, at 8 a.m., and at later periods, by cavalry reconnoissances which General Pleasanton sent out, that, on all the roads leading from the battle field, the enemy was in full retreat, destitute of ammunition, and in a very demoralized condition. General Gregg, for example, made such report, at the time designated, after he had moved out from our right twenty-two miles on the Chambersburg road. He found the road, as he reported, strewn with wounded men, stragglers, ambulances and caissons, and had captured a large number of prisoners. General Birney, who had succeeded General Sickles in command of the 3rd corps, thus reports:—"I was ordered to send out a reconnoissance at daybreak (on the 4th) to ascertain the position of the enemy. I did so early on Sunday morning, and reported that the enemy was in full retreat. I also sent back for permission to open upon the enemy with my rifled batteries as they were crossing a point very near me, upon the turnpike going towards Hagerstown; and the staff officer brought me permission to do so. I had commenced the movement to attack, when another staff officer arrived from General Meade, with a written order from him to make no attack, which was done. My skirmishers advanced and took possession of their hospitals, with a large number of their wounded. I had sent some twenty orderlies with a staff officer, who led the reconnoissance; and I reported these facts constantly to General Meade; but this peremptory order from him not to open fire at all prevented any pursuit of the enemy." On the morning of the 5th, when the retreat of the Confederates could no longer be doubted, General Pleasanton, with his cavalry, was sent on one road, and General Sedgwick, with the 6th corps, on another, in pursuit of the enemy. The cavalry of course, under such a commander as Pleasanton, acted with full vigour, harassing the enemy on their

rear and flank, capturing many prisoners, and many waggons, and everywhere finding demonstrative evidence of two fundamental facts—the demoralized condition of General Lee's army, and the exhaustion of its ammunition; facts which, in due order, were reported to General Meade.

The following statement of General A. P. Howe, who commanded a division under General Sedgwick—a statement made before the Committee on the Conduct of the War—will fully indicate the manner of the pursuit under the commander of the 6th corps. “On the 4th of July, it seemed evident enough that the enemy was retreating. How far they were gone we could not see from the front: we could see but a comparatively small force from the position where I was. On Sunday, the 5th and 6th corps moved in pursuit. As we moved, a small rear-guard of the enemy retreated. We followed them, with this small rear-guard of the enemy before us, up to Fairfield, in a gorge of the mountains. Here we again waited for them to go on. There seemed to be no disposition to push this rear-guard when we got to Fairfield. A lieutenant from the enemy came into our lines and gave himself up. He was a Northern Union man, in service in one of the Georgia regiments. Without being asked, he unhesitatingly informed me, when I met him as he was being brought in, that he belonged to the artillery of the rear-guard of the enemy, and that they had but two rounds of ammunition with the rear-guard. But we waited there without receiving any orders to attack. It was a place where, as I informed General Sedgwick, we could easily attack the enemy with advantage. But no movement was made by us until the enemy was away. Here one brigade of my division, with some cavalry, was sent to follow on after them, while the remainder of the 6th corps moved to the left. We moved on through Boonsboro', and passed up on the pike road leading to Hagerstown. After passing Boonsboro', it became my turn to lead the 6th corps. That day, just before we started, General Sedgwick ordered me to move on and take up the best position I could over a little stream on the Frederick side of Funks-town. As I moved on, it was suggested to me by him to

move carefully. 'Don't come in contact with the enemy; we don't want to bring on a general engagement.' It seemed to be the current impression that it was not desired to bring on a general engagement." In this manner the whole pursuit was conducted. One crowning wish evidently held full possession of the mind of our General in command and of his subordinates, as far as they sympathised with him, namely, to get the invaders as quietly as possible back upon the "sacred soil of Virginia."

After he had sent a small portion of his army in pursuit of the retreating foe, General Meade remained some two or three days longer where he was, employing his time in burying our dead, caring for the wounded, and refurnishing his forces for the campaign before them. We need not detail the movements of the two armies up to July 12th, when they were brought again face to face, at Williamsport on the Potomac. To this point, General Lee had conducted his discomfited army, and was detained there four days before our army, in its varied wanderings, through miscalculation, and want of energy in its commander, arrived, and compelled the enemy to face about to the north once more. The cause of the delay referred to was twofold. In the first place, General French, who had been left behind with his corps at Frederick, had, without orders, sent a body of cavalry to Falling Waters and Williamsport, and had thus, after capturing the weak guard which General Lee had left at those points, destroyed the bridges over which he had passed his army on his advance into Pennsylvania, all his means of recrossing the river being thus cut off. Then, the excessive rains which had fallen had so swollen the river as to render fording, or restoring the bridges, until after this delay, impossible. When our army, reinforced by General French's corps and a large body of militia, arrived at last in front of that of General Lee, he was found in a position which, in expectation of being able to cross the river before the arrival of General Meade, the Confederate commander had neglected to fortify in any important particulars, and where a defeat would have absolutely insured the capture of the entire invading army. Another important fact, in respect to the condition of the Confederate army, had become more

and more evident, that it was so short of ammunition as to be utterly unable to fight another important battle. From long and careful observations, General Pleasanton affirms that he had become able, as he listened to the early fire of the enemy, to judge unerringly whether they were well supplied with or short of ammunition, and that all the firing from the Confederates which he heard during their retreat, and especially as he approached their position on the Potomac, rendered it perfectly evident to his mind that their ammunition was short, and that, after fighting a short time, they would be compelled to surrender. The most important of all considerations were these: while defeat on the part of the Confederates rendered their entire surrender an absolute necessity, a safe retreat was open to our army, should our attack fail of success. Nothing but chicken-heartedness, and blindness to the most palpable and weighty facts, would deter a commander from fighting a battle under such circumstances.

Having, at the close of July 12th, got his army into position, General Meade called together his corps commanders, and to them submitted the question whether the final battle of the war should then and there be fought, or not. After a full discussion of the reasons for and against the measure, three—Generals Howard, Pleasanton, and Wadsworth, successor of General Reynolds—voted for, and five—Generals Sedgwick, Slocum, Sykes, French, and Hays, in place of General Hancock, wounded at Gettysburg—voted against fighting a battle. General Meade, after hearing all parties, agreed in judgment with the minority, but deferred to that of the majority, and our great army stood sublimely and bravely still, and permitted General Lee, at his leisure, and without molestation, to finish his bridges, and pass his army over the river, leaving, as he states, two stalled guns, some broken-down waggons, and some few weary stragglers to the keeping of the standstillers. On our side, it is affirmed, thanks to our cavalry, whose brave commanders everywhere permitted and required their brave men to do their duty, General Kilpatrick, on our left, having learned at 3 a.m. that the pickets in his front were retiring, gave chase, and after severe fighting captured upwards of

1,500 prisoners. In this fight Major Webber lost his life while leading the 6th Michigan in a desperate and open charge over the enemy's earthworks.

Thus ended this memorable invasion. That General Lee was permitted, with such a force as he commanded, and in the presence of forces which might as well as not have been brought against him,—forces outnumbering his as two to one,—that he should have been permitted to advance to such an immense distance from his own centre and into our territory, to suffer such a defeat as he did, and then to return unmolested to the point from which he started, losing, in all the campaign and its battles, but three guns, two of these voluntarily relinquished as stalled ones, and so few of his trains, is a mystery which nothing but the most unaccountable imbecility and irresolution and inertion in our military authorities in Washington, and in our commander in the field, can account for. No battle ever did more honour to the soldiery in both armies than did that of Gettysburg. No campaign stands more to the dishonour of the military authorities who planned and executed it, than does that of which this famous battle constituted a part.

The victory at Gettysburg, and the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, following one another in such quick succession, of course electrified the entire Northern States, and changed the deep general despondency into universal "assurance of hope." The writer of this treatise is, very probably, about the only individual in the United States who ardently desired the triumph, and early triumph, of the Union cause, who did not share in the general joy. No individual rejoiced more than we did in the advantages gained. We were saddened in view of coming events which we clearly foresaw, and others did not apprehend, namely, the real suspension of hostilities until the opening of the campaigns in the spring of the next year. We understood the character of our ruling military authorities, and knew well, and so affirmed to all around us, and so wrote, as we have stated, for the *New York Times*, that these imposing victories would so completely paralyze the minds of these authorities that our vast armies would be left to rest in demoralizing idleness for

nearly a year to come; when, by a proper and prompt use of these forces, the war might be brought to a close in a very few months, and that with a far less loss of life than would be occasioned by disease while our armies were doing nothing. The detail of subsequent events will absolutely verify our worst apprehensions.

On the 18th of July, General Meade crossed the Potomac at Berlin, and passing down the east side of the Blue Ridge, arrived on the 25th of the same month at Warrenton. From this time and onward, the remainder of summer and all the autumn ensuing were spent in marches and countermarches, in which Meade would advance, and then run as soon as Lee would look our brave commander in the face. At last, the two armies went into winter quarters; the Confederate at Hanover, and ours at Culpepper Court House, the latter located south of the Rappahannock, and about twenty miles north of General Lee's head-quarters. The utter contempt with which General Lee regarded his antagonist is manifest in this strange fact, that while the two armies were confronting each other, the Confederate commander, in the latter part of August or the early part of September, sent General Longstreet, with his entire corps, to Georgia, to aid General Bragg against General Rosecrans. Thus the entire Confederate army for the defence of Richmond was, as General Meade himself estimated, reduced to the small force of 50,000 men. We must bear in mind here, that Meade's army, in addition to a force quite 60,000 strong in Washington, amounted at least to from 80,000 to 100,000 men, while another veteran force, nearly 30,000 strong, lay confronting Richmond in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe. Suppose now, that 30,000 men from our vast armies in the field had been sent down to this latter point, and with the force already there, had been landed at Bermuda Hundred, Petersburg being recaptured, and all Lee's communications south of James river being seized; while the great army of Meade had, at the same time, been pushed directly upon the Confederate position at Hanover Court House. It is demonstrably evident that in less than six weeks Richmond and Lee's army would have been in our hands. Yet nothing whatever was done to take advantage of Long-

street's absence, and dispose of the puny force left with Lee for the defence of Virginia and the capital of the Confederacy. The nation looked on, contemplating the spectacle of 200,000 men lying idle, and that when confronted by a little band 50,000 strong. The cause of these mysterious facts, the reader, we judge, will find in the following testimony of General A. P. Howe, given before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Speaking of the judgment of those officers who were dissatisfied with General Meade's management, General Howe says:—

“I do not think they have full confidence in the ability or state of mind of General Meade. What I mean by that is the *animus* that directs the movements of the army. They do not think there is that heart and energy and earnestness of purpose in the war to make use of the means at his command to injure the enemy and carry on the war successfully. I do not think they have, I will not say confidence, but faith in him. They do not expect from him what the crisis seems to call for. They believe that, if attacked, he will do all he can to defend his position; but that he will act with zeal and energy, or that his whole heart and soul are in the bringing all the means successfully to bear to break down the enemy, so far as I can judge, they do not look for that,—they do not expect it. So far as I can judge, a great many officers think he can do very well in a defensive fight. If he were called upon to guard the Potomac or Washington, he would make good marches to stop the enemy; but that he will be active, zealous, energetic, in using his means to strike successful offensive blows against the enemy, not at all; he is not the man for that—at least, that is my impression.”

Question: “The same observation you apply to General Meade will apply to the corps commanders you refer to, will it not?”

Answer: “I think so. I do not know that it would be proper for me to state here the terms we use in the army. However, we say there is too much Copperheadism in it. There is so for different reasons: with some there is a desire to raise up McClellan; with others there is a dislike to some of the measures of the Government; they do not

like the way the Negro question is handled. And, again, the impression is made upon my mind that there are some who have no faith in this war, who have no heart in it; they will not do anything to commit themselves; but there is a wide difference between doing your duty so as not to commit yourself, and doing all that might reasonably be expected of you at these times. I do not know that I can express myself better than saying that there is Copperheadism at the root of this matter."

Here we have a look into the secret of the conduct of this war. Ignorance, irresolution, Copperheadism, and the lust of gain on the part of generals and party leaders, so controlled our campaigns as to cause the war to drag its slow length along during those dreary years, and that at such an enormous expense of life and treasure. Here we have also an explanation of the fact that our vast armies lay idle at such long intervals of time, that none of our victories were improved, and that all opportunities to end the war by single crushing blows were let slip. We now, for the present, leave the army of the Potomac, to consider an important event in another part of this field of war.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.

FROM the early part of January to the last of June of this year, General Rosecrans had remained at Murfreesboro', provisioning and recruiting his army, as preparatory to a decisive movement against General Bragg, who held Middle and Eastern Tennessee, Chattanooga being his main strategic point, and the consequent special aim of our authorities at Washington. At this time our army numbered about 60,000 men of all arms; the force under General Bragg being about two-thirds that number. While our army, that of the Cumberland, was a united body in one place, that of Bragg was divided into four parts, and these at unsupporting distances from each other. A body, 18,000 strong, was, for example, in a very strongly fortified position under General [Bishop] Polk at Shelbyville. Behind this, and commanding a mountain region traversed by narrow roads and most difficult passes, lay another equally strongly entrenched camp, at Tullahoma. On the right of Shelbyville, at Wartrace, covering the railroad and the mountain passes in his front, lay General Hardee, with a corps 12,000 strong. Another division under General Buckner occupied Knoxville and Chattanooga. The difficulties in the way of General Rosecrans's advance are obvious. Before him lay formidably entrenched camps, and more formidable mountain passes; the enemy being thus enabled to compel him to fight at the greatest disadvantage, and also to impede his advance by breaking up railroad communications and obstructing the narrow mountain passes through which that advance must be made. Then, in every position gained,

he was necessitated to leave large forces behind him to guard his rear. Thus our forces would be all the while suffering diminution, while those of the enemy, in falling back upon his reserves, would be on the constant increase. Another important difficulty had thus far prevented effectively any important active operations on the part of the army of the Cumberland. While our infantry greatly outnumbered that of General Bragg, his cavalry equally outnumbered ours, and hence in all advances rendered our communications liable to be broken up. Of this General Rosecrans complained, and made the strongest appeals to the authorities at Washington, for an adequate supply of cavalry. To all such calls, General Halleck refused to respond, assigning this as the specific reason, that there was not forage in that region for more horses. To this General Rosecrans replied, and with perfect truth, that forage in abundance existed, and that the want of horses was the only impediment to his obtaining it. Such considerations had no weight with our Commander-in-Chief.

Under the circumstances with which he was palpably encircled, General Rosecrans protested against an advance upon the enemy without reinforcements, and especially without being supplied with an adequate force of cavalry. While all such aid was denied him, he received an absolute order to advance upon the enemy, and take possession of Chattanooga. Just at this time, a fundamental error of General Bragg—an error the like of which was so common in this war—relieved our commander of the difficulty last named. In the latter part of June, the celebrated raider, General Morgan, with a cavalry force upwards of 2,000 strong, was sent past our army, and across the States of Tennessee and Kentucky. Crossing the Ohio river, some forty miles below Louisville, Morgan passed on through Southern Indiana, into Ohio, where he, with the men he had left,—some very few excepted, who swam their horses across the Ohio river—was captured in the south-western part of the State. By this foolish division of his cavalry force on the part of General Bragg, and through the most strenuous efforts of our commander to supply himself with horses and means of conveyance, General Rosecrans found himself able to take the field with some hope of accomplish-

ing the burdensome task so imprudently imposed upon him.

State of affairs in the Valley of the Mississippi.

Let us now, prior to a consideration of the campaign before us, contemplate the actual situation of affairs in the valley of the Mississippi—the situation when the Union and Confederate authorities were making preparation to strike a great and decisive blow, through the army of General Bragg on the one hand, and that of General Rosecrans on the other. By a combination of forces on an immense scale, the former authorities were collecting, under General Bragg, by far the most formidable army which they had ever brought into the field in this valley. As a means to this end, General Longstreet, with his corps 20,000 or 25,000 strong, was detached from General Lee, and sent round to General Bragg. The entire division under General Buckner was also brought down, leaving Knoxville to be taken quiet possession of by General Burnside. In all places where regular troops were stationed they also were brought forward, their places being supplied by militia called out for the purpose. Finally, a large part of the forces captured and paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hudson were reclassified, rearmed, and united with the grand army under the Confederate commander. By all these means, this army was increased to from 80,000 to 100,000 men, all to be concentrated for the destruction of the army of the Cumberland. What was the state of our forces in this valley at this time? An army quite 60,000 strong was under the immediate command of General Rosecrans at Murfreesboro'. In the interior of Kentucky, upwards of 20,000 troops available for active service were under the command of General Burnside; and this force, by the return of the 9th corps after the surrender of Vicksburg (July 4th), might have been, and was soon after, rendered 50,000 strong. By a combination of our forces on and west of the Mississippi, after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, an army more than 100,000 strong might have been concentrated at Memphis, and by railroad and other means sent inward to Georgia, to combine with Rosecrans and Burnside for the final destruction of

the grand army under General Bragg. No intelligent reader will question the fact that all these combinations were perfectly practicable at that time. When all was in readiness, and while General Grant was moving his army to the vicinity of Decatur, Burnside, 50,000 strong, should have moved through the mountain passes, and taken possession of Knoxville, as he did with 20,000, September 3rd. Suppose now, that while Grant was moving as stated, Burnside had moved upon Chattanooga, and Rosecrans upon the forces in his front. The immediate result would have been a most rapid flight of Bragg's forces from Shelbyville and other points to Fayetteville, twenty-five miles south-east of Chattanooga; while our Generals would have quietly united their forces in the vicinity of the place last named. Thus united, and forming an army of upwards of 100,000 men, a perfectly crushing force might have been precipitated upon General Bragg prior to the arrival of Longstreet. Before this force the Confederate commander would have fled to Atlanta. At this point, even when reinforced by General Longstreet, he would have found himself confronted by two armies, each greater than his own—to wit, by Burnside and Rosecrans from the north, and Grant's from the west.

Under such circumstances, the Confederate commander would have surrendered at once, or, in a few days or weeks at the farthest, would have been so encircled with resistless forces as to compel his surrender. The inevitable result would have been, that all the Confederate States east of the Mississippi, Virginia excepted, would have at once fallen into our hands. As the final result, General Lee, perceiving the absolute hopelessness of the cause he was maintaining, and the criminality of further effusion of blood, would have surrendered, and the Rebellion have been wiped out. Perceiving, and avowing at the time, the perfect practicability of all these combinations and results, and knowing well, because we fully understood the spirit and capacities of our military authorities, that no combinations or unity of action of our great armies for the realization of these or any other desirable ends would be made, and that the single army of Rosecrans would be thrown into the circle of fire with which it was afterwards

encompassed,—these were the reasons why we did not share in the public joy at the great victories gained at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson. These were the reasons why we wrote at this time that unpublished letter to the *New York Times*, the letter in which we clearly stated what might be done, and as clearly and definitely foreshadowed the events which did follow. Never did the idea have place in the mind of either of our commanders-in-chief during this war, that the only possible condition of putting down the Rebellion was the annihilation of the *armies* or *military power* of the Confederacy, that the immutable condition of accomplishing this result was the combination and concentration of the national forces for this one end, and that while this end was being accomplished, territory and positions should be taken and held, but for strictly strategic purposes. The policy, on the other hand, which determined the entire conduct of this war on our part, was the principle that the only method for an effective accomplishment of the end under consideration was to have in the first place as little to do as possible with the armies of the Confederacy, to lend all our energies in the next place to the one end of conquering and holding territory, capturing and garrisoning fortresses, villages, and cities, driving the enemy from any positions he might assume, leaving him then to go where and do as he pleased, until he should choose to locate again in some particular position, and finally, in no case to make any combined movements for the accomplishment of these or any other results, but to compel each army and each separated part of every army to act by itself, and that without reference to what any other part was doing. No comprehensive mind can contemplate the facts of this war, just as they occurred, without perceiving the strict verity of the above statements. After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, for example, nothing whatever hindered the prompt union of our great armies on the Mississippi with that of General Rosecrans for a grand movement upon General Bragg. Instead of this, however, all these forces lay idle, Sherman only being sent on a vain and senseless raid into the interior. When Burnside, with 20,000 disciplined troops, took possession of Knoxville, that city and all North-Eastern

Tennessee being intensely loyal, and in no need of being guarded, Rosecrans was in the act of driving Bragg's forces from Shelbyville and other places named above, and this as preparatory to his final move upon Chattanooga. At this time this place was abandoned by General Bragg, and all his forces between there and Knoxville were withdrawn to Fayetteville. Had Burnside moved down a distance of less than 150 miles, and taken possession of Chattanooga, he would have been able to have moved out and reinforced Rosecrans, and thus have enabled our combined forces to inflict a crushing defeat upon General Bragg at Chickamauga and driven him back to Atlanta. Instead of doing any such thing, Burnside, as soon as he got possession of Knoxville, scattered his forces all over North-Eastern Tennessee, where they were of no use for any purposes of the war. So much for the wisdom of our great Generals. Never could a nation (let me say here what I have said before) boast of a braver or more patriotic soldiery than ours, nor of abler Generals and under officers than held inferior command in these armies. The whole difficulty lay with those who held supreme command. One of the most intelligent chaplains in the army of the Cumberland, for example, told us, when I informed him of the plan which I had submitted in January 1863 for the conduct of the campaign in Virginia, that he had often heard corps, division, and brigade commanders in the army where he was, express their astonishment that that identical plan had not been adopted, that plan having independently suggested itself to their minds. Equally surprised were these men that no combinations of the national forces were anywhere made for the ends demanded by the exigencies of the war.

The Campaign under General Rosecrans.

Let us now direct our attention to the campaign as conducted by General Rosecrans. Here palpable facts at once reveal him as a General of no ordinary capacity. The plan he adopted was this. A feint was made in the direction of Shelbyville, which lay on our direct route—a feint which induced General Bragg to concentrate his forces at this point. While this movement was being

made, our main forces were moved by rapid marches to Manchester, on the enemy's right, thus jeopardizing all his communications with Chattanooga and the valley south of that place. Finding all the forces under his immediate command in danger of being surrounded and captured, General Bragg fled precipitately, first to Tullahoma, and then over the mountains to Lafayette, leaving all his strongholds behind him, to be taken peaceable possession of by his rival. Thus, by as skilful combinations as the history of war presents, Rosecrans in the short space of nine days succeeded, with the loss of 560 men on our part, in destroying quite as many of the enemy, and in capturing 1,634 prisoners, three guns, several very strongly fortified positions, a vast amount of provisions and other spoils, and clearing Middle Tennessee of all Confederate forces. Such facts clearly evince what this skilful commander would have done had adequate forces, as he requested, and which might have been done as well as not,—had adequate forces been put under his command.

Just at this time, the further advance of our forces, and a rapid pursuit of General Bragg, were prevented by seventeen days of incessant rain, which rendered the roads in those mountain passes quite impassable. The almost impassable state of the roads was not the only difficulty which General Rosecrans had to encounter. His further advance was now through a mountainous region in which all food and forage were destroyed or devoured, and in which the railroad communications were broken up by General Bragg in his retreat. All that could be done was to harass that General by means of our light troops, and that while the railroad from Nashville to Bridgeport, where the road crosses the Tennessee river twenty-eight miles below Chattanooga, was being repaired. By July 25th, this end was attained, and our army was in a condition to pass the river. By means of bridges constructed above and below, and at this point, the passage was commenced August 28th and completed by September 8th. The several corps now pushed forward across the mountains and concentrated at Trenton, in the narrow valley of Lookout Creek, which runs in a northeasterly direction into the Tennessee river, a few miles

below Chattanooga. Two courses were now before our commander. He might pass his whole army down this valley to the point designated, or send a division down, and take possession of the place, while our main forces were pushed forward over Mission Ridge into the far wider valley traversed by the Chickamauga Creek, which enters the Tennessee river a short distance above Chattanooga, and from thence move his army down to the place referred to. General Bragg, perceiving that if he remained at Chattanooga his communications would be seized and his army starved out, abandoned this stronghold, and retreated south to Lafayette. General Rosecrans, misled by a despatch which he received from General Halleck, concluded that General Bragg had retreated to Rome or Atlanta, and consequently adopted the latter of the two courses above indicated. The following is the despatch to which we refer:—

“WASHINGTON, Sept. 11th, 1875.

‘Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland gap, that he holds all East Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gap of the North Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving towards Athens to connect with you. *After* holding the mountain passes on the west, and Dalton, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg’s army, it will be decided whether your army shall move *farther south* into Georgia and Alabama. It is reported here by deserters, that *a part of Bragg’s army is reinforcing Lee*. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as soon as possible.

“H. W. HALLECK,
“*Commander-in-Chief.*”

Had General Rosecrans moved his whole army from Trenton direct to Chattanooga he would have taken peaceable possession of the stronghold, and also of Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and thus have been able to guard all his communications with Bridgeport and Nashville, and to bid defiance to any forces that might have been brought against him. Under the impression,

however, that Bragg was reinforcing Lee, instead of Lee reinforcing Bragg, with the best commander and corps then in the Confederate army, Rosecrans sent General Crittenden to Chattanooga, and with the remainder of his army passed over the mountain into the broader valley referred to, expecting here to be reinforced by the main portion of Crittenden's forces, and to move south in pursuit of General Bragg. To his amazement and consternation, however, our brave commander found himself about to be assailed by veteran forces quite one-third more numerous than his own, and that before he could have full time to get his army in readiness for the conflict. General Bragg, instead of retreating to Rome or Atlanta, was quietly waiting the arrival of General Longstreet, who was approaching as rapidly as the railroads could bring him forward. Of the two armies which now confronted each other, ours was about 55,000 strong, while that of the enemy numbered from 80,000 to 90,000 men. Not a moment was to be lost on either side. Our army, September 20th, was concentrated at a point midway between Chattanooga and Lafayette, and on the main road between the two places. General McCook's corps was on our right, that of General Crittenden in the centre, and that of General Thomas on our left; General Polk held chief command of the Confederate right, and General Hood, with Longstreet's veterans, held their left, until the arrival of the latter on the morning of the day above designated. On the 19th, a decided attempt was made by Polk to turn our left, and by seizing possession of the road to Chattanooga, to cut off our retreat to that place, and thus secure the capture of our entire army. General Thomas, anticipating such a design, opened the battle early in the morning by assaulting a Confederate brigade which seemed to be in an isolated position. This brought on a fierce conflict, in which at one time our forces, and then those of the enemy, were worsted. The conflict ended, however, by the rout of the Confederate advances, and the driving back of the entire right upon their defences on the creek. Thus the day closed with a decided advantage on our part in this portion of the field. On our right the enemy, after a severe cannonade, made several very determined attacks,

in which they gained temporary advantages, but were finally driven back with the loss of many killed and wounded, and quite a number of prisoners. On all parts of the field the advantage was decidedly on our side, and inspired our army with bright hopes of success in the great battle to be fought on the day following. Such hopes, however, turned out to be illusory. Early the next morning Longstreet, with the remainder of his corps, was on the ground, and assumed command of the Confederate left.

The attack on the part of General Bragg was intended to have been commenced at daylight. A dense fog filled the valley, however, and delayed the battle until half-past 8 a.m. According to the plan of the Confederate commander, the conflict was to have been opened by a flank movement of General Polk around our left, and by an overwhelming assault upon our left centre. Knowing that here would be the most decisive point of attack, Thomas was reinforced until he held command of quite one-half of our army. The advance of Polk was delayed, first by the fog, and then, when ready to move, by finding a full division of the Confederate left wing (Longstreet's) directly in his front, and thus rendering an advance impossible until this obstacle was removed. Two hours of precious time, as he affirms, was lost by this strange accident. At length Breckinridge, on their extreme right, flanked Thomas with a full division, pushing his forces across the main road; and then, facing to his left, attempted by desperate fighting to roll up our left wing upon its centre. This movement was taken up by successive divisions towards the Confederate centre, and all with the design which had been defeated the day before—to cut off our army from Chattanooga. Thomas, however, was on this as on the day previous, fully equal to the occasion. Breckinridge, assailed by superior forces, was soon hurled back in utter confusion; two of his Generals, Helm and Deshler, being killed, Major Groves, chief of his artillery, mortally wounded, and General Adams wounded and taken prisoner. In a similar manner were all attempts of General Bragg to turn our left and break our centre frustrated.

While all things were thus prospering in our centre and on our left wing, a disaster occurred to our right

which put in jeopardy our whole army. As Rosecrans early in the morning passed with his staff along the rear of his right wing, he perceived that McCook's right was too far extended, and that Davis with his division was too far to the right, and that the same was true of Crittenden's corps in reserve, and ordered the necessary changes. The movement of these several divisions from right to left was attended with the most fearful consequences. In these movements a gap was opened in our front, in consequence of the withdrawal of one of our divisions to the rear, its place not being closed up as was intended. Into this gap Longstreet instantly threw Hood's division, pushing at the same time that of Buckner on our right flank. By these assaults our whole right wing was utterly disordered, and rushed in a mingled mass in the direction of Rossville and Chattanooga. In this mass Rosecrans was borne along and separated from the rest of the army. He accordingly hastened on to Chattanooga to reform the fugitives and make preparations for the reception of the rest of his army.

Matters, however, were not, in reality, as desperate as at first sight they appeared. Almost our entire centre and all our left wing under Thomas were unbroken and stood firm. So was Crittenden's small corps, stationed, as we have stated, as a reserve, at Rossville. Thomas, alive to the perils which encompassed him, with cool deliberation moved back our centre and his own right, and reformed the forces under his command on a ridge directly across the road on which the Confederates were advancing in the full assurance of an easy and triumphant march upon Chattanooga, there to make prisoners of the entire army of the Cumberland. Before the assault of the enemy commenced, Granger, with his corps of two divisions, came up. So did several brigades of our centre and right, which had retreated, but had remained unbroken, or had been reformed. These unexpected reinforcements Thomas so distributed as to protect his wings and strengthen the weak points in his line, his own batteries, with all the guns that he could collect—guns abandoned by McCook's corps in its flight—being placed in positions where they could do the greatest possible service. The first service which General Granger did was to send two of his brigades under

General Whitaker and Colonel Mitchell, and hurl a full division of Confederates from a ridge on Thomas's right, where a decisive flank movement was intended. By the capture and the holding of this ridge our right was fully protected. At 4 p.m. the tempest, in terrible fury, burst upon our devoted columns, the entire Confederate army moving upon them in solid masses. These masses boldly moved up in front of our line, where they were first mowed down by a discharge of grape and canister from our batteries, and were then compelled to recoil before the still more destructive fire of our infantry. When reformed, they would move up again and recoil as before, and for the same reasons. These useless and destructive advances and recoils were repeated, until at dark the enemy retreated south, and our divisions, in regular order, and by word of command from General Rosecrans, retired to Rossville, encamped there for the night, and the next day moved without being disturbed to Chattanooga. It is a singular fact, that one of our soldiers, who happened to be separated from his company, slept for the night quietly upon the field held by Thomas, and was advised the next morning, by a Confederate surgeon who was passing alone over the field, to follow on as quickly as possible after his own regiment. This incident clearly evinces the fact of the retreat of General Bragg at the close of the battle, our army being in reality left victors upon the bloody field.

In his official report, General Rosecrans admits a loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, of 16,351 men, thirty-six guns, twenty caissons, and 8,450 small arms, while he claims to have brought off 2,288 prisoners. General Bragg admits a total loss of 18,000 men in all, of whom about 16,000 must have been among the killed and wounded. It was thus that, for want of proper combination and concentration of forces on our part, brave men were so recklessly slaughtered during this war. While, in all the great battles, our forces ought to have outnumbered those of the Confederates as two to one, or, at the least, three to two, the forces actually engaged were so brave and so determined, and at the same time so nearly matched, that one-third of the number on each side would be uniformly slaughtered before either would retreat.

The conduct of General Thomas on this occasion has but one parallel in the history of this war, that of Generals Pleasanton and Sickles at Chancellorsville, and but few parallels in the history of war anywhere. The cool and self-determined deliberation with which he reformed our line after nearly one-half of it had been utterly broken to fragments, the precision with which he stationed his own forces and those which providentially came to his relief, and the steadiness with which he held his lines under the terrible fire and crushing assaults of the disciplined and seemingly overwhelming forces of the enemy, and all this while he was in constant peril of defeat from the exhaustion of his ammunition, fully evince him as one of the greatest of military commanders. In all his career, he never lost a battle, while he often plucked a victory out of the hands of defeat; and never in any battle were his ranks broken, though those of other Generals were shattered on both sides of him.

General Bragg immediately followed our army as it retired to Chattanooga, took possession of Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain, by which he fully commanded all our communications by railroad and the river, with our depôts of supply, and drew up his army around the formidable fortifications which the Confederates had previously erected for their own defence. Knowing well that our army could not be captured by assault, the object of the enemy was to compel Rosecrans to surrender through exhaustion of his supplies.

The capture of Chattanooga, and with it the possession of East Tennessee, was a heavy blow upon the Confederacy. "Chickamauga," says Pollard, "had conferred a brilliant glory upon our arms, but little else. Rosecrans still held the prize of Chattanooga, and with it the possession of East Tennessee. Two-thirds of our nitre-beds were in this region, and a large proportion of the coal which supplied our foundries. It abounded in the necessities of life. It was one of the strongest countries in the world,—so full of lofty mountains, that it had been called, not inaptly, the Switzerland of America. As the possession of Switzerland opened the door to the invasion of Italy, Germany, and France, so the possession of East Tennessee gave

easy access to Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama."

Such were the obvious advantages which General Rosecrans had, by his very superior strategy and energy, secured to the nation in the course of a few weeks; and far greater advantageous results, bringing hostilities to a speedy termination, and all this with no reverses, would have arisen, had his wise counsels been heeded by our military authorities at the national capital. Yet for a single mishap—a mishap occasioned wholly by false information conveyed by these authorities—was he, immediately after his great success, and that by the authorities through whom his misfortune had been occasioned, suspended from his command, and openly disgraced before the nation. On the 19th October, he (we cite from Mr. Greeley now) "received an unheralded order relieving him from command, which he at once obeyed, leaving for the North the next day—just a year having elapsed since he left Corinth, the theatre of his then recent victory, to find himself assigned to command in this department."

Deeming it best for the service that he should depart before it was known to the soldiers that he was superseded, he bade adieu to his comrades in the following order:—

*"Head-quarters, Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 19th, 1863.*

"The General commanding announces to the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he leaves them, under orders from the President.

"Major-General George H. Thomas, in compliance with the orders, will assume command of this army and department. The chiefs of all the staff departments will report to him.

"In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms,—officers and soldiers,—he congratulates you that your new commander comes not to you, as he did, a stranger. General Thomas has been identified with this army from its first organization. He has led you often into battle. To his known prudence, dauntless courage, and true patriotism, you may look with confidence that, under God, he will lead you to victory.

"The General commanding doubts not you will be as true to yourselves and your country in the future as you have been in the past.

"To the division and brigade commanders he tenders his cordial thanks for their valuable and hearty co-operation in all that he has undertaken. To the chiefs of the staff departments and their subordinates, whom he leaves behind, he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and untiring devotion to duty.

"Companions in arms—officers and soldiers—farewell; and may God bless you.

"W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*"

Of the Generals who held high commands during this war, Rosecrans ranks among the three or four who evinced capacity to plan and execute important campaigns. In every instance, the single one excepted in which he was misled by false information from our Commander-in-Chief, his strategy was faultless. The same remarks hold equally in respect to his dispositions upon the battle-field. It was he who, in the absence of the General in command, planned—and, in fact, executed—those movements which annihilated the Confederate forces in Western Virginia, prior to the first Bull Run disaster; and it was the General in command of the department who, by his flaming dispatches, appropriated to himself all the credit of those splendid victories. Prior to the disaster referred to, General Rosecrans submitted a plan for the conduct of a great campaign in Virginia—a plan which, if it had been adopted, would have ensured as completely the annihilation of the military power of the Confederacy in Eastern as the plan above referred to did in Western Virginia. What that plan, in all its essential features, was, has been shown in the former parts of this treatise,—the same plan having suggested itself to two minds who were total strangers to each other's thoughts. A more disinterested, patriotic, or braver soldier, and one who deserves a warmer place in the hearts of his countrymen, never had a place in our armies.

The condition of the Army of the Cumberland did at length stir the dull brain of our Commander-in-Chief, and

did suggest to his mind the idea of a concentration of the national forces,—a concentration, however, not for offensive, but defensive measures. Dispatches were accordingly sent to Burnside, now strengthened by the return of the 9th corps, in East Tennessee, to Pope in the north-west, to Schofield at St. Louis, to Hurlbut at Memphis, and to Grant at Vicksburg, to hasten on all the troops they could spare for the relief of our army at Chattanooga. Finding that from none of these sources could the needed aid be got forward in time, the 11th and 12th corps of the Army of the Potomac, 20,000 men, were in an almost incredible space of time, sent, under General Hooker, to Middle Tennessee, to hold General Rosecrans's communications. In eight days, this force was debarked, in fighting order, on the Tennessee River, at the point of their destination. In January 1863, General Halleck, in connection with our Secretary of War, did, as we have seen, persuade President Lincoln that no such force could be conveyed one-half that distance in *four weeks*. To give unity to all operations for the end under consideration, General Grant, on the retirement of General Rosecrans, was appointed to the supreme command of all the western departments. He was, however, at the time, sick at New Orleans, and was unable to assume command at Louisville until October 18th, when he telegraphed General Thomas to hold Chattanooga at all hazards, and received the reply, "I will hold on till we starve."

While these events were transpiring, General Bragg sent the main portion of his cavalry, under Generals Wheeler and Wharton, across the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, into Middle Tennessee, with orders to fall upon and destroy General Thomas's supplies and supply trains. In the Sequatchie Valley this force captured and destroyed a train of from 700 to 1,000 waggon. At McMinnville they captured 600 prisoners, destroyed a large waggon and car train, and burned a great quantity of provisions. These forces were finally pursued by our cavalry and infantry, and escaped into North Alabama, losing upwards of 2,000 of their own number, but capturing and parolling more of our men, and destroying millions of dollars of Union property. On his way to

Chattanooga, General Grant found General Hooker, with all his forces, at Bridgeport, preparing to cross there, and dispute with General Bragg the right to compel our army under Thomas to supply itself with provisions by means of waggon trains dragged round through the mountain passes in Middle Tennessee,—a service in which 10,000 horses were soon used up, while the autumn rains would ere long render the roads so impassable that our army could be supplied but a few days longer.

On the 26th Hooker passed his whole army over the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and on the 28th reached Wauhatchie, a small station on the railroad in Lookout Valley, about twelve miles from Chattanooga,—here threatening General Bragg with a flank attack on his left wing. This movement was made intentionally in full view of the Confederate forces on Racoon and Lookout Mountains, the object being to conceal or divert the enemy's attention from certain corresponding movements to be made by Generals Grant and Thomas from Chattanooga. While General Hooker was moving from Bridgeport up the river, on its south, a division under General Palmer moved down the river, from Chattanooga, on its north side. Both movements being in full view of the enemy, completely diverted his attention from what was being done elsewhere. In the meanwhile, Palmer, having crossed the river, and joined Hooker in his advance to Wauhatchie, 4,000 men under General Smith, chief engineer, 1,800 by boats, and the remainder on the north side of the river, passed down to Brown's Ferry, some three or four miles below Chattanooga. Those on the boats landed on the south side, and seized the hills which overlook the ferry. The remainder, who had marched down to the same point on the north side, were ferried over, and by daylight all the heights which rise from the river on the one side, and from Lookout Valley on the other, were firmly secured. By 10 a.m. an excellent pontoon bridge was completed, and a free communication was opened between Hooker at Wauhatchie and our army at Chattanooga. With Hooker's left resting upon Smith's force and bridge, Palmer being in his rear as a support, a safe waggon route of twenty-eight miles over a good road from Bridge-

port was secured for our army supplies, and eight miles by using the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry. Thus all peril to our army from want of supplies was completely removed, and the defeat of General Bragg, as our army was being so effectively reinforced, was rendered only a question of time.

But one attack was made upon any part of General Hooker's line. This was done by General Law's division of Longstreet's corps, who held Lookout Mountain. General Geary's division, as was judged, lay exposed to surprise by a night attack, which was made at about 1 a.m., Oct. 29th, and that with loud yells and terrible impetuosity, driving in our pickets at a run, and charging Geary's division in front and on both wings. His brave men, however, stood firm, returning as deadly a fire as they received, until Carl Shurz with his division of Howard's corps came rushing from Hooker to their aid. The fight was soon over. One brigade under General Tyndale carried the hill from whence our men were enfiladed on their left, while another brigade under Colonel C. Smith, 73rd Ohio, charged up another very steep hill still farther behind, and carried that at the point of the bayonet, taking some prisoners. The Confederates accordingly fled, leaving 153 dead in Geary's front, and admitting a total loss of 361 men, that of General Hooker being 437 in this affair and since he crossed the Tennessee River,—to wit, 76 killed, 339 wounded, and 22 missing. Immediately after this, Racoon Mountain, with all west of Lookout Valley, was wholly cleared of Confederate forces, and all the positions of our entire army were rendered perfectly secure,—so obviously secure, that General Bragg made no more efforts to disturb them.

From this time to the 23rd November, when Sherman and his corps had arrived from Vicksburg and Memphis, nothing was done by either of the armies in and about Chattanooga. General Grant was waiting for reinforcements, and General Bragg was in suspense in respect to the question what he should do. Learning, however, that Burnside's forces were in a helpless and exposed condition, in consequence of being separated into small detachments, and scattered, as we have stated, all over East Tennessee,

the Confederate commander detached General Longstreet, with his corps, for the purpose of destroying our forces there, and regaining that portion of the State. No excuse can be furnished for the conduct of General Burnside after he entered Tennessee. In his advance, he passed through Kingston and Loudon, September 1st, neither of which was over a three or four days' easy march from Chattanooga. At the former place, he came into communication with the pickets of General Rosecrans, and was consequently informed of the critical condition of the Army of the Cumberland. He was also, as General Halleck affirmed, under a specific order to move from Loudon westward to the Tennessee River, and form a junction with Rosecrans. In disregard of all these considerations, General Burnside, after taking possession of Knoxville, and capturing 2,000 prisoners and fourteen guns at Cumberland Gap, scattered his forces, as already stated. In his advance, which was made with great secrecy and despatch, General Longstreet found matters very much as he desired, until he sat down before Knoxville. Before he arrived at Loudon, he inflicted a loss upon our forces, as officially stated, of 650 men, and several of our batteries. From this point he had several encounters with inferior forces under the immediate command of General Burnside, the latter being driven from position to position, losing heavily at each one, until he finally threw himself into Knoxville, and from within its fortifications confronted his foe, until, as we shall see, General Sherman came to the relief of our beleaguered forces, and General Longstreet retired.

On the arrival of General Sherman, he, with his corps, was placed on the left of our army, and above Chattanooga. Thomas, in the centre at that point, was strengthened by detaching General Howard, with his corps, from Hooker, and uniting him with the former. General Hooker's command was thus reduced to less than 10,000 men, and no two of his divisions had ever before fought together in the same battle. They were united now, however, under a General in whom all confided, and felt sure of victory.

The initiative was taken in the centre, Granger moving out at 2 p.m., November 23rd, driving the enemy back, and seizing a hill in front of the Confederate line, a hill known

as Orchard Ridge, capturing about 200 prisoners. This onward movement was supported by one made by Howard on the left of Granger, so that the important advantage gained was held through the night. Hooker, at 4 a.m. the next day, made an advance upon the north face and west side of Lookout Mountain. The object of this movement was to attract General Bragg's attention in this direction, while Sherman should pass his corps over the Tennessee above Chattanooga, and constitute our advanced left wing in that direction. As he reached Lookout Creek, Hooker found it so swollen by the recent rain that a delay of three hours was occasioned in building bridges and crossing his several brigades over. By 11 a.m. the crossing of his entire force was effected. At this time his batteries were so located on all available hills as to enfilade the Confederate infantry as they came down from their camp on the mountain to man their breastworks and rifle-pits below. As these forces fell back, our infantry followed them, "climbing," in the language of Mr. Greeley, "over ledges and boulders, crests and chasms, and driving the Rebels through their camp without allowing them to halt there." General Hooker, knowing that General Bragg had reinforced this wing of his army, ordered the men to be halted and re-formed as soon as they should reach the summit where the Confederate camp was laid. The men, however, disregarding all such orders, by whomsoever given, rushed on, hurling all the enemies they encountered down the eastern declivity, and Lookout Mountain was in Union hands. Hooker's line was now formed on the eastern declivity of the mountain, his left extending near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. At 4 p.m. he informed General Grant that his position had been rendered unassailable. For the capture of this mountain, the soldiery and under-officers are to be accredited, that capture being made by a spontaneous movement of the men,—a movement made, not only without orders, but in opposition to an express order for a halt. To the Confederates, as one of their officers afterwards said, "the capture was a surprise in the daytime, and that in the immediate presence of forces abundantly sufficient to repel any attack that could have been made upon the position, could those

forces have been formed in time to resist the perfectly unexpected attack." In their advance our forces took many prisoners, and on the mountain they found 20,000 rations, and the camp equipage of three brigades, which the Confederates had left behind them in their sudden flight. The next morning Hooker continued his advance across Chattanooga Valley, and at night bivouaced on Mission Ridge, which the capture of Lookout Mountain had rendered indefensible. In this advance the ridge was assailed on the east by the division of Osterhaus, on the west by that of Garey, and in front by that of Cruft. By these combined movements the enemy on the ridge was so hemmed in that but few escaped slaughter or capture, the division of Osterhaus alone taking upwards of 2,000 prisoners. Our forces also held Rossville, quite in the rear of General Bragg's left wing, and rendering his entire position no longer tenable.

After these decisive advantages gained by Hooker, the task imposed upon Thomas in the centre, and Sherman on the left, was a very easy one, Bragg's exclusive solicitude being to withdraw his army in safety—that is, what remained of it—out of the crushing coil with which he was being encircled. On the morning of the 25th, Sherman was ordered to open the attack at daylight, and did so. He found the enemy in his front so strongly entrenched, however, that up to 3 p.m. his columns had won no decisive success. At 2 p.m. Thomas received orders to advance. The position of the enemy here was on a steep ridge running along the front of the attacking column. Three divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Baird, Wood, and Sheridan, advanced, with double lines of skirmishers in their front, directly into the enemy's rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge. These were soon cleared, and the lines, re-formed, followed the retreating foe so closely up the steep declivity that they received but little injury from the fire of the batteries above them. Near sundown, the ridge was in possession of our brave soldiers. The nearness of night, and the stern resistance which Thomas received on his left, prevented any further advance. In the night, Bragg withdrew from the field. He was followed by General Hooker as far as Ringgold, where,

between our advance and Bragg's rear, a sharp action occurred, followed by the retreat of the enemy. At Ringgold, Hooker was required to suspend pursuit.

Thomas returned at once from the battle-field to do for Burnside, in his extremity, what the latter had failed to do for Rosecrans in his, namely, to hasten on Granger's corps for the relief of Knoxville. This corps was joined by that of General Sherman, who assumed command of the whole expedition. On his advance, the last eighty-four miles were passed over, on Tennessee roads, in the month of December, in three days. On the approach of Sherman, Longstreet decamped from Knoxville, retreating unresisted to Russellville, just east of the Tennessee line, where he wintered his corps, mostly upon resources drawn from the loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee. As soon as Knoxville was relieved, Sherman, with his command, returned to Chattanooga.

During the siege of Knoxville, Burnside lost about 1,000 men; and Longstreet, in the different and fruitless attacks made upon our fortifications, must have lost quite three times that number.

According to official report, our losses in and about Chattanooga amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing,—5,616 in all. "We captured," says the report, "6,142 prisoners, of whom 289 were commissioned officers; 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7,000 stands of arms. The entire Confederate loss may be safely set down as quite 10,000 or 12,000 men. In addition to this, in the language of Mr. Greeley, "their losses in guns, munitions, supplies, and camp equipage, were seldom paralleled." If we grant the correctness of the estimate of General Rosecrans, that the Confederate commander fought at Chickamauga with 92,000 men, he must have retreated from Chattanooga, Longstreet having withdrawn his corps, with considerably less than 40,000 dispirited and comparatively disorganized troops.

In contemplating the events before us, we are constrained to affirm that the main credit of rescuing our army at Chattanooga from its perilous condition, together with the defeat of General Bragg, must be awarded to

General Hooker. He it was that, prior to the arrival of General Grant, planned and afterwards executed those masterly movements which brought his army over the Tennessee River at Bridgeport to Wauhatchie, and then brought his left wing into communication with our army in its beleaguered condition, and not only wholly freed that army from all its perils, but ensured all the advantages which it afterwards gained. It was he who afterwards, with less than 10,000, men, and in the presence of a watchful and powerful foe, gained those positions on Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge,—positions which rendered General Bragg's position wholly untenable. Had not these heights been secured, there is no probability at all that General Bragg's position could have been successfully carried. It was Hooker that, with his immortal 10,000, and after all their prior hard fightings,—very little of such fighting having been done by the rest of the army,—it was he, and his immortal 10,000, I say, that pursued the enemy in his retreat, and inflicted the final blow upon him that he was allowed to inflict at Ringgold. I refer to one fact which ought to be stated in this connection,—I refer to the fact that the main part of the forces that he had brought with him from the army of the Potomac, was taken from him, and he was compelled to act the most important part in the whole drama with so small a force, and that constituted of three divisions who had never before acted together on any battle-field. This I say before the nation and the world, that the order which took from Hooker more than one-half of his force, to strengthen Thomas, who had more than 40,000 men under his immediate command, and was in a condition of no peril at all,—the order which placed Sherman with his corps intact on our left, and then required Hooker to act the part assigned him,—was dictated by a form of stupidity which has few parallels in the history of war. The part which Hooker did act in this campaign, in connection with his former history, absolutely evinces the fact that had he been continued in command of the Army of the Potomac, instead of being superseded by such a man as Meade, and had he been permitted to employ the forces immediately put under the command of his successor, General Lee would never

have set his foot upon "the sacred soil of Virginia" as commander of an army, nor would General Longstreet ever have seen Georgia or Tennessee as commander of a Confederate army.

MEASURES ADOPTED AFTER THE DEFEAT AND RETREAT
OF GENERAL BRAGG.

In judging of the military character of a General, we must take into account, not merely his victories, but the uses which he subsequently makes of such advantages. Judged by this standard, General Grant will stand very low in the scale of merit as a military commander, as far as this Chattanooga campaign is concerned. What was the condition of General Bragg's army when he retreated from Chattanooga? Undeniably he took with him less than 40,000 men, and these in as visibly dispirited and disorganized a condition as an army well could be. At the same time, he left behind him nearly or quite one-half of his guns, caissons, and munitions, and the greater portion of his provisions and supplies. In short, he was in no condition at all to offer any effective resistance, or make a rapid flight had he been pursued. No army, on the other hand, was ever in a better condition for an effective pursuit than was ours. Its *morale*, as all its deeds evinced, was perfect. Nor was any part of the army in a state of physical exhaustion, the whole command of General Thomas having been resting for months. The state of the roads, as evinced by Sherman's march of eighty-four miles in three days, over far worse roads than those between Chattanooga and Atlanta, were not in an unfavourable condition for pursuit. Besides, if Bragg could, as he did, retreat, Grant might have pursued. As a motive of infinite weight for a prompt and vigorous pursuit, the fact was palpable at the time that the military power of all the Confederate States between the Mississippi and Savannah rivers was then present in that defeated and dispirited and helpless army, and the destruction of it involved the destruction of that power, and the complete subjugation of all these States. Nothing can be more obvious than is the fact that before General

Grant, at that time, lay an unimpeded march to Atlanta, and that on that march the only army these Confederate States could have raised might have been utterly disorganized and dispersed, and the war brought to a final close, as far as all the Middle States of the Confederacy were concerned,—an event which would have speedily terminated the war everywhere. All this might have been done, and all needed aid have been sent to Burnside. Thomas and Hooker united could have crushed Bragg on any field where they might have encountered him. We affirm, without fear of contradiction, that nothing but blank stupidity, or an unaccountable blindness to the most palpable facts, can present the least excuse for the neglect of the golden opportunity of a most effective pursuit then presented.

Let us now consider the case of Sherman and Burnside at the time of Longstreet's retreat from Knoxville. The united forces of these two Generals outnumbered those of their antagonist, nearly or quite, by two to one. The forces of Burnside east of Knoxville could have been so concentrated in Longstreet's front as to have most materially retarded his retreat, while Sherman and Burnside might have fallen upon his rear and perfectly crushed him. Longstreet's corps never ought, but as paroled prisoners of war, to have seen Virginia again.

What was done under the circumstances? No pursuit whatever, either of Bragg or Longstreet, was attempted, that of Hooker to Ringgold excepted. On the other hand, as soon as Burnside was relieved, Sherman marched back to Chattanooga, and an army of 100,000 men lay idle there until the opening of the next spring campaign, while the Confederate armies moved off at their leisure, and as a recuperated and reorganized force met us upon the deadly field the next year. It took General Sherman from three to four months, the next year, to move from Chattanooga to Atlanta, a distance of 138 miles; and on his bloody march he lost from 50,000 to 60,000 brave men. In less than three or four weeks, General Grant might have followed General Bragg over the same road, and not have lost 10,000 men on the march, and would have annihilated the power of the Confederacy while on the way. To reap

the advantages of victory, however, was not the policy of this war. The non-pursuit, of Longstreet on the one hand, and of Bragg on the other, and the repose of our army for quite five months at Chattanooga, would have been in accordance with the conduct of Wellington and Blucher, had they rested at Waterloo for five months after the defeat of the French army on that field.

CHAPTER XXII.

MINOR CAMPAIGNS DURING THIS WAR.

THE whole science of war, according to the elder Napoleon, consists in this, in knowing how to be strongest at the point where the *main issue* lies. No more important utterance relatively to this science was ever given forth. The immutable condition of knowing how to be strongest at the point referred to, is a prior knowledge of what the main issue is, and where it lies. Here we have the peculiarity which distinguishes great commanders from those of an inferior order. The former intuitively apprehend what the main issue is, where it lies, what combination of forces is requisite to settle that issue, and then determine their arrangements and movements in fixed subordination to the one end under consideration. The latter either mistake the real issue or confound the main with the minor ones, and hence do little or nothing effective. Blucher, for example, saw clearly that the issue of the campaign in Belgium did not lie between Thielman and Grouchy at Wavre, but between Wellington and Buonaparte at Waterloo. Hence the great Prussian commander did not turn back upon Grouchy, but precipitated his main army upon Buonaparte. When Lord Cornwallis concentrated his forces and fortified himself at Yorktown, Washington saw at once that the whole issue of the war lay at that one point, and with that one commander. Cornwallis was accordingly captured, and peace followed, and the independence of the United States was acknowledged. After the War of the Rebellion assumed a definite form, we contended, and in all our communications with the leading minds in Washington so affirmed, that that war had, in reality, but two

issues—the army under General Lee, and that of the Confederates in the valley of the Mississippi east of that river; and that the annihilation of these armies, or either of them, would be followed by a speedy collapse of the entire Confederacy. In the judgment of our military authorities, the real issues of the war, as far as they thought of any such questions, lay not at all with the *armies* of the Confederacy, but with its vast territories, leading cities, seaports, rivers, and strongholds; and hence all military combinations and movements were directed to the settlement of these minor instead of the main issues. When we visited Washington in January 1863, the great issues of the war, as definitely stated by our military authorities, lay in the seaports of the Confederacy and on the Mississippi river, and hence the main direction of the war resources of the nation were determined with reference to two ends—"the plugging-up of the Southern ports," and "the opening of the Mississippi river." We read at that time, before the President and leading members of Congress, a carefully prepared paper, the exclusive object of which was to demonstrate the fact that the issues of that war, as then pending, did not lie in those ports, or on that river, but with the *army of General Lee*, an army then lying in a most exposed condition at Fredericksburg. To the validity of the argument the President at first fully assented, but was afterwards overpersuaded by the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of War. When General Lee had crossed his army over the Potomac in the summer of 1863, the war had but one issue, and that issue lay with that army in the State of Pennsylvania. That one army captured, and the war was in reality at an end. Nothing could be more manifest. The fact that 20,000 men were transported from Washington to Bridgeport, Tenn., in eight days, demonstrates the deduction that, while more than 30,000 might have been brought from the Carolinas and the vicinity of Fortress Monroe to Gettysburg, a still larger force might have been brought from our great armies at the west to Harrisburg, in time to have taken an effective part in securing the end under consideration. Our Commander-in-Chief, however, saw but one issue in the circumstances, the issue involved in the single question, How can the invading army be got

out of Pennsylvania, and back again upon "the sacred soil" from whence it came? When less than 40,000 men under General Bragg, and nearly 100,000 under General Grant, confronted each other at Chattanooga, the great issue of the war lay then in the immediate presence of our General. He had but to destroy that single army which lay in his immediate presence, an end which he might have accomplished in a few weeks, and the war would have been terminated in three months from that time. The only issue which General Grant then saw was involved in the single question, How could General Bragg be driven from the position he then occupied? When General Sherman raised the siege of Knoxville, a great national issue was presented to him and General Burnside for their settlement,—an issue involved in the question whether the enemy present before them should be crushed, or permitted to retire in peace to Virginia. Had that one corps been captured or dispersed, Lee's power would have been broken, and the Confederacy would have received "a deadly wound" which would have ensured its speedy dissolution. When that siege was raised, all issues which presented themselves to Sherman and Burnside's apprehensions were settled, and nothing more was to be done but for the former to lead his forces back to Chattanooga. The eye of the commander is the eye of the army which he leads. If the vision of that eye is dim, or of a limited compass, that army will be constantly employed in settling issues which determine nothing relatively to the main ends for which the army has being. Here lay the misfortune of our armies and nation, during this war.

From its commencement to its close, our Commanders-in-Chief, and for the most part our Generals in immediate command of our great armies, never knew what the real issues of the war were, or where those issues lay, and consequently never made their campaigns or their victories conducive to the ends for which the armies they commanded had being. We now refer, in the first place, in illustration of the principles above stated, to the various expeditions which were so frequently sent out from New Orleans and vicinity into the interior of Louisiana, and into the State of Texas,—expeditions generally consisting

of from 30,000 to 40,000 men. After the capture of New Orleans, the expulsion of the Confederates from Missouri, and especially after the opening of the Mississippi by the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, none of the real issues of the war lay west of that river. All that was needed to be done, as the event finally demonstrated, was to capture the two armies of the Confederacy east of this river. This being done, the war was ended at once everywhere. In all the expeditions to which I have referred, our forces were defeated. Had they all been successful, however, nothing effective would have been done to bring the war to a termination. Yet so blind were our Commanders-in-Chief to the real issues of the war, that so late as the spring of 1865, an expedition was planned for the subjugation of the State of Texas,—an expedition to consist of from 60,000 to 80,000 men. Without sending any army at all into that State, the war was, as we shall see hereafter, brought to a close, by diverting one-half of this expedition, leaving the rest to do nothing,—by diverting one-half of this expedition from its intended destination to the point where the real issue of the war did lay. Thus far, my countrymen have honestly supposed that General Grant, by his great military talents and energy, devised and executed the plan by which the war was brought to a close, and that by a sudden final collapse of the Confederacy. It will appear demonstrably evident, before this treatise is completed, that while the war was suddenly and unexpectedly brought to a close, this end was accomplished by an unexpected disposition of the national forces,—a disposition of which he had never formed a conception,—a disposition the idea of which, and the duty of ordering which, was brought to his mind by an order from the President; and that at the very time when General Grant received this order, he had planned and was in the very act of carrying into execution the wildest and most absurd scheme that ever danced in the brain of a Commander-in-Chief—a scheme the execution of which would in all probability have led to great national disasters, and without a question would, as General Grant expected, have protracted the war on to the spring of 1866. The nation has yet to learn how much it owes to the immortal Sumner, as the heaven-appointed medium of communicating to our

then President, and inducing him to adopt, the plan which suspended and reversed that of General Grant, and secured that unexpected disposition of the national forces which led, and that without bloodshed, to the surrender of the armies of Generals Lee and Johnston, and to the sudden termination of the war. We shall suspend our further criticisms upon these absurd, useless, and disastrous expeditions into Western Louisiana, and up the Red River into Texas, until we shall come to speak of that last most absurd and gigantic of all expeditions that ever was planned, and which was in the act of being carried out in the spring of 1865, when a sudden order from the President induced those final dispositions above referred to.

The remarks above made have an obvious application to the various expeditions sent round and landed on the coasts of the Confederate States. These expeditions were too small to make any extended, and but very few permanent, conquests, and everywhere acted as vexatious irritants upon the surface of the Rebellion, provoking the people everywhere to the most determined resistance. As soon, for example, as McClellan became Commander-in-Chief, instead of employing the vast resources under his control for the settlement of the great issues directly before him, he fixed the attention of the nation upon a contemptible expedition, under General Burnside, around the coasts of North Carolina. This expedition made some seemingly important and extensive conquests in the eastern parts of the State,—conquests which were of no value at all to us, which were maintained at an enormous expense, and were, Newbern and Roanoke Island excepted, almost entirely lost to us, by and during the year 1864. At another time an expedition was sent out which destroyed salt-works in West Bay, near St. Andrew's Sound,—works owned by the Confederate Government and private individuals, and valued at \$3,000,000. Expeditions of a similar character were, from time to time, sent around to the coast of Florida, and into the interior of that State, and did sufficient, and no more, damage than to madden the people against the Union cause. These expeditions were so numerous that, had they all been combined into one, and sent to localities where important issues lay, they would

have rendered valuable service. In the form in which they were sent, they simply weakened our central forces, and did nothing but injury anywhere. To any person who has made the science of war a careful study, and has comprehended the principles on which the great and successful campaigns of the world have been conducted, nothing can be more painful, and even agonizing, than the spectacle which this war everywhere presented, the spectacle of all main issues utterly misapprehended and neglected—of the vast resources of the nation directed to minor ends which had no bearing whatever upon the objects for which those resources were called forth—of victories unimproved, and golden opportunities let slip as if from design—and of the most reckless and lawless expenditure of life and treasure. With great satisfaction we record the fact that at length we did gain a hearing, and did secure the adoption of measures which stopped the outflow of blood and treasure, by terminating the Rebellion. Of this the reader will be fully informed as he progresses onward in the study of the contents of this treatise.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OUR NAVAL EXPEDITIONS AROUND THE SOUTHERN COASTS.

AFTER the capture of Beaufort, Hilton Head, and New Orleans, the only ports of vital importance in the possession of the Confederate States were Wellington, Charlestown, Savannah, and Mobile. To "plug up," in the first place, and to capture these ports, in the next, became from the commencement of the war a prime object of our naval and military authorities. All these ports were open to attack on two sides—on their water and land sides, or from both at the same time. The only peril to which any one of these ports might be subject was, in the estimation of our Government, from its water side, and that in case of a foreign war. Hence, upon this side every one of them had been almost impregvably fortified prior to the War of the Rebellion. After they were taken possession of by the Confederates, they were all, in every form which science could suggest, strengthened on the sides under consideration, by additional fortifications of the most formidable character. On their land sides, however, all these ports were almost utterly defenceless; and after we had obtained possession of Hilton Head, Savannah, Charlestown, and even Wilmington, were perfectly open to successful attack, and bloodless capture, by an army sent inward from the point first named. Indeed, no places were ever more assailable than were all these in the direction under consideration. At any period of the war, 80,000 men sent down to Hilton Head, and moved out from thence for the purpose under consideration, would have captured all these ports in a very short time. The validity of this

judgment was rendered demonstrably evident by the fact that, as soon as General Sherman approached Savannah, with from 50,000 to 60,000 men, on its land side, that stronghold was abandoned without a show of defence; that Charlestown, as soon as it was threatened with an attack on the same side, by the presence of Sherman in Savannah, was evacuated without being approached at all; and that Wilmington was captured at once, when assailed by General Scofield, on the side under consideration.

Yet while our military and naval authorities put forth untold efforts, with naval and land forces, to "plug up" and capture these ports, they were always, until the period designated, assailed on the sides where they were strictly impregnable, and this with no attempt whatever to approach them in the direction where they were perfectly defenceless, and most readily approachable, and when we had an abundance of unemployed forces that might have been sent forward for that purpose. These useless and most expensive efforts were, in the face of the most earnest expostulations, persevered in from the beginning up to near the close of the war,—and that when it was well known and acknowledged that, deprived of these ports, the Confederates would be immediately rendered powerless for self-defence. When, in January 1863, we, in the presence of leading members of Congress, expostulated with President Lincoln on the subject, and inquired of him why the advantages which the possession of Hilton Head furnished us were not improved to sunder into two parts the Confederacy, on the one hand, and to capture these ports by assailing them on their land sides, on the other, his only reply was that the exclusive object of taking and holding that port was to use it as a depôt for the supply of the navy around the Southern coasts. Our reply was, that while that port was of great use for such purposes, it presented the most obvious advantages for inflicting the most crushing and deadly blows at the vital centre of the Confederacy. No such considerations, however, were of any avail to induce our military and naval authorities to adopt any effective measures for putting a stop to the fearful effusion of blood and treasure, by bringing the conflict to a termination by capturing these ports. When

we take into account what was done, for example, to "plug up" and capture the port and city of Charlestown, the heart sickens at the details of the expenditure of blood and treasure in abortive attempts to gain the ends under consideration. As soon as our ironclad fleet was in readiness, it was pushed directly into that harbour, and there subjected to the concentrated fire of all the forts and batteries around, until one vessel was sunk, and the others forced out in a shattered condition. Then, after untold efforts, a position was secured on an island from whence Fort Sumpter and the city could be reached by guns of the longest range. Years were now spent in bombarding the fortress and city, and assailing, with unsupported infantry, fortifications which could be readily defended by a few men against ten or a hundred times their number. All this was persevered in during these long years, when 80,000 men, sent out from Hilton Head, and approaching the city on the land side, would have captured it and its fortresses in a few weeks' time. Charlestown and the other ports and cities named could be seen and thought of by our military and naval authorities, however, but upon the sides where they were obviously unassailable. We shall recur to this subject again, when we come to consider the progress of events under the administration of General Grant as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United States.

CHAPTER XXIV.

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL GRANT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

IN the early part of September, General Meade became aware that Longstreet's corps had been sent to Georgia, and that Lee's force was, consequently, reduced to two corps, in all not over 50,000 men,—the army of the Potomac, under General Meade's immediate command, then consisting of five corps, numbering in all, nearly or quite, 100,000 men present for service. Our army was at the time in the vicinity of Warrenton, and that of General Lee at Culpepper, a few miles south of Rappahannock station. At this time, General Pleasanton submitted to General Meade the following plan for a grand movement upon the enemy. The plan presented was this: General Pleasanton would divide his cavalry corps into two parts, and with these would cross the Rappahannock above and below Lee's position, threaten his two wings, and thus divert his attention in these directions. While these feints were being made, two corps were to be moved to the railroad crossing at Rappahannock station, and threaten Lee with a front attack. The other three corps were in the meantime to be moved to Kelly's Ford, four miles below, passed over there, and then, by a forced march over the Rapidan, seize Gordonsville, in the rear of the Confederate army. When the three corps were sufficiently advanced, the remaining two were to move down to Kelly's Ford, and follow on and join their companions at Gordonsville. By this movement, Lee, with his little force of 50,000 men, would be perfectly insulated, a force twice as numerous as his own being in his

rear, holding all his communications, and separating him hopelessly from all his supplies, while an important river would lie between him and the army in his rear. At the same time, an army nearly as large as that under General Meade would move out from Washington to attack the Confederates from the north. Nothing was more feasible than the plan proposed, and in its accomplishment the capture of General Lee's army was inevitable. General Meade adopted the plan, and ordered promptly all the initiatory movements. General Pleasanton crossed the Rappahannock as proposed, and drew an impenetrable veil between General Lee and all that was going on in the direction of both his wings. The two corps moved to the crossings in their front, and the other three crossed at Kelly's Ford, as proposed. This was just at evening, and an open road for an unsuspected night march to Gordonsville was before our commander, every item of the plan having thus far been most fully carried out. As soon as he had got his three corps over the river, however, Meade's courage or his patriotism failed him. He accordingly ordered a halt, and during the whole night compelled one division of his army to march as rapidly as possible back and forth over the four-mile road between him and the two corps on the river above him. The object of this strange measure seems to have been to discover whether General Lee had become aware of what was going on. Without finding the remotest indication that such was the fact, our veteran commander turned from the course intended, and, moving up the river, placed his three corps on its south, opposite the two on its north side.

In conversation with General Pleasanton in respect to the farce which our army had thus been compelled to enact, General Meade admitted that he had no heart to assault his antagonist, and proposed that General Pleasanton should assume the command, and order the movements he desired. To this General Pleasanton replied that he had no authority to do any such thing; nor would the authorities at Washington confer any such power if requested to do it. While remaining in this position, two corps, the 11th and 12th, were, as we have before stated, detached from the Army of the Potomac, and sent, under General

Hooker, to that of the Cumberland. The places of these were soon supplied, and our commander addressed himself to do something effective for the public service. While making preparations to do this something,—nobody, and probably not even Meade himself, knows what,—he was startled by a report brought to him by General Gregg, who commanded a division of cavalry on our right, namely, that that division had been driven back, and that the enemy were now crossing in force at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo. Frightened out of his senses by the spectre which had thus suddenly lifted its horrid form before our General's mind, he crossed his army over the river; and then ran, for dear life, 80,000 to 100,000 men, before less than 50,000,—fled, we say, precipitately, first to Catlett's Station and then to Centerville,—to Fairfax Court House, as the Confederates affirm,—before he dared to look behind him, or permitted his army or himself to take breath. General Lee of course took advantage of this fright of our commander, and in the pursuit took several thousand prisoners with very little loss to himself, and did much damage by the destruction of Union property. There was nothing that any General of even ordinary courage and capacity would have desired more than that General Lee should have passed his army to the north side of the Rappahannock at the very points where General Meade supposed that the crossing was being made, such a movement giving our commander an opportunity to cut off the whole Confederate army from their communications and supplies, and render its speedy capture a perfect certainty. To General Meade, and to such Generals as he is, such an opportunity by such a movement on the part of the enemy, was as the sound of Gideon's trumpets to the hosts of Ammon. Such Generals not only disgrace their country, but human nature itself.

During Meade's flight and Lee's pursuit, some incidents of a truly laughable character occurred. When General A. P. Hill, for example, with his corps, struck our line of retreat, he, supposing himself in the rear of our whole army, and being about to fall upon the fugitives before him, perceived, as he looked behind, that General Warren, with his entire corps, was also advanc-

ing, with an immutable determination not to be stopped in his flight. After some severe skirmishing, Hill withdrew from the road into the woods, and Warren continued his retreat. Stuart, also, with a body of cavalry numbering some 2,000 men, in making a flank movement, got ahead of Warren, who was acting as our rear-guard, and became so completely hemmed in, that his entire force might have been captured, had our men been aware of the prize within their grasp. Stuart succeeded in concealing his cavalry in an old thicket—so near the road where our men passed by, that every word they uttered was distinctly heard by the enemy. While the rear of Warren's corps was encamped for the night right by this thicket, Stuart succeeded in getting three of his men through our ranks, and thus conveying a knowledge of his condition to General Lee. At daylight, the sound of Lee's guns indicated the approach of relief, when Stuart opened with grape and canister upon our astonished rear, and threw it into confusion. Taking advantage of the panic, he dashed by and joined his commander, we suffering considerable damage, while the Confederates suffered almost none at all.

As soon as our army faced about, at Centerville, or Fairfax Court House, some twenty-five or thirty miles from Washington, General Lee, destroying the railroads, and leaving desolation behind him, deliberately and at his leisure moved back over the Rappahannock. Ashamed of what he had done, and under rebuke even from our Commander-in-Chief, General Meade at length moved back again to the point from which he had so shamefully retreated, and recrossed the Rappahannock, having captured on the north side of it some 1,600 prisoners, who were cut off from the river by two of our brigades. After waiting at Rappahannock station until his communications were put in order, and he was assured that he was not likely to be assailed by General Lee, our commander ordered an advance. Crossing the Rapidan, and moving in the direction of Orange Court House, on two parallel roads, Orange Plank and the Orange Turnpike roads, our forces found themselves at length confronted by the army of General Lee, in a strong position behind a small

stream called Mine Run, a stream which crosses both the roads referred to at right angles. After spending three or four days in reconnoitring the enemy's position, and thus giving him full opportunity to render it impregnable, General Meade concluded that the position was too strong to be assailed, retreated over the Rapidan, and entered into winter quarters at Culpepper Court House, General Lee retiring to Orange Court House, about twenty miles nearly south of our position. Thus ended the mission of the Army of the Potomac for the year 1863.

While our army lay at Culpepper, an event occurred which ought to go into history. Among the officers of the army who were called before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, was General Pleasanton. While before the Committee, he was requested to present a plan for the conduct of the campaign in Virginia. To such a request it was, of course, the plain duty of the General to reply. The plan submitted was in substance this, and was thus presented. "I will suppose," said General Pleasanton, "that one of you represents General Lee, and myself the commander of the Army of the Potomac, you being located at Orange Court House, I at Culpepper. I will assume, as the basis of my calculations, that you concentrate, for the defence of your position, 100,000 men. I select as my centre, and the basis of my operations, Culpepper. I do this for the obvious reason that it is a very important railroad centre, on the one hand, and that holding this position, on the other, I, in connection with the army in the Peninsula, hold the control of Eastern, Central, and Northern Virginia, and cut you, as General Lee, off from the main sources of supply for your army. Having selected Culpepper as my centre, I propose to concentrate there an army 250,000 strong—to fortify the place so that 25,000 men can hold it against your whole army—to complete the necessary railroad connections with this point, and then make it the depôt of supply for my army. All these ends can be accomplished in a few weeks, and when three months' provisions for the army shall be collected, all things will be in readiness to open the campaign. My first movement will be to flank your position at Orange Court House, by sending out

150,000 men to the vicinity of Stanton, thus threatening all your communications. Under such circumstances, you, as General Lee, will be necessitated to take one of three courses. You will, in the first place, move out from your fortified position to attack me in the open country,—the end which I desire to secure. In case of your making this movement, I will move out 75,000 men from my position, throwing this force upon your right wing, while I shall precipitate 150,000 upon your centre and left. The result cannot be a matter of doubt. In moving out from your position, you will also be drawn off from your railroads, your present means of supply, and will soon be necessitated to surrender from want of provisions, your means of conveyance by waggons being very limited. Or you may remain in your position, and wait coming events there: in that case, I shall soon capture Linchburg, your main line of supplies, and, moving east on the south of James river, shall seize all your communications, cut you off from your supplies in every direction, and compel you, by starvation, to surrender. Or you may retreat upon Richmond, as you probably will do: in that case, I will move up with my whole army, and in connection with the forces in the Peninsula besiege you there with an army nearly three times as numerous as your own. Your surrender through starvation will be only a question of time. To finish up the campaign in Virginia, with the total annihilation of General Lee's army, I ask, at the farthest, but six months' time."

Such are the substance and form of presentation of the plan submitted by General Pleasanton,—a plan perfectly practicable, and most clearly evincing, on the part of its author, great generalship. This plan embraced, as its prime object, not the capture of Richmond, or any other position, but the end for which the war was prosecuted, the overthrow of the Confederacy by the destruction of its central military force, the army of General Lee,—an end never contemplated by any of our Commanders-in-Chief, or, with one or two exceptions, by any of the commanders of our leading armies. Positions, not armies, were the ends towards which all their combinations and movements were directed. Had the armies of the Confederacy been

the centres towards which all combinations and movements of the national forces had been directed, one year would have been all the time requisite to have put down for ever that Rebellion. When we stated to President Lincoln that the destruction of the armies of the Confederacy, and not the capture of its territory, cities, and strongholds, should be the end of all military operations, the suggestion startled him as a new revelation to his mind. Such an idea, we repeat, had never been entertained at Washington. We refer to our military authorities. After General Pleasanton had presented the above plan, measures were taken by members of the Committee to whom it had been presented to have him appointed a Major-General in the army, he having long acted in that capacity, but never having received his appointment. As soon as it became known to the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of War that he had presented that plan, some member of the Committee betraying confidence, our brave General was arbitrarily suspended from his command in the Army of the Potomac, and sent to the Western Department. Of General Pleasanton, justice demands that this should be said: a braver, more energetic, and skilful commander of cavalry was unknown in either army. In counsel he always advised measures which subsequent events demonstrated to have been the wisest and the best. On the field his dispositions were faultless, he there proving himself more than a match for the best cavalry commander known in the Confederate army. No single General can be named to whom the nation owes more than to him, he undeniably having, by one of the most wonderful feats known in war, saved our army at Chancellorsville, and by his wise counsels and dispositions secured for us the victory of Gettysburg. It was an unpardonable offence, however, in the judgment, not of our venerated President, but of our Commander-in-Chief, and his immediate and controlling advisers, to perform such deeds, give such counsels, and even, when required to do it, to present such plans as the above. He was not the only General that was practically deposed for deeds and counsels which promised to bring that war to a speedy termination. Hooker, for example, was never permitted to have an

active command in the field after his wondrous exploits at Chattanooga. This I know to have been the judgment of the wisest statesmen in Washington, that the men who actually controlled matters in the high places of military authority there, had no desire—but an opposite one—to bring that war to a speedy termination. The reason is obvious. The emoluments of office were too great, and the annual dispersion, in untried relations, of from \$500,000,000 to \$1,000,000,000, presented too multiplied opportunities to amass untold private fortunes, to allow controlling minds to be willing that their opportunities should pass away by the early termination of that war. To show how everything was subordinated to private emolument, take into consideration one single fact. By a fixed order at Washington, whenever a cavalry horse was killed, or disabled from any cause, its rider was to be sent to Washington to be remounted there. No expostulations of the commander of the cavalry could induce a change of this order, by having the horses sent forward to the army, so that the ranks might not be perpetually diminished by absentees at the capital. This order became a controlling motive among cavalry-men to neglect their horses, or so expose or use them that they should become unfit for service, the riders by such means gaining coveted opportunities for vacations, suspensions from active service, and visits to the national capital. By this one measure, a large amount paid for each horse and his new furnishment, went into the pockets of speculators. Such facts coming to the surface of observation, indicate the ocean current of corruption and fraud which prevailed through that war, and perpetuated it through those long years of wasteful expenditure of treasure and blood.

CHAPTER XXV.

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL ULYSSES GRANT AS LIEUTENANT-GENERAL AND COMMANDER- IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE act of President Lincoln in appointing General Halleck Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, was, as we have stated, regarded with regret and reprobation by the armies which he was appointed to command, and by the people of all parties, without exception. Nobody welcomed him to his high office, and, like his predecessor, "he departed without being desired." During the long period in which he held command, he originated no plan for the conduct of our campaigns, and suggested no combination of forces—a combination which promised to give efficiency to our arms for the suppression of the Rebellion. While he uniformly had nearly, or quite, 1,000,000 brave and disciplined soldiers under his command,—one of the largest armies ancient or modern warfare ever knew,—these immense forces were under his immediate direction, so scattered and dispersed, and that at unsupporting distances from one another, and located where most of them were of no use whatever to the national cause, that on the fields where our great battles were fought, the Confederates, with their few and feeble forces wisely concentrated, were in a majority of cases successful; and our forces were too few, or our commanders too ignorant, when we gained a victory, to improve it. During the period of his command, also, golden opportunities, as we have shown, frequently presented themselves, when, by a proper combination of the forces

under his command, he might have brought the war to an immediate termination; yet every such opportunity he failed to discern and improve. Permit us here to notice one such opportunity which lay directly under his vision during the last months of his command. It was well known in the Army of the Potomac, and in Washington, that after the departure of Longstreet to Georgia, all the available forces under General Lee's command for the defence of Virginia amounted to less than 60,000 men, while forces more than 200,000 strong lay under the immediate control of our Commander-in-Chief,—forces which might have been combined for the destruction of that little army. Suppose, now, that Burnside's corps at Annapolis had been reinforced by 20,000 men, and that these had been sent down to Fortress Monroe, and united with the 30,000 under command of General Butler in that vicinity. An army at least 80,000 strong might have been landed at Bermuda Hundred, and have taken possession of all Lee's communications south of James river, and have captured Richmond too, if he had not moved to its rescue. Between the 80,000 under Butler, and the 100,000 under Meade, how long could Lee have kept the field? None but demented minds can fail to perceive that, under such circumstances, in a very few weeks Lee's army, Richmond, Virginia, and the Carolinas, would have been in our possession. Our Commander-in-Chief, however, had no capacity to perceive such an opportunity, or to conceive the combination of forces requisite to avail himself of it. Either this was the case, or he lacked the patriotism which would prompt the ordering of the combinations and movements demanded by the circumstances. One or the other of these deductions must be adopted.

In view of all the facts and experiences of the war thus far, the conviction had become absolute among leading members of Congress, that under the administration of General Halleck and his immediate and controlling advisers, the prospect of bringing the terrible conflict to a successful termination was most distant, if not hopeless. At the same time they were assured with equal absoluteness, that President Lincoln could not be induced, such

was the influence of the Secretaries of State and of War particularly on his mind, to supersede Halleck by appointing any other Major-General in his place. Hence the necessity, in their judgment, of adopting some measure which would, under the pressure of national sentiment openly expressed through Congress, impel the President to make the change obviously demanded by existing exigences. After mature deliberation, the following measure to secure these results was adopted by overwhelming majorities in both Houses of Congress, namely, "the revival of the grade of Lieutenant-General of our armies, and the recommendation of Ulysses S. Grant for the post." This measure received the prompt approval of the President, and General Grant was appointed to the supreme command, to which his new and high office most obviously entitled him. These measures were consummated on the 8th March, 1864. The most obvious considerations render it undeniably evident that such a measure can receive the approval of impartial history but in view of the most imperious national necessity. No man but General Washington had ever been honoured by such an appointment, General Scott having only occupied the post by brevet. All the known facts of General Grant's life prior to the war revealed him as utterly disqualified to command a great army, and especially of one numbering more than 1,000,000 men. Nor can the impartial but critical historian find anything in his military career during this war, thus far, to justify his elevation to such a pre-eminence. His first essay, after he held an independent command, his essay at Belmont, was undeniably rash,—a measure in which much was lost, and vastly more risked, and all with no prospect whatever of any important advantage. At Donaldson he won deserved honour. At Shiloh, as we have seen, his conduct was most inexcusably censurable, not to say criminal. His campaign at Vicksburg, as we have also seen, was, though a final and marked success, most awkwardly conducted and needlessly protracted. All the measures which led to the relief of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga were in full operation when he assumed command there, while the measures which he then adopted were indications of military wisdom of a

very low order. Yet no General who had held a high command, had, as a matter of fact, gained such advantages and captured so many prisoners as he had. One quality he undeniably did possess — the will to act and the courage to fight. He would, on assuming command, hold in his hands a club of untold weight, and was sure to strike somewhere, even though blindly. It remains for impartial history to reveal the manner in which he “demeaned himself in his high office.”

*The plan of the grand campaign under the direction of
General Grant.*

On receiving notice of his appointment, he at once repaired to Washington, and was, March 8th, formally invested with his office as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United States. Paying a mere flying visit to the Army of the Potomac, he started back to Chattanooga to concert with General Sherman, who had been invested with the command of the entire Western Department, the plan for the great campaign about to be inaugurated. According to the plan agreed upon, three great movements were to be commenced at one and the same time. The Army of the Potomac was to act against General Lee for the capture of Richmond; that of the Cumberland was to move against General Johnston, who had superseded General Bragg, for the capture of Atlanta; and that of the Western Army, under General Banks, was to move into the heart of Texas, for the purpose of ending the war in that quarter. The reason assigned for the simultaneous movement of the Army of the Potomac under the immediate command of General Grant, and of that of the Cumberland under General Sherman, was to prevent Lee reinforcing Johnston, and Johnston reinforcing Lee. Let us stop here for a few moments, and consider carefully the essential elements and characteristics of this plan. Any well-informed military critic will at once detect in it at least five fundamental errors.

1. The plan itself involves a fundamental misapprehension of the real issues of the war at the time. But two issues then presented themselves,—the army of General Lee on the one hand, and that of General John-

ston on the other. It was perfectly obvious that, these armies being disposed of, the war was at an end everywhere. There was no more occasion, in settling the actual issues of the war,—and this was afterwards fully verified,—there was no more occasion, we say, to send an army into Texas than there was to send one to Alaska. All the national forces should have been combined and concentrated for the final settlement of the two issues above designated.

2. This plan was also based upon a contingency which did not exist, and was not at all likely to occur. In the absence of Longstreet, who was separated at an unsupported distance from both the Confederate armies, General Lee had under his command less than 50,000 men, while the army under General Johnston very little, if at all, exceeded that number. Where was the peril of either of these Generals dividing his own forces to reinforce the other, and that while each was confronted by an army more than twice as strong as his own? We can hardly conceive a more obvious or essential blunder in planning a campaign than we have before us.

3. This plan involved a delay in the movement of the Army of the Cumberland of quite two months, a period which General Johnston was certain to improve, and did improve, to the uttermost, to reinforce, and reorganize, and his disorganized forces re-supply with guns, and to employ his army, and all the able-bodied slaves of Georgia, in fortifying every defensible position in those mountain gorges between Chattanooga and Atlanta—gorges through which Sherman would be necessitated to force his uncouth way. Nothing but the most imperious necessities—and no necessities at all existed in this case—could excuse such a delay under such circumstances.

4. This delay, we remark again, kept this army in demoralizing idleness during these two spring months, and threw forward the campaign, in that unhealthy and pestilential region, into the hot summer months, the most enfeebling and fatal period of the year for northern soldiery,—months in which the least sickness, and very slight wounds, as it was affirmed during that campaign, could hardly result in anything but death, and did most com-

monly thus result. We feel quite safe in expressing the opinion, that of the more than 50,000 men which were lost during that summer march of 128 miles, the loss of more than 30,000 should be put to the account of this most imprudent delay in opening the campaign.

5. Finally, the known circumstances in which the armies of Lee and Johnston were at the time, demanded most imperiously the immediate and prompt opening of the campaign on the part both of the Army of the Potomac and of that of the Cumberland. Before General Sherman lay an almost unobstructed road to Atlanta, and a defeated and demoralized army not half as numerous as his own,—an army, too, which had just lost nearly or quite one-half of its guns. While there was no prospect that, during these two months, Sherman's army would be increased, from 10,000 to 20,000 men were certain to be added to that of Johnston. While it was certain that the condition of Sherman's army would in no respects, during these months, be improved at all, that of Johnston was certain to be brought from a disorganized to a well-organized state. At the beginning of these months Sherman, as we have said, had an open way before him to Atlanta. At their close, he was certain to find every defensible position on his march bristling with the most formidable fortifications. Nothing but the most perfect blindness to the most palpable facts can account for this two months' delay in opening the campaign in Georgia.

The case is still worse for General Grant in Virginia. By a flank movement in the direction of Stanton he could have placed an army of from 80,000 to 100,000 men between Lee and Longstreet, and rendered it impossible for them ever to reunite their forces. By sending Burnside, reinforced by 10,000 or 20,000 men, down to Fortress Monroe, an army not less than 70,000 strong could have been landed at Bermuda Hundred, and the immediate capture of Lee's army been rendered an absolute certainty. In the circumstances in which Lee's army was at the time when General Grant received his commission as Commander-in-Chief, a Wellington, Napoleon, Moltke, or any military commander of ordinary capacity, would not have asked for more than two months' time to finish up fully the

campaign in Virginia, and thus put a speedy end to the war. When the armies of Wellington and Marmont lay in the vicinity of one another in Spain, and each commander was waiting for the other to make some mistake, Marmont made a movement by which one of his wings was separated to a considerable distance from the rest of his army. The moment Wellington was informed of the fact, he exclaimed, "Marmont is ruined," and by instantly precipitating the English army upon that wing, Marmont was ruined. Had a General of one-fourth of Wellington's ability received Grant's commission, he would never have gone to Chattanooga to lay out a plan for the general campaign. Within twenty-four hours after receiving his commission, his orders would have been issued for the movement of our armies to secure the most decisive advantages then most palpably existing. This I have affirmed before the nation, and this I here repeat before my country and the world, and do so without fear of being contradicted by any candid reader of common sense, and especially by any competent judge of military matters,—that in the interval between the reception of his commission and the opening of his campaigns, General Grant ought to have totally finished up the campaign in Virginia, and thus practically ended the war: that what the nation is really indebted to him for, is a needless protraction of the war for more than a year after the period in which it might have been ended—a needless loss of more than 150,000 brave men—and a needless increase of the national debt to the amount of from \$500,000,000 to \$1,000,000,000.

*Comparative amount of the Union and Confederate forces
at this time.*

There is still another aspect of this subject which must be fully taken into account, before we can form an adequately correct judgment of the campaigns in prospect. We refer to the relative amount of forces in the Union and Confederate armies at the time. According to the official report of the Secretary of War, the report submitted to Congress the 1st of December, 1862, the Union army, according to the report of the Adjutant-

General, submitted some months previous, "amounted to 750,000 men, well armed and equipped," a force which, as the same report affirms, would, during the month of January of the following year, be increased to quite 1,000,000 men. This immense force was diminished, during the year 1863, through losses in battle, and the expiration of terms of enlistment, by more than 200,000 men. These vacancies, however, were more than supplied by the addition of upwards of 50,000 conscripts, 83,242 recruits by voluntary enlistment, and upwards of 50,000 coloured troops,—a force which was increased to quite 180,000 while General Grant held supreme command. Of the veterans whose term of service expired in the fall of the year 1863, according to the official statement of the Provost-Marshal-General, "over 136,000 tried solders, who would otherwise, ere this, have been discharged, were secured for three years longer." The army subject to General Grant's orders, at the time when he assumed supreme command, was quite equal in number to that which existed one year previous, and amounted to an effective force of quite 800,000 men. On the 1st February, 1864, the President, under a special law of Congress, issued a call for a draft of 500,000 men; on the 14th of the next month, he issued another similar call for 200,000 men; on July 18th, 500,000, and on December 20th, 300,000 were called for; making in all a draft of 1,500,000 men during this year. In the spring and summer of this year, a temporary addition was also made to our armies of 100,000 men, furnished by the several States by voluntary enlistment for one hundred days. When we affirm, therefore, that during his supreme command General Grant had constantly under his control an effective force of quite 800,000 men, we are undeniably within the circle of truth. At the time when McClellan was superseded by Burnside, the Army of the Potomac, as we have seen, numbered upwards of 300,000 men, and that exclusive of the large force under General Butler in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, and the forces under General Dix at Baltimore, and in the Middle Department. At the time when, May 5th, General Grant opened the campaign from Culpepper, this army was in

all respects much superior to what it ever was under General McClellan.

Since the above was written, we have found in the volumes recently published by General Sherman, not only a verification of the statements which we have made relatively to the amount of force under the command of General Grant, but full proof that our estimate is far within the circle of truth. General Sherman states that the forces under his command numbered about 340,000 men, and that of these upwards of 180,000 were present and fit for duty. It is well known that the Army of the Potomac outnumbered that of the Cumberland by upwards of 50,000 men. That this was the case, we have been assured by a General who held a high command in the former army up to a few weeks of the time when General Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief. From the time when General Grant assumed command up to the close of the war, our armies undeniably numbered upwards of 1,000,000 of men.

How numerous were the armies of the Confederacy during this period? According to official and reliable historic statement, these armies in the field, in all the Confederate States, did not amount in all to 200,000 men.

General Lee was never able to confront General Grant's immense forces with an army over 70,000 strong; while all the forces which the Confederate States could furnish General Johnston, against General Sherman, amounted to less than 60,000 men. The Union army, during the entire period under consideration, undeniably outnumbered that of the enemy as quite four or five to one. Yet the war, under these unheard-of circumstances, dragged its slow length along for upwards of one year, and would, as our Commander-in-Chief expected, have been protracted during the year 1865, and even longer still, had not the execution of the plan which he had definitely laid down, and was putting into execution, been, by influences outside the army, fundamentally changed.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNDER GENERAL GRANT.

ON the 4th May, 1864, the Army of the Potomac moved out from Culpepper, and that of the Cumberland from Chattanooga, on their respective campaigns; while, about the same time, General Banks moved upon his unfortunate expedition up the Red river.

The original plan of the campaign of the Army of the Potomac.

The original plan of the campaign for the army first designated was the following. The corps of General Burnside, about 40,000 strong, was to be conveyed by water from Annapolis to Fortress Monroe, and incorporated with that of General Butler, an army quite 60,000 strong being thus organized in that vicinity. When Grant should move out from Culpepper, Butler, with his army of 60,000 men, was to land at Bermuda Hundred and seize Petersburg, on the one hand, and all Lee's communications south of James river, and Richmond if possible, on the other.

This plan, it will be at once perceived, is an exact copy of the one we laid before the President and other leading minds in Washington, in January, 1863,—a plan fully approved at the time by the corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, and, as we have been informed, by General Butler, who had then returned from New Orleans. It was General Butler, as we have also been informed, who submitted the plan to General Grant and secured its adoption by him. Had the plan, as originally projected, been carried out, and especially with the addition of 10,000 or 20,000 men, brought up from the Carolinas and sent down from Washington, which could have been done as well as

not, it would have been, most obviously, the grand movement of the war, and would soon have ended the Eastern Campaign, by the capture of Lee's army, of Richmond, and the ready conquest of Virginia and the Carolinas. Just before he was ready to move, however, Grant ordered Burnside to move from Annapolis to the vicinity of Culpepper, and at the same time issued an absolute order to Butler to land with 20,000 men at Bermuda Hundred, and accomplish, or attempt the accomplishment of, the great flank movement above indicated. General Butler did move as commanded, and seized the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond, and in his despatches affirmed himself able to hold the advantage he had gained. The nation received the intelligence with ecstatic joy, and inferred from it the great success of the campaign which was being inaugurated. We openly spake of the movement with deep regret and reprobation. Our views were soon the topic of general remark in the community, and the late Judge Barbour called upon us, and thus remarked: "Dr. Mahan, the Republicans are saying very hard things of you, and I have called to advise you to be cautious about what you may say. We know very well that ever since the war began you have advocated the identical movement which General Butler has made, and now, when it has been successfully made, you speak of it with reprobation. Such inconsistencies appear mysterious and inexcusable to us, and I would seriously advise you to restrain further remarks upon the subject." "Please say to the Republicans and Democrats too, Judge Barbour," we replied, "that Dr. Mahan will continue to utter what he thinks on this and other subjects. It is true, as you state, that I have advocated such a movement, and that to secure such a movement was a known object of my visit to Washington in the winter of 1862-3. While I have thus advocated this movement, I have, as you and the Republicans and Democrats around you well know, ever maintained that this movement should not be made with an army less than from 70,000 to 100,000 strong. Now that it has been made with 20,000 men, I pronounce it a ridiculous and tragic farce. Please say to our Republican and Democratic friends, that Dr. Mahan affirms that General Butler

will be driven back with loss the very first blow he shall receive, and that that blow will fall within two or three days. Say to them, further, that Dr. Mahan expresses the sad belief that, in ordering this absurd and tragic farce, General Grant has revealed an utter incapacity to lead a great army in a campaign of vital importance such as this is, and that the campaign which he has inaugurated will be a disastrous one." "But General Butler says that he can hold his present position." "I know that he says so. I tell you, however, that he can't do it, and that events will issue as I have foreshadowed them." We all know now that the blow did fall, and that General Butler was driven back as predicted, and was "bottled up at Bermuda Hundred." For the credit of General Butler, it should be said that, prior to this event, he made the attempt, with a force 20,000 strong, to capture Richmond by surprise, and was only prevented doing so by a culprit who, by bribery, escaped from prison, and gave the Confederates timely notice of the impending peril. In this expedition our commander marched his infantry the astonishing distance of 80 miles in fifty-six hours, and moved his cavalry 150 miles in fifty hours.

A plan proposed.

When we learned that Burnside was ordered to Culpepper, instead of being sent to Fortress Monroe, we forwarded to Washington the following plan for the conduct of the campaign,—a plan which was laid before the President and his advisers,—namely, nothing should be done within the circle of Butler's command. He, with his forces, on the other hand, should be brought up to the Department of Washington, and there united with the corps of Burnside. With 10,000 to 20,000 men added to this body, a second army should be constituted and secretly located at the crossings over the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg. When all things should be in readiness, this army, under General Butler, for example, should cross the river, and by a rapid march through Chancellorsville and Spottsylvania, move directly upon Richmond,—General Grant, with his army, in the meantime, moving directly upon Lee's position at Orange Court House. In this double

movement, the contiguous wings of our two armies should be kept in continuous communication with one another, so that, in an exigency, either army could go to the other's help. Under such circumstances, General Lee would be necessitated to adopt one or the other of the following courses. He might remain where he was, and await there the approach of General Grant. In that case, Butler would capture Richmond and seize all Lee's communications south of James river. Being thus cut off from its supplies, the capture of the Confederate army would be only a question of time. Or, General Lee might move out to attack Butler. In that case, in the open country, Lee would encounter an army as large as his own, while Grant, with a still larger force, would fall upon the Confederate army and crush it. In the next place, Lee might retreat to Richmond. In that case, he would soon find himself surrounded with a circle of fire, through which it would be impossible for him to break, and, by starvation, he would soon be forced to surrender. Or, finally, Lee might attempt a retreat into the Carolinas. In that case, while hard pressed by our forces, he would be thrown from his railroad communications, cut off from his supplies, and from want of provisions be necessitated to disperse or surrender his army. It is perfectly obvious, that had this, or the plan previously suggested by General Pleasanton, been adopted, the destruction of General Lee's army would have been accomplished in a short time, and at a very small expense of human life. All the known principles of military science, and all the examples of successful warfare, required that Grant should have made Lee's position at Orange Court House his objective point, or centre, and that he should have approached that position in connection with a great flank movement upon Lee's right or left wing, and it mattered little which.

The campaign as actually conducted.

It now remains to consider how a campaign inaugurated by a false and tragico-farical movement south of James river, in the first instance, and directed towards a totally wrong centre, in the next, was conducted by our Commander-in-Chief.

Moving out from Culpepper, advancing on a single line, and making Richmond his objective point, General Grant was necessitated to cross the Rapidan, and pass through a region of country known as the Wilderness, an almost totally uninhabited region, from which the timber had often been cut off for mining purposes, and had consequently become a densely overgrown thicket. This Wilderness, which is situated directly east of General Lee's position at Orange Court House, extends south from the river named to the vicinity of Spottsylvania Court House, and is crossed, among others, by two excellent highroads which branch off from the village where the Confederate army lay, and consequently furnished its ever-vigilant commander the best possible opportunity to assail and strike through ours when on its line of march. It was over this river, and through this Wilderness, and in the form stated, that General Grant made his advance upon Richmond. What, judging it from the military standpoint, shall we think of that advance? It was made, permit us to say, in the first place, upon one of the most perilous and universally condemned and reprobated principles known to the science of war. We refer to a *lateral* movement, on a single line, directly in front of the position occupied by a powerful and ever-vigilant foe. It was just such a movement, on the part of the forces of the Coalition, that gave Buonaparte his world-renowned victory at Austerlitz, and Wellington his great victory over Marmont in Spain. This lateral movement of General Grant was made, we add, in the most perilous circumstances conceivable. No spot in the wide world can be selected where such a movement would give greater advantages to the enemy than General Grant's movement through that Wilderness presented to General Lee. The roads diverging from Lee's position, and cutting our line at different points, gave him the best possible facilities to advance his army upon that line, while the Wilderness itself gave him the best possible opportunities to conceal his movements, and to deliver his blows at the very times and places when and where the effects would be most fatal to our army. Nor is it possible to conceive of such a bad movement made in a more careless and stupidly presump-

tuous manner than was this of General Grant. It cannot be shown, while he was moving on the worst principle, and in the most perilous circumstances conceivable, that he took any proper caution at all to guard his extended line against surprise. On the other hand, he moved on, into and through that Wilderness, almost exclusively, as he would have done had he known that no enemy whatever existed to disturb his march. No wonder that Lee's attack was a surprise, and that it cost us the horrible loss of between 20,000 and 30,000 brave men. A commander of common intelligence and prudence, if he had resolved on such a movement, would have stopped a division at each of the roads referred to: the first that touched them, would have deployed those divisions in battle array, sent out his pickets in the direction of the enemy, rendering a surprise impossible, and then led the rest of his forces in the rear of those divisions. Our army, however, moved blindly on, as if their commander had lost his reason, or never had any. Let us now consider the facts of the case.

Having reduced his army, Burnside's corps excepted, from five to three corps, General Hancock being put in command of the 2nd, General Warren of the 5th, and General Sedgwick of the 6th, the grand movement commenced May 4th. Warren, followed by Sedgwick, crossed the Rapidan at Germania Ford, and pushed on in a serpentine course into the Wilderness. Hancock, crossing at Ely's Ford, several miles below, moved in the direction of Chancellorsville. The first day our advance was almost wholly, as General Lee intended it should be, unimpeded, the Confederate pickets falling back without hardly firing a gun. As soon as our line was well extended into the Wilderness, a region unknown to our commanders, but well known and carefully studied by the enemy, the Confederate army, which had been looking northward in the direction of our position at Culpepper, faced to the right, moved up on the roads above referred to, and formed their line of battle parallel to that of our carelessly moving columns. The Confederate line was formed in most propitious circumstances, very strong defences lying at Mine Run, some six miles east of their position,—defences to which they could safely retreat in case of defeat. This army, like ours, was divided

into three corps, commanded respectively by Generals A. P. Hill, Longstreet, and Ewell. What saved our army from a total rout was the fact that Longstreet's corps, lately arrived from Tennessee, was stationed at Charlottesville, two marches distant from Orange Court House, and only came up in time to take part in the battle of the second day. The Confederate line was directly parallel to that on which Warren's and Sedgwick's corps were moving,—that of Hancock, who moved on another road, being miles distant, and quite in advance of Warren's most advanced division. The arrangement of the Confederate line brought Hill, who was on their right, in conflict, June 5th, with Warren, while Ewell, with his corps, struck Sedgwick. As Warren was moving unsuspectingly along, Hill suddenly drove in the 5th New York Cavalry with loss, and struck our advancing column heavily in front before our army was in position to make or receive an attack. The shock was irresistible, of course, and one brigade after another was driven back with great slaughter. About 3 p.m., Hancock, who had received orders to close up on Warren's left, was seen approaching. Hill, who had closed round Warren's left flank, threw a strong force between our two corps, which were endeavouring to form a junction. This brought on a most terrible conflict, in which our columns were saved by the most obstinate fighting from being utterly routed. A little after 1 p.m., Ewell opened upon Sedgwick. In the early part of the conflict, only a small part of Ewell's corps having come up, the advantage was on our side, and the enemy were compelled to give ground. At length, the Confederates having come up in force, our line was charged and driven back with loss, we not only losing heavily in killed and wounded, but also about 1,000 prisoners, having in our prior advance captured about 300. Thus the battle ended for the first day, our loss being exceedingly heavy as compared with that of the enemy.

The morning of the next day, June 6th, the battle opened early, Longstreet having come up on the part of the Confederates, and taken position between Hill and Ewell; while Burnside, by a forced march during the night, had arrived on our side, his corps being thrown in

between Sedgwick and Warren. The intention of Grant was to have opened the battle by an advance on our side, Sedgwick being ordered to advance at 5 a.m. This advance was anticipated, however, by an attack from Ewell, he attempting to turn our right flank. This attack, which was twice repeated during the forenoon, was only a feint to mask the real assault which was to be precipitated upon Hancock. At 5 a.m. Hancock moved forward and pressed Hill back nearly two miles, capturing a large number of prisoners. Here our advancing line was struck by Longstreet's veterans, who had just come up, and our whole front was thrown into confusion, and was saved from a complete rout by the aid of Burnside's men. Longstreet, in turn, was driven back, and himself was disabled by a severe wound. The enemy now massed upon Warren, and drove him back to his entrenched line. Still farther to the right, the lamented General James S. Wadsworth fell in an endeavour, by his division, to stem the tide of death that was rolling over our devoted ranks. During a short lull, our centre was strengthened by throwing Burnside's corps between those of Hancock and Warren. While this was being done, General Lee assuming direct command, after the fall of Longstreet, of Hill's and Longstreet's corps, fell with crushing weight upon our left and left centre, forcing them back, and striking so heavily upon Stevens's division of Burnside's corps, that it fled in disorder, and the Confederates rushed through our broken line. Carroll's brigade of Hancock's corps now assaulted the enemy in flank, and they in their turn were driven back. This ended the conflict on our left and centre.

After our commanders supposed that the battle was over for the day, the Confederates suddenly massed upon Sedgwick, routing two of his brigades, and taking and leading off about 4,000 prisoners, including the commander of one of them, General Seymour. For a time it seemed that our whole right wing, and with it our army itself, was likely to be routed, and this might have been the case, had not darkness put an end to the conflict.

What added inconceivable horror to the scene on that field of blood, was the fact that while the wounded and

dead of both armies, lay, like autumn leaves, scattered all through the Wilderness, the dry rubbish there at length took fire, and added suffocation and burning to the agony which those wounded sufferers were already enduring. War itself can hardly furnish a parallel to the spectacle then and there presented.

In this battle, General Lee carried out to perfection his favourite and peculiar method of attack, massing his columns first upon one part of our line and then upon another, finding a weak point in this line and breaking through that, and, finally, suddenly rushing through any opening which might be discovered between any of our divisions or corps, and rolling up our line in both directions. Never was a battle fought on a field which afforded the assaulting parties better facilities for practising this system of tactics, than did this Wilderness, in which our army was so helplessly shut in, all of Lee's movements being concealed from our commanders, while his command of our entire front, together with our ignorance and his full knowledge of the grounds themselves, enabled him to strike when and where and in what form he pleased, and to render all his assaults a surprise. The Battle of the Wilderness was to our army, undeniably, Shiloh repeated, with this difference, that the former was a surprise from beginning to end. A reconnaissance the next day discovered that Lee, having entrenched his whole front, awaited our attack, without showing any disposition to take the offensive himself. In this state the day was spent. In the evening a council of war was held at the head-quarters of our Commander-in-Chief. It is affirmed by those who profess to know, that, in the judgment of most of the corps commanders present, our army had suffered such a defeat as rendered a retreat necessary. In the council nothing positive was determined on, at least avowedly so, and each General left carrying in his hand an order, not for a retreat, but for an advance out of the Wilderness in the direction of Spottsylvania Court House.

Our loss in this terrible battle could not have been much, if any, less than 25,000 men, General Meade admitting a loss of quite 20,000, exclusive of the losses in Burnside's corps, which could not have been much less than 5,000. The Confederates admit a loss of 7,000, which is

probably not far from the truth. We have great occasion for thankfulness that a campaign conducted upon such a false principle, and in such a recklessly careless and presumptuous manner, cost us no heavier disaster. Of Grant's plan of the campaign, and especially of the march through the Wilderness, we may safely challenge every military critic on earth to designate a single feature or circumstance demanding commendation, a single feature or circumstance that was not in flagrant and presumptuous and most stupid violation of all the known and universally acknowledged principles of strategy. As thus far developed and conducted, this is about the only campaign known in history of which something cannot be said in its justification, but must, in strict justice, be pronounced totally wrong, and most flagrantly so, in every solitary particular. Impartial history has but one single apology to make for the horrid slaughter of those thousands of brave men—the blank ignorance and stupidity of our Commander-in-Chief.

In the movement out of the Wilderness, Warren took the lead, commencing his march at 9 p.m., a body of cavalry moving in advance. On his way, his march was impeded by obstructions of the road and a cavalry fight. As he emerged from the Wilderness at a place called Alsop's Farm, he found himself anticipated by Longstreet, who had drawn up his line behind the small river Ny, and had placed his guns upon a ridge so as to sweep our columns as they passed. After a mutual cannonade, Warren advanced Robinson's division to the assault. Our forces being outnumbered, Robinson was driven back, and was himself severely wounded. Later in the day, May 8th, a portion of the 6th corps having come up, the assault was resumed with success, and the advance was renewed.

The Battle at Spottsylvania Court House.

The next day our army emerged from the Wilderness, and drew up its lines in front of Spottsylvania Court House, the Confederate fortifications then being occupied by Generals Hill and Ewell, General Lee moving upon the cord, while our army moved upon the circle, of an arc, he having anticipated our advance. At our first formation, Hancock took position on our right, Warren in the centre,

and Sedgwick on the left. While in the act of placing his guns, Sedgwick was struck in the face by the bullet of a sharpshooter, and instantly fell dead; General H. G. Wright succeeding him in the command of the 6th corps. We should bear in mind here, that our army drew up in front of formidable batteries which had all been prepared beforehand and sodded for preservation. When Burnside came into position on our left, two divisions, Barlow's and Gibbon's,—our batteries having previously opened fire,—charged upon the rifle-pits in front of the 2nd and 5th corps. This brought on a general engagement, in which various attempts were made to dislodge the enemy, but with no decisive success anywhere. Our loss in the battle of this day, May 9th, was severe,—that of the enemy in his rifle-pits, and behind his batteries, being, of course, comparatively small.

The following despatch from General Grant to the War Department is explicable but upon the hypothesis that he was ignorant of the facts of the case, or paid no respect to them :—

"Head-quarters in the Field,

May 11th, 1867, 8 a.m.

"We have now ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The result, to this time, is very much in our favour. Our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I think the loss of the enemy must have been greater.

"We have taken over 5,000 prisoners by battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except stragglers.

"I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer.

*"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General
Commanding the Armies of the United States."*

Near the close of the battle of the second day in the Wilderness, the enemy captured, at one time, about 4,000 prisoners,—all our missing during the battle being about 7,000, as officially reported. Had the loss of the enemy been "much greater" than ours, as General Grant affirms it "must have been," General Lee would, in fact, have been

without an army of any account. He had at this time, as we shall see, an army sufficiently strong to defeat General Grant at this place, at North Anna, at Cold Harbour, at Petersburg, Weldon Railroad, and other places, and hold him stationary at Petersburg until the spring of 1865. About the line to which he refers in his famous utterance, the historical critic may properly ask whether our Commander-in-Chief, in that utterance, referred to the line which he did pursue, namely, the outer line of an arc extending round from Culpepper to Petersburg. If this is the line referred to, the utterance is to the perpetual discredit of its author. If the line referred to is the direct one from Culpepper to Richmond, then General Grant fought but a single battle, his first, on that line. The prudence of giving forth such an utterance at all may well be questioned, as it could not have been concealed from the enemy, and revealed to him the fixed plan of our commander.

May 11th was spent in preparation for the great battle which was to be fought the next day. At midnight, Hancock moved from our extreme right and took post between Burnside on our left, and Sedgwick's corps, now commanded by Wright, Warren occupying our right opposite to Hill, who occupied the extreme left of the enemy's line, Ewell being in their centre, and Longstreet occupying their extreme right. The Confederate line conformed to two sides of a triangle, the centre and point of which, consisting of a mass of earthworks, which were occupied by a portion of Ewell's corps, the division of General Johnson. Under cover of a dense fog, which had succeeded the heavy rain of the previous afternoon, Hancock the next morning moved, in two lines, four divisions of his corps, Barlow's and Birney's, and Gibbon's and Mott's, directly upon the salient angle of earthworks referred to. The enemy, as we were in the Wilderness, was taken by surprise. The two front divisions, those of Barlow and Birney, rushed over those works, and captured Johnson, and Brigadier-General G. H. Stewart, with about 3,000 prisoners, and thirty guns,—Lee himself barely escaping being taken prisoner. This signal advantage induced a simultaneous advance of our entire line. At all points,

the dreadful charges made were unsuccessful, and Hancock, though strongly reinforced, was unable to advance, as was hoped, beyond the position he had gained. After repelling five desperate charges which Lee made to recover his lost ground, Hancock retired, getting off but twenty of the guns he had captured,—after Lee had ceased his attacks, and had fortified and held a line in front of the position he had lost.

From May 12th to May 18th was spent in endeavours to find some weak point in the enemy's line; but all to no purpose. On this day, four divisions, as at the first,—to wit, Gibbon's and Barlow's, supported by those of Birney and Tyler,—were pushed upon the Confederate defences near those where Hancock's attack had been made. The assault was, of course, repulsed with heavy loss. On the afternoon of the next day, General Lee, under the impression that our army was retiring in the direction of its left flank, made an assault upon our right, now weakened by the movement referred to. This attack, by the aid of the 2nd and 5th corps, was repulsed, and the next night, May 20-21, our army resumed its march.

Our losses up to this time, on this fatal march, amounted, according to General Meade's official report, to 39,791 men. This does not include the losses of Burnside in the Battle of the Wilderness, nor those of General Butler at and near Bermuda Hundred, nor the losses of our cavalry in their various raids. Putting all these together, they constituting parts of one campaign, and our losses during the fourteen days from May 6th, when the Battle of the Wilderness commenced, to May 20th, when that at Spottsylvania Court House ended, amounted to somewhat more than 50,000 men. From the circumstances in which these battles were fought, and from the known strength of Lee's army after this period, as well as from the Confederate reports, we are bound to conclude that the losses of the enemy did not amount to much, if any, more than one-fifth of ours.

Sheridan's Raid.

As our army emerged from the Wilderness, what we have referred to as a peculiarity of this war, the main part

of our cavalry was sent off, under General Sheridan, on a raid in the direction of Richmond,—a raid in which considerable damage was done to railroads, bridges, and depôts; and in a fight with Stuart and his cavalry, this famous cavalry commander and General Gordon were mortally wounded, the Confederate cavalry driven off, and the road to Richmond left open. We were assured by a Confederate officer who was in the city at the time, that it was defenceless, and might have been captured, had Sheridan assaulted it with the entire force under his command. Custer, with a single division, made an assault upon the outer defences, captured a hundred prisoners, and was then repulsed. Sheridan, however, with his corps united, crossed the Chickahominy, and moving up by the White House, rejoined our army.

Movement to North Anna.

The next movement of our army, by its left flank, was by a circuitous and difficult detour eastward, around to the point where the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the North Anna River. To this point, our movement being readily discoverable from the high position held by General Lee, the Confederate army was, by the direct and excellent road from Spottsylvania to that point, moved at easy marches. When our army arrived at its objective point, it found its old and terrible antagonist in an admirable position on the south side of the river, and there fully prepared to question our right to move another step in that direction towards the Confederate capital. In his attempt to advance upon the enemy's position, General Grant soon got our army into as complete and ridiculous a limbo as can be imagined. As the river approaches the Confederate position, it deflects from its eastern to a south-eastern direction. After running in this direction for about a mile, it turns to the north-east, and, running in this direction about a mile and a half, turns again in a south-eastern direction. The river thus forms curves like two oxbows, with the corners of each widely extended,—the point of the first nearly touching the Confederate centre, the south side of the peninsula formed by the other being covered by their right

wing. His left wing was formed on a road running a little west of south. At this time, also, Lee was reinforced by the corps of Breckinridge, who had defeated Sigel in the valley of the Shenandoah. In his endeavour to get within striking distance of his antagonist, Grant passed Warren's and Wright's corps, and a division of Burnside's, over the river in front of the Confederate left, while the remainder of Burnside's corps and the right of that of Hancock were located within the oxbow first described, and in front of the Confederate centre. The remainder of Hancock's corps was formed over the river, and within the other oxbow, and in front of the Confederate right wing. Thus our army was divided into three parts, separated from each other by the river, and so separated that neither could help the other in case of a disaster. The Confederate army, on the other hand, was not only in a strong and fortified position, but was so situated that it could, in its entirety, act as a unity, and concentrate upon either of our wings as it chose. The river, which cut and separated our army into three parts, it should be borne in mind, is fordable only at different points, and barely fordable at these, while its banks are high and rocky. The formation of General Lee's army very much resembled ours at Gettysburg, the wings being thrown back, the right being protected from being flanked by marshes, and the left by Little river, while in the centre all advance on the part of Burnside was barred most effectually by the river with its rapid current and steep banks. The nature of the ground, also, presented the greatest facilities for mutual support, and concurrent action on the part of every portion of Lee's army with every other. The position of our army, when the intended crossings were made, and that with very little loss,—resembled that of General Lee at the same place, with this difference, that the parts into which our army was divided could not support one another, and in case of disaster on the part of either wing, a retreat was impossible. When our line was formed, and Burnside attempted a crossing in his front, the attempt was repelled with heavy loss; and when Warren sent a division down the south side of the river, that division was at once assailed with crushing force, and with much difficulty

saved from being wholly annihilated or captured. The limbo into which our army had been so stupidly and presumptuously led, became at length so palpable as to command the regard of even our Commander-in-Chief. On the evening of May 26th a retreat was accordingly ordered, and by the next morning our army was in safety on the north side of the river. In this affair our loss is reported as amounting in all to 1,607 men.

Movement to Cold Harbour, and battle at that place.

Falling back to some distance, General Grant moved a considerable march to the east, and then faced south again. In the progress of this march, our army crossed the Pamunkey river, and came upon or approached the ground occupied by the portion of McClellan's army which lay north of the Chickahominy two years previous. There, in front of a village called Cold Harbour, General Grant found himself confronted by General Lee, in a strong and fortified position, about a mile north of another small place called New Cold Harbour, and of another place called Gaine's Mill, where the battle which goes by that name was fought before McClellan's retreat to Harrison's Landing.

Our line, now strengthened by 10,000 men sent round from General Butler, was thus constituted: Hancock was on the left; Wright first, and then Smith—from Butler's command—in the centre; next Warren, with Burnside on his right and rear. In gaining this position, an attempt was made on our left to force our way across the Chickahominy. This attempt, which brought on a severe conflict, failed with the loss of quite 2,000 men on our side, we capturing from the enemy about 600 prisoners. Nothing, in the judgment of General Grant, remained but a simultaneous advance of our whole line directly upon that of the enemy, we moving up in open and helpless exposure upon rifle-pits and breastworks behind which the Confederates, in quiet and conscious security, waited our presumptuous approach. When General Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff, saw the advance, he cried out in blasphemous horror at the spectacle. At about sunrise the advance was made, naked infantry helplessly exposed, in circumstances where

nothing but ineffable stupidity could expect success,—helplessly exposed, to be slaughtered by every engine of destruction which military science has invented. The result could not have been otherwise than it was. Nowhere was a permanent advantage gained. Everywhere, on the other hand, our ranks, as they came within range of the enemy's fire, were swept away by a desolating tempest of death missiles. In twenty minutes after the first shot was fired, our columns were seen flying back in utter confusion, leaving behind them more than 10,000 of their comrades dead, weltering in their gore, or prisoners in the hands of the enemy, the Confederate loss being less than 1,000 men. Some hours later, that stupidity might reach its consummation, and make itself fully manifest to the world,—some hours later, we say, when our ranks were re-formed, every corps commander received an absolute order to renew the assault immediately, and that in the exact form in which the first had been made. To this mad and stupid order, the army unanimously and absolutely refused obedience, every portion of our line remaining stationary.

Our loss on this bloody field and vicinity, amounted, as officially reported, to 13,153 men, that of the Confederates being about 1,000. We fully believe that the battle of Cold Harbour, except in the campaigns of General Grant, has no parallel in history. Let the reader conceive of an army of nearly, or quite, 100,000 infantry, drawn up in a line of battle of from three to four miles in extent, and standing there in front of a line of batteries of corresponding length—batteries bristling with all the engineering of death which the science of modern warfare has ever known, and behind which more than 50,000 veteran troops are waiting in quiet security the approach of our death-devoted line. Let the reader now conceive that, before a cannon has been fired from our position to disturb the enemy in his, that line of infantry is pushed up within the range of fire of all these batteries, and of those 50,000 sharpshooters, that as soon as our line can be re-formed, after it has recoiled and fled in disorder from the deadly tempest to which it was subject, it receives an absolute order to move up a second time, and be slaughtered as it had

been before. We affirm, without fear of contradiction from any well-informed and candid mind, that such orders could have originated but from a blind and dogged stupidity of which the history of war furnishes no parallel.

Movement across James River to Petersburg.

General Grant had now tried in vain, and that with the sacrifice of upwards of 50,000 men, to find, between Culpepper and James river, some line on which he could advance his army to Richmond. To a mind as blank as his, but one alternative remained, namely, to seek a road to the Confederate capital, south of that river,—that is, *viâ* Petersburg. He accordingly passed his army over the James, and advanced upon the city last named. From the first, a fatality seemed to attend the approach of our army to this city. The policy of our commander was to capture the city before Lee could arrive to defend it. General Smith, who with his corps had been returned by water to Butler, was sent promptly forward to seize the place. When he approached the city, and found it wholly undefended, he, as Meade did when Lee's whole army was within his grasp, hesitated and delayed until the Confederate army began to arrive. When Hancock with his corps arrived, and put all his forces at Smith's disposal, the weak man still hesitated and delayed, until Lee's veterans came up, and Petersburg was rendered impregnable. At length—Lee, as usual, being before us—our army came up in force; and now, June 16th, an opportunity presented itself to General Grant to repeat, in the same form, the tragedy of Cold Harbour, Spottsylvania, and other places,—that is, in three successive assaults, in which, in all but the last, lines of naked infantry were stupidly pushed up in front of impregnable and destructive batteries, to lose, nearly or quite, 20,000 more brave men. It is useless to detail the form in which such senseless and madly presumptuous assaults were made, Cold Harbour being the proper example of the rest. In the first, before Petersburg, we lost 9,665 men, in the second 5,316, and in the last 4,008, independent of 868 in the trenches. The last of these assaults was on this wise. General Burnside had run a mine under the central fort of the Confederate

line, and had all arrangements perfected for the assault, as soon as the mine should be sprung. Immediately before the time for the explosion and the assault, General Meade assumed the authority to change the whole programme. At 4.30 a.m. the mine was sprung, and the fort, with its 300 occupants, was lifted 200 feet into the air, and a deep chasm was left in its place. At the same moment our batteries opened all along the line in the vicinity of the explosion. In consequence of the disarrangement referred to, the assault was delayed, or rendered ineffective, for quite two hours, during which time the enemy fully recovered his lost self-possession, and rushed to the defence of his broken line. The result was, that our attacking columns were driven back and huddled together in that chasm, where they were slaughtered as the Confederates willed. In this abortive effort we lost quite 4,400 men, the entire loss of the enemy being less than 1,000.

General Grant, fully convinced at last that Petersburg could not be captured by an assault in front, attempted to turn the enemy's right by a flank movement in the direction of Weldon Railroad. In the various conflicts in this direction, we lost about 14,000 more men. At length, all efforts in that direction were abandoned, and our whole army, in the latter part of October, returned to its entrenchments before the city.

Our army as distributed in front of Petersburg, and our prior losses.

To understand the situation of our army from the middle of June 1864, when it crossed James river, to the last of March 1865, when the great movement which led to General Lee's surrender was made, we must take into account the following facts. Our line of defences extended from the south front of Petersburg north to James river, and then a corresponding distance north of that river, making an almost straight line of fortifications from twenty to thirty miles in extent. This position General Grant had gained by months of tedious marching and terrible fighting, in which he had, directly under his own

eye, as furnished by one of his staff to the author of "Grant and his Campaigns," lost the appalling sum of 88,387 men. If we add to these what is not therein included, namely, the losses in Burnside's corps before it was incorporated with the Army of the Potomac, in the various cavalry raids, and in the Army of the James, the amount will far exceed 100,000 men, that of the Confederates being not over one-third, if they were one-fourth, of that number.

What the country lost and gained by this campaign.

Let us stop for a moment and inquire what we have lost and gained by this enormous and appalling sacrifice of men and treasure. When the Army of the Potomac lay at Culpepper, we held full command of all Eastern, Central, and Northern Virginia. Our national capital, and the Shenandoah Valley, were also so perfectly protected, that all our forces at the places named, in the Peninsula, in the Valley, and in Washington, those necessary for mere garrison duty excepted, could have been effectively employed for a combined movement upon General Lee and the Confederate capital. When our army sat down before Petersburg, we had surrendered all Central Virginia, and had fully exposed the national capital, the valley referred to, Western Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. All the railroads south of the Rappahannock and east of Richmond were also surrendered; while all north of that river, with their bridges, were constantly exposed to be broken up. Just as the great harvest was coming on, the largest and richest portion of the great State of Virginia was given up to be drawn upon for the support of the Confederate army. Before our army moved, the Government had in its own hands the chief means of transport for provisions and supplies. In its new and insulated position, these provisions and supplies had to be conveyed, at the most enormous expense, by vessels hired of speculators at their own prices. In consequence of the new position of our army, also, we were necessitated to keep two additional ones of large magnitude for mere defence—one for the protection of Washington, and the other to defend

the Shenandoah Valley, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. But this was not the worst of the case. These three great armies—that at Petersburg, that at Washington, and that in the Shenandoah Valley—were so located that co-operative action between them was impossible, while neither could by itself do any effective service whatever. The two last-named could, of course, do nothing but stand on the defensive. How was it with that immediately under Grant? There was nothing in its rear to be done. In front it was everywhere stopped by impregnable fortifications. All attempts to move south had been defeated, and to move north was to retreat. Thus all these three armies were perfectly paralyzed for any offensive service—that under Grant being as completely “bottled up” and corked up as was possible. It is impossible to conceive armies in a more helpless condition than were those under consideration, while all General Lee’s communications were most open and secure. The worst feature of Grant’s position at Petersburg yet remains to be stated. When he located one part of his army on the south and the other on the north side of the James river, three powerful ironclads, with other war vessels, were in process of construction at Richmond. January 23rd, 1865, when our army was divided as stated, when our war vessels were, with very few exceptions at distant stations, and when the portion of our army that lay before Petersburg had a supply of provisions but for a very short time, the Confederate fleet, consisting of three ironclads — the *Virginia*, *Fredericksburg*, and *Richmond*, five wooden steamers, and three torpedo boats, dropped down the river in the darkness of night. At midnight they passed Fort Brady, and in returning its fire disabled one of its 100-pounders. They then broke the chain in front of the obstructions placed in the river by General Butler at the lower end of Dutch Gap. The *Fredericksburg* passed through; the *Virginia*, *Richmond*, and another vessel called *Drewry*, fortunately for us, grounded. The vessel last named was blown up; and the *Virginia*, before it could be got off, was fatally injured by a 300-pound bolt from one of our monitors. This rendered the accomplishment of the Confederate plan impossible, and the

remainder of the fleet returned to Richmond. Had the plan under consideration been successful, and our army, as a consequence, inseparably divided, General Lee with his whole army—all preparations being made for the purpose—would have fallen upon General Grant's left wing with the intent of rolling it up upon the centre and right of our divided forces, and thus capturing them. If this assault should not succeed, another part of his plan was to stop all supply of provisions, and thus compel Grant's surrender. The conquest of our army north of the river would then have been only a question of time. From all this peril that army was delivered by this providential accident, the grounding of those vessels. The stupid presumption involved in selecting a position so insulated, and which so palpably exposed our army to such perils, is too obvious to require further comment. The last result that we notice of Grant's leaving Culpepper as he did, and conducting the campaign as he did, is the additional loss of between 40,000 and 50,000 men in the Valley of the Shenandoah and in Northern Virginia. General Grant's conduct of his Virginia campaign undeniably cost us the loss of nearly or quite 150,000 men, an army more than twice as large as General Lee commanded at the opening of that campaign—a campaign protracted through quite eleven months of stupid fighting and demoralizing idleness, attended by an enormous expense of treasure to the nation. All this occurred when no strategist of ordinary capacity would, with Grant's resources when he lay at Culpepper, have asked more than two months to have finished up the campaign in Virginia and the Carolinas, and would readily have accomplished all this with a loss of less than 20,000 men. The history of all wars, since gunpowder was invented, absolutely verifies these statements. A view hereafter to be presented of General Grant's actual advantages to have brought the war to a speedy termination, during all the nine months, or nearly, that he lay in idleness before Petersburg, will evince, if possible, beyond any facts we have yet presented, his utter ignorance of the whole science and art of war, and of ever ordinary common sense in its conduct.

A general and specific view of General Grant's plan of the entire campaign.

The plan of General Grant, as far as he had any,—a plan which Mr. Greeley calls “General Grant's comprehensive plan of campaign,” but which, as we shall see, in the mind of its originator really comprehended nothing, this plan involved concentrative and co-operative movements on a larger scale and over a wider extent of country than we have yet indicated. Simultaneously with his own movement through the Wilderness, and Butler's advance *viâ* Bermuda Hundred, General Sigel was required to move up the Shenandoah, and General Crook up the Kanawha; the Generals last named being directed to meet and unite in the vicinity of Stanton and Lynchburg. The fundamental vice of the plan was this, namely, that while the central force at Culpepper was much larger than was needful in a proper conduct of the campaign, all the others were too contemptibly small and feeble to render any but abortive services in any direction. While General Butler was ordered to move, *viâ* Bermuda Hundred, with 20,000, Sigel was required to move up the Shenandoah with 10,000, and Crook up the Kanawha with 6,000 men. In connection with the fatally tragic march of the Grand Army through the Wilderness, the simultaneous movement of the three other feeble bodies could not have failed to render the whole campaign an abortive and calamitous one. A more vicious plan for the conduct of a great campaign, we may safely defy human stupidity, or ingenuity, to invent than was the one under consideration. Let us suppose that before any movement at all had been made, Butler, as was originally intended, had been reinforced by Burnside's corps of about 40,000 men, and also by the two corps subsequently brought up from the Carolinas, and that the forces under Sigel and Crook had been united in the Shenandoah, and raised to an army 50,000 strong by reinforcements sent out from Washington, which might readily and safely have been done. We should then have had a grand central force at Culpepper of upwards of 180,000 strong. We should have had an army in the vicinity of

Fortress Monroe of about 80,000, and another in the Shenandoah of 50,000 men. Suppose now that the campaign had opened in the following manner. While Grant, with the central force, had moved directly upon the Confederate position of Orange Court House, Butler had moved his army to Bermuda Hundred, and Sigel had, by forced marches, moved up the Shenandoah, and seized Stanton and Lynchburg. Such a plan for the conduct of the campaign was perfectly practicable, most obviously demanded by the circumstances, and was so palpably suggested by existing facts, that any commander of ordinary capacity would have apprehended and adopted it. The certain result is undeniable. In six weeks, or two months at the furthest, Lee's army, with Richmond, would have been captured, and the campaign closed up in Virginia and the Carolinas. All this would have been accomplished with a loss of less than 20,000 instead of 150,000 men, and a protraction of the campaign for nearly a year.

Let us now consider some of the further results of this stupidly devised and presumptuously and awkwardly executed campaign. On May 15th, General Breckinridge assaulted and routed Sigel's army, we losing 700 men, six guns, 1,000 small-arms, our hospitals, and part of our train. Having thus removed all fear of an advance of Sigel's force up the valley, Breckinridge hastened, as we have seen, to the aid of General Lee against General Grant.

Still more calamitous was the advance of General Crook. Having divided his forces, they were at length cut to pieces in detail, and dispersed. Thus on both of the wings of our army,—that is, on the part of Butler on the one hand, and Sigel and Crook on the other,—less than nothing was achieved, and the campaign, in all its movements, became a great national calamity.

General Sigel was promptly superseded by General Hunter, and our forces in the Shenandoah were considerably strengthened. General Hunter accordingly made an advance, and at Piedmont defeated General Jones, the latter losing his life. In this battle our army captured some 1,500 prisoners, three guns, and 3,000 small-arms.

Moving on to Stanton, General Hunter was there reinforced by Generals Averill and Crook, with what was left of his men, and our commander found himself at the head of an army quite 20,000 strong. General Hunter now made a forced march for Lynchburg, hoping to be able to capture the place before it could be relieved by reinforcements sent up from Richmond. In this hope he was sadly disappointed. General Lee, having rendered Petersburg secure, sent Early, with a large portion of Ewell's corps, for the relief of the place, which was hardly second in importance to Richmond itself. Early, with most of his forces, arrived before Hunter did, and thus placed the latter in a most precarious condition. With his provisions quite exhausted, and his ammunition fast failing, nothing remained for our commander but a precipitous retreat. As a return by the way he came was too hazardous, our army moved on the railroad west to Solun, where pursuit was suspended. From thence General Hunter moved by a circuitous route down the Kanawha, and around to Grafton, his army suffering beyond conception from want of provisions. We have heard soldiers say that they were often glad to gather up the kernels of corn which the horses dropped from their mouths while feeding, and with these, having washed the same, allay the gnawings of hunger.

By this absence of our army, the Shenandoah, Northern Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland were left defenceless, an advantage to the enemy which such a General as Early was certain to improve. Moving rapidly down the Shenandoah, he captured from Sigel, who retreated to Maryland Heights, a large amount of stores, crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and having done much damage to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, invaded the free Union States above noticed. The main object of this invasion was to capture horses, cattle, provisions, and goods for the supply of the Confederate army. Hence, they scoured the country in all directions for the objects designated. The invasion was everywhere so wisely masked by cavalry, that the amount of Early's command was immensely exaggerated, and a panic in all directions spread among the people,—the Government, in fear of

Washington and Baltimore, calling upon the States of Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts, for militia to repel the invaders. During this invasion, but one battle of any importance was fought, and that was near Frederick in Maryland. In this battle a few thousand men under General Wallace were defeated in a sanguinary fight, we losing about 2,000 men, and the Confederates about one-third that number. In a cavalry raid into the interior of Pennsylvania, villages and farmhouses were plundered, and two-thirds of the city of Chambersburg was burned to the ground, because the inhabitants failed to furnish in time \$100,000 in gold, or \$500,000 in paper money. Early, at length, moved south; and approaching within a few miles of Washington, recrossed the Potomac, with his cavalry remounted, with 2,000 to 3,000 spare horses, upwards of 5,000 cattle, and an immense amount of provisions and goods which he had gathered up. Soon after his return to Virginia, he encountered and defeated General Crook near Martinsburg,—the latter, with our defeated forces, having imprudently moved out from Harper's Ferry. In this affair, the Confederate loss being very small, we lost upwards of 1,200 men, with Colonel Mulligan killed, the brave defender of Lexington, in Missouri, in 1861. In one of these cavalry raids, General Averil, after pursuing the raiders up one branch of the Potomac, captured upwards of 500 prisoners, with their guns and waggons, with a loss of but fifty men on our side. Thus ended the last invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland.

At length, General Hunter having returned from his long detour, was superseded by General Sheridan, who soon found himself at the head of an army quite 30,000 strong. After completing the necessary organization of his forces, Sheridan took the field, and in a pitched battle of great severity on the banks of Opequan Creek, covering Winchester, defeated Early, September 16th, with the loss of about 3,000 men on each side. The Confederates now abandoned the valley, pursued in their retreat by our forces, who captured near Fisher's Hill 1,100 prisoners, sixteen guns, and seventy-five waggons, etc. Sheridan, in passing up and down the valley, obeyed to the letter

a command which he had received from General Grant, namely,—“In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable,” says Grant, in the order referred to, “that *nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return*. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for your command: such as cannot be secured, destroy.” We must bear in mind here, that among the people upon whom this brutally savage order was executed with most brutally savage ferocity, were not a few Union men who were then fighting in the Union army, while more were Quakers and Dunkers, who from conscientious regard to what they held to be moral and religious obligations, took no part in the war whatever. Of the manner in which he executed this order, General Sheridan (October 7th, 1864, 9 p.m.) thus reports to Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant:—

“I commenced moving back from Port Republic, Mount Crawford, Bridgewater, and Harrisonburg, yesterday morning.

“The grain and forage in advance of these points had previously been destroyed.

“In moving back to this point” (Woodstock, Va.), “the whole country from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain has been made untenable to the Rebel army. I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat and hay and farming implements, over seventy mills filled with flour and wheat, have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray Valley and Little Fort valley, as well as the main Valley.

“A large number of horses have been obtained, a proper estimate of which I cannot now make.

“Lieut. John R. Meigs, my engineer officer, was murdered beyond Harrisonburg, near Dayton. For this atrocious act, all the houses within an area of five miles were burned.”

We must bear in mind, that when the above order was given and executed, all the Confederate forces that could have been concentrated for the defence of Virginia, and the invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland, did not amount to over 70,000, while General Grant had under his

control upwards of 1,000,000 men. At any period, our Commander-in-Chief could have assembled an army—to protect ours cooped up in the Peninsula, to render secure our national capital, and to preserve our territory from invasion—outnumbering all the Confederate forces that could have been concentrated in the State of Virginia, as more than six to one. Yet, “in the deep recesses of a mind capable of such things,”—“the deep recesses” of the mind of our Commander-in-Chief—the only means by which the States of Pennsylvania and Maryland could be rendered safe from another invasion by the great army of General Lee, was, after the example of Hyder Ali in India, to “place perpetual desolations” between those States and the 70,000 men referred to. Still further, as our commander “revolved in the deep recesses of his mind” the widespread desolations which his stupid order had so savagely consummated, he was not yet satisfied that these States were secure from invasion. By his grave advice, that “surety might be rendered doubly sure,” 100,000 volunteers, enlisted for one hundred days, were armed and equipped, and brought forward, and the most of them added to the Army of the Potomac. All this was done for no offensive purposes whatever, but exclusively to save from capture our army before Petersburg and Richmond, to render secure our national capital, and prevent the States referred to being invaded by forces sent out from an army 70,000 strong, and having upon its hands the defence of the Confederate capital and the great State of Virginia.

Subsequent to the events above referred to, another quite famous battle occurred. Sheridan, supposing that the desolation he had created had rendered the condition of his army perfectly secure, had gone on a visit to Washington; and his Generals in command, deeming danger out of the question, had suspended all precaution. “Our forces,” says Mr. Greeley, “were encamped on three crests or ridges; the Army of West Virginia (Crook’s) in front; the 19th corps (Emory’s) half a mile behind it; the 6th corps (Wright’s) to the right and rear of the 19th. Kitching’s provisional division lay behind Crook’s left; the cavalry under Forbut, on the right of the 6th. It is a fact,

though no excuse, that they had no more apprehension of an attack from Early than from Canada.”

It was the known absence of Sheridan, and the equally known supposed security of his army, that Early took advantage of to attack it by surprise. Nor were measures for such an end ever more wisely and promptly adopted than by the Confederate General on this occasion. Separating his army into two bodies, so as to strike our right and left wings at the same moment, he made his approach, not by the main road, but over rough mountain passes, where his men had to hold on to bushes to preserve their standing, and twice to ford the Shenandoah. That no noise might be made, his soldiers were required to leave their canteens in camp, lest their striking against their guns should create an alarm among the Union forces. As the enemy drew near, a rustling as of the trampling of many feet in the underbrush was heard by our pickets, and the news sent to head-quarters. A good look-out was ordered, but no reconnoiterers were sent out. At one hour before dawn, both bodies of Early's command were in their desired places, both our wings being flanked, while the muskets of many of our soldiers were unloaded, and all our men, with the exception of those on duty, were resting in deep slumber. As soon as the dawning light revealed the distant hill-tops, volleys of musketry on our flanks and in our rear startled the sleepers. The next moment, with multitudinous yells peculiar to the Confederate soldiery, Early's forces leaped into our trenches, and charged into our camps. In a few minutes after the first dawn, Crook's entire command was a mingled mass, flying they knew not whither.

The 19th corps made a short and bloody resistance, but was soon driven back in confusion. The 6th, finding resistance vain, retreated in good order. The victory was with the Confederates, with the loss on our part of quite 1,200 prisoners, our camps, defences, and twenty-four guns. Had Early's army been in a condition to follow up his advantage, our defeat would have been complete and most disastrous. His men, however, were too weary, hungry, and thirsty, and eager for plunder, to enable him to reap the full results of his easy victory. Hence the pursuit was not rapid, and

our broken columns at length began to re-form behind Wright's unbroken ranks.

At 10 a.m. Sheridan, who had slept at Winchester, on his return to his army, was, after his famous ride, at the front. Just at this time Wright had halted, and the pressure of Early had ceased to be severe. As soon as our broken forces could be rallied and re-formed, our army took the offensive, and the Confederates, in their turn, fled from the field, leaving in our hands quite as many prisoners as they had taken from us, and twenty-three of their own guns in addition to the twenty-four which we had previously lost, and then recovered. Such is the difference which the presence or absence of a single individual often makes upon the battle-field. Our loss in this double battle was quite 3,000 men, and that of the Confederates considerably larger. With this battle, the campaign in the Shenandoah, and until next spring throughout the sphere of the Army of the Potomac, ended. For about six months from this time, October 18th, "all was quiet on the Potomac," in the trenches before Petersburg and Richmond, in Washington, and in the States which had been three times invaded by the Confederate armies. This unheard-of quietude of more than 1,000,000 of armed men, the small portion under Sherman and Thomas, and under Pleasanton in Missouri, excepted, will be the subject of remark in future portions of this treatise. All that we need to say here is that all this needless and useless slaughter and desolation in connection with the Army of the Shenandoah was wholly occasioned by General Grant's vicious plan, and more vicious conduct, of the campaign in Virginia in the year 1864.

CHAPTER XXVII.

SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

THE object of this history, as the reader is aware, is a peculiar and special one—an exposition of the leading facts of this war from one single standpoint, *its military aspect*. The object of the work is to subject each campaign to a most rigid and impartial criticism, that its excellences, errors, and blunders may be distinctly understood; my fixed aim being to enable my countrymen to know the past as it was, to comprehend fully and truly the real merits and demerits of the commanders of our armies, and the character of the soldiery whom they led and so mercilessly slaughtered; and this as a means to a still higher end—that the errors and blunders of the past may never be repeated in future. We are conscious of no sentiment in regard to General Sherman, or any other individual that ever held command in our armies, that would conceal or eclipse one of his excellences, or hide, diminish, or magnify in public estimation one of his defects, our object being criticism in that form which, in all future time, will stand the test of criticism. What General Sherman actually accomplished reveals him as a military man of whom our nation has no reason to be ashamed. While we freely admit and affirm this, we are also most fully persuaded that there were errors in the plan of his campaigns, and blunders in their conduct, which no future commander should copy. Let us advance to a direct consideration of the subject before us.

According to his own statements, he had at his disposal an available force amounting to upwards of 180,000

men, all the forces in his department amounting to upwards of 340,000. The forces by which he was directly opposed, no well-informed individual estimates at over 55,000 men. When Generals Grant and Sherman were assigned to their respective commands, they met at Nashville, and passed in company together to Louisville. During this interval, the plan of their respective campaigns was definitely settled. One fixed element of the plan was, as we have already stated, that both Generals should move at the same time, and that their campaigns should not be opened until the month of May. The openly avowed reason for this simultaneous movement was to prevent General Johnston dividing his little army of 55,000 men, and reinforcing General Lee, on the one hand, and General Lee dividing his small force of 70,000, and reinforcing General Johnston, on the other, and this when it was well known that these two little armies were from 600 to 1,000 miles distant from each other, and each commander of the same was confronted by forces quite three times larger than his own, and much more numerous than both the Confederate armies united. Here, undeniably, was "a step from the sublime to the ridiculous."

Neglected opportunity.

When General Sherman moved out, May 6th, from Chattanooga, what did he find in his immediate front? At Dalton, about thirty miles from the former place, at the junction of the railroads from Chattanooga and Knoxville to Atlanta, he encountered General Johnston in a position strong in itself, and very strongly fortified. At Resaca, about fifteen miles farther on, upon the Oostenaula river, in a still stronger and more formidably fortified position, he encountered the Confederate army a second time. After the retreat of General Bragg, General Hooker, with only 10,000 men, captured Dalton, and would have held it but for the fact that he was positively commanded to return to Chattanooga. From the latter part of November, 1863, to the 6th May, 1864, our army, quite 100,000 strong, lay in perfect idleness at Chattanooga, allowing General Johnston to advance with

his little army into our immediate presence, and there, on our known and predetermined route to Atlanta, raise up, at his leisure, the formidable fortifications above designated, and that without the remotest attempt on our part to disturb his operations. What excuse, but the baldest ignorance of what is essential to the proper conduct of a great campaign, can be offered for such neglect? Any General well instructed in the science of war, and half awake to his duties as the commander of a great army, would, if he had determined to advance no farther until the May following, have promptly seized Dalton and Resaca both, and prepared the latter as his advanced depôt of supplies. The location of this place upon the river designated rendered it most obviously the proper position for the purpose named, and for opening the spring campaign. A correspondent in our army in Western Virginia, when McClellan was in command there, made this statement, namely, "that the fixed policy of our commander seemed to be this, to suffer the enemy to approach as near to us as he chose, select his position, and at his leisure fortify it to his own full satisfaction. Then our commander would set his wits to work to dislodge the enemy." This seems to have been the equally fixed policy of our General in command at Chattanooga.

The campaign as it should have been conducted.

The advance of General Sherman from Chattanooga to Atlanta, the time spent in capturing the latter place included, occupied just four months, and those, the last three especially, the worst of the year, the three months of summer, and was attended, as we have already stated, with the loss of upwards of 40,000 men, almost as many as General Johnston had in his army. We now lay down this proposition, the validity of which we expect to render demonstrably evident, to wit, that *this campaign ought not to have been, at the farthest, of more than four weeks' continuance, and ought not, by any means, to have been attended with the loss of 5,000 men on our part.* History furnished any number of precedents from which our commander might have drawn a proper plan for the conduct of his campaign. Among these precedents, we specify but one, the famous

march of the Duke of Wellington up the Ebro and over the mountains into the plains of Vittoria, where he gained that world-renowned victory over the French army under King Joseph. During the winter, while the Duke was making preparations for the intended campaign, the French commanders, correctly divining his plan, and the line of his march, erected all along that line, at every defensible point,—and no line ever presented more positions of this character than did this,—the French commanders, we say, erected at every defensible point along that line a succession of the most formidable fortifications which military science could plan. The route before the English army was, to all appearance, an absolutely impracticable one. Here was a route precisely similar to that which lay before General Sherman in his advance upon Atlanta. What did the English commander do in the circumstances in which he was placed? He did not do as General Sherman afterwards did,—that is, advance his whole army directly upon those fortresses, and spend the whole spring and summer in capturing them one after the other, losing, in doing so, more than one-third of his army. The grand Duke, on the other hand, as soon as full preparation was made for his advance, sent forward his left wing under General Graham, and flanked each of those fortresses in succession, while with the remainder of his army he moved directly upon those strongholds. The result was, that each position in succession was abandoned without firing a gun,—abandoned as soon as it was flanked by General Graham's advance. Wellington's army contemplated with utter amazement the strength of the successive fortifications which they entered and found empty in their unresisted advance. On all that march, "not a drum was heard, nor a funeral note," over a single officer or soldier fallen in battle in that army. The march was literally an uninterrupted and bloodless one, and the great conqueror of Napoleon brought his whole army intact over into the plains of Vittoria. Had General Sherman equal facilities for an equally uninterrupted and bloodless advance for himself and his army from Chattanooga to Atlanta? He had, as we will now proceed to demonstrate. Let us suppose that, of the

effective force of more than 180,000 men under his command, he had reserved 70,000 at Chattanooga for the advance upon Atlanta, a force abundantly sufficient to act against 55,000. Having done this, we will suppose that he had located another army 60,000 strong under General Thomas at Decatur. This latter army would have been superior to Johnston's by 5,000, and the former by 15,000 men, so that each would have been safe from an effective assault from the enemy, we having still in reserve upwards of 50,000 men to guard our communications, and to succour either army, if needful,—a body abundantly sufficient for all such purposes. When all was in readiness to open the campaign, Thomas, we will suppose, had moved by forced marches directly for Atlanta, there having been nothing at the time in his way to impede his march, as the subsequent advance of Hood from Atlanta to Decatur, and then west of it, demonstrated. When Thomas had been about one week on his march, we will suppose, once more, that Sherman had moved directly upon Johnston at Dalton. How long would the latter, under such circumstances, have remained in those mountain passes to resist the advance of the former? The retreat of the Confederates back to Atlanta, we answer, would have been instantaneous, and Sherman's march thither would have been as uninterrupted and bloodless as was Wellington's from Portugal to the plains of Vittoria. And when the Confederate army had emerged from those passes, and arrived at Atlanta, it would have found itself in an infinitely worse condition than was that of France when it was assailed by Wellington on those plains. Johnston would have found himself encircled by forces nearly three times as numerous as his own, and could not have kept the field for six weeks longer. There is no escaping these deductions. We affirm it before the nation and the world, that both Grant and Sherman ought to have finished up totally the campaigns before them, and terminated the war, in two months, at the farthest, after those campaigns were opened. Ever since we have considered what General Sherman did do, and contrasted that with what he might have done, we, as our most familiar acquaintances will testify, have affirmed

that he was, at the time, either an unread commander, or that he was wholly destitute of capacity to plan an important campaign.

The campaign as it was conducted.

When we consider the conduct of the Atlanta campaign as executed by General Sherman, and that irrespective of the plan of the same, we shall be constrained to award him no little praise, and that praise a grateful country should not withhold. The manner in which all General Johnston's strong, and more strongly fortified, positions were flanked,—and he was compelled to abandon each one of them in succession,—must command the admiration of every well-informed individual. The Confederate prisoners of the lower order of rank and file were accustomed thus to speak to our soldiers upon the subject: "The you-uns don't treat the we-uns fair. When the we-uns draw up behind our fortifications, the you-uns, instead of coming right up and fighting the we-uns, as the you-uns should do, the you-uns go away round, and then come up and take the we-uns ēēnd-wise like. That arn't fair." As examples of the manner in which those strongholds were flanked, we cite the two following from Mr. Greeley, our object being criticism, and not mere detail:—

"The country between Chattanooga and Atlanta is different from, but even more difficult than, that which separates Washington from Richmond. Rugged mountains, deep, narrow rivers, thick primitive woods, with occasional villages, and more frequent clearings, or irregular patches of cultivation, all traversed by mainly narrow, ill-made roads, succeed each other for some forty miles; then intervenes a like distance of comparatively open, facile country, traversed by two considerable rivers; then another rugged, difficult region of mountains and passes reaches nearly to Chattahoochee, across which, eight miles distant, lies the new but important city of Atlanta—a focus of several railroads, having some 20,000 inhabitants, and then the seat of extensive manufactories of Confederate supplies. It had been well fortified early in 1863.

“Johnston’s position at Dalton was covered by an impassable mountain known as Rocky-Face Ridge, down by the passage of Mill Creek called Buzzard’s Roost Gap. The railroad traverses this pass, but our army could not, it being naturally very strong, and now thoroughly fortified. Hence, while Thomas menaced and feebly assailed it in front, McPherson flanked the enemy’s left, moving down by Ship’s Gap, Villanow, and Snake Creek Gap, to seize either Resaca or some point well in its rear, while Schofield should press on Johnston’s right. In executing these orders, Thomas was compelled to bear more heavily on the Rebel front than he intended. Newton’s division of Howard’s 4th corps and Geary’s of Hooker’s (20th) corps, assaulting in earnest, and even carrying portions of the ridge; whence they were soon repelled with loss. Meantime, McPherson had reached the front of Resaca, scarcely resisted; but he could not carry it, and dared not remain between it and Johnston’s main body; so he fell back to a strong position in Snake Creek Gap, which he could hold for some hours against all gainsayers. Sherman now, leaving Howard’s corps and some cavalry to threaten Dalton in front, moved the rest of his forces rapidly in the track of Schofield, and through Snake Creek Gap, which compelled Johnston to evacuate his stronghold, and fall back rapidly to Resaca; advancing in force against which, Kilpatrick, fighting the enemy’s cavalry, was disabled. Sherman had calculated on seriously damaging Johnston when he retreated, but was unable to reach him, Johnston having the only direct good road, while our flanking advance was made with great difficulty. Howard entered Dalton on the heels of the enemy, and pressed him sharply down to Resaca.

“Sherman forthwith set on foot a new flanking movement by his right to turn Johnston out of Resaca; which Johnston countered by an attack on Hooker and Schofield, still in his front and on his left; but he was rather worsted in the bloody fight thus brought on—Hooker driving the Rebels from several hills, taking four guns and many prisoners. The Rebels retreated across the Oostenaula during the night, and our army entered Resaca in triumph the next morning.”

In this manner quite two months were spent, Johnston retreating from position to position in consequence of the skilful manœuvrings of his shrewd antagonist, the Confederates losing about 10,000 men, and we, of course, more than twice that number. In capturing strongholds by skilfully turning the position of an enemy, Sherman has revealed the possession of a very essential form of military talent of which General Grant is wholly destitute. General Grant knows but one method of attacking a strong position which cannot be besieged, the very worst form of attack known to the science of war, namely, moving his lines up directly in front of the enemy's batteries, and there letting his men be mercilessly slaughtered, until endurance ceases to be a virtue, and a confused retreat becomes a necessity. The idea of moving round a position, and taking the enemy "ēēnd-wise like," never had place in the brain of our Commander-in-Chief. Grant's prisoners from Georgia, if he had taken any, could with truth have said to our soldiers, "The you-uns do treat the we-uns fair. When the we-uns are drawn up behind the we-uns' strong fortifications, the you-uns always come right up in front of the we-uns, and suffer the we-uns to shout the you-uns down just as the we-uns want to. That is fair."

When our army, June 27th, had arrived at Kenesaw Mountain, within about twenty miles of Atlanta, however, General Sherman acted a tragical scene which clearly revealed the fact that he was possessed of the quality so conspicuous in his illustrious predecessor. The Confederates having made, under General Hood, an unsuccessful attack upon a portion of our line, General Sherman determined to return the compliment. Having made careful preparations at two points, to the south of this mountain, and in front of Thomas and McPherson's position, he ordered each of these Generals to make the assault upon the enemy's line. The attack, in both cases, was of course repulsed with great slaughter, we losing upwards of 3,000 men; Generals Harker and Daniel McCook were also killed, and many brave officers were badly wounded; the loss of the Confederates being 442 in all. The reason assigned by General Sherman for thus assaulting a position most

obviously impregnable, is very singular. "I perceived," he says, "that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank. An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan that promises success. I wished, therefore, for the moral effect to make a successful assault on the enemy behind his breastworks. I yet claim that it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them." Perhaps General Sherman had in remembrance, when he gave the presumptuous order for the above attack, a scene which was enacted under his command at Jackson, Miss., in July of the previous year. At least he should have remembered this event, and also his own experience in another like assault at Vicksburg, when he was sent down to capture that city. Some minds, however, are slow to learn from experience. We refer to these facts because the reckless sacrifice of human life and limb in such mad assaults cannot be held in too great reprobation. Let us now recur to the assault at Jackson, when General Sherman was making his advances upon the position of General Johnston at that place. Our citations are from "Personal Recollections of Army Life," by James D. English. The length of the citations will not be a matter of regret to the reader, and may we not hope that such experiences will deter future Generals from repeating such mad assaults upon fortified positions? Now to the citations:—

"Early on the morning of July 12th, General Hovey advanced his lines to within eight hundred yards of the Rebel works, after some sharp fighting, and hastily erected a barricade of logs to protect the men from a sudden rush of the besieged.

"By this move a gap of nearly half a mile was created between the two divisions, which if the enemy should discover, would enable them to pour a heavy force through the opening, and force Hovey to retreat from his barricade to save his rear.

“To remedy this an order came to General Lauman to push forward with his division, drive back the enemy, and connect with General Hovey on a straight line, great stress being placed on the words *on a straight line, which, strange to say, if done, would place the parallel to be established twenty feet inside the Rebel lines* on the right, as General Hovey's line was then within musket range of the enemy.

“It was unmistakably evident that the ‘Star’ that sent that order could not have known the nature of the ground, or the exact position of the Rebel works, or it would have never been issued, or at least would have been modified to suit the nature of the case.

“However, it was ‘orders,’ and nothing remained but to obey. Accordingly, General Lauman selected for the task the 1st Brigade, Brevet Brigadier-General J. C. Pugh commanding, consisting of the 3rd Iowa, 28th, 41st, and 53rd Illinois Volunteers, and two 12-pound howitzers of the 5th Ohio battery.

“The brigade moved down the hill, across the bottom, halted and formed in column. Unfurling the colours, the line moved slowly forward through a field of green corn that had been carefully put down by somebody, and beyond the field the ground was covered with brush piles, logs, and abattis, rendering it extremely difficult to move in anything like order. The Rebel works were in full view, the brigade still advancing. As yet no one could be seen in the works, and not a shot had been fired. What did it mean? Could the enemy have retreated? Surely it seemed so!

“Ah! most unfortunate conclusion; the brigade had reached within 300 yards of the ditch, and were congratulating themselves on a bloodless victory, when suddenly there burst forth a deafening chorus of yells, as if a Pandemonium had emptied its legions upon earth, and the next instant there arose from the heretofore silent works a double rank of the enemy, and poured upon the heads of our column a deliberate, murderous, staggering fire of musketry that was absolutely awful in its destructiveness. The killed and wounded fell almost in heaps. Great openings were torn out of the ranks, by the hissing death-sleet that streamed from the Rebel line. Although staggered by the suddenness of the attack, the regiments bravely

returned the fire (braver men never handled guns than were the 1st brigade boys), but it was no use, for the Rebels, sheltered behind their works, fired deliberately, every shot taking effect, while our boys, without stick or stump to shelter them, and appalled at the frightful destruction that was fast thinning their ranks, fired wildly. A few of the men reached the ditch under the Rebel battery, but were almost instantly shot down or captured. Deeming further effort useless, General Page ordered the survivors of this murderous contest to fall back. When the brigade fell back, and the survivors re-formed and were numbered, it was found that the loss was appalling.

"The brigade went into action 803 strong; killed, wounded, and captured, 508; came out of action with 295 survivors. Third Iowa went into action with 241 men; killed, wounded, and captured, 157; came out of action with 84 survivors. Forty-first Illinois went into action with 234 men; killed, wounded, and captured, 162; came out of action with 72 survivors. Twenty-eighth Illinois volunteers went into action with 128 men; killed, wounded, and captured, 55; came out of action with 73 survivors. Fifty-third Illinois volunteers went into action with 200 men; killed, wounded, and captured, 134; came out of action with 66 survivors.

"General Hovey, who had witnessed the battle, rode up to where the brigade was halted, and when he learned the extent of the loss, declared it the most unprecedented loss for the length of time (forty-eight minutes by his watch) that he ever heard of. Checking his horse in front of the brigade, and lifting his cap gracefully, the General said: 'Soldiers of the First Brigade! I know you; I have heard of your bravery and devotion before; I know you are true to every instinct of patriotism and love of country, but what better evidence need I ask than those historic names—Donelson, Shilo, Big-Hatchie, and Vicksburg—I see emblazoned upon your flags, yet begrimed by the smoke of the battle just closed, and your shattered ranks before me? They speak, my brave fellows, in silent but eloquent praise of your heroism and devotion to our cause. Indeed, gentlemen, to illustrate your case briefly, *you remind me of old-rye whisky—the older it gets the better it is.*'

"With a few more clever words, General Hovey rode back to his division.

"The Rebels were 4,000 strong, and one battery and 6 guns. Loss: 27 killed and 55 wounded."

General Sherman, now fully convinced of the inexpediency of assaulting his opponent's positions by direct attack, resorted to his hitherto successful expedient of accomplishing his purposes by the less costly one of flank movements. By movements of this character—movements very skilfully planned and executed—Johnston was again necessitated to move back, first from the Kenesaw, and then quite across the Chattahoochee river, within about ten miles from Atlanta. After getting his own army over, and in a state of readiness to recommence operations as soon as the proper time should arrive, General Sherman gave his soldiers a few days of necessary rest. While thus waiting, he was joined by General Rousseau with 2,000 cavalry, this General having come in twelve days, and by a long circuit, from Decatur, Ala.,—verifying the practicability of readily moving an army from that point to Atlanta.

During this interval, also, an event occurred which changed the whole aspect of the campaign, and finally annihilated the last hope of the Confederacy. We refer to the substitution of General J. B. Hood, of Texas, in the place of General Johnston, as commander of the army opposed to General Sherman. Of General Johnston, justice requires the historian to affirm that, as a General, he probably had no superior in ability in the Confederate army. He had courage, energy, and prudence, of by no means an inferior order. His successor, on the other hand, had courage and energy, without prudence. He had fighting qualities of a high order. These, however, were all under the control of one fixed idea—acting on the offensive, attacking the enemy in whatever position he might be found, and that with a reckless disregard of the inferiority of force on the part of the assailing party. He was, consequently, the very man needed to waste away the small force which remained under his command in the shortest time possible, and thus ensure a speedy collapse of the Confederacy. His predecessor had, up to the time

of his supersedure, acted, and that very prudently, upon the only policy which wisdom dictated in his circumstances, namely, to fight only when it could be done with small expenditures of his own forces, and large draughts upon the resources of his opponent—to draw away his enemy from his base of supplies, always necessitating him to diminish his own forces by leaving large bodies behind to guard his rear—to continue this process until the pursued should be stronger than the pursuer; and then fall upon the enemy and crush him in detail. Atlanta was the position fixed upon by General Johnston for a final stand, the most formidable position which General Sherman had yet approached, lying between that city and the Chattahoochee, while the city itself was, on all sides, most im pregnably fortified, and prepared for a long siege.

From all perils of this character, the blind giant with his little club—the giant who succeeded Johnston, soon relieved us. He received his command for the known purpose of assuming the offensive, and he immediately acted under the impulse of his native instincts. His effective force, when he assumed the command, says Pollard, was 41,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 cavalry. During the nearly two months which intervened between this period and the time when he abandoned Atlanta, he fought with our army no less than three pitched battles, in which he was the assailant,—in which he was, of course, defeated, with losses to us which we could afford to endure, but with a loss to himself of quite one-third of the forces under his command—losses which ruined the cause which he was appointed to defend. If we bear in mind that it took Sherman, within four days, as much time, after he had crossed the Chattahoochee, to capture Atlanta, as he had spent in all his prior campaign, and this when opposed to such a blind giant as Hood, we shall at once be impressed with the apprehension that that campaign might have had a very different outcome had Johnston been continued in command. In that case, the probabilities would evidently have been fearfully against us, and might have presented another verification of the fundamental error on which all advances into the Confederate territory were made, namely, an *advance on one line by*

a single force. By an advance on this principle, the enemy, by threatening communications, can necessitate the advancing army to weaken itself by constantly leaving large forces behind to protect its rear, and thus at length becoming so weakened that the enemy will be the strongest, and then defeat in detail the invading force. By advancing into Russia on this principle, which he proclaimed as the only proper one, Buonaparte found himself but a little stronger than his enemy at Borodino, and too weak to do anything effective at all when he arrived at Moscow. Hence that disastrous retreat which cost him his empire. Had the French army escaped from Metz, Paris would not have fallen. The communications of the German army would have been so exposed, that they could not have been provisioned around the city. In our discussions before President Lincoln in January 1863, we fully convinced him, and drew from him a distinct avowal of the conviction, that the principle,—that under consideration,—on which all our invasions of Confederate territory, up to that time, had been made, is a totally false one. The principle on which the campaign under consideration was made is wholly of this bad character, and but for a change in the command of the Confederate army would in all probability have resulted in a national disaster. General Johnston, as we have been informed on authority which we deem perfectly reliable, calculated that at the opening of the campaign the relative amount of the forces of the two armies was as twelve to seven. At the time when he was superseded, he calculated that the ratio stood at seven to six. At that time Sherman was in circumstances where he would be compelled to fight at great disadvantage. One or two battles fought under such circumstances would change the relative strength of the armies, so that the Confederates would be the strongest, and our army would be at their mercy, and would be crushed by superior forces. Such were the definite plans of General Johnston when he was superseded.

On the morning of September 1st, General Sherman, who was then twenty miles from Atlanta, heard sounds which clearly indicated that something of the greatest moment was transpiring in that city. Three days after, he

received intelligence from General Slocum that the sounds heard were the result of the explosion of the Confederate magazines in the city—an event which had been followed by the retirement of Hood and his army, and the peaceable entrance of ours into that same stronghold. Between September 5th and 7th, Sherman returned, and sent a telegram to Washington that “Atlanta has been fairly won.” In capturing the city, but very few prisoners fell into our hands. The loss to the Confederates, however, was immense. The position itself was of great importance; and the munitions, guns, cars, locomotives, manufactories, and machinery, all together constituted a loss truly irreparable.

One fact occurred at this time which does not add to the credit of General Sherman as a general. The Confederate army was now divided into two parts, and these were separated quite a distance from one another, while our army was so located that any amount of force which our commander might deem requisite might have been readily thrown in between the separated parts referred to, and have fallen with crushing weight upon either, or both in succession. Movements might obviously have been made which would have rendered it impossible for General Hood ever to have reunited his army. General Hardee, for example, as Sherman was from careful reconnoissance fully aware, was about twenty-five miles to the south of Atlanta, at a place named Lovejoy, in a strongly entrenched camp, while General Hood with the other half of his army had retired in quite another direction. By placing a strong force between Hood and Hardee, the one half of the Confederate army under the latter must inevitably have been defeated and captured. This golden opportunity, however, was neglected, and the Confederate army was reunited near Jonesboro’, it being the fixed policy of our Generals to capture positions, and not armies. Here, by forced conscription, that army was raised to nearly its primal strength, consisting now of 35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.

The policy of the Confederate commander, at this crisis, was certainly very shrewd. Passing his entire army over the Chattahoochee, he moved directly upon Sherman’s

communications. As soon as our commander became aware of this fact, he sent General Thomas to Nashville, giving him full command of all forces in that department: while General Sherman himself, leaving Slocum with the 20th corps at Atlanta, hastened with the rest of his army to protect his imperilled rear. Hood made unsuccessful attempts to capture Altoona, then Kingston, Rome, and finally Resaca, to all of which places Sherman pursued the enemy in hot haste, without, however, being able to bring his antagonist to a stand-up fight, an event which, by this time, misfortune had taught Hood sufficient wisdom not to desire. At Fayetteville all movements and dispositions to bring on a general engagement having failed, and the enemy, passing round our front, and moving by our left, having suddenly become invisible, and gone our commander could not divine whither, the pursuit was given over. Halting finally near Galesville, Ala., and searching in vain for his vanished foe, our commander concluded that Hood had passed over Sand Mountain, and was moving in the direction of Nashville. This conjecture was confirmed by information that Hood, passing Decatur, had crossed the Tennessee at Florence, and was marching, or making preparation to march, into Tennessee. Detaching the 4th corps under Stanley, and the 23rd under Schofield, with the mass of his cavalry under Wilson, with orders to march to Chattanooga and report to Thomas, Sherman, with a single division of cavalry under Kilpatrick, and the rest of his army, returned to Atlanta to prepare for his famous march across the State of Georgia. Thus ended this Atlanta campaign, a campaign which, as we have seen, involved a fundamental error in its plan, was prosecuted with much skill and energy, and at a vast expenditure of men and treasure, and produced comparatively small results to the benefit of the nation. Of the verity of this statement, the reader will be rendered fully aware when we shall have noticed certain operations west of the Mississippi, and then presented a general view of the state of affairs, together with the plan of the Confederates at this time.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OPERATIONS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

“THE comprehensive plan” of General Grant comprehended, as we have stated, the idea of a nearly simultaneous movement upon the enemy, on a line quite 1,500 miles in extent,—namely, that of the Potomac, under Grant himself, in Virginia; that of the Cumberland, under Sherman, in Georgia; and two others, one under Banks, and another under Steele, in Texas and Arkansas. The results of the first two campaigns are before us. Let us now turn our thoughts to the current of events west of the Mississippi.

As early as January 1864, General Banks had planned a campaign in Texas, by way of Galveston,—a plan to enter the State from the sea-coast. This plan was superseded by another and different one, a movement up the Red river for the capture of Shreveport, and the general conquest of the State. This plan was to some extent matured before General Grant assumed supreme command, but was after that adopted as a part of his “comprehensive plan.” The force set apart for this movement amounted to quite 40,000 men. Of these, some 15,000 were under the immediate command of General Banks at Franklin, Louisiana, and 15,000 under General Steele at Little Rock, Arkansas, while 10,000 were to be sent from Vicksburg, up the Red river, under General A. J. Smith. These forces, attended by Admiral Porter with a fleet of fifteen ironclads and four lighter steamers, were under four distinct and independent commands, neither reporting or accountable to the other. “While four forces,” said General Banks, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War,—“General Steele’s, Sherman’s (under General

Smith), Admiral Porter's, and my own,—were operating together, neither one of them had a right to give a command to the other. General Smith never made any report to me, but considered his as substantially an independent force. It took us twenty days to communicate with General Steele; and then we could only state our position, ask what he was doing, and give advice; but we could not tell whether he followed the advice or not, or what he was doing." The result of a grand expedition thus conducted could not but be a failure. Steele's army never came upon the field at all. Of the 10,000 sent from Vicksburg, 3,000 marines were soon recalled to guard the Mississippi. At Alexandria, some seventy or eighty miles up the Red river, 3,000 more troops had to be left to guard the depôt of supplies. After getting up some distance farther, to Natchitochis, the river was found to be too low to float safely the heavy ironclads, and all means to remedy the evil proved ineffectual; while in an important crisis, General Franklin, as might have been expected, failed to come up in time. After fighting several bloody battles, in the most important of which, that at Pleasant Hill, both parties claimed the victory, the expedition returned with the acknowledged loss of quite 5,000 men. General Banks, who had to bear the blame of the blunders of his superiors, was now superseded, General Canby being put in command.

General Steele, after making ineffectual efforts to enter into communication with General Banks, gave over all attempts to reach Shreveport; and, on hearing of the latter's reverses, faced in the opposite direction. The efforts of the Confederates were now directed mainly to two ends—the recovery of Arkansas, and a grand invasion of Missouri. In both respects those efforts were successful. After various battles of greater and less importance, battles in some of which one party, and in others the other, was successful, Arkansas was practically recovered to the Confederacy, and about the middle of September, General Price, having been reinforced by General Shelby, entered South-Eastern Missouri with an army from 20,000 to 30,000 strong, and met with no resistance until he encountered a single brigade under General H. S. Ewing, at Pilot Knob.

CHAPTER XXIX.

RESULTS OF THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS OF 1864; PLANS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE COMMANDERS.

WE have deemed it essential to a full and correct understanding of the conduct of this war, to devote a single chapter to a consideration of the results of the great campaigns of this year—results up to the 1st October, on the one hand, and of the plans of the Union and Confederate military authorities for the future, on the other. The results of these campaigns may be stated in a few words. The relative strength of the hostile forces, we must bear in mind, was, at the beginning of May, as 1,000,000 of men on our side, to not over 200,000 against us, on the other. In the Eastern Department, where our forces, at the time referred to, outnumbered those of the Confederacy there as more than three to one, the results of the campaign may be thus summed up. On the 1st May, the main portion of our Grand Army lay at Culpepper, holding full control of by far the largest part of the territory of Virginia, and all parts of that army so distributed that they could act together as a perfect unity. On the 1st October, we find the main portion of this territory reconquered to the Confederacy, and the Grand Army of the Potomac separated into three parts, and these located at unsupporting distances from each other,—namely, the main body under Grant “bottled and corked up” in that narrow peninsula in front of Petersburg; another great force at Washington,—a force lying idly there to preserve the city from the grasp of the enemy; and a third army, 30,000 to 40,000 strong, under General

Sheridan in the Shenandoah, with a wide strip of territory, barbarously desolated, in its front,—and all to guard Pennsylvania and Maryland against a fourth invasion. These great results have been gained at a loss of from 140,000 to 150,000 brave men. We must bear in mind, also, that all these immense forces, increased by more than 70,000 one-hundred-days' men, lay, from this period until the opening of the next spring campaign, as immovable as "a sea of stagnant idleness," and this while all the Confederate forces in our immediate front numbered less than 70,000 men, and could at no time have numbered more than that, a blank ignorance sitting as a nightmare upon the brain of our Commander-in-Chief as to what use ought to be made, under the circumstances, of the immense and overwhelming forces under his command.

In the grand centre of the great movement we find General Sherman, after a four months' campaign, in which we have lost upwards of 40,000 of our best troops, advanced from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and here located in a city made as desolate as Herculaneum, and that for reasons which neither humanity nor national necessity can justify, while Tennessee is invaded by a hostile army 50,000 strong, and General Sherman is sending back a large portion of his forces to save that State from being reconquered to the Confederacy. West of the Mississippi, the campaign, up to the period under consideration, was a series of disasters to the national cause. We have only to think of the defeats of Generals Banks and Steele, the expulsion of our army from Texas, the recovery of Arkansas to the Confederacy, and the imposing invasion of Missouri to recover it to the enemy, to apprehend at once the strict correctness of the above statement.

Such, up to the time under consideration, were the results of our grand campaigns conducted under "the comprehensive plan" of our Commander-in-Chief,—results gained at the most enormous expenditure of the national treasury, and at the loss on our part of nearly or quite 200,000 men. In view of such results,—results gained through the controlled agency of 1,000,000 men against

200,000,—a large portion of my countrymen will have it that in this Commander-in-Chief we have a greater than a Wellington or a Napoleon—a Cæsar “come again.”

Plan of the Confederate authorities.

Let us now turn our attention, for a few moments, to a consideration of the *plans* of the Union, on the one hand, and on the other, of the Confederate, military authorities, at this time. In respect to that of the latter, we would say that, in two fundamental respects, it resembled the original one of General Grant,—namely, that as far as mere *extent* was concerned, it was very comprehensive; and as far as the idea of combination of forces for the realization of desired ends is concerned, this plan in reality comprehended nothing, and miscalculated everything. A mind of the feeblest intelligence can determine to act upon a widely extended field, and can make certain dispositions for such action. To comprehend the entire situation, however, and to understand the combination of forces demanded by existing circumstances, is quite another matter. When, in the fall of 1861, it became evident that an inflexible determination existed in the Government and people of the North to put down the Rebellion, its leaders ought to have dissolved their Government and army, and returned to their homes. Nothing in the future was more certain, whatever errors in the conduct of the war might exist, than the restoration of the union of these States. The temporary advantages gained by the Confederate armies were in fact disastrous defeats, because such advantages were secured by sacrifices which assured the ultimate extinction of those armies. Whatever of lost territory was reconquered, merely attenuated the feeble power of the Confederacy over a wider extent of country than before, and thus rendered the conquest of the whole rebellious States a matter of greater ease and certainty. The machinery of the Confederate power may be compared to a machine which an individual, many years ago, submitted to critical inspection in the city of Boston—a machine in which the inventor affirmed that he had solved the problem of perpetual motion. The machine was of strange and admirable structure, and seemed perfect in all its parts. There was one,

and only one, difficulty about it—*it would not go*. There was no “living spirit” in its wheels to set it in motion, or keep it going when started by power from without. So it was with the Confederacy. There was from the beginning a friction in all its motions, a friction which rendered its continued action impossible,—“a sentence of death in itself,” which rendered its dissolution at no distant day a necessity. All the plans of the Confederates, consequently, had in them the element of the absurd,—the attempt to realize the impossible. This was true, however those plans might give promise of temporary success.

Their plan for the two campaigns under consideration—that in Missouri, on the one hand, and that in Tennessee, on the other—looked in the direction of vast results, and bore as fair promises of success as characterized any of the important aggressive movements made by the Confederacy during the war. In November ensuing, the Presidential election was to occur, an election in which the national choice lay between President Lincoln and General McClellan. The results anticipated from the invasion of Missouri by General Price, were, Arkansas having already been recovered, that by a general rising in Missouri, not only to recover that State permanently to the Confederacy, but by an invasion of Iowa to prevent all these three States from taking part in the election, and thus to ensure a majority of Presidential votes for the Democratic candidate. Among the documents which General Pleasanton captured while repelling this invasion, he found one in which this identical plan was specifically laid down. Such was the plan of the Confederate campaign west of the Mississippi.

As far as Tennessee was concerned, it was fully believed that if General Hood should, with an army 50,000 strong, cross the Tennessee river, and capture Franklin and Nashville, there would be a universal uprising throughout the State in the interest of the Rebellion, an uprising which would be at once followed in Kentucky, and these two States would be recovered to the Confederacy. Nor was this all that was hoped from these invasions. The idea of an uprising in the Free States, to stop the effusion of blood, and prevent the success of the emancipation measures of the Government,—the idea which induced the

invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland by General Lee,—still had place in the plans and hopes of the Confederate authorities, and induced them to put forth all possible efforts to secure signal success, especially in the States of Tennessee and Missouri. Judged in the light of such considerations, the advance of General Price into Missouri, and that of General Hood into Tennessee, were as wise and prudent as were those of General Lee into Pennsylvania and Maryland. The idea entertained by General Price, however, of forcibly preventing an election in Iowa, gives the appearance of the ridiculous to his whole scheme.

Plan of the Unionists.

We now turn to a consideration of the plan of our own commanders, the plan of which General Sherman, with truth no doubt, claims to have been the originator. General Sherman is now at Atlanta, with an effective force, according to his own statement, of 62,000 veteran and able-bodied troops, under his immediate command. General Hood, with an army upwards of 50,000 strong, had crossed the Tennessee river to recover the State of Tennessee at all events, and Kentucky if possible, to the Confederacy. To repel this invasion, General Thomas, in command there, had an effective force under his immediate control of less than 30,000 men. The possibility of preventing the capture of Nashville, and all the consequent evils that might arise, depended upon a contingency to which the greatest uncertainty attached, namely, the timely arrival of adequate reinforcements from Missouri. We must bear in mind here, that General Smith, with a corps 20,000 strong, had gone down as far as Cairo, and had been recalled from thence to repel the invasion of General Price. The only rational hope of success on the part of our commander was the early defeat of Price, and the subsequent timely arrival of Smith to aid Thomas against Hood. Another fact of fundamental importance lay out with perfect distinctness before the mind of General Sherman—the fact that in the army of General Hood lay the entire military power of the Confederacy, as far as all the States lying between Virginia and South Carolina and the Mississippi river are concerned. To raise that army to its

existing strength, all the remaining resources of those States had been put forth. To destroy that army was, in fact, to annihilate the military power of the Confederacy in the States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Tennessee. This end being accomplished, a Union army 10,000 strong could have marched at will in any direction over and through any of these States. Another fact equally obvious presented itself at that time, the fact that this army lay within the visible grasp of General Sherman, and might have been utterly annihilated by him in four or six weeks' time at the farthest. Within the space of ten days, Hood moved his army from the vicinity of Resaca over the mountains to the front of Decatur. In two weeks, as none will deny, Sherman might have marched his army from Atlanta to the same point, or to any other point that might have been selected. It would have been perfectly easy for Sherman to deceive Hood into the belief that the former had started on his southern march, and thus to induce the latter to advance into the interior of Tennessee, in the direction of Nashville. This end being gained, Sherman should have suddenly changed his course, and by forced marches have moved upon Decatur, all his prior dispositions having been preparatory to this one grand movement. On arriving at this point, Hood would have been before Nashville, and would have been there between two armies each greater than his own—Thomas having been reinforced by General Smith from Missouri. Under these circumstances, the capture or annihilation of the entire Confederate army would have been an inevitable certainty. With Hood's army disposed of as it should have been, the last movement that would then have been thought of would have been that famous march across the State of Georgia. On the other hand, while to Thomas would have been assigned the care of the States above designated, Sherman with his veterans would have been transported round to Washington, or Anapolis, to finish up the war by an overwhelming movement upon General Lee. Sherman on his arrival might have moved out from Washington to Culpepper, being there reinforced by Sheridan, and his army thus raised to about 100,000 men, and then, with a crushing force, have moved upon Lee's rear. Under such

circumstances, the latter would have surrendered, and the war have been terminated without fighting a battle. The same end, though not so soon, would have been accomplished by moving Sherman's army round from Annapolis to Wilmington, as Schofield's afterwards was, and moving it up upon Lee's rear through North Carolina. Undeniably, General Sherman had it in his power to have finished up the war in a few weeks during the autumn of 1864.

Instead of discerning and availing himself of all these most palpable advantages, what were the visions which opened upon our General's mind and fixed his determinations? A thousand mile march of 62,000 men, first down to the ocean across one State, and then up through two other States, to the rear of General Lee's army before Petersburg. The advantages which such a march promised—feasting his army upon the hams, and pigs, and turkeys, and chickens of the Confederates on the way—outweighed, in the judgment of our General, all the palpable considerations and facts above indicated. Let us hear General Sherman himself upon this subject. "I only regarded the march from Atlanta to Savannah as a 'shift of base,' as the transfer of a strong army which had no opponent, and had finished its then work, from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, from which it could achieve other important results. I considered this march as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war. Still, then as now, the march to the sea was generally regarded as something extraordinary, something anomalous, something out of the usual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply moved from Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond, a movement that had to be met and defeated, or the war was necessarily at an end. Were I to express my measure of the relative importance of the march to the sea, and of that from Savannah northward, I would place the former at one, and the latter at ten, as the maximum." General Sherman is unquestionably right in his estimate of the relative importance of that famous march across the State of Georgia. Excepting as a means to an end, "a step in the direction of Richmond," that march had, in reality, no bearing upon the real issues of the war. The idea that feeding an army

of 62,000 men upon the people of a narrow territory across the State of Georgia, divided in sunder the Confederacy, as had often been affirmed, only betrays ignorance. The only real good proposed to be accomplished by that land march of 1,000 miles, was to get what might then remain of those 62,000 men into the rear of General Lee's army at Richmond. Here, undeniably, is a blunder of the gravest character. He might, by facing to the north instead of the south, and moving his army, not on foot, but by rail and steam, have reached that point, not after a wearisome and destructive march of five months, but in less than four weeks, and that without wearisomeness or loss of life on the way.

CHAPTER XXX.

GENERAL PRICE'S LAST INVASION OF MISSOURI.

WHEN General Rosecrans assumed the command in Missouri, he found all things there in a state of confusion and agitation. Oath-bound secret organizations existed, not only in this State, but over the north-west—organizations prepared for an uprising as soon as the favourable opportunity should present itself. Not less than 23,000 individuals were, in this State alone, found to have been bound together under oath to join General Price as soon as he should appear with a force which promised success. In a meeting of "the Order of American Knights," in St. Louis, a resolution was proposed and laid over, to commence operations in that city by the assassination of the Provost-Marshal, and seizing the head-quarters of the department. By order of General Rosecrans, the State Commander, Deputy Commander, the Grand Secretary, Lecturer, and from thirty to forty influential members of the Order, were seized and lodged in prison. The State Commander turned out to be the Belgian Consul in that city. An order for his release was sent on from Washington—an order which, by a disclosure of facts, General Rosecrans got reversed. While such a state of things existed, our commander found his embarrassments greatly augmented by the want of a military force adequate to the preservation of peace. Under such circumstances, General Price, with an army from 20,000 to 30,000 strong, mostly cavalry, entered the State at the south east, and advanced without resistance to Pilot Knob. There, as formerly stated, he met his first resistance from a single brigade commanded by General H. S. Ewing. In the

battle which there occurred, the invaders lost upwards of 1,000 men, Ewing losing about 200. Having inflicted this loss upon the invaders, and after bravely repulsing two determined assaults, General Ewing made a safe retreat to Rolla, having at Harrison been joined by a body of cavalry sent to his assistance, the Illinois 17th, under Colonel Beveridge. In his retreat, General Ewing moved his forces sixty-six miles in thirty-nine hours. At Harrison, our wearied forces were fiercely assailed by General Shelby. For thirty hours that brave band, under their brave commander, resisted the far superior forces precipitated upon them, until Colonel Beveridge arrived and Shelby drew off.

General Price having, as he intended, threatened St. Louis, and fixed attention in that direction, turned to the north-west, obtained a ready control in the interior of the State, and advanced in force against its capital, Jefferson City, having burned Herman, a Union settlement of Germans, on his way. In his advance, Price was vigorously, but with much care, pursued by General A. J. Smith, brought up, as formerly stated, from Cairo, while on his way to reinforce General Thomas. General Smith had under him some 6,000 men, and 1,500 cavalry. At this time an important accession of strength to our forces was made. General Mower, with quite 5,000 veteran troops, had followed in the rear of General Price out of Arkansas, having, over exceeding bad roads, marched upwards of 300 miles in eighteen days. This force was brought by steamboats from Cape Girardeau to St. Louis, and from thence hastened on to Jefferson City to aid in its defence against General Price.

At this time "the indiscretions" of our military authorities at Washington brought upon the scene a man adequate to the occasion. General Pleasanton having been dismissed from the Army of the Potomac, and sent to the Western Department, arrived, and assumed command of the forces in the interior of the State. On his arrival, he found 12,000 men in Jefferson City, General Mower having arrived. Of these, about 5,000 were cavalry. These forces, commanded by General Fisk, were acting on the defensive, and were cutting down even the shade-trees,

about the city to strengthen the defences. General Pleasanton, having, as formerly stated, captured documents which revealed the plans of the enemy, determined upon a prompt and vigorous assumption of the offensive, combining with those before him the forces under General Smith, and others available for his purpose. Price's army was in no condition to meet such a movement. While his central force was before Jefferson City, nearly one-half of his army was north of the Missouri under General Shelby.

Two circumstances now occurred which prevented the utter annihilation of Price's army,—General Smith was detained with our supplies, and by the destruction of the railroad bridge at Romine, where he was joined by General Mower. At this time Pleasanton and Smith both received positive orders from General Rosecrans to move in force to Lexington. This delay, on the one hand, and deflection from the proper line of pursuit on the other, enabled Price to widen the distance between him and his pursuers, to bring back his forces from the north of the Missouri, and to concentrate them for retreat, defence, or attack, as circumstances might require. Having as far as possible remedied the evils of a false move, which absolute orders from his superior in command compelled him to make, and having got his cavalry into a moving condition, General Pleasanton made a direct and most vigorous pursuit of the enemy. The detour referred to, however, rendered it impossible for General Smith with his infantry corps, all possible efforts to that end being put forth, to cut off Price's retreat south. All that could be done was by a vigorous pursuit. Now commenced a series of the most brilliant movements known in the history of this war. In three days General Pleasanton moved his cavalry quite 120 miles, fought four battles, and gained as many important victories on the way. His first encounter was at Little Blue, at 10 a.m., October 22nd. Driving the enemy from a strong position at this point, he pressed hardly upon his flying footsteps until nightfall, when Independence was captured by a brilliant charge of cavalry.

The next morning the pursuit was renewed. On arriving at the crossings of the Big Blue, the enemy, who

had the day before made at this point an unsuccessful attack upon General Curtis, was found drawn up in order of battle, and fully prepared for a most stubborn resistance. The battle opened at 7 a.m., and at 1 p.m. the enemy was routed and fled from the field. At first General Curtis, with his Kansas forces, took up the pursuit. He soon gave place, however, to Pleasanton's cavalry. At Marais-des-Cygnés, after a march of sixty miles, the enemy was again overtaken. Aroused in their bivouac, at 4 a.m., by the booming of cannon, the Confederates sprang to their horses, and fled without their breakfasts. After being chased to Little Osage, they faced northward for a final stand against their relentless pursuers. Their line of battle displayed eight guns, the only cannon they had brought back with them. General Pleasanton instantly ordered a charge by two brigades, commanded by Generals Benteen and Phillips. The charge was, of course, most splendidly made, and resulted in the quick rout of the enemy, with the loss of their eight guns, and more than 1,000 prisoners, besides many colours, a great amount of small-arms, and the most of their waggons. Among their prisoners were Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, and five colonels. A fresh brigade under General Sanborn now came up, and took the lead in the pursuit. A few miles farther south, the enemy made another stand. Here they were again put to rout, and driven headlong onward until darkness rendered further pursuit impossible. Burning their waggons and other materials, the enemy now took to their horses, and fled for life. Here, from mere exhaustion, Generals Pleasanton and Smith gave rest to the main portions of their forces.

General Blunt, with a body of Kansas troops, and General Benteen's brigade, followed by that of General Sanborn, moved upon the trail of the foe to Newtonia, in the south-western portion of the State. Here General Blunt encountered a stubborn resistance, and would have been worsted had not General Sanborn, after a march of 102 miles in thirty-six hours, come up and secured a victory. With little left, as Mr. Greeley truly says,—“with little left to lose but their bodies and worn-out horses,” the enemy escaped into Western Arkansas. General Curtis followed

on as far as Fayetteville, Arkansas, where he routed, with great loss to them and none to us, a body of 2,000 men, who were besieging a small Union force under Colonel Brooks. Long before this last of that memorable series of victories, which sent General Price a returnless fugitive and exile from the State of which he was Governor at the beginning of the war, General Smith, with a corps about 20,000 strong, was on his way to Tennessee to aid Thomas in destroying the army of General Hood at Nashville. We shall speak of the cause and bearing of this event after we shall have considered the campaign in the State last referred to.

Reflections on this campaign.

According to the fixed principles and precedents of all prior campaigns during this war, Generals Pleasanton and Smith, and their bold coadjutors, deserve the deep reprobation of the army and nation. We refer to the relentless pursuit by these men and their forces of General Price and his raiders, after the first signal defeat of those invaders had rendered their prompt retreat from the State of Missouri a certainty. After that defeat, all heart to fight was taken out of Price and his subordinates, and they became possessed of but one desire, and that was the privilege of a peaceful departure from the State which they had invaded, taking along with them the plunder which they had gathered up during their invasion, and which they would so much need in their banishment. All such considerations their relentless pursuers utterly disregarded, not suffering the pursued to carry back one of the guns which they brought with them out of Arkansas and Texas. What, in all the precedents of all leading commanders during the war up to that time, can be pleaded in justification of the reckless conduct of General Sanborn in pushing his command upwards of a hundred miles in thirty-six hours, in order to perfect the disorganization of the *débris* of that flying foe? Even this did not satisfy the hungry maw of Curtis, but he must press forward into Arkansas, and perfect the paralysis of the Confederate cause there by the cruel defeat of that besieging force at Fayetteville. In this censure, General Rosecrans must

come in for his full share; because he, from his high watch-tower at St. Louis, witnessed that relentless pursuit, and might have stopped it. Yet he never uttered a prohibition, rebuke, censure, or expostulation,—and that when it was perfectly manifest that the pursuers not only grudged the invaders the plunder they were endeavouring to escape with, but the food which the men were endeavouring to collect to satisfy their famishing stomachs, and even the wild grass with which they were endeavouring to keep their horses from falling under them, and to keep upon the reeling bodies of those animals the flesh they had on when the invasion began. And then, what shall be said of the promptitude with which General Smith, as soon as the ruin of Price was secured, was sent off to Tennessee to enable Thomas to inflict upon Hood the same relentless form of ruin which Pleasanton and his coadjutors had perpetrated upon Price? What, finally, can be said in apology for Thomas in his palpable departure from the precedents of his illustrious predecessors, and copying such a new and dangerous example as had just been set him in Missouri? No historian can find in the campaigns of those predecessors a single example that can be pleaded in excuse for the two campaigns under consideration. It is absolutely undeniable that those predecessors ought to have been dismissed for their incompetency or neglect of palpable duty, or Pleasanton and Thomas should have been cashiered for their reckless and cruel innovations.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL HOOD IN TENNESSEE.

WE now turn to a consideration of the celebrated campaign of General Hood in Tennessee. We here notice two existing misapprehensions in regard to this campaign. As commonly represented, its prime object was to draw General Sherman back out of Georgia. If this was so, why did Hood tarry upon the Tennessee river, crossing but a part of his army over until he had definite information that Sherman had broken from all his communications, and was considerably advanced on his march through that State? And why did Hood, as soon as he was fully assured of Sherman's real purpose, commence his advance upon Nashville? The truth is, that nothing was less desired than Sherman's return to Tennessee, and nothing was more desired than that he should continue his march south. The plan and purpose of Hood's invasion was, undeniably, what we have represented it to have been, a part of a great movement to restore Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri to the Confederacy, to secure a general uprising in the north-west against the emancipation policy of the national administration, and, if possible, to prevent Iowa taking part in the then approaching Presidential election.

The other mistake is that the advance of Hood to Decatur was "a feint to cover his crossing farther west." General Hood, on the other hand, advanced to that point with the serious intent of crossing there, and was induced to change his plan by the prompt and wise dispositions of General Granger, then in command at that place. Knowing that his forces were too small to withstand a general

assault from the army of General Hood, and being well aware of the importance of time to the Union cause, General Granger, to impose upon his antagonist, advanced his entire force, with all his guns, into his front line, everywhere putting on a bold face, making a sortie on his left, and capturing 120 prisoners. Hood, inferring from what was visible in his front that a very large Union force was in Decatur, drew off, and passed the river at Florence.

We shall not stop to detail the senseless folly which characterized this war as conducted by both sides. We refer to those cavalry raids in which this portion of these armies did a great deal of material damage, but accomplished nothing decisive any way. We shall only refer to the essentials of the campaign itself. When he became fully assured that all danger of General Sherman's return to Tennessee was past, General Hood entered in right good earnest upon his intended campaign. His army was divided into three corps, under Generals Cheatham, A. P. Stewart, and S. D. Lee, while his splendid cavalry, 12,000 strong, was commanded by General Forrest. To meet the invading force, quite 55,000 strong, General Thomas could send forward but five divisions of infantry,—their number, as we shall see, being greatly increased near the close of the campaign. Falling back, as Hood advanced, first from Pulaski to Columbia, and from this place to Franklin, our army, all its parts being concentrated, made a determined stand here, General Schofield in command, to resist and turn back the further advance of the invading force.

Battle of Franklin.

To understand the nature of the battle-ground at this place, we would state that the Harpeth river, coming down from the south, passes the place on its east side, and then, turning due west, passes it on its north side, the river thus forming two sides of a square. Our army was so drawn up, that, with the river, it formed a hollow square, with Franklin near its centre, our right wing touching the river at the west, and our left at the north-east of the village. One division of our forces was located over the river to the east of the village; while Fort Granger, from

whence General Schofield observed the battle, lay still farther south on the same side of the river, near the point where it was touched by our left wing. Our army numbered nearly or quite 20,000 men. Hood was present with his whole army, which had come down mainly on the Columbia and Nashville turnpike, which passes through the centre of the square above described. The entire force of the Confederate army thus confronted our left wing and part of our centre, where our main forces were drawn up, with defences very hastily constructed in their front. In the formation of Hood's army, Stewart was on his right, next the river, Cheatham on his left, and Lee in reserve, with the cavalry on both wings. As Hood looked upon the slight breastworks before him, he exclaimed to his men, "Break those lines, and there is nothing more to withstand you this side the Ohio river." The first assault of the enemy was irresistible. The Confederate forces rolled as a torrent over our breastworks, and captured eight of our guns, with many prisoners. The hill was lost to us, and the enemy was closing up his ranks within our lines, our men rushing to the bridges under the idea that all was lost. At this crisis, a command rang out from General Opdycke: "First brigade, forward to the works!" In a moment, that fearless brigade advanced to the charge. The conflict was fearful; but in a few minutes the enemy, taken perfectly by surprise, recoiled before that charge, and abandoned the works they had carried, leaving behind them 300 prisoners, ten battle flags, and all the guns they had taken from us. In vain did Hood continue, until 10 p.m., to push his columns upon the works which he had won by force, and lost by a surprise. During the night our army retired, and by noon the next day lay down to rest and sleep within the defences at Nashville.

In this bloody battle, our losses, as officially reported, were, in killed, wounded, and missing, 2,326, while General Hood admits a loss in all, on his part, of 4,500 men. After spending the next day in caring for the wounded, and burying his and our dead, the Confederates moved, on December 2nd, to Nashville. It is singular that in this battle, none of our Generals were killed, and but one,

Major-General Stanley, wounded. The Confederates lost, in killed, Major-General P. R. Cleburne, "the Stonewall Jackson of the West," and Brig.-Generals Gist, Adams, Strahl, and Granbury. Among their wounded were Major-General Brown, and Brig.-Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott; Brig.-General Gordon being taken prisoner. Such a victory is, in fact, a defeat.

Siege and battle of Nashville.

When Hood sat down before Nashville, the relative strength of the two hostile armies was very soon most materially changed. While the Confederate forces had been, in the various battles, reduced below 45,000, the Union forces, by the arrival of General Smith's corps from Missouri, and of 5,000 men, with a black brigade, from Chattanooga, had been rendered quite 50,000 strong. Wisdom now demanded a prompt retreat of the invading army, and its precipitation upon General Sherman. Military prudence, however, had no place in the mind of General Hood. With an army obviously larger than his own, and a city quite strongly fortified in his front, what but ruinous defeat awaited him should he remain where he was? By following on the track of Sherman, however, the Confederate commander had it most obviously in his power to inflict a great disaster upon the Union cause.

On account of deficiency in cavalry, and that he might mount a few thousand of his men, General Thomas delayed action for a few days. This greatly perplexed and offended General Grant, as he looked out upon passing events from the centre of the bottle in which he was corked up. Despatch after despatch was accordingly sent on, demanding of Thomas that he should open upon the enemy. To all such messages, one reply was sent, that the fight should begin as soon as the army could be prepared for it. Then a providential interposition rendered a fight on the part of Thomas, or an assault or a retreat on the part of Hood, nearly or quite impossible,—the occurrence of a week's cold of the greatest severity. This perplexed and irritated our Commander-in-Chief to the utmost. Thomas was threatened with displacement;

Logan was sent on as far as Louisville, to assume the command, and push our forces upon the enemy. Finally, Grant himself came on to Washington with the determination to hasten to Nashville and force the battle. To all commands and messages, Thomas replied that the authorities might displace him, if they chose. One thing he should not do, and that was, open the fight before his army was ready for it.

At length the anxiously-looked-for event arrived. The weather became warm, and the organization of the army was perfected. Our army at first lay around the south side of the city in a semicircular form, our right touching the Cumberland river west, and our left at the east of the city, the river itself leading in a semicircle from our left around to our right. In our line, Smith held our right; Wood, now commanding Stanley's corps, held the centre, and Schofield our left; while Steedman, with the forces brought up from Chattanooga and other points, occupied several positions to the east of Schofield. Hood's line confronted our centre, and the main portion of Schofield's line. Thomas, December 14th, ordered an advance of his right and right centre, on the next day, the weather now being propitious. As a means of diverting attention from this movement, Steedman was ordered the morning before to assail, and roll up, Hood's right wing, and thereby cause a movement from his centre to repel the assault. This movement proving a success, Smith the next morning being sustained on his right by Wilson's cavalry, advanced up the Hardenpike, and flanked Hood's left. Hatch's division of Wilson's cavalry first struck, and drove back the enemy from one of his positions, capturing a number of prisoners and waggons. The cavalry were now dismounted, and carried by assault, and in succession, two more redoubts. The result of these exploits was, not only the capture of three important redoubts, but eight guns, and upwards of 300 prisoners. In these assaults, Smith's infantry rendered all the aid which the rapid action of the cavalry permitted. About 1 p.m. Wood came into action on Smith's left, and carried, first, Hood's central, and then forced him back from his entire line to the foot of Harpeth Hills, south of his first position. The

result of this day's action was the capture of the enemy's whole line, 1,200 prisoners, sixteen guns, and forty wag-gons, our losses being very small. While these operations were going on, Schofield advanced to the right of Smith, and came into action just at nightfall. Our new line, as readjusted at evening for the next day's operations, was thus formed: Wilson, with his cavalry, was on our extreme right, and ready for a flank movement around Hood's left; Schofield was next; Smith in the centre; and Wood on our left, with Steedman, as before, still farther in that direction.

The operations of the next day commenced with a simultaneous advance of our whole line. Wilson, on our extreme right, closed round the Confederate left and gained their rear. Schofield, facing to the east, threatened to roll up and close round their left flank. Smith confronted their centre, whilst Steedman and Wood assaulted and flanked Hood's right at a place called Overton Hills. The assault upon this position was repulsed with a terrible slaughter of our forces. The attack on our right and front, however, was successful, all the works of the enemy being carried, while Wilson's cavalry seized and held one of the enemy's main lines of retreat. Wood's and Steedman's corps, hearing the shouts of victory from our centre and left, and being fully re-formed, charged a second time, and carried every position before them. The rout of Hood's entire army was now complete. Abandoning most of their guns and materials, and leaving many prisoners behind them, they fled in all directions south as best they could.

Now commenced a relentless pursuit of the flying enemy—a pursuit like that which we have detailed as having occurred in Missouri. For several days the pursuit was prosecuted, the enemy being driven from position to position, and from bivouac to bivouac, until the state of the roads, and the flooded streams,—the enemy destroying all bridges behind them,—rendered further pursuit impossible.

In this campaign, from its commencement to its close, our loss amounted in killed, wounded, and missing to about 10,000 men. According to the official statement of

General Thomas, the prisoners captured from the enemy amounted in all to 11,857 men. If we add to these 1,332 who were exchanged, and 2,207 deserters who received amnesty, the loss of the enemy, aside from their killed, and wounded who were carried off, amounted to 15,396. We captured, also, 72 serviceable guns, and upwards of 3,000 small-arms. Among the prisoners were, one major-general, seven brigadiers, thirty colonels and lieutenant-colonels, twenty-two majors, 813 captains and lieutenants, and eighty-nine surgeons and chaplains. If we take into account the killed and wounded, and the numbers who had joined the campaign only for temporary service, the fact becomes obvious that the army with which Hood invaded Tennessee was practically annihilated. On his arrival at Tupelo, Mississippi, Hood was "relieved at his own request," the Confederate army having lost while under his command between 30,000 and 40,000 men; the ruin of the Confederate cause in Tennessee, and the four States south of it, being consummated through his instrumentality.

We must here put on record our decisive protest against the conduct of Thomas, after Hood's last defeat at Nashville, our protest being based upon all prior precedents from the commencement of this war, the prior campaign in Missouri excepted. We write in no prejudice against General Thomas, or his illustrious predecessors in whose footsteps he refused to follow. What we say is dictated by one motive, to enable our countrymen rightly to understand the past, and to guard against its errors and blunders in the future. The obvious motive and plan of General Thomas was not only to defeat General Hood, but to annihilate his power for further mischief. In all prior victories under our leading commanders, those in Missouri excepted, this latter end seems to have been most carefully guarded against. After a victory over the enemy, the defeated army appeared to become a sacred thing in the regard of our Generals. We have heard it gravely asserted, that on the evening after the battle of Antietam, General Lee sent one of our captured officers to General McClellan, with a letter requesting the latter, in the name of humanity, not to press upon the Confede-

rates in their disorganized and weakened condition. All this was pure fiction, of course, and was invented merely to illustrate the conduct of our Generals after a victory. Lee understood the state of facts too well to send such a request. He was well aware that, after a defeat, the Confederate armies were as safe from the perils of pursuit as from the falling of the sky.

After the victory of Thomas in Eastern Kentucky, and the capture of Forts Henry and Donaldson, the entire Confederate army at Bowling Green, as we have shown, lay within the easy grasp of Halleck and Buell. All advance of our forces, and that against solemn protestations, was held back, until the enemy had full time to retire with all their ill-gotten plunder, to take with them \$10,000,000 worth of material from Nashville, to concentrate at Corinth, and then move up and slaughter thousands of our brave men at Shiloh. When Halleck had compelled the Confederates to retreat from Corinth, he stood still again until the enemy, by reorganizing his forces, could pass round our army and invade Kentucky a second time. When Buell had hastened back to that State, and by a defeat of the enemy had necessitated his retirement, he then prohibited pursuit, permitting the Confederate commander to retire at his leisure, driving off his immense droves of hogs and cattle and his long trains of waggons loaded with plundered provisions and goods, and afterwards to slaughter more than 50,000 of our men in the battles of Murfreesboro', Chickamauga, and on other fields. After his so-called victory at Antietam, McClellan retired back miles into the country to sleep, prohibited all disturbance of the enemy while passing over the Potomac, and for more than forty days refused all pursuit, thus permitting General Lee to recuperate his forces, and afterwards destroy more than 50,000 of our men in the battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. After our great victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson, nearly 1,000,000 men, "well armed and equipped," with the exception of the single movement of Rosecrans with the Army of the Cumberland, and the relief of our forces, at Chattanooga and Knoxville, nearly 1,000,000 men lay "in stagnant idleness, from July until the beginning of

May of the next year, the Confederacy being thus allowed full time to recover from the blows it had received, to adjust itself to its new relations, and with renewed energies and reorganized armies to enter the field of slaughter for the year 1864, that most bloody year of all the war. As soon as the Confederate lines were broken at Gettysburg, and the power to crush Lee, and end the war, was put into the hands of our General, he ordered an immediate stand-still of our forces, until the enemy had leisurely retired beyond the reach of danger. How tenderly, and by word of command, was subsequent pursuit conducted. And when Providence, by a swollen river, had again put the entire Confederate army into our hands, how sacred was that army in the regard of our commander, until the flood had subsided, and the enemy had passed safely and undisturbed over upon his own "sacred soil," with full leisure there to recover strength to slaughter upwards of 150,000 Union soldiers. When Bragg, with a large portion of his guns and material, and his army but a little more than 30,000 strong, retreated before Grant and Sherman at Chattanooga, 100,000 men were compelled to lay idle on the Tennessee, until that defeated and disorganized army had recovered strength to "beat down to the ground" more than 50,000 of our "strong and lusty" men. Had Sherman improved his three victories over Hood as Thomas did his two, the Confederate army would have been destroyed at Atlanta, instead of Nashville. It was, undeniably, by the utter and palpable neglect of our Generals to improve the manifest advantages which their victories so often put into their hands, that, more than any one cause, occasioned the amazing protraction of the war, the appalling slaughter of hundreds of thousands of our brave men, and the creation of that Atlantean debt with which our nation is now so oppressed. It was by a departure from such precedents that the military power of the Confederacy was annihilated in the States of Missouri, Arkansas, and in fact in Texas, on the one hand, and, on the other, in those east of the Mississippi, and west of Virginia and the Carolinas.

CHAPTER XXXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA.

ON the 11th November, General Sherman, having sent his sick and wounded back to Chattanooga, having destroyed the railroads and all property which might be used to his injury, having sent his last message to Washington, and cut off all telegraphic communications between himself and the Northern States, commenced his famous march from Rome and Kingston to Savannah, a march of some six weeks' continuance,—a march which was made without fighting a battle worthy of being recorded, and in which almost the only impediment encountered was rains, swamps, and bad roads,—a march of 255 miles, and in which we lost in all less than 600 men. Before entering upon his march, General Sherman divided his army, upwards of 60,000 strong, into two grand divisions, commanded by Generals O. O. Howard and H. W. Slocum, each division being constituted of two corps, the four being commanded respectively by Generals P. J. Osterhaus, F. B. Blair, J. C. Davis, and A. S. Williams; the cavalry being led by General J. Kilpatrick. When the army moved from Atlanta, it was furnished with bread for twenty, and meat, sugar, etc., for forty, and forage for three days,—supplies for the rest of the march being drawn from the country. As no incidents worthy of notice occurred during this march, we deem it important merely to direct special attention to the following statements and reflections in respect to it.

The dismantling and depopulation of Atlanta.

On taking possession of Atlanta, General Sherman sent off in different directions, at Government expense, and as

the people elected, all the inhabitants of the city, rendering its habitations tenantless. "This unprecedented measure," General Hood affirmed, "transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever brought to my attention in the dark history of war." Of the truth of that statement posterity will judge. That it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a parallel for it in modern warfare, we deem undeniable. Nor can it be defended, or apologized for, on the ground of expediency. After the destruction of its fortifications and manufactories and railroad communications, and its abandonment by our army, it had no importance as a military post to us, or to the Confederates. Nor did the depopulation of the place give us any facilities for its reoccupation, should we ever have desired to return to it. Just as valid reasons can be offered for the depopulation of Rome, Kingston, Macon, or Savannah, as for Atlanta. To be sure, the people were sent off at Government expense. After being thus conveyed to a certain distance, however, they were left homeless, and without provisions, or the means of obtaining them. We cannot regard the act in any other light than that of needless barbarism, like the desolation inflicted upon the defenceless population of the Shenandoah Valley.

What the highest wisdom demanded of the Confederates at the time of Sherman's invasion.

The same fundamental blunders characterized this war as conducted by the Union, on the one hand, and the Confederate military authorities on the other. We refer to a want of discernment of *golden opportunities*. When Hood lay at Florence, his army, as we have seen, was at the mercy of Sherman. As soon as Sherman advanced from Atlanta into the interior of Georgia, his army, most obviously and undeniably, lay equally at the mercy of the Confederates. Practicable dispositions on their part would have rendered the capture of the entire invading force an absolute certainty. Had Lee, as he might have done, with 10,000 men, reinforced Hardee, who confronted Sherman, and had Hood, with his 45,000 infantry and artillery, and his 12,000 splendid cavalry, pressed upon our wings and rear, Sherman could, by no possibility, have sustained

himself for two weeks, after he was assailed in his front and rear. This was the golden opportunity for the Confederates, and, failing to discern it, they, in a military point of view, deserved most richly all the disasters that subsequently befell them. Viewed from the strategic standpoint, that famous march is one of the most presumptuous movements known in history, a movement from the disastrous consequences of which we were saved but by the palpable want of discernment on the part of the Confederates. Such is the judgment which, as is well known, we passed upon the movement when it was being made, and which we have entertained ever since. When asked at the time what we thought of the movement, our reply was this: "If the Confederate military authorities are as blind to existing facts and exigencies as ours have thus far proved themselves to be, and Sherman is clearly aware of the facts of the case, and is acting upon such knowledge, then this campaign may be justified as the least eligible of two good measures which might have been determined on. If, on the other hand, he is not thus informed, this campaign is one of the most presumptuous blunders of which we can form a conception. We record it as our deliberate judgment, that that famous march is a precedent which all future commanders should avoid. Success never changes a blunder into a precedent.

What Sherman failed to do.

One fact connected with this famous march appears to all Confederate generals and officers with whom we have conversed an inexplicable mystery. In the same light, we have been informed, has the matter ever stood in the regard of all well-informed generals in their army. Augusta, which lay but a few miles east of General Sherman's line of march, was, and was universally known to be, a place of more vital importance to the Confederacy than Atlanta, while Savannah was, at the time, the least important of the three, Augusta lying on the direct and main route between Virginia and the Carolinas, and the central and western States of the Confederacy, and being also the great central depôt for cotton, provisions, and supplies for the Confederate armies east and west. No

other position was of such vital importance to the Confederacy as Augusta, and its fall would have, of necessity, involved the speedy ruin of the cause of the Rebellion, inasmuch as their means of supply and of united action would have been cut off. The route through Augusta to General Sherman's objective point, Petersburg, was more direct, and from 150 to 200 miles shorter, than that through Savannah. By taking the former route, and advancing from Augusta through Columbia, he would not only have divided the Confederacy into two parts, but would have rendered their reunion impossible. He would, at the same time, have ensured the surrender of Lee, and the final fall of the Confederacy itself, some months earlier than they did occur. By passing Augusta, and moving round through Savannah, he permitted Johnston, with what remained of Hood's forces, to reinforce Hardee in front of our army, and to make dispositions which, but for an event hereafter to be designated, rendered the destruction of that army almost, or quite, inevitable. Besides, the capture of Augusta, which was then defended by less than 5,000 men, and the consequent hopeless prostration of the Confederacy, would have delayed the advance upon Savannah but a very few days, had such an advance been determined upon. The neglect to avail himself of this most propitious opportunity, involves, not only a palpable blunder, but a mystery which the present generation will probably be wholly unable to solve, whatever may be true of the disclosures of the future.

What the Confederates suffered in regard to provisions and supplies from this march.

The common impression is that by this march the Confederacy was not only divided, but so impoverished in provisions as to render a further prosecution of the war impossible. That the march did not divide the Confederacy at all is rendered fully evident by the advance of Johnston with Hood's army through Augusta into Sherman's front in North Carolina. Indeed, until our army arrived at Columbia, railroad communications between Virginia and Mississippi were not essentially disturbed. That what our army devoured, and carried off,

during the march did not impoverish the Confederacy, is evident from the abundance which they found on the narrow strip of territory over which that army passed. If so much was found here, what must have remained on the other portions of the fertile territories of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. It is undeniable that the damage done by this march was a matter of trifling concern to the Confederate cause. We must find the effects of this march in other directions than its immediate results.

What material and provisions we gained, and the Confederates lost, as the results of this march.

During the march itself, almost nothing but provisions were gathered up. In the capture of Savannah, however, the case was different. The results of the march are thus summed up by Mr. Greeley:—"We had lost in that march of 255 miles, which was substantially the conquest of Georgia" (a great mistake, as we have seen), "six weeks' time and 567 men; whereof 63 were killed, 245 wounded, and 159 missing. To offset these, we had taken 1,328 prisoners, and 167 guns. Our ammunition expended was very inconsiderable; while our 65,000 men and 10,000 horses had lived generously off a State wherein our captives in thousands had died of virtual starvation and kindred agonies because (as was alleged) their captors were unable to subsist them. Aside from sheep, fowls, sweet potatoes, and rice, whereof they had found an abundance, 13,000 beeves, 160,000 bushels of corn, and over 5,000 tons of fodder, had been gathered from the country and issued to our men and animals; while 5,000 horses and 4,000 mules had been pressed into the national service. Of cotton, 20,000 bales had been burned, while 25,000 were captured in Savannah." Two or three times that number, with untold amounts of provisions and supplies, would have been found in Augusta, had that place also been captured.

The resistance Sherman received from the Confederate forces.

While the neglect to capture Augusta must remain as the mystery of the campaign as conducted by General

Sherman, the absence of all real resistance to his march from Rome and Kingston to Savannah must remain a mystery equally inscrutable in the campaign as conducted by the Confederates. Hardee's cavalry under Wheeler, outnumbered, it is affirmed, those of Kilpatrick under Sherman. It is a well-ascertained fact that on his march Sherman was confronted by an army 30,000 strong, and that about 10,000 of these were cavalry, while his line of march compelled him to pass two important rivers, the Oconee and the Ogeechee, and on narrow roads, over many smaller streams, and through multitudinous marshes. Yet nowhere was there a serious resistance to his advance. At many points he might obviously have been compelled to concentrate his forces and fight battles at the greatest disadvantage. To all human appearance, his front of, for the most part, upwards of thirty miles in extent, might at different points have been successfully assaulted and broken through, and that with disastrous results to our army. Yet nothing of the kind was even attempted. Our men were permitted to forage and move at will, as if no hostile forces were near. When Fort McAlister was captured, and Hardee was summoned to surrender Savannah, the only reply returned was that the surrender could not be properly made, because the city was not then sufficiently invested. While Sherman was on his way to Hilton Head to concert measures to cut off Hardee's retreat in the direction of Charleston, the latter evacuated Savannah, and left it, with all its forts, guns, munitions, and cotton, to be taken peaceable possession of by our forces. Great generalship did not always characterize the campaigns as conducted by the Confederate any more than by the Union commanders. But one conceivable explanation of the facts before us suggests itself to our mind, namely, after the defeat of Hood, Generals Lee and Johnston, divining Sherman's final purpose, developed the plan of concentrating in North Carolina Hood's and Hardee's forces, with all others that could be collected there, for the purpose of crushing Sherman, when he should have advanced to the vicinity of Goldsboro', and then confronting Grant with a combination of force which he could not overcome. This hypothesis

renders all Hardee's conduct fully explicable, he having been instructed to risk nothing, and to do nothing but impede Sherman's advance, until the combination above suggested could be perfected. If this was the plan of the Confederate Generals,—and we have very good reasons for the statement that it was their real plan,—then, notwithstanding the final result, we must give them credit for strategic talent of a very high order.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH FROM SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, TO GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA; THE SUR- RENDER OF LEE AND JOHNSTON; AND THE CLOSE OF THE WAR.

WE now approach the closing scenes of the eventful tragedy which has thus far occupied our attention,—scenes in respect to which our nation and the world have thus far, and in many important respects, been most essentially misinformed, and in respect to which we will at this late period furnish the needed information. Contrary to all expectation, to the great surprise of our military authorities and the nation at large, the war, by the unexpected surrender of Generals Lee and Johnston, and of the entire Confederate armies throughout the United States, came to a sudden and bloodless termination. The surrender of Generals Lee and Johnston, at the time when it occurred, was as unexpected to them and to the whole Confederacy as it was to the rest of the nation and the world. Two weeks prior to this surrender, these Generals, as we shall see, were in the most sanguine expectation of a great victory—a victory in which, and by which, Sherman would be crushed and captured, Grant be rendered powerless for future aggressive movements, and the whole aspect of the war fundamentally changed.

The real cause or causes which brought about this unexpected consummation.

What were the causes which so suddenly blighted these hopeful expectations, induced the unexpected surrender of the two central armies of the Confederacy, and brought the

war to this sudden and bloodless termination? The masterly strategy, wise dispositions, and timely and energetic action of General Grant, is the present response nearly or quite universally given to such a question. It is this impression which, in the general regard, has given him a place among the great commanders of the world, has for two successive terms rendered him President of the United States, and, until quite recently, was likely to put him upon the course for the occupancy of that high office for a third term. Of the correctness of this impression, the nation and the world will, in the light of the facts which we are about to present, be able to form a correct judgment. What, then, was the *immediate* cause which did occasion this unexpected consummation? The Hon. Alexander H. Stevens, ex-Vice-President of the Confederacy, assigns, as the definite and exclusive reason why Generals Lee and Johnston surrendered without fighting a battle, the fact that, at Goldsboro', Sherman was reinforced by the corps of Generals Schofield and Terry, the Union army thereby being rendered nearly or quite 100,000 strong, and thus becoming irresistible to any force which the Confederate Generals could bring into the field against us. Between such an army under Sherman, and a still greater one under Grant, these Generals saw themselves utterly powerless. For them to fight a battle under such circumstances, would be to throw away thousands of precious lives to no purpose. But one thing remained, unless they would involve themselves in the crime of a murderous and unavailing slaughter of their brave troops, and that was to surrender on the best terms that could be secured. Such is the definite cause assigned by Mr. Stevens for the unexpected and bloodless termination of the war, and nobody questions the accuracy of his information. In assigning his reasons for his approval of the surrender of Lee and Johnston without a battle, Mr. Stevens (vol. ii., p. 624 of his History) says: "I saw nothing to prevent Sherman himself from proceeding right on to Richmond and attacking Lee in the rear, to say nothing of any movements by Grant, who then had an army in front of not much, if any, under 200,000 men. Lee's forces were not over one-fourth of that number. Sherman's army, when united with Schofield's and Terry's, which were

joining him from Wilmington, North Carolina, would be swelled to near 100,000. To meet these, the Confederates had in his front, nothing but the fragment of shattered armies amounting in all to not one-half the number of the Federals." We have good reason for affirming that Johnston's army was at this time greater than Mr. Stevens supposes, as that army was being rapidly reinforced, and had become so large, and brought into a state of such organization, that its commander had no doubt whatever of being fully able to defeat the army which Sherman brought with him from Savannah to North Carolina. The case was widely and appallingly different in Johnston's regard, after Sherman had been reinforced by Schofield and Terry. To fight Sherman then would imply infinite presumption. The fact is undeniable, that at the time when this reinforcement did arrive, the battle was being joined between the armies then confronting each other—that had this battle been fought, it would have been one of the bloodiest of the war—that, in the united judgment of two such Generals as Lee and Johnston, who perfectly understood the amount and character of the force in each army, the result of the conflict would have been the defeat and destruction of the Union army, and a sudden and total change in the status and prospects of the war itself. The fact is equally obvious and undeniable, also, that in consequence of the arrival of these reinforcements at that critical moment, Johnston retreated, and he and Lee afterwards surrendered, and the war was terminated without further bloodshed.

Now, if we would know the *real* cause of this sudden and bloodless termination of the war, we must find the reasons and influences which brought Schofield and Terry to Goldsboro' at the critical moment when they appeared at that place. On the evening of January 14th, General Schofield, then at Clifton, on the Tennessee river, received by telegram an order to report, with his entire army, as soon as possible at Annapolis, Maryland. He was at the time at Clifton, under special orders from General Grant to transport that army by water, down the Tennessee, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers, to Eastport, Mississippi, and this for the purpose of another expedition up the Arkansas river for the subjugation of Texas; and had all things in

readiness to embark his army on that expedition the morning after the telegram referred to was received. The order conveyed in that telegram turned the army of Schofield from its intended destination, and brought it round, in connection with the corps of Terry, to Goldsboro', and by that means brought the war to its unexpected and bloodless termination. After the presentation of a few important facts and considerations, the causes which occasioned that order will be presented, and then all misapprehensions which have hitherto hung over the subject will be for ever removed.

What General Grant did, and might and should have done, while he was "bottled and corked up" in the Peninsula before Petersburg and Richmond.

Between the 12th and 15th of June, 1864, General Grant passed his army over James river, and commenced operations before Petersburg. After many vain efforts, in which he lost upwards of 30,000 men, he remained idle there until the opening of the next spring campaign. The only excuse or apology that we ever heard offered for this idleness is that the policy of Grant was to threaten Lee, and thus prevent his injuring Sherman by reinforcing Johnston. In other words, our great Commander-in-Chief kept for more than half a year 1,000,000 men in stagnant idleness, for no other reason than to enable an army 60,000 strong to make a safe march around a semi-circle of 1,000 miles in extent, and at the end of that march to come upon General Lee's rear. If this was the real motive for such inaction, then we affirm that our General ought to stand lower in national and world regard than any other General that ever commanded a great army.

Let us for a few moments contemplate the facts of the case. During this year, aside from all the forces then in the field, the Government made successive calls for conscriptions amounting in all to the vast sum of 1,500,000 men, and it is quite safe to conclude that from 600,000 to 800,000 of these entered the army. In addition to the 180,000 coloured troops enlisted during this and the year preceding, 100,000 volunteers, enlisted for a hundred days,

were "fully armed and equipped." Of these coloured troops and volunteers more than 100,000 joined the Army of the Potomac. All these—with, no doubt, a still larger number from the regular army—were added to Grant's forces in Virginia. With all these immense forces under his immediate command, he lay in perfect torpor for more than six months, watching, in his wisdom, it is said, General Lee, to prevent his dividing his little army of 60,000 men, and sending reinforcements to Johnston, Hood, or Hardee, and waiting for Sherman to make with his 60,000 men his march of 1,000 miles, round from Rome and Kingston, in Georgia, through Atlanta, Macon, Savannah, Columbia, and over Johnston's army into Lee's rear at Petersburg. We leave the facts, which cannot be denied, and their explanation, to speak for themselves. The only explanation which meets our honest judgment is the conclusion that our General remained thus idle because he did not know what to do.

Let us now consider what might have been done, and what any General of even ordinary knowledge and capacity would have done, in General Grant's circumstances. We will suppose, to instance no other case, that he had moved an army 70,000 or 80,000 strong to Warrenton or Culpepper, had reinforced these with the 30,000 troops under Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley, and had given Sheridan the command of all these combined forces. All this could, undeniably, and at any time, have been done in two or three weeks. While Grant had concentrated all his army at Petersburg, and held his forces in readiness to move as soon as the proper moment should arrive, suppose that Sheridan, driving Early before him, or more probably having captured his little army, had moved through Gordonsville into Lee's rear, as Sherman was expected to do, after his march of 1,000 miles. The inevitable consequence would have been that General Lee would have surrendered, as he afterwards did, without a battle. Between the crushing forces of Sheridan and Grant he would never have assumed the criminal responsibility of sacrificing his soldiery to no purpose. Had he retreated into the Carolinas, he would in his retreat have been confronted with the superior forces sent round to Hilton

Head, on the one hand, while he was relentlessly pursued by Grant on the other. The war would thus have had a bloodless termination quite six or eight months earlier than it did, and numberless precious lives, and not less than \$500,000,000 of national debt, would have been saved to our country. To us, it appeared at the time, as is well known to our then students and friends with whom we communicated, an inexplicable enigma, that some such most obvious combination of the national forces in and about Virginia did not occur to our military authorities; and more than all, that they could by no possibility be persuaded to order such combinations when they were suggested by others.

The plan of the campaign devised and ordered by General Grant while General Sherman lay at Savannah.

Let us now turn our consideration to General Grant's plan of the campaign while General Sherman lay at Savannah,—the plan which was being carried into execution at the time when the telegram referred to above reached General Schofield at Clifton. After the defeat and demoralization of Hood's army, General Grant ordered the following disposition of General Thomas's forces. The corps of Generals Schofield, Smith, and Wilson were ordered to move to Clifton on the Tennessee river, to be conveyed by water to Eastport, Mississippi, for a campaign in that direction, while General Wood's corps was ordered to Huntsville, Alabama, for a winter campaign in the latter State. While the forces first designated lay at Clifton for the purpose named, Schofield received his telegram—the order which brought him and Terry to Goldsboro'. The first order which General Grant gave forth to Sherman, when the latter arrived at Savannah, was that he should move his army by water round to Petersburg, and reinforce ours there. This, then, was the original plan of our Commander-in-Chief—the movement of Thomas's army as stated, and a movement of the Army of the Potomac, reinforced by that of Sherman from Petersburg,—a campaign which, if carried out, would inevitably, and as Grant calculated at the time, have protracted the war far into the year 1866. By the

visit of Sherman to Petersburg, General Grant, after the most earnest entreaty, was induced so far to modify his original plan as to allow Sherman to make, as he had at first determined, his march through the Carolinas. In all other respects the original plan of the campaign remained unchanged.

The counter-plan of the Confederate commanders.

After the final defeat of General Hood, it became perfectly manifest to the Confederate Generals that all hope for their cause then depended upon the destruction of Sherman's army, and a subsequent union of their forces against Grant. At this time, however, Sherman was too far advanced upon his march to be injured through the forces of Hardee and Hood in the State of Georgia. Assuming that the ultimate plan of Sherman was to move through the Carolinas into Lee's rear at Petersburg, they determined to organize in North Carolina a new army under Johnston—an army consisting of Hardee's and what remained of Hood's forces, of all that Johnston would bring with him from the States of Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, and all that by any possibility could be drawn together from the Carolinas. This army, reinforced by General Lee so as to be rendered entirely superior to Sherman's, was to await his approach to North Carolina, and there, at a place which the Confederates should select, fall upon and crush him, and having captured his forces, combine with Lee against Grant. That this was the definite plan of the Confederate Generals is perfectly obvious from the facts before us. That it was their plan, we have also been assured by General Ripley, who joined Johnston with the forces which retreated from Charleston, and enjoyed his full confidence. It is perfectly obvious that had the campaigns as originally devised by the Confederate Generals on the one hand, and by Generals Grant and Sherman on the other, been carried out, by far the most bloody battle of the war would have been fought in the vicinity of Goldsboro', and that with the almost certain defeat and ruin of our army. Johnston was there with an army reinforced by Lee, and thereby rendered superior to Sherman's in infantry, artillery, and cavalry; and the

plan was, as we have been positively assured, for Lee with his entire army to join Johnston, leaving Richmond to its fate, if that should be deemed necessary. Furthermore, Johnston's army was perfectly fresh, fully organized, in the best spirits, and on ground well known to its commander; while the army of Sherman was wearied, and not a little demoralized, by its long and marauding march, and was upon a field of which its commander was wholly ignorant. It is perfectly obvious, also, that, in case of defeat, the utter ruin of Sherman's army was inevitable, because it would have been driven back into a region rendered by our advance devoid of the means of sustaining our army for a single week. The reader will perceive at once that the Confederate Generals had the best of reasons for the sanguine hopes which they entertained, until their expectations were blasted by the union of Schofield and Terry with Sherman at Goldsboro'. Justice also compels us to affirm that, while the plan of Sherman and Grant was most obviously presumptuous, that of the Confederate commanders was one of the most perfect known in history.

The originating cause of those dispositions of the national forces which broke up the plans of both the Union and Confederate commanders, and brought the war to its unexpected and bloodless termination.

The way is now prepared, and that fully, for a disclosure of the real origin of those dispositions of the national forces,—dispositions which so suddenly changed the course of events as they were progressing under the direction of the Union and Confederate commanders, and brought the war to its unlooked-for and bloodless termination. We shall disclose the facts as they actually occurred, although in so doing we may seem to be aiming at self-glorification. To all who would impute such a motive, our reply is, "Strike, but hear me." Truth has a right to be heard everywhere,—a right especially to supplant misleading error on the page of history. The following are the facts of the case under consideration. While the army of General Sherman was resting at Savannah, we carefully contemplated the situation, and felt appalled at the facts before us. The plan of Grant and

Sherman, on the one hand, and of Lee and Johnston, on the other, were each perfectly obvious. Sherman was to move out from Savannah with the intent of pushing Johnston back upon Lee. Then Grant was to move out from Petersburg, and push Lee back upon Johnston. Thus, as it was anticipated, the two Confederate armies would be crushed between the two masses which should at the same time be precipitated upon them. Such was the plan of our Generals. In accordance with the counter-plan of the Confederates, Lee, keeping sufficient forces to hold Grant in check, or moving with his entire army, if need be, was to reinforce Johnston until he should be far stronger than Sherman. When the latter should advance over the line of North Carolina, Johnston, with an overwhelming force, was to fall upon and annihilate him, and then unite with Lee against Grant. The plan of the Confederates we saw to be perfectly practicable, and of certain execution, should the movements contemplated by both parties be made, and be made as contemplated. The force under Sherman, as we know must have been the case, was well known to the Confederate commanders; and it was perfectly practicable for them to concentrate in his front a force so far superior to his as to render his defeat and capture inevitable. Yet our commanders were manifestly blind to the catastrophe before them. We accordingly, to prevent such a disaster, wrote a letter to Mr. Sumner, who was at his place in Washington, a letter containing the following statements:—

“ You have now got our army into the worst condition possible. Never were we in such peril of a great national disaster as at this present time. Our army, as you perceive, is divided into three parts, and these parts located on the angles of a great triangle, as Thomas at Nashville, Sherman at Savannah, and Grant at Petersburg, with the enemy in the centre, and ready to concentrate with crushing force upon the portion of our army which shall make the next move,—and that movement will be made by Sherman. He evidently is to move out from Savannah, capture Columbia, and then assail Johnston, with the intent of forcing him back upon Lee, and crushing them between our two armies. The counter-plan of the Con-

federate commanders is to allow Sherman to move, with very little opposition, through Columbia into North Carolina; and then, by a union of the armies of Johnston and Lee, to precipitate, suddenly and unexpectedly to us, an overwhelming force upon our insulated army, crush and annihilate it, and then turn back upon Grant. Such, you may rest assured, is the catastrophe before us if Sherman shall make the movement now contemplated.

"In existing circumstances there is one, and but *one* thing to be done. If that one thing shall be done, the war will be ended at once. If this one thing shall not be done, you may depend upon it that the greatest catastrophe that has yet occurred since the war commenced is immediately before us, and this to be followed by a long and bloody campaign."

What the movement hinted at was, we did not indicate at all, and that under the belief that it was best not to disclose this, unless it should be inquired for. There is one mistake in the extract above cited, the location of the army of General Thomas. Myself and the public were at the time ignorant of the fact that his army had moved from Nashville.

Mr. Sumner did with the above letter as we supposed he would do. He took it directly to the President, and after a consultation with him and the Secretary of War, who had now come to respect our judgment, wrote back, under instruction, a letter from which we take the following extract, namely: "We wish to know *immediately*, here in Washington, what the movement is which, in your judgment, ought to be made. We think that General Sherman has under his command more troops than you suppose. His army is between 50,000 and 60,000 strong. Please answer without delay."

The following is an extract from our reply:—

"General Sherman has the identical amount of force that I had supposed, as the basis of my calculations. But this force is by no means sufficient for the movement contemplated, because Johnston, reinforced as he may and will be by Lee, will command an army more numerous than this. Our army, on an unknown field,—wearied, as it will be, by its long march, and not a little disorganized by the manner

of that march,—will be in no condition to encounter an army superior in number, commanded by such a General as Johnston, and who is also perfectly acquainted with the country around him. Bear this in mind, that if Sherman shall make the movement under consideration, a great national disaster and a long and bloody campaign are before us.

“The measure that should be adopted under such circumstances is the following. The defeat and rout of General Hood has rendered it unnecessary that anything should for the present be done by the army of General Thomas in that department. Leave him, then, on the defensive, with no forces greater than are indispensable for present security, and bring all the remainder around, and unite them with the army of Sherman, thus making him invincible and all-powerful against any amount of force that the enemy can bring against him. With such forces under his command, let him come out, capture Columbia, and move upon Lee’s rear, and the war is at an end at once. If this is not done, the events which I have foreshadowed will inevitably occur. Now, Mr. Sumner, if you have any love to your country, go at once to the President, and say to him that *this must be done*. Press upon him also the consideration that there is no time to be lost.”

Such was the reply given to the request forwarded to us through Mr. Sumner. As soon as the reply was received, a consultation was had with the President, the Secretary of War, and how many others we were not specifically informed. As the result of that consultation, the resolution was adopted that the measure recommended should be carried out, and that General Grant should be directed to order the dispositions requisite to that end. That direction was complied with by the Commander-in-Chief,—the order directing General Schofield to report at Annapolis, Maryland, instead of Eastport, Mississippi, being forwarded as above stated. After we became aware that our advice had been complied with, and that General Schofield was on his way to reinforce General Sherman, we wrote to Mr. Sumner a letter from which I take the following extract: “I am of course ignorant of the amount of force which is being brought round, and this is the only consideration

about which I feel any concern, being absolutely assured that if this force is adequate to the end intended, the war will be ended in a very few weeks." The reply to this letter, the last communication we ever received from that venerable patriot and statesman, contained this sentence: "We are very glad, on account of the confidence we have in your judgment, to have you speak thus encouragingly of the prospects."

Results of the new movements occasioned by this correspondence.

The results of the movements occasioned by the above correspondence may be told in a few words. Sherman, as intended, moved out from Savannah, captured, and occasioned (by accident) the destruction by fire of Columbia, and advanced, almost without the show of resistance, into North Carolina as far as Goldsboro'. Schofield, on his arrival at Annapolis and Washington, was taken round by water to Wilmington, captured that city and its fortifications, and joining his forces with those of General Terry, who was holding Fort Fisher, moved up to Goldsboro', and there reinforced Sherman, rendering his army, as stated, nearly or quite 100,000 strong. Johnston, who was in the act of falling upon Sherman, and had captured two of his regiments when Schofield arrived, finding that by this arrival he (Johnston) had two armies to fight instead of one, and that he was utterly powerless in the presence of the overwhelming forces now combined against him, retreated without fighting a battle at all. General Lee now attempted to reinforce Johnston with the entire forces left under his (Lee's) command, and that in the vain hope of yet being able to crush Sherman, and then turn back upon Grant. In this attempt the Confederate commander was foiled by the timely advance of General Grant, on the one hand, and by the authorities at Richmond on the other. General Lee had ordered supplies from Danville, to meet him by cars at Amelia Court House. When he arrived with his army in a famishing condition at the place last designated, he found that the train had been ordered to Richmond to aid in conveying from thence the fugitives, and that, in obeying this order, the train had passed Amelia Court House without unloading. This calamity necessitated a

halt of two full days to collect provisions, and enabled our advance, under Sheridan, to interpose between the two Confederate armies, and render their junction impossible. The Confederate commanders perceiving clearly, such being the overpowering odds against them, that further resistance was vain, surrendered their respective armies,—Lee surrendering to Grant, and Johnston to Sherman; the conditions granted by Sherman to Johnston being reversed by our supreme authorities at Washington. As a final consequence, the surrender of these two main armies was immediately followed by that of all the other Confederate forces in all the States then in rebellion, and, as we affirmed it would be, provided the one movement referred to above was made, “the war was ended at once.”

CHAPTER XXXIV.

LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE STRATEGY WHICH BROUGHT THE WAR TO ITS UNEXPECTED SUDDEN, AND BLOODLESS TERMINATION.

THE immediate results of the strategy which brought Schofield round from Clifton to Goldsboro', were the prevention of a great and bloody battle, then imminent, and the sudden and bloodless termination of the war, by the immediate surrender of all the Confederate armies, and the submission of the States in rebellion to the national Government. The results which would have arisen had this movement on the part of General Schofield not been made, are obvious. The great battle referred to would, in that case, have been fought,—a battle in which, including losses on both sides, there would undeniably have been a slaughter of from 30,000 to 50,000 brave men. Had Sherman been victorious, the war would have been brought to an immediate close,—a close, however, attended with this fearful sacrifice of human life. Had Sherman been defeated, as in our judgment he unquestionably would have been, a long and bloody campaign would have followed, with the war protracted into the year 1866, and the addition of from \$300,000,000 to \$500,000,000 to our present national debt. The lessons taught by the strategy which prevented such evils, and brought about such results, are too important to be forgotten by the nation. Among these lessons, we specify the following :

*Wisdom of the strategy urged upon the national authorities
from the beginning of the war.*

We have, in the first place, an absolute verification of the wisdom of the strategy which we urged upon our naval

and military authorities from the beginning to the close of the war. We contended and urged from the first, that the Confederate ports should be attacked by adequate forces on the land as well as on the water sides. The nation exhausted its naval resources, and spent untold millions of treasure, in blockading those ports, and assaulting them exclusively on their water sides. The capture of Savannah by Sherman, of Wilmington by Schofield, and the abandonment of Charleston as soon as it was flanked by an adequate land force, demonstrate the practicability, as we maintained, of their early, easy, and cheap capture, had they been attacked on both sides instead of one and that their impregnable side.

We contended and urged, also, that General Lee, for example, should be assaulted, not as he always was,—to wit, merely in front, and in positions where he was impreguably fortified,—that he should be assaulted by adequate forces, which were always at command, both in front and on his flank or rear. Our nation spent four long years in continuous fighting, sacrificing thereby more than a quarter of a million of our citizen soldiers in fruitless and bloody assaults upon that small Confederate army, and that because it was always assaulted merely in front, and generally when behind impregnable fortifications. As soon as that army was approached as we contended it ever should have been,—that is, by adequate forces both in front and rear,—it surrendered without fighting a battle. During all these long years of reckless slaughter, that army was, and that most obviously, approachable in this the only effective form, and might have been captured, and the war brought to a termination, with very little bloodshed. Such wisdom, however, had no place in the stolid brains of our Commanders-in-Chief. Suppose that General Grant had sent the 60,000 men whom he so stupidly sacrificed in the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania, and Cold Harbour, down to General Butler, thus rendering the army of the latter quite 80,000 strong; that this army had been landed at Bermuda Hundred and then moved out upon Lee's communications south of James river; while Grant himself had moved directly upon the position of the Confederate army at Orange Court House. There is no person at all acquainted with the

history of military affairs who will doubt for a moment that Lee's army, Richmond, Virginia, and the Carolinas, would have been ours one year sooner than they were, and that in gaining all these ends we should not have lost 20,000 men, in the stead of the 150,000 which we did lose in Virginia during the year 1864. Had Sherman, with adequate forces, as he might have done, moved upon Johnston from Chattanooga and Decatur at the same time, instead of the 60,000 which we did lose, we should not have lost 15,000 men in the conquest of all the Confederate States between the Savannah and Mississippi rivers. The fundamental dispositions which occasioned the bloodless surrender of Lee and Johnston absolutely verify all these statements.

From the commencement of the war onward, we contended that it was attended with a fearful sacrifice of human life, and a corresponding expenditure of the national treasury,—a sacrifice and expenditure for which no excuse or apology could be offered but the blind ignorance and reckless obstinacy of our military authorities; and that at any time, by an obviously wise combination of the national forces, the war could, in a very few months, be brought to an almost bloodless termination. We finally succeeded in securing the identical combinations which we had all along urged upon our military authorities, and to secure which was the specific and exclusive object of our visit to Washington in January 1863. The result is before the nation and the world. Let it stand as a beacon of admonition and warning against past errors, and as a light for present and future generations, should the eclipse of peace ever again shed disastrous twilight over our country. There never was an important Confederate army that might not most readily have been placed between two of our armies, each of which was equal, or superior, to that of the enemy, just as the armies of Johnston and Lee were placed between those of Sherman and Grant, and so located that it could not escape the crushing folds in which it was involved. Any prudent General, when he finds himself thus involved, will surrender without the effusion of blood. We have often said, and now repeat before the world, that this war ought by no means to have continued one year after October 1st, 1861; that it ought not to have cost us

over 50,000 lives, nor to have burdened the nation with a debt amounting to over \$500,000,000. We now, in verification of such statements, confidently present the dispositions by which the war was brought to a close. Precisely similar dispositions, as we have already demonstrated, might have been made relatively to every important army which the Confederates ever brought into the field, and this without compelling one army to march a thousand miles, in one, and another to be conveyed, by rail and water, a much greater distance, in another direction.

False views of conducting the war.

Another lesson, taught by the facts before us, demands very special attention. We refer to the idea which generally obtained in respect to the *method* by which the war was to be brought to a termination. When General Grant, for example, took supreme command, it was well known, and was everywhere spoken of to his great credit, that "he despised strategy," that he held to but one method, falling directly upon the enemy wherever he might be found, and by precipitating upon him an overwhelming force, crush him outright, and all this without regard to the sacrifice of life and limb which such a blind method might involve. Hence it was that, under the impression that while one Confederate was killed at the loss of three or more on our part, the war was being wisely conducted, and on account of the immense odds on our side, was sure to terminate in our favour, "Peg away" was the word sent down to Grant, when it was well known that, as a little blind giant with a great club, he was recklessly wasting our army "at the rate of 10,000 a day," and inflicting only small loss upon the enemy. We can, and the enemy cannot, continue the conflict for ever, it was thought, even at this difference of rate of loss. As no other method was thought of, the ocean-current of blood was permitted to roll on, and would have desolated the nation, had not wiser counsels finally obtained a hearing. Now no idea can be more false and perilous to the interests of a great nation than that under consideration. None but a great strategist should ever be placed over a great army. A General with "a baswood brain," and the

spirit of bull-dog fight in him,—such a commander, at the head of vast armies, will hardly fail to prove himself “an abomination of desolation” to the armies he may command, and to the nation who has stupidly put its destiny in his hands. A vast army blindly conducted is one of the most helpless and readily defeated bodies ever set in motion. Who can estimate the disastrous results which Grant’s blind and reckless conduct of the war would have entailed upon our country had not that conduct been interrupted just at that eventful crisis of our history?

Advice given to President Lincoln, January 1863.

It was on account of the prevalence of this false idea, and in view of the disastrous consequences which had resulted, and were certain to continue to result, from the existing method of conducting the war, that in our visit to Washington, January 1863, we advised, and most earnestly urged, President Lincoln, in accordance with the example of Great Britain in view of the palpable failures of its various early expeditions in Spain and Portugal, to appoint a Military Commission, whose business it should be to inquire into the causes of past failures, to devise proper methods for the future, and, above all, to find a man who comprehended the causes referred to, and the true method for the future conduct of the war,—a man who fully understood the situation, and who could show how to put a stop to the reckless slaughter of our citizen soldiery, and how this desolating conflict might be brought to a speedy and comparatively bloodless termination. “Your generals,” we remarked, “are untried men, and know little or nothing of the science of war, and especially about vast campaigns, and the movements of great armies. The first duty you owe to your country, as its Chief Magistrate, is to inquire, at least, for such a man; and when he is found, if Providence shall present one, place your armies under his control. The Military Commission in England found Wellington, secured his appointment to supreme command, and thus ensured the ruin of the cause of France in the Peninsula. Your Commission may, and probably will, furnish you a man of similar capacities. In such a case, this war will be brought to a speedy termination, and that

with very little further effusion of blood." Such advice failed with our Executive and his advisers, and hence the desolation continued, until the cry of our country was like the wail of Egypt, because "there was not a house where there was not one dead." Let such facts stand as a beacon of warning and admonition to future generations.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.

It does not comport with the plan of this treatise to trace the progress of events which followed the surrender of the Confederate armies, and the dissolution of the Confederacy itself, nor to detail that tragic event which deprived us of our venerated President, just after, by an overwhelming majority, he was elected and inaugurated a second time to the office of President of these United States. The end I have aimed at will have been attained, provided the war itself, and those who, for the most part, misconducted it, shall be understood, and the people who, notwithstanding such unheard-of misconduct, so "patiently endured to the end," shall better understand themselves, and better comprehend their duty to themselves and to their country.

Taking all the facts of that war into account, two deductions are undeniable, namely, that no people ever won for themselves higher claims for real self-respect, and for the deep esteem of the world, than did the people of these United States during that terrible conflict, and that no people can have less occasion to glorify, and raise to the highest offices in their gift, the chief leaders of our great armies, and the noisy politicians who controlled our national affairs during that memorable period. Think of a people who uncomplainingly furnished for that war upwards of 2,600,000 men, enduring, in a single year, a conscription of 1,500,000 of its citizens! Think of the uncomplaining patience with which that people endured, not only such calls for the army, but the weight of taxation suddenly heaped up, "Pelion upon Parnassus," upon their shoulders, and the rivers of blood perpetually flowing out from the hearts of their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers! Think of the sacrifices, *voluntarily* endured,

during that war, by families at home, while their fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers were in the field marching, fighting, or suffering and dying in hospitals from wounds or sickness, our entire families all unitedly labouring to provide comforts for the sufferers in the army! Then think of the unselfishness with which that people, on the return of peace, themselves having endured all the hardships of the war, and receiving none of its emoluments, honoured with their highest civil gifts the men who had led—may I not more properly say misled, and recklessly slaughtered our soldiers? Our people, being an unmilitary people, naturally fell into the illusion that the individuals who happened to be at the head of our armies at the time when the war terminated, must have brought to us the blessings of peace, by their superlative military wisdom, and hence deserved the highest civil emoluments in the gift of a free people.

The most important fact to the honour of this people yet remains to be adduced. I refer to the sentiments of those who suffered most, in respect to the sacrifices at which peace and national unity were procured, on the one hand, and in regard to the people of the Confederate States, on the other. I never yet met with an individual who had lost a father, husband, son, or brother, in that war, who expressed regret that the sacrifices by which those blessings were procured were made, or a sentiment of bitterness towards the people who, by the rebellion, had occasioned those sacrifices. Much has been said and done since the war to perpetuate in the Northern heart the sentiment of bitterness towards the people of the former Confederacy. An appeal to that sentiment was one of the leading influences employed in the last Presidential election. *Politicians* wielded that weapon—politicians who had enriched themselves by the war, and sought by such savage means to secure for themselves the emoluments of peace. In one speech, for example, this utterance was found: "This we hear said,—‘Let us shake hands over the bloody chasm made by the war.’ I protest against such a sentiment." The author of that utterance had, it was said, made an immense fortune out of the war, and was then "coveting earnestly" a residence of at least four

years' continuance in the White House. One of the "pictorials" which was during that canvass spread all over the Northern States, was of this kind. In the centre was represented the field of Andersonville, with its real and imagined horrors. On one side of the field stood Horace Greeley, and on the other Jefferson Davis. The former, extending his hand to the latter, says, "Let us shake hands over the bloody chasm made by this war." It is with much gratification that I am able to record the fact that the author of that representation was not an American, and knew not the heart of an American. Permit me here to allude to my own case, and I claim no special merit in what I am about to utter. In that war, as I have stated, my only son, after painfully suffering for more than six months, died of injuries received in the battle of Fredericksburg. The wife of my youth, the mother of all my children, from no other cause than over-fatigue around that bed of pain and death, returned home with me to die. A blooming daughter, on account of the shock received by the death of her brother and mother, drooped in spirit, and, despite all our efforts to save her, "dropped into the lap of God." Another daughter, through excessive labours in the service of the Sanitary Commission, brought on a lingering disease of which she afterwards died. In the Army of the Potomac, a noble youth, the only living child of my only own sister, lost his life, and so did one of two sons of the only sister of my first wife. Such were my bereavements from this war. And here let me say, that were the remains of all these lying side by side, in the centre of the field referred to, standing at one end of that line, that would be a sacred spot to me, the spot which, of all others, I would select, from whence to extend my hand over my dead, and grasp that of any individual, whatever the past may have been, who *now* bears in his bosom a genuine American heart. And this I well know to be the common sentiment of my fellow-citizens who have been bereaved, as I have been, by this war. For one, I would as soon give my vote for Benedict Arnold, were he now living, as I would for any man who shall hereafter attempt by means of these bloody and vengeful remembrances to influence our elections.

Such are some of the reasons which the facts of this war present to the people of this nation for self-respect, and for the high regard of the world. How far they find reasons from such facts, to seek out, or to have sought out, among the leaders of our great armies, the past or the future rulers of this great Republic, may be gathered from the preceding pages of this history. I rejoice in being able to record the fact that the appalling evils which have arisen from the direction which "hero-worship" took after the close of the war, begin to be appreciated. Years ago, after we had, as the then avowed choice of two evils, helped by our influence and vote to elevate the present Chief Magistrate to the highest office in the gift of a free people, and after the results of that election began to appear, we wrote a letter to Mr. Sumner, containing these statements, namely: "The national mind is being dwarfed by the worship of small men. We can have no reasonable hope that our countrymen will become, and be known to the world as, "a wise and understanding people," and as morally virtuous as they are wise, while national thought and regard revolve around small specimens of human nature—small minds especially in whose character corruption is added to littleness. As events are progressing, after the few relics of the past shall have disappeared, relics which now stand as vanishing towers amid the desert of true greatness around them, real wisdom will have no place in our Cabinets, and little but the babble of small voices will be heard in our halls of legislation. Under such circumstances, our mothers, instead of giving birth to "pillars of state," will give us a posterity "after the image and likeness" of what passes before their minds as the highest forms of true wisdom and greatness. What can be done to give back to our nation the real idea of what greatness and excellence are? The nation elected our Chief Magistrate to his high office under the illusion that he was not only our Washington, but "our Cæsar come again." Hence all the offensive protuberances which have appeared upon his character and administration, seen as all have been through the imagined halo of military renown and national deliverances, have appeared as superlative excellences, or, at the worst, as mere specks on

the face of "the excess of glory." Revivals of religion which prevailed, many years ago, in the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, were attended with peculiar forms of physical convulsions called "the jerks." A certain old lady denounced the jerks, in all their forms, as from the devil. Her standing argument for her belief was the fact that her favourite minister, Dr. —, never had the jerks; and if they were from heaven, such a godly man as he would certainly have them. At length Dr. — had the jerks, and his were, in every respect, like other people's. "What do you think now, madam?" asked a neighbour. "Dr. — has the jerks." "Well," replied the prudent matron, "I like such jerks as Dr. — has. They are from God. But common jerks I don't believe in at all. They are all from the devil." "How can wisdom enter into the heart and knowledge be pleasant unto the soul" of such a mind as that? Just as readily as "wisdom and knowledge can become the stability of our times," as long as such jerks as are continually appearing in the most conspicuous character that lifts its form before the national mind, are held up before the rising generation as forms of beauty, grace, and perfection. Take a single example in illustration of what has appeared generally among the eulogists of this individual. In a communication addressed to the President, one of his leading magnifiers, Mr. Welsh of Philadelphia, says: "Every suggestion I ever made to you was promptly responded to, save only the investigation of frauds allowed by your appointees." Here is an admitted crime of the most atrocious character. Every wise and righteous ruler holds, of all others, his own appointees to the strictest account. How does this monstrosity appear when viewed as an undeniable characteristic of the administration of our President? "Even this lamentable trait, I believe," adds the blind eulogiser, "springs from a distorted virtue." Yes, Mr. Welsh, *et id omne genus*, "you like such jerks as your President has." They cannot, in your regard, be anything worse or anything else than "distorted virtues." "Common jerks," the same as those appearing in any other individual, "you don't like at all. They are all from the devil." My countrymen! has not this debasing folly gone far enough? Does not self-

respect, and a regard for the best interests of posterity, require of us that henceforth character and deeds, as they lift their forms before us, shall be seen and appreciated as they are in themselves; that real excellences, wherever, and in whomsoever, they appear, shall receive our high approval, while deformities and corruptions shall bear their real names? Bear this in mind, that in present and future elections the main issue to be settled is, and will be, not whether this or that party shall have the majority, but whether stupidity and corruption, or wisdom and integrity, shall control our state and national legislation. There are in all the parties which divide our nation men of wisdom and integrity in sufficient numbers to fill all the offices in your gift. In the hands of such men, to whatever party they may happen to belong, our country's honour and interests are safe. When any party asks for your suffrages, look directly at their candidates. Ask yourselves the question whether they are men whom you do and ought to esteem for their wisdom and integrity, and whether you can point them out to your children as "pillars of state." When such men are presented, honour them with your votes. If, on the other hand, you are asked to "say to the bramble, Rule thou over us," repudiate their candidate as an insult to your knowledge, manhood, and patriotism.

THE END.

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
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